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Abstract 
	
The US-Israel relationship reached a critical, institutionalizing juncture during the 1980s. Measurable in 
qualitative and quantitative terms, the Reagan administration had a transformative impact on bilateral ties, 
institutionalizing ad hoc forms of cooperation while modifying prevailing discourse to recognize Israel as 
an ‘ally’ and a ‘strategic asset’ in the Cold War. New bureaucratic agreements were signed, bilateral 
working groups formed and joint military exercises held throughout a decade that capped a long 
familiarization process between societies and political elites in the two countries. By the end of the 1980s, 
many of the bureaucratic frameworks that today still govern the US-Israeli relationship were 
institutionalized, as were those elements of preferential treatment commonly cited as proof for the 
‘special’ or ‘unique’ nature of US-Israel ties.  
 	
This study focusses on the institutional and bureaucratic dimensions of US support for Israel, examining the 
changing rationalizations for this support and the way this relates to the salient theme of a mutual struggle 
for influence and leverage over the policies of the other. Drawing on recently declassified documents, 
complimented with high-level interviews and other materials, the research answers three interrelated 
questions as to ‘why’ this institutionalization process was carried out, ‘how’ it would materialize and ‘what 
effects’ these processes would have on future US policy towards Israel and the Middle East.  
 
While predicated on an effort to enhance US leverage over Israel, the study argues that the 
institutionalization of the relationship would formalize interdependence between the two countries, 
consolidating a ‘policy straitjacket’ that has constrained presidential freedom of action towards both Israel 
and the broader Middle East. This has furthered the US’s ‘entrapment’ in a quasi-exclusivist relationship 
with Israel that has enhanced a process of ‘Israelization’ of US approaches and viewpoints on Middle 
East developments, harming US influence while transforming the US into an active participant and major 
obstacle to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the broader stabilization of the Middle East. 	
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Introduction 
 
The 1980s and the Reagan administration are commonly described as a ‘golden age’ for US-Israel 
relations. Reagan noted in his diary that Israel ‘never had a better friend’1 in the White House, and Moshe 
Arens, Israeli ambassador to the US and later defence minister in the right-wing Likud government at the 
time, agrees, remembering the 1980s as an ‘extended honeymoon’, 2  a decade when the US-Israel 
relationship reached a level of ‘friendship and alliance unprecedented in previous years’.3 Writing on the 
eve of Reagan’s death in 2004, Arens recalled how the president’s two secretaries of state were the ‘first to 
change’ the ‘traditional attitude’ towards Israel in the US State Department, adding that ‘when it comes to 
friendship for Israel, all occupants of the White House can be measured by the standard’ Reagan set.4 
 
Beyond the pleasantries conveyed by such statements, one might be puzzled to find that the 1980s were 
marked by severe, even unprecedented, tensions between the United States and Israel. Crises ranged from 
Israel’s staunch opposition to the sale of US weaponry to ‘moderate’ Arab states, Israel’s bombing of the 
Iraqi nuclear reactor and PLO headquarters in Beirut, the annexation of the occupied Golan Heights, the 
1982 invasion of Lebanon and the 1985 arrest of Jonathan Pollard, to name but a few. While such events 
could be expected to severely test and even damage the US-Israel relationship, not least by calling into 
question the increasingly public portrayals of Israel as a ‘strategic asset’ and ‘loyal ally’ of the United 
States, disagreements were quickly overcome and the overall trend remained characterized by a profound 
institutionalization of the relationship and a growing interdependence between the national security policies 
of the two countries. 
 
By the end of the 1980s, many of the institutional frameworks that today still govern US-Israel ties were 
institutionalized in the US bureaucracy, as were those elements of preferential treatment that are 
commonly cited as proof for the ‘special’ or ‘unique’ nature of the US-Israel relationship. Adding to the 
twin pillars of shared Judeo-Christian values and political affinities that had defined US support for Israel 
since 1948, a third and most controversial pillar would be formally added to the relationship during the 
1980s: that of ‘strategic cooperation’. This would represent the climax of a long, incremental process of 
institutional development that began in the late 1950s, was further augmented by a series of key bilateral 
agreements signed throughout the 1960s and 1970s, leading finally to the normalization of relations and 
their formalization during the second Reagan term in the mid-to-late 1980s (see Appendix A-F).  
 
An unprecedented number of 31 bilateral agreements were concluded during Reagan’s tenure, covering 
everything from cooperation in research and development to emergency medical assistance, anti-terror 																																																								
1 Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, New York, Harper Collins, 2007, p.14. 
2 Moshe Arnes, Broken Covenant. American Foreign Policy and the Crisis Between the US and Israel, Simon & Schuster Ltd., 1995, p.25. 
3 Moshe Arnes, “A True Friend,” Ha’aretz, 22 June 2004, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/a-true-friend-
1.125913. 
4 Ibid. 
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training, pre-positioning of US military hardware in Israel and periodical military exercises. 5  The 
relationship was also deepened by the conclusion of the US’s first bilateral free trade agreement, Israel’s 
inclusion in Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and the recognition of Israel as a ‘major non-
NATO ally’ of the United States. Beyond the flourishing of economic, military and intelligence ties, the 
1980s also inaugurated a significant deepening of societal bonds, whether in the form of private business 
ventures, military-to-military cooperation, or official or non-official state visits that were to increasingly 
add a separate, more informal, dimension to the relationship.6 
 
Most importantly, in late 1983, the Reagan administration created a Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) 
tasked with strategic planning and coordination between the respective foreign and defence ministries of 
the two countries. This was followed by the launching of a Joint Security Assistance Planning Group 
(JSAP), where aid and military supplies were discussed, a Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG), 
where policies aimed at strengthening Israel’s economy were coordinated, and finally, by 1988, the 
launching of Joint Political Consultations (JPC).  
 
The long-term significance of these groupings rested in their ability to extend US-Israel cooperation 
beyond the current administration or personalities occupying the White House. By involving the 
respective bureaucracies in these discussions, the US-Israel relationship would be better shielded from the 
top-level political crises that have been a constant feature of the relationship. Staffed by professional 
bureaucrats drawn from the Treasury, State and Defence departments—as well as the National Security 
Council (NSC)—such working groups also served to ‘sensitize’ these American bureaucracies to the 
potential benefits the US could draw from establishing closer ties with Israel as elements of cooperation 
were effectively diffused and compartmentalized within the US’s foreign policy bureaucracy.  
 
This would diminish the traditional scepticism towards overt cooperation with Israel present within these 
branches of government by creating new constituencies within them, particularly among the various 
branches of the US armed forces, which actively campaigned for increased cooperation with Israel. Such 
bilateral groupings also served as important channels for the creation of personal and professional 
contacts between staffers and mid-level officials in both countries. These would serve as avenues for 
increased understanding and cooperation on various dimensions of the US-Israel relationship, as well as 
forums to pre-empt and defuse the numerous political crises that have periodically arisen between the 
respective governments of Israel and the United States.  
 
																																																								
5 For a (non-exhaustive) list of formal US-Israel agreements from 1950 to the present see, “US-Israel Relations: Formal US-Israel 
Bilateral Agreements Index,” Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/MOUs.html. 
6 The first official visit by the Chairman by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff took place in 1984, followed shortly thereafter by the 
commander of the US Marine Corps. Israel’s port of Haifa also became a major docking area for the US’s Sixth Fleet. See, Yossi 
Melman and Daniel Raviv, Friends in Deed: Inside the US-Israeli Alliance, New York, Hyperion, 1994, p.243-50. 
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The Reagan period would therefore lead to the development of new bureaucratic frameworks, negotiating 
modalities and rationalizing principles applied to US-Israel relations. By the end of Reagan’s tenure the 
relationship was thus formalized to new extents, with strategic rationales emerging at the forefront of the 
debate surrounding US support for Israel. As noted by Steven Spiegel, ‘in the mid-1980s, […] there was 
the beginning of the institutional process. A number of people in the American bureaucracy became 
involved with this program and liked what they saw, so that in a very quiet way strategic cooperation did 
become institutionalized’7 during the latter half of the 1980s. 
 
Against the backdrop of a renewed heightening of East-West tensions and animosities associated with the 
‘Second Cold War’ (1979-89), the key strategic priority of the Reagan administration during the 1980s 
revolved on drawing closer to both Israel and Saudi Arabia, seeking to transform these countries into the 
‘twin pillars’ of US military strategy in the region and the first line of defence against the Soviet Union, its 
regional ‘proxies’ and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
Such efforts would not come easy and indeed represented a rehashing of the traditional challenge that 
had long plagued US Middle East policy: that of reconciling the ‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ dimensions of US 
policy into a single and mutually reinforcing plane. In this context, US efforts had traditionally focussed 
on Arab-Israeli diplomacy, identifying the festering conflict as a major impediment to these efforts to 
reconcile the US’s set of partnerships in the region as well as a significant structural constraint to more 
overt forms of US-Israeli cooperation and alliance. Moreover, both sets of partners in the region had long 
sought to co-opt US policy to serve their own narrow interests, adding a further dimension of complexity 
to US efforts. As candidly noted by Nicholas Veliotes in an interview with the author, ‘each new 
president had to learn two things when dealing with the Middle East. The first is that Israeli right wing 
governments would screw you and the second that the Saudis would disappoint you’.8 
 
As the Reagan administration juggled these competing interests and partnerships in the Middle East, it 
gradually moved to overturn previous approaches and conceptualizations of US policy towards both sets 
of partners in the region. While downplaying the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a means to 
reconcile the two strands of policy, it would approach the region as divided into separate zones—the 
Near East and the Persian Gulf. This served a precise objective, that of diminishing tensions between US-
Israeli and US-Saudi relations, thereby ostensibly freeing the US to draw closer to both without damaging 
its interests in either of the two central zones of the Middle East. 
 
																																																								
7 Steven Spiegel, “US-Israeli Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, Vol. 97, Jerusalem Centre for Public 
Affairs (JCPA), 1 January 1990, p.7, http://www.bjpa.org/Publications/downloadFile.cfm?FileID=2310 [emphasis added]. 
8 Author interview, Nicholas Veliotes, Washington DC, September 2015. Veliotes served as US Ambassador to Jordan (1978-81), 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (1981-84) and US Ambassador to Egypt (1984-86). 
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It is in this context of efforts to enhance US strategic cooperation with both sets of partners that the key 
institutionalizing juncture for the US-Israel relationship should be framed. Israel, therefore, represented 
one component of a much broader US strategy for the region, one that would however reap the greatest 
benefits of this American ‘second coming’ to the region, essentially succeeding to ‘entrap’ the US in an 
increasingly one-sided, or exclusivist relationship with Israel in the Middle East.  
 
Israel was thus formally integrated into the US’s global security strategy, becoming an overt component in 
US deterrence posture in the Middle East, a complementary ‘asset’ for US-NATO contingencies in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and a key covert ally in advancing US interests in the Third World. As noted by 
William Quandt, by the end of Reagan’s presidency ‘the entire relationship was given a strategic rationale 
that had previously been missing, or had at least been less central’9 under preceding administrations. 
 
In light of these dynamics, Moshe Arens’s description of US-Israel ties during the 1980s should come as 
no surprise. Such views were shared by other high-level officials at the time. In September 1981, Israeli 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin spoke of the Reagan administration’s interest in concluding a strategic 
cooperation agreement as signalling a ‘third stage’10 in US-Israel relations. In the wake of the 1987 
recognition of Israel as a major non-NATO ally, his successor, Yitzhak Shamir, would proudly announce 
to the media that ‘for the first time, Israel is formally considered an ally’11 by the United States 
government. 
 
Research Questions and Contribution 
 
The overarching objective of this research is to delve deeper into this institutionalizing juncture for the 
US-Israel relationship and examine what set of motivating drivers can best account for this push to 
formalize the relationship under Reagan. More precisely, the thesis will answer three interrelated 
questions pertaining to this institutionalizing juncture, highlighting the continued importance of this 
period and its key relevance to the fundamental themes of leverage, influence and interdependence in the US-
Israel relationship. The three questions relate to: 
 
• ‘The Why’: Why did this institutionalization process occur during the 1980s, what motivating 
drivers can account for this shifting conceptualization of Israel’s role and value for US policy and 
why did the US’s traditional reluctance to overtly embrace Israel as an ally change under Reagan? 
What mixture of strategic, ideational and political pressures can best account for this shift? 
 
• ‘The How’: How was this institutionalization process carried out, what were its major qualitative 
and quantitative components and how did these processes differ from previous US approaches 
towards Israel and the Middle East? 																																																								
9 William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, Washington & Berkeley, Brookings 
Institution Press, 2001, p.289. 
10 Paul L. Montgomery, “Begin Proclaims a New US-Israeli Era,” New York Times [NYT], 15 September 1981, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/09/15/world/begin-proclaims-a-new-us-israeli-era.html. 
11 Dan Fisher, “US Granting Israel Non-NATO Ally Status,” Los Angeles Times [LAT], 16 February 1987, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1987-02-16/news/mn-2391_1_egypt-non-nato-ally. 
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• ‘What Effect’: What effect would this institutionalization have on future US policy towards Israel 
and the Middle East, and to what extent were the original hopes and expectations matched by the 
outcome of these processes? What elements of path dependency can be traced back to this 
period, and in what ways does this juncture help to explain a number of key themes often 
associated with the ‘special’ US-Israel relationship? 
 
Drawing on recently declassified documents from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (RRPL) and 
other collections in the United States and UK, combined with high-level interviews with Reagan era 
officials,12 archival news articles, oral histories and other secondary source materials, the study will set out 
to unpack and problematize this institutionalization of the relationship under Reagan. Based on the above 
questions the research will provide a mixture of empirical and analytical contributions to the study of US 
Middle East policy and US-Israel ties while engaging with a number of themes and debates that have 
often been associated with the ‘special’ relationship. 
 
These range from understanding why there appears to be an inverse relationship between growing Israeli 
dependence on the US and decreasing US leverage over Israel; to engaging with the so-called ‘asset/burden’ 
debate on Israel which has accompanied US-Israel relations throughout the Cold War and beyond. The 
notion that Israel represents a ‘strategic asset’ for US policy has developed into one of the fundamental 
drivers to justify mounting US aid and support. Significantly, with the end of the Cold War and the 
retrenchment of the Soviet threat, new strategic conceptualizations would be developed. Terrorism and 
Iran would serve these purposes—and indeed the political, legal and conceptual foundations of US policy 
on terrorism, including pre-emptive strikes and a growing reliance on Israeli intelligence, would first begin 
to emerge during the Reagan administration.13 
 
Understanding the nature of these strategic justifications, and the extent to which these would survive 
repeated changes to the strategic environment in the Middle East, provides many insights into the 
evolution of the bilateral relationship. It is in this context that the ‘asset/burden’ debate has been 
identified by so many scholars as holding important insight for the articulation of US policy towards 
Israel.14 The fact that these conceptualizations stemmed more from short-term expediency and domestic 
political calculations than a concrete appreciation of Israel’s tangible contributions to key strategic 
interests stands out as a highly important dynamic in US-Israel relations. 
 
Through an examination of these themes the research will engage with a number of other ‘principles’ or 
‘slogans’ often associated with US support for Israel. From the ‘tail wagging the dog’ scenario to the ‘no-																																																								
12 Interviews were conducted in September 2015 in Washington DC, New York and Boston. Interviewed experts include: 
Richard W. Murphy, Nicholas Veliotes, Dennis Ross, Geoffrey Kemp, Daniel C. Kurtzer and Thomas Pickering. Exploratory 
meetings and discussions were also held with: Stephen M. Walt, Noam Chomsky and Rashid Khalidi.  
13 Mattia Toaldo, The Origins of the US War on Terror, Lebanon, Libya and American intervention in the Middle East, New York, 
Routledge, 2012. 
14 Camille Mansour Beyond Alliance: Israel and US Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 1994; John J. Mearshimer 
and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, New York and London, Penguin Books, 2008. 
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daylight’ principle, the ‘linkage doctrine’ or support for Israel ‘right or wrong’, these rhetorical labels are 
valuable to engage with the prevailing literature, discourses and controversies that are often associated 
with US-Israel relations. Engaging and problematizing these labels will help to explain the incremental 
trajectory of the relationship while clarifying the complex interactions between domestic and systemic 
pressures in the development of US policy towards Israel and the broader Middle East 
 
One could not write a thesis on the US-Israel relationship without acknowledging the powerful influence 
of pro-Israel lobby groups in the United States. The study will address this theme, arguing that the key 
institutional juncture for the US-Israel relationship during the 1980s would help lay—and 
institutionalize—both the conceptual and institutional groundwork for this expanding relevance of strategic 
justifications for US aid and support for Israel. It would be on the basis of these precedents that the 
influence and access of pro-Israel lobby groups in the US would grow and expand during the 1980s15 and 
indeed it is no coincidence that the growing influence of such groups closely matches the gradual 
development and institutionalization of the third pillar in US-Israel relations: that of ‘strategic 
cooperation’. 
 
While no doubt influential, the Israel lobby cannot be identified as a key impetus for the development of 
US-Israel relations or the growing overt US bias towards Israel. It rather represents something akin to an 
‘enforcement mechanism’ that, particularly in the post-Cold War era, has constrained US policy options 
while ensuring that successive administrations abide by certain precedents governing US support that 
have become institutionalized in the US foreign policy bureaucracy. It is for this reason that mapping the 
changing conceptualizations of US support for Israel and the underlying rationalizations for this aid and 
assistance is so important to explain the development of US policy towards Israel and, almost by 
extension, the broader Middle East as well. 
 
In examining the key significance of the 1980s for the institutional history of the US-Israel relationship, 
the study will be of interest to a wide and diverse readership. Fundamentally, it will argue that a key by-
product of this juncture would be to further the development of an institutional and bureaucratic 
straitjacket constraining presidential freedom of action to develop policy while essentially ‘entrapping’ the 
US in a circular game of inducements and compensation for Israel each time it sought to develop a new 
policy action for the region. This would in turn draw the US closer to Israel’s long-term goal of 
establishing a quasi-exclusivist relationship with the US in the Middle East, one capable of preserving the 
unique nature of US preferential treatment for Israel while elevating Israeli interests and concerns to front 
and centre of US Middle East policy. 
 
																																																								
15 Michael Thomas, American Policy Towards Israel. The Power and Limits of Beliefs, London, Routledge/LSE International Studies, 
2007. 
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In this respect, the research will engage with a final debate that can also be traced back to the 1980s and 
the Reagan administration. Aside from a growing interdependence between the US and Israel, the study will 
also address the theme of a gradual ‘Americanziation’ of Israeli state-society relations as compared to a 
parallel process of ‘Israelization’ of US perceptions and approaches to Middle East developments. These 
dynamics have become increasingly prominent in certain debates in the post-Cold War era and, more so, 
since 9/11 and the beginnings of the ‘US war on terror’.16 
 
Herein lies the paradox addressed by this study, and which is indeed also applicable to the broader history 
of US-Israel relations: US efforts to increase leverage over Israeli policy, or to mould it through a 
combination of inducements, soft persuasion and a slow, largely covert effort to ‘Americanize’ Israel’s 
policies and behaviour, have actually had the opposite effect. 
 
Rather than limit (or satisfy) domestic constraints on policy, the formalization of the relationship under 
Reagan and the emergence of overt forms of cooperation and interdependence in the economic, military 
and political domains, would increase the weight of domestic constraints. Indeed, while Israel’s 
dependence on the US was solidified and institutionalized through long-term military aid and new 
bureaucratic and institutional agreements, it was Israeli leverage, not that of the US, that appeared to be 
enhanced, as US policy became increasingly reliant on this Israeli pillar. 
 
The normalization of ties and the lack of conditionality or clear enforcement mechanisms that link Israeli 
behaviour to US aid and support would therefore increase interdependence between the two countries, 
gradually making US Middle East policy reliant on Israeli approval and backing. This has contributed to a 
scenario in which the US’s own perceptions and priorities in the region have gradually become coloured 
by Israel’s interpretations of regional developments, a dynamic that has considerably hampered US 
Middle East policy while significantly undermining its professed role as a mediator between Israel and the 
Arabs. 
 
Indeed, rather than creating a scenario in which Israeli policy and perceptions would become 
‘Americanized’, the formalization of the relationship would set the stage for what appeared to be an 
increased ‘Israelization’ of US policy in the Middle East. Meanwhile, beyond highly specific policies or 
negotiating circumstances, the US’s embrace of a strategy based mainly on inducements and soft 
persuasion has not increased US leverage and influence over Israeli behaviour. 
 
This growing interdependence between US and Israel and the related reluctance to link US aid to Israeli 
policy also contributed to a sense of impunity and hubris on the side of Israeli politicians during the 																																																								
16 See for instance, Special Issue of Journal of Israel Studies, “The Americanization of Israel,” Vol.5, No.1 (Spring 2000), pp.1-
372; The author is indebted to Marwan Bishara for an insightful discussion on this theme in Bologna, Italy in April 2017. Also 
see, Marwan Bishara, Embedded: Israel, America, and the War on Terror, New York, Nation Books, 2004. 
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1980s, given that US backing was increasingly taken for granted. This would further complicate US 
strategic objectives in the region, while demonstrating the catch-22 affecting US policy and leverage 
towards Israel. As aptly noted by Henry Kissinger in one 1975 meeting where US aid to Israel was 
discussed: ‘If you don’t give them arms, you weaken an ally; if you give them arms, they get total 
freedom’.17 
 
Against this backdrop, many within the Reagan administration approached the question of US-Israel ties 
from a different angle, overturning previous assumptions on the central importance of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and discarding the common belief in the prominent linkages between the US’s two strategic 
zones in the region. 
 
In conceptual terms, the significance of the Reagan period can be framed by the emergence of a discourse 
and rationalizing principles that boil down to a belief that an overtly pro-Israel policy in the Middle East 
was equivalent to a pro-US policy. Increasingly public demonstrations of the US’s unwavering support for 
Israel should be welcomed as a means of restoring US resolve in the region. This would foreshadow the 
gradual emergence of a contemporary slogan characterizing US support for Israel ‘right or wrong’, a 
slogan that has increasingly been applied to US policy towards Israel in the post-Cold War era. Yet, the 
origins and conceptual foundations of this approach—like the ‘no-daylight’ and ‘no surprises’ 
principles—can be traced back to the Reagan administration and the formalization of the ‘special’ US-
Israel relationship. 
 
In a nutshell, these principles all stemmed from a belief that the best means to increase US leverage over 
Israel while limiting the political costs of disagreeing with its leadership in public, was by ‘hugging it 
closer’, displaying an outward image of alliance and an ironclad support for Israeli security and military 
superiority as the foundation of US-Israel relations in all spheres, not as a potential lever or ‘quid pro quo’ 
in exchange for tangible Israeli concessions or commitments.18 
 
Any hint of overt linkage between US aid and tangible Israeli concessions, argued the supporters of the 
institutionalization process, would be counterproductive. It would signal to Israel that US support was 
not ‘sincere’ but rather a tactical investment aimed at extending US influence over the Arab world. This 
would deepen Israeli fears that its interests would someday be sacrificed by the US in order to attract the 
																																																								
17 Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], Volume XXVI (1974-1976), Document 159. 
18 A leaked 2010 email by Martin Indyk containing recommendations on how to deal with the intransigence of Israeli leader 
Benjamin Netanyahu included a variant of the ‘hugging Israel closer’ theme, with Indyk counselling the Obama administration to 
‘put your arm around Bibi [Netanyahu] […] to nudge him forward’; the US needed to ‘try to make him understand that his 
negotiating tactics are counterproductive to his own purposes’. ‘If all else fails, avoid recriminations […] you should avoid finger-
pointing in favour of a repeated commitment to a negotiated solution and a willingness to engage with both sides in trying to 
make this happen, when they’re ready’. UNCLASSIFIED, US Department of State, Case No.F-2015-06322, Doc No. 
C06065660, Date: 02/24/2017, available online at https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/Litigation_Feb2017/F-
2015-06322/DOC_0C06065660/C06065660.pdf. The author is indebted to Amb. Daniel Kurtzer for highlighting this dimension 
in an interview with the author. 
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numerically superior and energy-rich Arab states into the US orbit, in turn strengthening Israel’s 
propensity for unilateral military action and more general reticence to follow the US lead in the region. 
 
Conversely, according to this emerging constituency of US experts and practitioners, any use of negative 
conditionality, sanctions or coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Israel in an effort to extract concessions or 
modify a given Israeli policy would actually be damaging to US interests. Israel would be unlikely to give 
in to pressure; US leverage and influence would decline or be proven inefficient, and those Arab states 
still at war with Israel could be expected to increase their demands in light of the appearance of a ‘crisis’ 
or ‘weakening’ in the US-Israel relationship 
 
Yet, by effectively granting Israel exuberant amounts of aid and military support with little or no strings 
attached and transforming US support into what amounts to a de facto alliance framework without any 
formal and binding exchange of assurances, Reagan and his team of advisors have undermined an 
important lever that could have been used as a means to incentivize Israel to modify policies the US has 
long opposed. Indeed, with Israel already benefitting from elements of preferential treatment that are not 
even supplied to NATO countries, and US aid and support growing annually independently from Israeli 
actions or behaviour, the question must be asked what real incentives Israel has to modify its policy and 
entertain concessions needed for peace. 
 
In terms of pronouncements by Reagan officials, there is little doubt that strategic rationales were 
elevated to the forefront of the public debate on US support for Israel during the 1980s. Internal 
documents from the administration demonstrate the extent to which US officials were divided on 
endorsing Israel as a strategic asset. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger was entirely opposed to the 
notion, arguing—as many had done before—that such overt forms of cooperation would endanger US-
Arab relations and that Israel’s capabilities to contribute to America’s strategic priorities in the region 
were actually quite limited. This was not a new phenomenon—indeed, in 1976 the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Gen. George S. Brown, expressed in an interview with an Israeli journalist that he 
considered Israel ‘a burden’ rather than an asset for US military planners.19 
 
A close examination of these competing views will provide important insight into the underlying motives 
that led to this institutionalizing juncture as well as a better understanding of the benefits—both strategic 
and political—that US officials hoped to draw from these efforts to normalize the relationship with 
Israel. When assessed in relation to the broader historical development of US-Israel relations since 1948, 																																																								
19 The remark led Joseph Churba, the Air Force’s top Middle East intelligence expert at the time, to publicly rebuke his boss by 
describing Gen. Brown’s comments as ‘dangerously irresponsible’ given that they ‘encouraged the Arabs and Russians to think 
American backing for Israel had diminished’, as the New York Times put it. Churba was subsequently forced to resign his post. He 
would later play an important role in the Reagan administration’s efforts to formalized strategic cooperation with Israel, also 
serving as a campaign advisor to Reagan in 1980. “Joseph Churba, Intelligence Aide Who Criticized General, Is Dead,” NYT, 28 
April 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/28/world/joseph-churba-intelligence-aide-who-criticized-general-is-dead.html. 
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the thesis will demonstrate how these efforts to institutionalize the relationship during the 1980s are part 
of a wider theme that has long existed below the surface of the so-called ‘special relationship’: that of a 
constant struggle by both sides to increase their influence and leverage over the policies of the other—
and, for the United States, to reconcile domestic political pressures to support Israel into a broader 
strategy capable of advancing other US interests as well. 
 
The underlying incompatibility between the long-term US and Israeli visions of the regional order in the 
Middle East, and the best means to provide for Israeli security therein, has long represented (and still 
represents) a source of top-level political crises and disagreements between Washington and Tel Aviv. It 
is in this context that US policy towards Israel has sought to gradually ‘Americanize’ Israel’s long-term 
viewpoints and policies in the region, bringing these more in tune with the US’s own vision and interests.  
 
Explained in part by Ronald Reagan’s instinctive feelings of sympathy and support for Israel and the 
dominance of the globalist, East-West prism in Washington, this push to formalize the relationship can 
also be understood through a set of deeper political, moral-ideational and strategic objectives. Three 
interconnected aims can be identified as motivating drivers for this process of institutionalization, and it 
important to note how all three of these objectives relate directly or indirectly to an effort to increase US 
leverage over Israeli policy and seek to guard against (or satisfy) domestic constraints on executive action.  
 
These aims included:  
• To limit and restrain Israel’s adventurist policies in the region by requesting that Israel coordinate 
major policy actions with the US ahead of time, as would be expected from two ‘formal’ allies; 
• To reach an amicable agreement with Israel and members of the organized Jewish-American 
community in the US whose influence and financial capabilities the Reagan administration (and 
the wider Republican Party) knew could complicate US policy objectives and that they therefore 
wished to co-opt to serve their own foreign and domestic agendas; 
• To convince Israel to support, or at least not overtly oppose, Reagan’s national security strategy 
for the Middle East based on building up the military capabilities of ‘moderate’ Arab states while 
enhancing the US’s ability to directly project military force into the region to deter potential 
Soviet moves, particularly in Iran and the Persian Gulf.  
 
Underpinning these efforts was the key aim of reducing the tension between US policy toward Israel and 
broader US-Arab relations, an objective that has remained a constant in US Middle East policy since the 
1950s. 
 
Enhanced cooperation with Israel, therefore, also represented a means for the US to consolidate its 
leverage and influence, formalizing the clear power asymmetry between the two countries, while banking 
on the notion that Israel’s increased dependence on the US would provide US leaders and policymakers 
with more grounds on which to influence Israeli policy and behaviour. 
 
Reagan himself was fond of describing the US-Israel ‘alliance’ as a ‘two-way street’, and expected Israel to 
act not as a proxy but as the ‘loyal ally’ he believed it to be. This entailed not creating problems for the 
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administration, both in terms of political capital at home and in the strategic domain abroad where 
Israel’s adventurist policies or opposition to the US’s wider strategic plans for the region were creating 
considerable frustration among administration officials.	
 
A key objective in this context, particularly following the serious disagreements that emerged between the 
US and Israel in 1981–82, was to keep political crises under wraps, thereby avoiding the political costs of 
publicly clashing with Israel on issues where the two countries did not agree. Also significant was the 
hope that by responding favourably to Israel’s requests for aid and preferential treatment, the Reagan 
administration would garner important political support for policies that had little or nothing to do with 
the Middle East, but on which Israel’s supporters in the US could provide important assistance and 
backing. 
 
Israeli services, particularly in the covert domain, were no doubt helpful for administration officials 
during the 1980s. Israel (and other allies) could be relied upon to help circumvent Congressional bans on 
aiding revolutionary groups in Central America and other Third World ‘hot spots’. Israel’s geostrategic 
location and experienced military forces equipped with US weaponry could assist US goals as a potential 
force multiplier and in serving as a staging area for force projection contingencies. Finally, the 
considerable increase terrorist attacks against US personnel and allies throughout the 1980s—coupled 
with Reagan’s fixation on the need to save US hostages abducted in Lebanon—furthered Israel’s value as 
a source of intelligence and counter-terrorism tactics, a component of US-Israel cooperation that has 
become increasingly visible in recent years. 
 
In broad geostrategic terms, however, these benefits were on the whole limited considering the actual 
priorities that governed the Reagan administration’s approach to the Middle East. In this context, the 
Persian Gulf quickly emerged as a top strategic priority for the US in the 1980s. The need to reassure 
local allies in the wake of the 1979 revolution in Iran and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the major 
impetus that drove this renewed emphasis on the region. Other events such as the Iraq-Iran war and the 
1987 US Operation Ernest Will (aimed at protecting shipping lanes and escorting oil tankers in the 
Persian Gulf) furthered the importance of the area. 
 
In light of these dynamics, how can one account for the Reagan administration’s repeated portrayals of 
Israel as a ‘strategic asset’ of the United States? How did this effort to formalize the relationship fit into 
US interests and priorities in the Near East and how did these compare to broader components of US 
Middle East policy centred on the Persian Gulf and developments in the Iraq-Iran war? 
 
What tangible benefits did the Reagan administration believe would flow from this institutionalization 
process, and how can one explain the decision to revive formal US-Israel strategic cooperation in the 
midst of the severe disagreements that rocked the relationship during the Lebanon war? If Israel’s 
	 18	
strategic capabilities can only partially account for this formalization of US-Israel relations, what set of 
deeper, indirect benefits did the US hope to draw from closer ties with Israel? Given that Israeli leaders 
had long lobbied the US to formalize the US-Israel relationship, and that US officials had in the past 
turned down similar offers of cooperation, how can one account for this change in US policy during the 
1980s? 
 
Finally, would it have been possible for the Reagan administration to implement its wider national 
security strategy for the Middle East without upgrading US-Israel cooperation? In other words, may 
Reagan’s formal embrace of strategic cooperation with Israel be considered a form of compensation for 
similar efforts aimed at enhancing strategic cooperation with the US’s Arab allies? 
 
When framed within the wider context of the Reagan administration’s ambitions and priorities and 
examined on the basis of historical precedents tied to US-Israel relations, a clearer picture emerges of the 
underlying motivations that led to this critical, institutionalizing juncture in the US-Israel relationship.  
 
The research will therefore examine and differentiate between the image and reality of US-Israel ‘strategic 
cooperation’ during the 1980s, while reflecting on the lasting impact this notion has had on the broader 
US-Israel relationship in the post-Cold War era. The long-term explanatory significance of this 
institutionalizing juncture can be framed in terms of the consolidation of a powerful ‘policy straitjacket’ 
governing US strategy and approaches to Israel and the broader Middle East, one that has essentially 
crystallized the intrusion of the ‘domestic’ over the ‘systemic’ for examinations of US foreign policy 
towards the Middle East in the post-Cold War era. It has further resulted in a growing, but ultimately 
harmful, interdependence between US and Israeli approaches to the Middle East, and a considerable 
decline in presidential freedom of action to develop policy vis-à-vis both Israel and the broader region. 
 
Division of the Volume 
 
Before proceeding with a brief overview of the division of the volume, it is fist important to clarify that 
this study does not set out to perform a comprehensive diplomatic history of the US-Israel relationship, 
or of US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. These dimensions will of course be present in the 
following chapters, yet they serve as backdrops to contextualize a number of key themes associated with 
the US-Israel ‘special’ relationship and US policy towards Israel. 
 
Moreover, the research is tailored towards understanding the US’s standpoint vis-à-vis Israel and the 
Middle East, and in this respect the empirical analysis is primarily drawn from US sources and 
documents. The analysis will take into account the perspective of Israel and the Arab States—Saudi 
Arabia in particular—but the fundamental angle will remain centred on Washington. While the research 
does employ a number of non-US primary sources, a lack of local language skills—in both Hebrew and 
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Arabic—does represent a ‘gap’ in the analysis, and may in itself provide one potential avenue for future 
research agendas that may complement this research. 
 
The first chapter will introduce the research framework and methodological tools employed throughout 
the analysis of US foreign policy towards Israel and the Middle East during the Reagan administration. 
Here the research will adopt a modified Neo-Classical Realism framework that identifies the domestic 
setting in the US as the independent variable, while recognizing the importance of the systemic—regional 
and international—level as the intervening variable needed to explain US-Israel relations during the 1980s 
(the dependent variable). Within the domestic context, the research will prioritize executive agency, but it 
will complement this focus on the president and his key advisors with a broader appreciation of historical 
precedent and the power of intangible forces such as belief systems and ideology that also impact 
decision-makers. Here the research will introduce the twin methodological tools of Foreign Policy 
Analysis and Historical Sociology as a means to ‘unpack’ the domestic ‘playing field’ and account for 
broader influences and constraints on executive agency.  
 
The second chapter of the study will introduce the foundations of US policy towards Israel, highlighting 
the shifting weight of the ‘three pillars’ of US support: shared Judeo-Christian values, political affinities 
and, finally, ‘strategic cooperation’. The chapter will further address the changing conceptualizations of 
Israel as a ‘burden’ or ‘asset’ for US policy and the growing significance of the systemic—Cold War—
environment as an intervening variable to help frame the slow emergence of strategic rationalizations for 
US aid and support during the 1970s. These themes will be analysed and assessed through the prism of 
reoccurring top-level political crises and disagreements between Israel and the US and the growing 
tendency of US policy to embrace a strategy predicated mainly on inducements (‘carrots’) rather than 
pressure of coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Israel.  
 
The third chapter will address the ‘Reagan Revolution’, zeroing in to analyse the important socio-cultural 
and political changes occurring in the US in the run-up to Reagan’s electoral victory in 1980. These will 
be employed to emphasize how the Reagan administration would herald an overturning of traditional 
political alliances and constituencies in the US. While Reagan’s approach to the Middle East would 
represent an ‘evolution’ from the previous Carter administration, the way in which the administration 
approached Israel would stand out as a considerable departure from previous US policy and approaches, 
and can largely be explained by the composition and ideational inclinations of key advisors within the 
Reagan administration.  
 
The fourth chapter will introduce the strategic environment of the Middle East in the 1980s and the 
‘Second Cold War’, emphasizing the key priorities of the Reagan administration and the difficult 
relationship between US allies and strategic zones in the Middle East: Israel, in the Near East, and Saudi 
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Arabia in the Persian Gulf. The fifth chapter will highlight the deep divisions within the Reagan 
administration on enhanced strategic cooperation with Israel, and carefully trace the development and 
balance of viewpoints and rationalizations among supporters and sceptics of such cooperation. The first 
1981 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on US-Israel strategic cooperation will be introduced and 
analysed, pointing to the very different understandings of this agreement held by Israel and the US.  
 
Chapter 6 will engage with the key event of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which led to a 
significant top-level political crisis with the US and yet ultimately resulted in the final push for the 
institutionalization of the relationship. The Lebanon war and Israel’s policy of deception vis-à-vis the US 
would therefore pay off, effectively ‘entrapping’ the US in a quasi-exclusivist relationship with Israel in 
the Middle East, an objective that had long been a key goal of Israel’s foreign policy establishment but 
which US officials had traditionally opposed.  
 
The seventh chapter will trace the subsequent blossoming of bilateral agreements and institutional 
frameworks governing US aid and assistance for Israel following 1983. The focus here will be the 
bureaucratic and institutional agreements concluded with Israel in the latter half of the 1980s, and the 
implications these agreements would have on the growing interdependence between the US and Israel in 
the Middle East, particularly in the Near East, the strategic theatre of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
chapter will demonstrate the continued significance of this period in terms of key themes and slogans 
such as the ‘no-daylight’ principle; support for Israel, ‘right or wrong’ and the ‘tail wagging the dog’ 
scenario. 
 
Finally, in the conclusions, the study will reflect on the broader legacy of this critical institutionalizing 
juncture for the relationship and its impact on the key themes of influence, leverage and interdependence 
between the US and Israel in the post-Cold War era. Here the study will emphasise the growing 
development of a policy straitjacket constraining US presidential authority to develop policy while 
deepening the US’s entrapment in a quasi-exclusivist relationship with Israel in the Middle East based on 
a circular game of inducements and compensation each time the US seeks to articulate a new policy 
approach to the region.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Framing US Foreign Policy 
 
This study will examine the changing nature of US support for Israel in the 1980s, and the ramifications 
these changes would have on future US policy towards Israel and the broader Middle East in the post-
Cold War era. To frame the significance of the Reagan administration, and identify the strong degrees of 
path dependency that would flow from this period, the research will focus on the key variable of 
executive agency in the United States in an effort to discern how elite opinion—including the President 
and his closest advisors but also extending to Congress, media and think tank elites as well as the various 
branches of the foreign policy bureaucracy in Washington—would develop policy towards Israel and the 
Middle East during the ‘Second Cold War’ (1979–1989). 
 
In keeping with the overarching goal of providing qualitative and quantitative evidence in support of the 
claim that US-Israeli relations reached a critical, institutionalizing juncture during the Reagan administration, 
and giving answers to the three interrelated questions of how, why and to what effect these processes of 
institutionalization would take place during the 1980s, this chapter will address the following dimensions: 
 
• It will provide a research framework that accounts for the importance of the domestic setting in 
the United States in examining US-Israel relations, emphasizing that intangible forces rooted in 
US society stand out as the fundamental driver for US support for Israel, and were only later 
joined by strategic and Cold War rationales. 
 
• Having identified the domestic setting as the independent variable, the chapter will address the 
role of the systemic, international environment, recognizing it as an important ‘intervening 
variable’ needed to explain the slowing or acceleration of US-Israeli cooperation in the broader 
context of the Cold War. In this respect, the thesis will adopt a slightly modified Neo-Classical 
Realism (NCR) framework to account for this ‘special’ intrusion of the domestic over the 
international in US-Israeli relations. 
 
• Finally, the chapter will move to ‘unpack’ the domestic context, and identify those structural and 
ideational variables that have an impact on executive agency. Here the research will employ 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) with a focus on executive agency—the President and his closest 
advisors—as the fundamental unit of analysis, but will combine this focus with a wider 
appreciation of how structural and ideational forces also influence policy decisions by 
establishing certain parameters, ‘road maps’ or ‘world view(s)’ within which US policy debates are 
held. In this respect, FPA will be combined with Historical Sociology (HS) as a means to account 
for the broader influences of history and ideology on executive agency. 
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This chapter will therefore introduce the research framework and methodological tools through which to 
analyse the changing nature of US support for Israel during the 1980s. This will be combined, in Chapter 
2, with an in-depth analysis of the incremental development of US-Israel ties between 1948 and 1980, in 
order to demonstrate the administration’s shift from the past and significance for the future. 
 
1.1 A Modified Neo-Classical Realism Framework for the ‘Special’ US-Israel 
Relationship 
 
Neo-classical realism provides much of what is required by this research. NCR can account for the role of 
ideas and ideology, acknowledges the important interplay between the domestic and the international 
levels of analysis and places much emphasis on the key role of executive agency in making policy 
decisions.1 NCR also resonates with the twin methodological tools of HS and FPA employed to ‘unpack’ 
the domestic context and add clarity to the diverse influences and constraints impacting executive agency. 
 
NCR’s acknowledgment of ‘intervening variables’ accommodates the need to account for the shifting 
relationship between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ levels of analysis in explaining the development 
of US policy towards Israel. While the US-Israel relationship was born out of intangible feelings of moral 
responsibility and ideological support rooted in the US domestic setting, the bilateral relationship would 
begin assuming ‘special’ characteristics only after US strategic interests in the Cold War and the Middle 
East became aligned with this baseline of US moral and political support for Israel. 
 
It is against this backdrop that the research framework will acknowledge the important role of the 
systemic environment as an intervening variable, while firmly approaching the domestic context—and 
within it the role of executive agency—as the key independent variable employed for an examination of 
the US-Israel relationship. This modified NCR research framework is more adept at capturing the largely 
unique nature of US-Israel relations, allowing the analysis to underline the influence of the domestic level, 
while highlighting the key role of executive agency in seeking to reconcile domestic constraints into a 
coherent strategy that at the same time was also capable of advancing US strategic and material interests 
in the Cold War and the broader region. 
 
When it comes to the US-Israel relationship, the context is defined by the domestic setting of the United 
States, as it is within this base of US societal sympathy and support for Israel that executive agency has 
developed policy. For the purpose of this research therefore, the traditional NCR framework is modified 
to account for the domestic as opposed to the systemic environment as the independent variable, while 
the international level can be considered an intervening variable, speeding up or slowing down the 
incremental development of US-Israel ties.  																																																								
1 See, Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation,” 
Review of International Studies, No.36, (2010), pp.117-43; Gideon Rose, “Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign 
Policy,” World Politics, Vol.51, No.1 (Oct.1998), pp.144-72.  
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Having identified the domestic level as the fundamental unit of analysis, the next step is that of 
‘unpacking’ the domestic setting, in an effort to discern those influences that have a bearing on executive 
agency. To examine the structural and ideational ‘playing field’ in which executive agency develops policy, 
the twin methodological tools of HS and FPA can be employed. Historical sociology will allow the 
analysis to trace the political and ideational roots of policies, contextualizing their development into 
broader historical and socio-political trends taking place at the domestic level. FPA meanwhile will serve 
as a tool to focus on executive agency, seeking to clarify how the President and his key advisors weigh up 
these diverse material and non-material, domestic and systemic pressures, developing policy within these 
parameters and constraints. 
 
Here the more subtle functions of ideas and ideology can be conceptualized in relation to their role in 
creating certain ‘road maps’ and ‘worldviews’ that influence, albeit at times subconsciously, the way 
society and decision-makers interpret and (re)act to international developments. A focus on ideology and 
beliefs systems will allow the research to better contextualize the analysis of internal debates and 
competing views within the administration, highlighting the deeper ideological and political roots of these 
perceptions and the ways these are influenced by the general socio-political context in which the 
administration operates (i.e., US society). In the words of Fred Halliday, a combination of historical 
sociology and foreign policy analysis will make it possible to examine how the ‘decisions, and capabilities, 
of rulers are to a considerable extent formed by the history and context within which they operate’.2 
 
This approach is particularly well suited for the present study in light of the continuous interplay (and 
tension) between US domestic pressures to support Israel and the US’s wider geostrategic ambitions and 
responsibilities in the Middle East. It is the way presidents and their closest advisors interpret and react to 
systemic pressures, while choosing from a pool of policy options and strategies that have already been 
restricted by this baseline of US moral and ideational support for Israel, which explicates the domestic 
determinants of US policy. Significantly, as the relationship matured and became institutionalized, the 
relevance of the domestic setting would extend to broader dimensions of US Middle East policy as well. 
This stemmed from the growing tendency to elevate Israeli security to front and centre of US policy 
towards the region, gradually making US Middle East policy reliant on this Israeli pillar.  
 
Such exercise will provide essential insights into the US foreign policy decision-making process towards 
Israel and the Middle East, emphasizing that there was nothing predetermined in the way the relationship 
developed. Rather, the gradual transformation of Israel from a ‘burden’ or ‘liability’ to an ‘asset’ for US 
foreign policy would be the product of tactical choices made by US and Israeli leaders in reaction to 
broader developments tied to the Cold War and the growing Soviet penetration of the Middle East. It is 																																																								
2 Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations. Power, Politics and Ideology, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.40 
[emphasis added]. 
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the underlying rationalizations advanced as justifications for increased aid and support—and the ways 
these have been updated and modified over time in an effort to reconcile domestic constraints to support 
Israel with the task of advancing wider US strategic interests tied to the Cold War and continued access to 
oil—that define the development of US Middle East policy from Truman to Reagan.  
 
1.2 Unpacking the Domestic ‘Playing Field’ 
 
US foreign policy is often framed in term of a clash—or perennial search for balance—between the 
pursuit of hard, material and geostrategic interests (‘realism’) and the promotion of intangible norms and 
values such as democracy, human rights, individual freedoms and the rule of law (‘idealism’). Both prisms 
are fundamentally linked to the national interest of a state, understood as the maximization of (material) 
power and (intangible) influence abroad in order to enhance security at home.  
 
These strands are rarely reconcilable into a coherent set of policies to pursue, however. Indeed, and 
particularly in the Middle East, US interests have tended to coexist in tension with the promotion of 
intangible values. Throughout history, US presidents and administrations have inevitably couched their 
policies with broad reference to both prisms, generally emphasizing the one considered most convincing 
and/or applicable in a given case. In light of the spread and complexity of interests and responsibilities, 
US foreign policy is infused with a high degree of flexibility and pragmatism, capable of adjusting to 
specific circumstances and crises. Thus, it is rarely simply ‘realist’ or ‘idealist’, ‘interventionist’ or 
‘isolationist’, and instead tends to be infused by various shades of ‘grey’ that push US policy away from 
either extreme.3 
 
This dynamic increases the explanatory value of the domestic context and in particular those structural 
and ideational variables that combine to create the playing field in which policy debates are held and 
approved by executive agency. By mapping various constituencies and belief systems present at the 
domestic level and assessing the degrees of influence each holds on individuals charged with key positions 
in the executive branch, a clearer picture emerges of the origins of a given policy as well as the reasons 
why other approaches or viewpoints rarely seem to attract the same degree of support. 
 
Distilled to its minimum, US foreign policy can be conceptualized as resulting from a complex process of 
balancing and negotiation between different power nodes present in the domestic context of the state. As 
the arena in which policy is formed, debated, diluted and ultimately approved, the domestic context is 
crucial for understanding the political origins of a given policy as well as the mix of ideational, strategic 
and material motives that are provided as justification for its implementation.  
 																																																								
3 Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam. Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?, Cambridge/New York, Cambridge University 
Press, pp.4-6. 
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Individual actors (or executive agency) make policy decisions, and while these are necessarily influenced 
by outside developments it is through the prism of domestic realities that such events are interpreted in 
Washington. Foreign engagements are ultimately aimed at advancing the domestic standing of states (i.e., 
the ‘national interest’), and given that states do not correspond to monolithic actors on the world stage, 
the choice of individual policies—as well as the underlying strategies to advance a given ‘national interest’ 
and the definition or ranking of that interest itself—are the product of complex negotiations between 
various constituencies and centres of power within them. 
 
The domestic characteristics of a state include ‘static’ elements, such as geographic positioning, size, 
national resources and the bureaucratic makeup of a state,4 as well as more intangible forces like societal 
cohesion, political culture, historical experience and ideology. These characteristics combine to create the 
general domestic context, the structural and ideational playing field where executive agency develops policy. 
It is on the basis of internal debates and capabilities that certain policies are chosen over others, and it is 
through debates occurring at the domestic level that actors and broader society define a set of ‘national 
interests’ for a country to pursue. In other words, while a focus on the systemic environment may provide 
important insights as to why (and to some extent when) US policy and perceptions changed, it is 
developments at the domestic level that provide further analytic depth for explanations of how the US 
decided to (re)act, and with what means.  
 
The centrality of the domestic setting is particularly relevant in the context of the United States. The 
structural characteristics of the US set it aside from most, if not all, other state actors on the world stage. 
Its size and political system—defined by a federalized structure of checks and balances that diffuses 
decision-making power among various branches of the bureaucracy—ensure that a multitude of views 
and opinions coexist (and compete) within the political arena (and even a sitting administration) on any 
given policy issue.  
 
The legal and structural makeup of the US, which allows special interest groups to influence the decision-
making process, further enhances the value and complexity of the domestic context. On this topic, it is 
important to appreciate how the US’s size, security and geographic positioning remove large segments of 
US society from many aspects of foreign policy. This trend has allowed presidents and decision-makers, 
as well as special interest groups, greater freedom of action to develop policy. Yet, on issues where 
American society is more actively engaged, the relevance of domestic constraints increases, given that 
policy decisions will be more closely scrutinized and debated in the public sphere. 
 																																																								
4 The bureaucratic makeup of states is less ‘static’ than the other structural elements. While the bureaucratic architecture remains 
largely stable, the influence of the bureaucracy and legislative branch over the articulation of US policy has ebbed and flowed 
throughout history, often in reaction to a perceived overstepping of authority by the executive branch. In the 1980s the legislative 
branch maintained significant influence over US foreign policy. A major objective of the Reagan administration was to win back 
authority. Indeed, the administration would set the stage for a consolidation of decision-making powers in the executive branch 
from 1989 onwards. 
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Of the large number of US foreign policy topics, no single issue is capable of arousing such domestic 
animosity as the US’s relationship with Israel.5 This dynamic, combined with the fact that increased 
American presence in the Middle East largely coincided with a deepening of the political-military 
relationship with Israel, has rendered the US’s approach to the region particularly exposed to domestic 
considerations. 
 
US policymakers are effectively constrained by public interest in, and support for, Israel’s survival and 
wellbeing.6 The fact that this support has traditionally been understood to coexist in tension with the US’s 
ability to maintain cooperative relations with Arab states, thereby weakening its geostrategic positioning 
in the Middle East, stands as a testament to the power of these intangible bonds. As noted by Michael 
Barnett, ‘Israel’s collective identity, and the US’s understanding that Israel shares with it certain values’, 
becomes ‘critical for an understanding of US-Israel’ relations.7 While ‘domestic and systemic pressures 
affected the level of US support for Israel, it is the existence of a shared identity and transnational values 
that is the foundation of this relationship’.8 
 
With these societal bonds acting as the foundational driver for the US-Israel relationship, every president 
since Truman has been committed to Israel’s survival and security—and it is for this reason that US 
policymakers have had to struggle, and at times fall over backwards, to develop creative strategies for the 
region that were capable of advancing US interests while staying true to this baseline of support for Israel. 
A ‘more vulnerable’ Israel ‘would not just be a strategic failure, it would be a moral failure,9 noted US 
President Barack Obama in a recent interview, demonstrating the degree to which ‘values’ remain even 
today a key driver for the relationship. 
 
Indeed, it is this commonality of interests and values—with the former still debated by some—that makes 
the US-Israel relationship ‘unique’ as well as a de facto alliance. By comparison, the US relationship with 
Saudi Arabia or with other Arab states is generally framed as a ‘partnership’, because as one high-level 
policymaker recently put it, ‘America’s allies share values and not just interests’.10 
 																																																								
5 Walter Russell Mead has described American societal support for Zionism (and later Israel) as ‘one of the most potent political 
forces in US foreign policy’. See, W.R. Mead, “The New Israel and the Old: Why Gentile Americans Back the Jewish State,” 
Foreign Affairs, Vol.87, No.4 (July-August 2008), p.29. 
6 See, Avraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel. The Limits of the Special Relationship, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1993, pp.1-29; Shai Feldman, US Middle East Policy: The Domestic Setting, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies [JCSS], Tel Aviv 
University/Westview Press, 1988; Nimrod Novik, The United States and Israel. Domestic Determinants of a Changing US Commitment, 
JCSS, Tel Aviv University/Westview Press, 1986. 
7 Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,” in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security. Norms and 
Identity in World Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, pp.400-447, pp.402-3 (quote). 
8 Ibid., pp.403-4. 
9 Thomas L. Friedman, “The Obama Doctrine and Iran,” NYT (Video Interview with President Obama), 5 April 2015 [emphasis 
added], http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/opinion/thomas-friedman-the-obama-doctrine-and-iran-
interview.html?ref=opinion. 
10 Dennis Ross, “The Saudis are rightly concerned about Iran,” NYT Opinion Room for Debate, 5 January 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/01/04/saudi-arabia-a-dangerous-ally/the-saudis-are-rightly-concerned-about-
iran. 
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It is also in light of the power of these intangible bonds, and the politically charged nature of US support 
for Israel, that successive administrations have sought to concentrate decision-making on this issue within 
the White House.11 An agency-oriented approach is therefore indispensable for studies of US-Israel 
relations.12 By focussing on individual agency, the broad influences and constraints coming from the 
domestic and international levels as well as the weight of material and non-material considerations can be 
collapsed into single planes and assessed in terms of their impact on the views, beliefs and perceptions of 
executive agency charged with implementing policy.  
 
In this respect, it is important to specify at the onset that intangible forces on which a national identity is 
based have also been influenced through interactions with the ‘international’. This specification is 
important given that an encompassing analysis of the domestic context should also appreciate the way 
ideological inclinations and historical experience have a bearing on the policymaking process through 
their role in creating a national identity, world view(s) or understanding of one’s self in comparison to 
others.13 Important for a conceptualization of foreign policy is therefore also an understanding of 
national identity (who we are), the historical roots of such identity (where we come from), and the ways these 
two dimensions combine with present realities to create the ideational context in which executive agency 
develops policy. 
 
1.2.1 Bureaucratic Structure and Executive Agency 
 
The ultimate authority to make foreign policy decisions rests with the president, who weighs diverse 
policy options and engages in a cost-benefit analysis of each before making a final decision. Here, the 
president and his closest advisors take into consideration their material capabilities and chances of 
success, bad and worst case scenarios, the impact on domestic politics—including opinion polls and the 
electoral cycle—and the available sources of support that can be rallied around a given policy decision. 
 
In this process, a number of domestic constraints come into play and often dilute or modify an ideal 
policy approach developed by the executive. Indeed, the power of the presidency is in many respects 
circumscribed by the vast bureaucracy and often-competing interests and priories present within society. 
It is in this context that Richard Neustadt wrote that the real sources of presidential power are largely 
																																																								
11 Quandt, Peace Process, op.cit., pp.6-8. 
12 Indeed, some of the most insightful and detailed studies on these topics have adopted precisely this approach. See, Quandt, 
Peace Process, op.cit., pp.5-10; Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, Chicago, Chicago 
University Press, 1986, pp.10-15; George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, Duke University Press, 1990, pp.1-6.  
13 Iver B. Neumann, “Uses of the Other in World Politics,” in Uses of the Other. ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1998, pp.1-39; Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, New Haven/London, 
Yale University Press, 1987. Hunt describes US foreign policy ideology in terms of three reoccurring core concepts: US national 
greatness, the hierarchy of race and US hostility towards social revolutions. Elements of comparison with the American 
experience are implicit in each dimension.  
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intangible in nature, derived from the symbolism and visibility associated with the office of the presidency 
and the power of persuasion this pulpit bestows on its occupant.14 
 
The various branches of the bureaucracy—the Department of Defence, State Department, Congress and 
the intelligence services—all play a role in the policymaking process. Together with the media, think tanks 
and lobby groups, these domestic actors seek to influence executive agency by advancing their own 
interpretation of the ‘national interest’ or the best means to advance it. On top of these domestic 
influences, international systemic forces, such as responsibilities towards allies, threat perceptions or 
perceived opportunities, also influence executive agency in the development of foreign policy.  
 
As argued by Robert Putman, these processes of balancing and prioritization between domestic and 
systemic pressures can be framed as a ‘two-level game’, in which key decision-makers weigh up the 
constraints and chances of success among two separated constituencies, one internal and one external.15 
In noting how ‘it is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, 
or the reverse’16, Putman argues for ‘general equilibrium’ approaches that account for the complex 
interactions of both the domestic and the international in the articulation of policy. 
 
The central component of these equilibriums relates to the need to secure separate ‘win sets’ or buy-ins 
for a given policy at both the international and the domestic level, then reconciling what is desired/made 
possible internationally with what is desired/made possible in light of political realities at home. In the 
case of the US-Israeli relationship and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the development of US policy has been 
deeply affected by the inability to reconcile the demands of the international and regional environment 
with what is politically feasible at home. The need to secure domestic buy-in for a given policy has 
repeatedly resulted in a modification or dilution of the proposed policy, which in turn has weakened the 
potential buy-in(s) from the region. Indeed, one by-product of the gradual processes of 
institutionalization of US-Israel ties and the addition of strategic rationales for US support for Israel has 
been to further diminish the potential overlap between domestic and international ‘win sets’, in light of 
the fact that US policy has consistently prioritized the former over the latter, not least given the politically 
charged nature of US policy towards Israel. 
 
Such micro-level, agency-orientated approaches tend to focus on the personnel changes brought about by 
the electoral cycle and the individuals tasked with such high-level positions as the Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Defence and the staff on the National Security Council. As outlined by Steven Spiegel, 
‘whenever a new president arrives in the Oval Office, the system changes because he brings with him a 																																																								
14 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan, New York, Free 
Press, 1991. 
15 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol.42, 
No.3 (Summer 1988), pp.427-60. 
16 Ibid., p.427. 
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new set of advisers and associates, a new background, different knowledge and predispositions, a new 
philosophy, a conception of his own interest, and a new attitude towards the proper policy roles of the 
bureaucracy, Congress and interest groups’.17 
 
The impact of the so-called ‘bureaucratic model’ on decision-making is often emphasized in studies of US 
foreign policy in the Middle East in the context of the more sympathetic stance towards the Arab states 
and the Palestinians that is traditionally associated with the State Department’s office of Near East 
Affairs, US diplomats serving in the Arab world and other lower level bureaucrats and analysts in the 
Pentagon and intelligence services.18 These individuals, often referred to as ‘Arabists’ in the US foreign 
policy bureaucracy, are in turn contrasted with the point of view of the executive branch, Congress and 
other high-level political appointees, where domestic political considerations and a greater focus on the 
global dimension of US foreign policy have tended to dominate decision-making, often translating into 
more sympathetic policies towards Israel.19  
 
In the context of the 1980s, a focus on the bureaucratic model is important in light of the infighting and 
dysfunctional decision-making processes that defined the Reagan administration. Numerous studies 
recount how the president’s hands-off leadership style and aversion to confrontations with advisors led to 
significant problems in the policymaking process.20 A recently declassified document found at the Ronald 
Reagan Presidential Library (RRPL) sheds light on the leadership qualities of the president. Described as 
‘non-provocative’, Reagan was said to prefer to lead ‘by example and suggestion’ while leaving ‘the 
detailed work to subordinates’ and delegating ‘authority and decisions to appropriate individuals’.21 This 
tendency contributed to significant uncertainty as to who was ‘in charge’22 of policy, and in turn to 
repeated turf wars between the State and Defence Departments. One member of the Reagan 
administration later recalled how ‘in terms of US foreign policy decision making, the Reagan 
administration was the messiest I’ve ever seen’.23 
 
These dynamics, combined with an appreciation of the ebb and flow of legislative oversight on executive 
power, are important in framing the balance of decision-making power within the US domestic setting, 
helping to highlight the role of key individuals within the administration and broader bureaucracy and 
their respective influences on the president’s prerogative to develop policy. 																																																								
17 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, op.cit., pp.14-15.  
18 Author Interview, Richard W. Murphy, New York, September 2015. Richard Murphy served as US ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia (1981-83) and Assistance Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs (1983-89). Also see, Spiegel, The Other 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, op.cit., pp.4-10; Fawaz A. Gerges, Obama and the Middle East. The End of America’s Moment?, New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp.16-25.  
19 Hugh Wilford, America’s Great Game. The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East, New York, Basic Books, 
2013.  
20 More will be said on these dynamics in Chapter 3, ‘The Reagan Revolution’. 
21 RRPL, George Shultz Papers, “Executive Secretariat Super Sensitive (10/08/1986-10/15/1986),” Box 4A.  
22 Quandt, Peace Process, op.cit, pp.245-68. 
23 Ronald Reagan Oral History Project, “Interview with Kenneth Adelman,” Miller Center of Public Affairs, Presidential Oral 
History Program, September 2003 (Published 2005), p.18, 
http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_2003_0930_adelman.pdf. 
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Yet, an excessive focus on executive agency or the relative balance of power and influence between the 
executive and the legislative branch of government, may also obscure important elements of continuity 
carried over between administrations. While it is undoubtedly true that each new administration brings 
along its own ‘baggage’ of ideas and priorities, it is also important to appreciate the impact of institutional 
constraints and political precedents on the policy actions of a sitting administration. 
 
To begin with, any president or new administration will necessarily be affected, and sometimes 
constrained, by the actions of his predecessors. This dynamic holds particular weight in the case of the 
US-Israel relationship, where a president’s freedom of action has been constrained by a combination of 
domestic politics and the murky array of ad hoc agreements and commitments granting Israel elements of 
preferential treatment in Washington. These agreements have been provided on a linear, incremental 
basis by each administration since Truman, ensuring that every new president will not only inherent but 
also build on these commitments upon entering the White House. Aside from institutional constraints, 
another means of capturing elements of continuity across various administrations is that of emphasizing 
the power and influence of political precedents in the making of US foreign policy. 
 
Presidents and policymakers tend to ground their decisions on the experiences of previous 
administrations, a dynamic that leads to certain perceptions and approaches becoming engrained in the 
policymaking process and thereby replicated across administrations. Once a policy decision becomes 
institutionalized in the political bureaucracy, together with the concepts and assumptions underpinning its 
approval, it becomes particularly hard to overturn. Such entrenchment further increases when powerful 
domestic constituencies—lobby groups, Congress or elements of elite or popular opinion—are actively 
engaged in campaigning for continuation of a given policy or conceptual approach. 
 
Conversely, when a given policy approach or argument has been shown to cause particular damage to one 
administration, its successor will internalize these lessons and avoid repeating similar mistakes. This is 
relevant to the case of the US-Israeli relationship, in light of the political costs implied by clashing with 
Israel in the court of US public opinion. These experiences, combined with the powerful reputation of 
pro-Israel lobby groups in the US, would create important precedents for US policy towards Israel. 
 
It may be no more than a coincidence that two of the most controversial US presidents on Israel, Jimmy 
Carter and George H.W. Bush, were both one-term presidents, but such dynamics do have an impact on 
the policymaking process and are carried over across administrations. This in turn may help to explain the 
more general US embrace of a policy of positive inducements and soft persuasion (carrots) as opposed to 
sanctions or coercive diplomacy (sticks) vis-à-vis Israel. 
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Ultimately, the salience of executive agency for such analysis is augmented in that any definition of the 
‘national interest’ carries an inherently ‘subjective element’, and no consensus exists as to what strategy is 
best suited to advancing these goals.24 As a result, it is not enough to identify a set of interests, material or 
otherwise, for US foreign policy to pursue. Individual actors and groups of decision-makers will 
necessarily devise different strategies or approaches to achieve such ends. Thus, agency-oriented analytical 
approaches should be combined with a wider appreciation of the power of intangible forces, such as 
ideological inclinations, cultural predispositions or beliefs. Dennis Ross, who served in successive US 
administrations since the mid-1970s, is right to point out that ‘differences in foreign policy goals and 
objectives may express themselves politically but are more often based on ideological premises. […] It is 
the ideological divide about the proper course for American foreign policy that needs to be understood’.25 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that US national interests in the Middle East remained largely constant 
throughout the Cold War—secure the flow of oil, support Israel and prevent Soviet encroachment—
between 1948 and 1989 US policymakers adopted different strategies to achieve these goals. As noted by 
William Quandt, ‘without a common yardstick, […] there was almost no agreement on what these 
interests meant in terms of concrete policies’.26 Some in the United States have considered Israel to be a 
burden, while others contend that Israel is an asset for US interests. Some have called on America to 
apply conditionality to US aid and support for Israel, arguing that only an even-handed and balanced 
policy is capable of advancing US interests vis-à-vis both Israel and the Arabs. More recently, new 
constituencies in America have argued against the US’s traditional search for balance in the Middle East. 
 
Indeed, and starting in the early-to-mid 1980s, some have urged the US to be openly pro-Israel as the best 
means of advancing US interests in the region, a dynamic that would become institutionalized during the 
latter half of the 1980s and has continued to hold significant influence over US policy. As noted by 
Dennis Ross in an interview with the author, to understand US policy towards Israel it is critical to 
discern the worldviews and ideological inclinations of key decision-makers in the US, and the relative 
distribution of viewpoints and perceptions held by key personalities with decision-making roles within the 
administration.27 
 
US policy towards Israel cannot therefore be explained through the simple prism of material interests and 
contemporary developments, the ‘here and now’ of international politics. Neither can the administration’s 
policies be understood though an exclusive focus on key decision-makers. A more encompassing analysis 
																																																								
24 Quandt, Peace Process, op.cit., pp.10-15, p.11 (quote). 
25 Dennis Ross, Statecraft: How to Restore America’s Standing in the World, New York, Farrar Straus Giroux, 2007, p.12. 
26 Quandt, Peace Process, op.cit., p.14. 
27 Author Interview, Dennis Ross, Washington DC, 25 September 2015. Dennis Ross has served in various capacities in 
successive US administrations since the 1970s. In late 1980s he served as director of Near East and South Asian affairs on the 
National Security Council staff and deputy director of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment 
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should also focus on the deeper layers of ideational and historical influences that have a bearing on the 
policymaking process. 
 
1.2.2 Ideology and Beliefs: The ‘Power’ of Ideas  
 
An emphasis on ideational forces can provide important analytic depth to agency-oriented studies 
focussed on key decision-makers and elite opinion. The embedded, personal or societal beliefs of a nation 
and its leaders, in themselves the result of historical experience and the construction of a national identity, 
also have a bearing on the policymaking process. 
 
Ideational forces and beliefs gradually become embedded both in society—in its various groupings and 
sub-groupings—and the institutions of the state, thereby influencing the principles and assumptions of 
decision-makers.28 As noted by Goldstein and Keohane, ‘insofar as ideas put blinders on people, reducing 
the number of conceivable alternatives, they serve as invisible switchmen, not only by turning action onto 
certain tracks rather than others, […] but also by obscuring the other tracks from the agent’s view’.29 
 
While many have warned that an excessive ‘intrusion’ of ideology, ‘moralism’ or domestic politics into the 
realm of foreign policy would complicate the task of defining and advancing US material interests, 
domestic political realities (and rivalries) have gradually spilled over to impact policymaking.30 Nowhere is 
this dynamic more evident than in US policy towards Israel, also contributing to explain the significant 
criticism of US policy coming from key realist thinkers in academia and the policymaking circles.  
 
The relevance of ideology grew with the deepening political partisanship between Republican and 
Democratic parties, and the gradual fraying of the so-called post-war foreign policy consensus. As noted 
by Destler, Gelb and Lake in 1984, ‘for two decades, the making of American foreign policy has been 
growing far more political—or more precisely, far more partisan and ideological’.31 In the 1960s, John F. 
Kennedy used foreign policy issues—and in particular the supposed threat of a widening ‘missile gap’ 
between the Soviet Union and the United States—to score political points against President Eisenhower, 
setting a trend for the future.32 Growing ideological and political partisanship at home meant that no 
foreign or domestic issue was out of bounds for the two parties to compete over, including issues of war 																																																								
28 See, Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Ideas & Foreign Policy. 
Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1993, pp.8-10 & 13-17; Nicholas Kitchen, “Ideas 
of Power and the Power of Ideas,” in Asle Toje and Barbara Kunz (eds.), Neoclassical Realism in European Politics, Manchester/New 
York, Manchester University Press, 2012, pp.80-82. 
29 Goldstein and Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy,” op.cit., pp.8-19, p.12 (quote).  
30 George F. Kennan, the ‘godfather’ of American ‘realism’, famously warned that an excessive ‘moralism’ or ‘legalism’ in foreign 
policy would carry decision-makers ‘away from the sterner requirements of political realism’, causing their ‘statements and 
actions, however impressive to the domestic political audience, to lose effectiveness in the international arena’. ‘Government is 
an agent, not a principle’, wrote Kennan, “its primary obligation is to the interests of national society it represents, not to the moral 
impulses that individual elements of that society may experience’. George F. Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy,” Foreign 
Affairs, 64:2 (Winter 1985), pp.205-18, pp.205-6 (quote). 
31 Destler, Gleb and Lake, Our Own worst Enemy. The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy, New York, Simon and Schuster, pp.11-30, 
p.13 (quote). Also see, Ole R. Holsti, Making American Foreign Policy, New York/London, Routledge, 2013. 
32 Interview, Nicholas Veliotes, op.cit. 
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and peace as demonstrated by Nixon’s and Kissinger’s efforts to scuttle peace talks with the Vietnamese 
to enhance their chances of electoral success in 1968.33 
 
The role of Israel as a political wedge would grow during the 1970s and 1980s, as Republicans and 
Democrats began competing on the nature and extent of US support for Israel. Reagan in particular 
would employ Israel to detract votes from Jimmy Carter—another important precedent in US-Israel 
relations that can be traced back to the Reagan period, as was the increased identification with Israel 
among new Republican constituencies in the United States during the 1980s. These trends would in turn 
further consolidate the explanatory significance of the domestic setting over US policy towards Israel 
(and eventually the broader Middle East) as political competition on Israel would only deepen the 
relevance of domestic constraints on executive agency. 
 
US leaders have repeatedly emphasized how US support for Israel is derived from these intangible bonds 
and political affinities.34 President Kennedy spoke in 1960 of how Israel ‘is the child of hope and the 
home of the brave. […] It carries the shield of democracy and it honours the sword of freedom’.35 
Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, would further this emphasis on common values, while also 
expressing admiration for Israel’s military successes.36 Johnson, a native of Texas and a man who was 
significantly influenced by his religious upbringing, would come to consider Israel as a kind of extension 
of the US, incorporating its same values and human spirit. As noted by Steven Spiegel, ‘Johnson tended 
to see the Israelis fighting the Arabs as a modern-day version of the Texans struggling with the Mexicans. 
The analogy between the Alamo and Masada was not far below the surface’.37 
 
While in the case of Israel, US policy has traditionally been coloured by emotional considerations linked 
to common values and political organization, such ‘idealism’ has been lacking in relations with Arab 
partners. US-Arab relations are driven by purely material and geostrategic interest, mostly of an 
exogenous nature and linked to the safeguarding of the status quo in the region as a function of the Cold 
War, energy flows and Israel’s security. The dominance of the globalist, Cold War perspective in US 
foreign policy has meant that regional developments tended to be interpreted in Washington in light of 
their implications for the outside world and the US’s confrontation with the Soviet Union. In other 
words, the Middle East was important for Washington due to its exogenous qualities, not because of any 																																																								
33 Greg Grandin, Kissinger’s Shadow. The Long Reach of America’s Most Controversial Statesman, New York, Metropolitan Books, 2015, 
pp.36-52. 
34 As noted by Secretary of State Dulles in one 1953 meeting with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion when the idea of a 
permanent US-Israeli alliance was being discussed, the presence of these strong societal feelings of sympathy and support for 
Israel in the US ‘created a feeling of common debt which was more binding than a formal treaty of alliance’.34 See, FRUS, 
Volume IX Part 1(1952-1954), Document 13. 
35 The American Presidency Project [APP], “Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy, Zionists of America Convention,” Statler 
Hilton Hotel, New York, 26 August 1960, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=74217. 
36 Spiegel, The Other, op.cit., pp.118-125; Dennis Ross, Doomed to Succeed. The US-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama, New 
York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015, pp.76-103. 
37 Spiegel, The Other, op.cit., p.123. 
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attachment to the region, its governments, cultures and people. The obvious exception to this rule is 
Israel, contributing to very different dynamics of bilateral relations than with the US’s Arab partners. 
 
While the Arab components of US Middle East policy can in general be defined in terms of the US realist 
school of thought, the presence of Israel in the region and the importance of intangible norms and values 
to explain US support have complicated the development of a purely ‘realist’ approach to the Middle 
East. Indeed, while these shared bonds of friendship between societies have forced US policy towards 
Israel to operate within certain supportive parameters, no similar sensitivities were present in US policy 
towards the Arab world. Geography, cultural barriers and historical contingency have reinforced this 
dynamic, yet it would be a mistake to seek to explain this apparent insensitivity through an excessive 
focus on cultural, religious or ideological differences.38 
 
Cultural differences and historical experience have no doubt created a rich reservoir of symbolism, images 
and stereotypes associated with the Middle East. However, these would survive and continue to surface 
primarily in light of other dynamics tied to the global ideological and military confrontation between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, in juxtaposition with the Arab-Israeli conflict in the post-1967 era. 
Given that ‘the Cold War shaped the conceptual lenses through which American officials viewed the 
Middle East’39 and that the United States had, by the early 1960s, all but abandoned efforts to convince 
Egypt’s Nasser to exit the Non Aligned camp and enter the Western bloc, the US came to view Arab 
nationalism as a threat to the regional status quo.  
 
Initial hints of what this would entail were detectable already in 1958 as evidenced by a report prepared 
by the NSC in which scenarios and policy options are explored in light of recent developments in the 
region. The document begins by acknowledging that ‘current conditions and political trends in the Near 
East are inimical to Western interests’ while adding that if indeed the United States opts for a 
confrontation with the forces of Arab nationalism, rather than putting pressure on Israel to reach a 
territorial compromise with Egypt and the Arab states, then ‘a logical corollary would be to support Israel 
as the only strong pro-West power left in the Near East’.40 
 
Overall therefore, a major reason for the continued presence (and indeed deepening) of mistrust and 
misunderstanding between the United States and large portions of the Arab world does not relate to an 
irrational rage among Muslims or an engrained US cultural bias against Islam. Rather its roots are found 
in actual US policies conducted in the region and the gradual expansion, or juxtaposition, of the Cold 
War onto regional dynamics, which in turn would solidify these popular conceptions of the ‘Arabs’ as 																																																								
38 See, Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011; Bernard 
Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East, New York, HarperCollins, 2003; Edward Said, 
Orientalism, New York/London, Penguin Books, 1995. 
39 Gerges, Obama and the Middle East, op.cit., p.21.  
40 FRUS, Volume XII (1958-60), Document 35.  
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antagonists to US interests. Indeed, following the First World War, when the United States was still a 
distant and relatively neutral power in the region, it was common to find widespread admiration for the 
US in the Middle East.41 
 
These dimensions have led certain scholars to downplay the role of intangible feelings of moral and 
political support for Israel in US society, and argue that material and strategic interests tied to the Cold 
War and US-Arab relations are of greater relevance. While it is no doubt true that the US-Israeli 
relationship only assumed ‘special’ or ‘unique’ characteristics following the addition of strategic rationales 
to the relationship, these Cold War justifications would emerge and become consolidated due to the prior 
influence of domestic political and moral-ideological constraints on executive agency, and the consequent 
need to orchestrate a foreign policy strategy with this central commitment in mind. As will be outlined in 
more detail in the subsequent chapter on US-Israeli relations, it is the twin pillars of shared Judeo-
Christian values and political affinities that provide the greatest explanatory significance for the way US-
Israel relations developed. The third pillar of ‘strategic cooperation’ also retains explanatory value, but has 
never reached the same level of consensus or significance compared to the original, foundational pillars 
of shared norms and values.42 
 
Due to the existence of strong bonds of sympathy, and a related feeling of moral responsibility for the 
legacy of the Holocaust, US policy towards Israel has been particularly exposed to domestic political 
pressures. The growing identification with Israel as part of the ‘Western’ bloc in the Cold War, sharing 
principles of democracy and the rule of law, has facilitated the blossoming of US-Israeli cooperation. Yet, 
if Israel had opted to side with the Soviet Union in the early-to-mid 1950s, it is highly doubtful that such 
popular conceptions of Israel would survive and continue to surface in US popular and official discourse. 
Rather, it is likely that similar stereotypical portrayals of Arabs and Jews would instead be present, as 
ideational constructs will generally gain currency among large and diverse cross-sections of society only 
when rival material and strategic interests are added to the mix. 
 
Indeed, the influence of ideology and beliefs is inherently linked to the advancement of the ‘national 
interest’, understood in both hard and soft power terms. In this respect, ideology and ideational 
constructs also serve as a means to strengthen and reinforce feelings of national pride and self-
confidence, essential elements tied to the promotion of US influence, credibility and prestige (‘soft 
power’) on the world stage. ‘Americans have used the Muslim world as a reference point to highlight their 
exceptionalism—liberty, power, and human progress’, 43  serving as a reminder of the US’s unique 
attributes and a mirror used to cement feelings of national pride and the benign nature of the US’s role in 																																																								
41 Ussama Makdisi, Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of US-Arab Relations: 1820-2001, New York/London, Public Affairs, 2010. 
42 Shai Feldman, The Future of US-Israel Strategic Cooperation, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC, 1996, 
pp.6-7. 
43 Gerges, America and Political Islam, op.cit., p.9. 
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the world. ‘American policy makers’, wrote Michael H. Hunt in his study of ideology and US foreign 
policy, had a tendency to measure ‘the worth of other peoples and nations against a racial hierarchy’44 
dominated by America’s ethno-cultural ties to Europe and the subsequent experience of revolutionary 
and enlightened governance, the separation of powers, individualism and scientific progress. ‘Revolutions 
that failed to conform to the standards of America’s own moderate, constitutional beginnings’, Hunt 
explained, ‘inspired hostility and, with increasing frequency, active opposition’45 from the US foreign 
policy establishment.46 
 
Notwithstanding the US’s early confrontation with the colonial powers of Europe, such stereotypes and 
popular characterizations of the Middle East would resurface in US discourse, resulting in often 
distorted—or at the very least less sympathetic—portrayals of the Middle East, its peoples and cultures. 
These are particularly detectable in popular culture and the media, which have furthered these 
stereotypical characterizations by highlighting the lack of conformity, on the part of ‘the Arabs’, with US 
values and experiences.47 Thanks to increased media coverage of such events as the 1972 Munich attacks, 
the 1973 war and oil embargo, the 1979 revolution in Iran and the ensuing hostage crisis, popular 
conceptions of the Middle East were further solidified in US society.48 
 
This tendency to demonize adversaries or ‘the other’ is part of human emotions and psychology, and also 
serves as a means to enact coercive policies—war, sanctions, boycotts, etc.—that would otherwise be 
harder to justify in the court of public opinion. It is in this sense that ideological constructs can be used 
by elite opinion to ‘manufacture consent’ and increase the propensity for a given policy over another.49 
Indeed, the relevance and appeal of such stereotypical portrayals increase exponentially when such 
‘otherness’ is joined by contrasting material, strategic or political interests.  
 
Historical contingency has meant that US interactions with the Arab world have occurred through either 
war (starting with the Barbary wars of the late 18th and 19th centuries) or missionary activity and trade, and 
these dimensions have no doubt facilitated the spread and resurfacing of stereotypical portrayals of the 
Arab-Muslim world in US popular culture. The increased juxtaposition of Cold War realities with the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in the late 1950s, and particularly since the 1967 war, have reinforced this dynamic, 																																																								
44 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.171. 
45 Ibid., p.174. 
46 Also see, William Stivers, America’s Confrontation with Revolutionary Change in the Middle East, 1948-83, Macmillan Press, 1986, 
pp.95-106. 
47 See, Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters, Culture, Media and US Interests in the Middle East since 1945, Berkeley/London, University 
of California Press, 2005; Douglas Little, American Orientalism. The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (3rd ed.), Washington 
DC, University of North Carolina Press, 2008, pp.10-11 & 17-25. For a visual representation of the role of culture and media in 
portrayals of the Middle East see, Michael Singh, Valention’s Ghost: Framing the Arab Image, Two-Part Special Documentary Series, 
Al-Jazeera English, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2015/08/valentino-ghost-150816121213605.html. 
48 Important in this respect was the launching, in 1980, of the first 24/7 news channel (CNN). McAlister, Epic Encounters, op.cit., 
pp.178-87 & 198-201. Also see, Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, op.cit., pp.5-16. 
49 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of Mass Media, New York, Pantheon Books, 
1988. 
	 37	
with Israel being often cast as the pioneering ‘Westerner’ fighting the ruthless Arabs motivated by denial 
of the Jewish right to a national home. It was therefore the growing association between Arab rivals of 
Israel and the Soviet Union that ultimately consolidated and diffused these ideational constructs of Israel 
as an ‘extension of America’ sharing both ‘values’ and ‘interests’. 
 
A final clarification is in order before moving to dissect the origins and development of US-Israeli 
relations. The first has to do with the ranking and relationship between shared norms and values and 
material interests in US support for Israel. The above passages do not mean that shared Judeo-Christian 
values and political affinities, the twin pillars of US support for Israel, are simple constructs articulated by 
elites in the US to justify the pursuit of material interests and power. What is meant instead is that the 
resilience of these principles and popular portrayals of Israel was facilitated by this marriage of US 
interests and values in US support for Israel, which in turn has extended the ‘shelf life’ of such principles, 
shielding them from other more critical viewpoints or approaches.  
 
It follows that intangible norms and values do retain explanatory influence for the development of US-
Israel ties, but need to be addressed in synergy with broader US strategic interests and concerns. As aptly 
noted by Noam Chomsky ‘America’s relationship with Israel has been determined primarily by the 
changing role that Israel occupied in the context of America’s changing conceptions of its political-
strategic interests in the Middle East’.50 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has laid out the research framework and methodological tools that will be employed for the 
subsequent analysis of US foreign policy towards Israel and the Middle East during the 1980s. In light of 
this work’s focus on a specific time period—the 1980s and the ‘Second Cold War’—and its efforts to 
answer the three interrelated questions of why the US-Israel relationship became institutionalized during 
the latter half of the 1980s, how this institutionalization process was carried out and what effects these 
processes would have on future US policy (and leverage) over Israel and the Arab Middle East, the 
research will prioritize methodological tools that focus on the domestic micro-level of foreign policy 
decision-making in the United States. 
 
In this context the chapter has introduced a modified Neo-Classical Realism research framework that 
prioritizes the domestic context (independent variable) over that of the international environment 
(intervening variable) for the study of US foreign policy in the Middle East and the evolving relationship 
with Israel (dependent variable). In focusing on the domestic context, the chapter has highlighted how 
																																																								
50 Quoted in Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, op.cit, p.17. 
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executive agency and elite opinion serve as the most encompassing unit of analysis for examinations of 
US policy towards Israel.  
 
The president and his closest advisors retain the power to make foreign policy decisions, but they do so 
through a complex process of balancing and negotiation with other domestic power centres in the United 
States. During this negotiation other important forces at the domestic level—public opinion, the 
bureaucracy, party politics, pressure groups, the media and research centres—all compete for influence 
over the decision-making process by advancing their own interpretation of the national interest and the 
best means to advance it. 
 
Examinations of US foreign policy must therefore attempt to ‘unpack’ the domestic context and examine 
domestic debates with the aim of identifying the various pull-factors that direct policy along one 
trajectory as opposed to another. International developments, in the form of both threats and 
opportunities, will necessarily impact and at times constrain a president’s prerogative to enact policy. Yet, 
it is ultimately through the prism of the domestic context that outside events are viewed and interpreted 
from Washington, and it is through a careful examination of domestic debates that a clearer picture 
emerges as to how the US eventually decides to (re)act and with what means. This approach will also help 
to explain why alternative strategies or viewpoints on Israel and US Middle East policy rarely seem to 
attract the same degree of consensus. 
 
Yet, assessments of the domestic context must go deeper, detecting further variables that impact foreign 
policy by influencing and constraining the actions and viewpoints of executive agency. Starting from the 
most basic (and static) characteristics of a state—its geographic positioning, availability of natural 
resources and political-bureaucratic setup—these ‘structural’ characteristics impact the way a state and its 
leaders interact with the outside world. Such structural elements also influence perceptions and 
interpretations of outside developments, particularly as these relate to security, threat perceptions and the 
availability of resources to back up foreign engagements. 
 
US foreign policy is also influenced by intangible forces such as historical contingency, political or 
institutional precedents and ideology, which combine to create a particular national identity. The 
perceptions and/or ‘world view(s)’ of a nation and its leaders will be coloured by these intangible forces. 
By influencing the principled and causal beliefs of leaders, ideology can have an important impact on the 
policymaking process, directing policy within certain parameters while constraining, albeit at times 
subconsciously, alternative policy options.  
 
A historical lens is indispensable to frame the gradual emergence and development of a US national 
identity and conception of itself in comparison to the actions of others. The US’s geographic positioning 
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has shaped this identity, as has its particular historical development, its links and tensions with the 
Colonial powers of Western Europe and its struggle to define itself as separate from, yet profoundly 
influenced by, the lessons of the Enlightenment and European politics. The US’s deep belief in the 
exceptionalism of the American experience, mixed with a similarly pervasive conception of the universal 
appeal of its values and ideals, is inherently linked to the country’s historical development and gradual 
emergence as a superpower on the world stage.  
 
History, however, is not limited to the international environment and also includes socio-cultural and 
political changes occurring within the domestic context of a state. Individual leaders and decision-makers 
are part of broader society and as such are impacted by socio-political and ideational changes occurring 
within that society. Generational changes and social, cultural and economic developments occurring 
within the domestic context of a state, but which are also necessarily impacted by outside developments, 
lead to the creation of new political constituencies and alliances, changing viewpoints and new pressures 
on those individuals charged with developing foreign policy.  
 
Ronald Reagan’s electoral victory in 1980 was itself the product of a long process of socio-political 
change occurring in the United States since the late 1960s. This would lead to a slow replacement of old 
political elites associated with the Republican Party and based in the affluent north-western US states, 
with a new leadership based in the South. This in turn would produce a GOP leadership with different 
worldviews, priorities and political rhetoric. Generational changes within US political bureaucracies, the 
media, pressure groups and broader elements of elite opinion can therefore serve as further 
demonstrations of how changes at the domestic level impact the way a country and its leaders interact 
with the outside world. As new advisors and lower level officials join the US government, their 
worldviews and perceptions are defined by more recent phenomena that have impacted their personal 
life-development. These experiences translate into different perceptions and priorities, in turn leading to 
shifts in US debates on foreign policy. 
 
On the whole therefore, to unpack the domestic context is to appreciate how structure and national identity 
combine to create the general domestic ‘playing field’ where individual actors develop foreign policy. 
Executive agency shares this playing field with other important forces and together these engage in 
negotiations and debates on foreign policy. It is in this context that a focus on the micro-level of 
executive agency can be coupled with the twin methodological tools of foreign policy analysis and 
historical sociology to add further depth to analyses of the domestic context and executive agency. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Anatomy of a ‘Special Relationship’: Domestic Constraints, Power 
Asymmetries and the Struggle for Leverage 
 
Few topics in US foreign policy give birth to such hard-felt emotions and contrasting views among 
popular and elite opinion as the US relationship with Israel. Beyond the controversy and recriminations 
about lavish US support for Israel, comparatively little attention has been given to the structural—
bureaucratic and institutional—components of US aid and assistance that are the cumulative result of 
successive presidential commitments and ad hoc agreements providing Israel with preferential treatment 
in Washington. 
 
The fact that many of these commitments were justified on the basis of their ability to increase the US’s 
room to manoeuvre in the region, exposes what has long been an underlying paradox in US-Israel 
relations: the US’s apparent lack of leverage over Israel notwithstanding the clear power asymmetry 
between the two countries and repeated attempts by the US to establish a traditional patron-client 
relationship with its small Middle Eastern ally. Indeed, a bird’s-eye view of the history of US-Israel 
relations would appear to reveal an inverse relationship between growing Israeli dependence on the US 
and a parallel decline in US leverage and influence over Israel, a dynamic that has become crystallized in 
the ‘tail wagging the dog’ scenario often associated with US-Israel relations.1 
 
While lacking an official agreement codifying these ties into a legally binding alliance, the US-Israel 
relationship has evolved from difficult beginnings in the 1950s to dwarf the relationships the United 
States has with other strategic partners, from NATO allies to countries like the United Kingdom, Canada 
or Australia. In 1974, Israel became the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance since World 
War II and by the mid-1980s US aid stabilized at an average of $3.1 billion annually, with all assistance 
transferred from loans to outright grants.2 The first multi-year military-aid packages were provided in the 
early 1970s, but it was only in the 1980s that bureaucratic and institutional frameworks were developed to 
institutionalize long-term economic, military and political cooperation.3 
 
																																																								
1 See, Kathleen and Bill Christison, “Does the Israeli Tail Wag the American Dog?” Information Clearing House, 1 March 2007, 
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article17217.htm. 
2 US assistance to Israel began in 1949 with a $100 million export-import bank loan. The first major sale of US weapons to Israel 
occurred in 1962, and military aid has skyrocketed since the early 1970s. Much of this aid was provided as long-term loans with 
highly beneficial, 30-year repayment terms. In 1985 all aid was transformed into grants and by 2008 Israel stopped receiving 
economic support funds. Jeremy M. Sharp, “US Foreign Aid to Israel,” Congressional Research Service (CRS), 10 April 2018, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf. 
3 Today, US aid to Israel, all of it composed of foreign military financing, is governed through 10-year supply assistance 
agreements. The first 10-year MoU covered FY1999-FY2008, followed MoU (FY2009-FY2018) and most recently by a new 
MoU (FY2019-28) that elevated annual US aid to $3.8 billion. Ibid., p.5. 
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With official bilateral aid now standing at over $134.7 billion in non-inflation-adjusted dollars since 19484 
and Israel accounting for over 61% of America’s annual foreign military financing (FMF) budget, a 
growing consensus has formed around the notion that this relationship holds certain ‘unique’ 
characteristics that set it aside from other bilateral relationships. 
 
While no doubt striking, it is the qualitative rather than quantitative nature of US support that makes the 
relationship unique. This is particularly true with regard to the unprecedented institutional agreements 
granting Israel elements of preferential treatment in the US, and the extent to which these commitments 
have gradually constrained US policy options towards Israel and the broader Middle East. It is also true 
regarding the way Israeli leaders and representatives can publicly defy stated US objectives with little fear 
of political repercussions, or any decline in US foreign aid and assistance. As noted by Nicholas Veliotes 
in an interview with the author, ‘the usual bureaucratic rules don’t apply to the US-Israel relationship and 
sometimes even the usual security rules don’t apply’.5 
 
Defined by a complex and multi-layered web of bonds, US-Israel ties were recently described as ‘too big 
to fail’ by long-time US Middle East negotiator Aaron David Miller.6 This is mostly a result of the gradual 
institutionalization of the relationship and the considerable interdependence that has developed between the 
two countries in the economic, military and politico-diplomatic domains. Given the lack of an alliance 
framework, US-Israel ties have come to be governed by a murky patchwork of ad hoc agreements, 
presidential commitments and the signing of various Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) and 
Agreement (MoA) that together form the legal and bureaucratic backbone of the US-Israel relationship. 
 
Elements of interdependence are particularly visible in the growing juxtaposition or assimilation of the 
US’s military-strategic positioning in the Middle East and its alliance with Israel. As US planners began 
fashioning a military-strategic approach to the Middle East centred on an ironclad US commitment to 
Israeli security and defence, US strategy and approaches in the Middle East became increasingly reliant 
on, and interdependent with, Israel. 
 
This chapter will introduce the ‘three pillars’ of US support for Israel, emphasizing how these derived 
from a combination of shared Judeo-Christian values, political affinities and, finally, ‘strategic cooperation’. 
Based on the shifting weight of these pillars and their relationship with broader US interests and 
concerns, the remaining sections will trace the evolution of US-Israel ties between 1948 and 1980, 
highlighting the fluidity of US policy but also its underlying continuity. We shall see how perceptions of 																																																								
4 Ibid.p.1. Adjusted for inflation, the figure is more than double. In 2013, total US aid since 1948, excluding loan guarantees, 
which account for about $19 billion, stood at $233.7 billion. Ora Coren and Nadan Feldman, “US Aid to Israel Totals $233.7b 
Over Six Decades,” Ha’aretz, 20 March 2013, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.premium-u-s-aid-to-israel-234-
billion-over-60-years-1.5234820?=&ts=_1524214130790. 
5 Interview, Nicholas Veliotes, op.cit. 
6 Aaron David Miller, “The US-Israel relationship is fraying, but won’t fail,” RealClearWorld, 26 May 2015, 
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2015/05/26/obama_netanyahu_the_us-israeli_relationship_is_fraying_111215.html. 
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Israel moved from a ‘liability’ to an ‘asset’ and how US policy came to justify this support on the basis of 
US self-interest in both the political (domestic) and strategic (systemic) domains. 
 
Finally the chapter will address the security-leverage paradox that has come to dominate US policy 
towards Israel and, almost by extension, the wider Middle East. As the United States emerged as Israel’s 
primary security provider, linking this support to the advancement of other US Cold War objectives, US 
Middle East policy has effectively been caught in a vicious circle of having to abide by these 
institutionalized precedents even when systemic developments would suggest a revision of these 
conventional wisdoms. 
 
Increasingly caught in this policy straitjacket, US approaches to the Middle East would become predicated 
on the need to periodically upgrade elements of US preferential treatment towards Israel without any 
assurance of a change in Israeli behaviour or an increased US ability to restrain Israeli policy. As a result, 
rather than slowly ‘Americanizing’ Israel’s policies and bringing them more in tune with the US’s own 
objectives and concerns, the outcome of these processes of institutionalization would have the opposite 
effect, gradually ‘entrapping’ the US in a quasi-exclusivist relationship with Israel that would result in a slow 
‘Israelization’ of the US’s own policies and viewpoints on the Middle East rather than the other way 
around. 
 
2.1 Foundations of US Support for Israel: The Three Pillars 
 
Academic literature has long recognized Israel as transcending the boundaries between foreign and 
domestic politics in the United States. The baseline of US societal support for Israel is derived from a 
mixture of ideological, religious and emotional considerations that can be summarized by reference to the 
‘twin pillars’ of shared Judeo-Christian values and political affinities. Such intangible forces are reinforced 
by the memories of the Holocaust and the striking parallels that can be drawn between the early 
experiences shared by the two countries, the US and Israeli frontier and entrepreneurial spirit and the fact 
that both societies are built on immigration. 
 
The role of religion in the US and Israel, and America’s early fascination with the Holy Land as the 
birthplace of Christianity have furthered the popular appeal of Israel within US society, a dynamic which 
has also been strengthened through major motion pictures and romanticized portrayals of biblical and 
historical occurrences in the Middle East.7 These domestic influences are an integral part of what 
Abraham Ben-Zvi has termed the ‘special relationship paradigm’, described as ‘a widespread fund of 
goodwill toward Israel that is not restricted to the Jewish[-American] community’ and has resulted in ‘an 
equally strong and persistent commitment to Israel’s continued national existence, integrity and security’.8 																																																								
7 Little, American Orientalism, op.cit., pp.1-43; Mcalister, Epic Encounters, op.cit, pp.43-83 & 155-98. 
8 Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel, op.cit., pp.15-16. 
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A shared adherence to democracy and the rule of law have traditionally been among the most powerful 
concepts used to rationalize US support for Israel. On the basis of its liberal-democratic credentials, Israel 
has attracted widespread bipartisan support in the US, helping to solidify its image as a ‘stable’ and 
‘reliable’ ally, a kind of ‘small America’, or, as some have grown accustomed to calling it, the 51st state. 
‘Israel is not only a nation—it is a symbol’, exclaimed Republican candidate Ronald Reagan during a 
campaign speech at the 1980 B’nai B’rith forum in Washington. ‘Since the rebirth of the State of Israel, 
there has been an iron-clad bond between that democracy and this one’, continued Reagan. ‘In defending 
Israel’s right to exist, we defend the very values upon which our nation is built’.9 
 
The US’s decision to recognize Israel in 1948 was itself born of the influence of these intangible feelings 
of support. President Truman noted in his diaries how the ‘specialists’ in his administration ‘were almost 
without exception unfriendly to the idea of a Jewish State’. Yet in a private letter sent to Eleanor 
Roosevelt, the US president stated that his sympathy had ‘always been on their [Zionist] side’. 10 Further 
evidence of popular feelings of support for Israel is found in the diaries and writings of Kermit Roosevelt 
Jr., the grandson of US president Theodore Roosevelt and organizer of the CIA’s covert operations in the 
broader Middle East during the 1940s and 1950s. Being an anti-Zionist in the United States during the 
late 1940s, Roosevelt lamented, was akin to ‘marching through the ranks of a parade “in the opposite 
direction”’.11 A Gallup poll from June 1948 confirms this trend, with almost three times as many 
Americans describing their sympathies as lying with Israel compared to ‘the Arabs’.12 
 
The importance of American public support for Israel is recognized by all major players in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Such feelings of societal sympathy are present beyond the Jewish-American community 
and encompass other important segments of American society. Few would debate that such high levels of 
sympathy—especially if compared to the decidedly limited identification with the Arab or Palestinian side 
in the conflict—have had a strong impact on US policy, not least by influencing the perceptions and cost-
benefit analyses of key decision-makers in the US. 
 
As the relationship progressed, and particularly in the wake of the 1967 war and Israel’s capture of 
Jerusalem and its holy sites, important segments of the evangelical Christian community in the United 
States also became strong supporters of Israel. By the late 1970s, these would come to replace the waning 
support of US Protestant communities, which tended to hold more liberal views and were consequently 
																																																								
9 RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, “Israeli Settlements 1981,” Box 3. 
10 Quoted in Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, Myths, Illusions and Peace. Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East (with 
new afterword), New York/London, Penguin Books, 2010, p.36. 
11 Hugh Wilford, America’s Great Game. The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East, New York, Basic Books, 
2014, p.93 (quote), pp.77-92 & 113-127. 
12 Mead, “The New Israel,” op.cit., p.29. 
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more troubled by Israel’s military reprisals and treatment of the Palestinians.13  So-called Christian 
Zionism in the United States, together with the growing breed of US intellectuals and policymakers who 
rose to prominence during the 1970s and 1980s and later came to be known as neoconservatives, would 
considerably expand the domestic basis of support for Israel in the United States. 
 
This represented a growing marriage of convenience between the more hawkish, idealistic and offensive 
strands of conservatism in the United States, reflecting the slow emergence of the third pillar in US-Israel 
relations: ‘strategic cooperation’. United by their calls for large defence budgets and more forceful and 
direct use of US military and economic power abroad, these constituencies were among the most vocal 
and successful supporters of Israel. Many of these personalities also considered support for Israel a means 
to restore US global military-political influence, as well as to instil a renewed sense of self-confidence and 
pride in US capabilities.14 
 
During the late 1940s and 1950s such popular feelings of support were not shared by a majority of expert 
practitioners, particularly in the State Department and Pentagon.15 At the time, Israel was largely viewed 
as a ‘liability’ for the pursuit of US strategic interests, and support for Israel was primarily ‘bottom-up’ 
rather than ‘top-down’. It was in this context, and in an effort to overcome this tension between 
‘interests’ and ‘values’ in US support for Israel, that US administrations sought to develop strategic 
functions for the relationship. By adding ‘strategic’ rationalizations, US policy could be brought more in 
tune with the prerogatives of elite opinion and executive agency in the United States.  
 
Israel’s military prowess and emphasis on national sovereignty and self-reliance, characteristics that find 
significant parallels in US society, were also appreciated in the US.16 Israel’s traditional reluctance to 
entrust its security to third parties garnered significant praise, not least in light of the fear that US troops 
might someday be needed to defend Israel directly.17 While Israel has been far from self-reliant, given that 
US aid and political-diplomatic support have effectively bankrolled its military and economic standing, 
the country’s successes, particularly in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, did much to stir the 
imagination of US society. Following 1967, Israeli military effectiveness came to be seen as an asset in the 
context of the Cold War and US efforts to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East, adding a further 
layer of strategic justifications for US support for Israel. 																																																								
13 Peter Beinart, The Crisis of Zionism, New York, Henry Holt Publishing, 2012, pp.30-59; Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, op.cit, pp.9-
32; Dov Waxman, Trouble in the Tribe. The American Jewish Conflict over Israel, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2016, pp.55-
147. 
14 See, James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans. The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, London, Penguin Books, 2004, pp.112-150; Chomsky, 
Fateful Triangle, op.cit, pp.13-32. 
15 See, Walt and Mearsheimer, The Israel Lobby, op.cit, pp.1-51; George F. Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy,” Foreign 
Affairs,Vol.64, No.2 (Winter 1985/86), pp.205-218. 
16 Andrew J. Bachevich, The New American Militarism. How Americans are Seduced by War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. 
17 This praise has also turned into frustration due to Israel’s reluctance to follow the US lead or to have Israeli forces come under 
a unified American command. Indeed, while the US has striven for a traditional patron-client relationship with Israel in the 
Middle East, Israel has consistently pushed back against these efforts, instead seeking to establish a quasi-exclusivist relationship 
with the US in the region. 
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Such views derived from Israel’s territorial conquests during the 1967 war. These territories would 
become the key bargaining chips or levers used by US planners to solidify Washington’s hegemony in the 
Middle East. The promise of being the only player capable of ‘returning’ these territories or extracting 
Israeli concessions would become the key to developing a new strategic approach to the region based on 
a growing marriage of ‘interests’ and ‘values’ in US support for Israel.  
 
US self-interest—both political and strategic—has therefore also played an important role in the 
development and expansion of US-Israel ties. It would be naïve to think that US policymakers would 
agree to such high levels of aid and support if this were perceived as damaging to the US’s own interests 
and concerns. To understand the development of US support for Israel is therefore to understand how 
Israel’s perceived value for US foreign policy changed in synergy with broader regional and international 
developments tied to the Cold War and US-Arab relations. 
 
In conceptual terms, the significance of strategic cooperation rests on the fact that while the other two 
pillars of the relationship—shared values and political affinities—were born out of intangible feelings of 
societal and ideological (bottom-up) support, the third and last pillar held the promise of material benefit. 
This synergy could allow executive agency to harness domestic constraints and reconcile them into a 
more coherent strategy able to advance broader US strategic and political interests as well. The need to 
‘protect the domestic flank’18 of an administration, by heeding the fundamental baseline of US sympathy 
for Israel, while seeking to harness this support and reconcile it with broader US strategic interests would 
therefore create the fundamental parameters for US Middle East policy during the Cold War. One quote 
from Kissinger’s memoirs—that ‘Israel’s security could be preserved in the long run only by anchoring it 
to a strategic interest of the United States, not to the sentiments of individuals’19—is particularly salient in 
this context, demonstrating the sequencing and causality underpinning the emergence of a marriage 
between US ‘values’ and ‘interests’ in support for Israel. 
 
Significantly, it is on these strategic and security-related themes that pro-Israel lobby groups in the US 
have been most active and successful. The fact that the growing influence of these groups closely matched 
the gradual emergence of the third pillar of US support for Israel reinforces this point. The Israel lobby 
does not operate in a vacuum. Its activities are facilitated by widespread popular support for Israel but 
also by the institutionalized nature of certain concepts and perceptions linking Israeli military strength and 
superiority to the advancement of US interests. 
 																																																								
18 This term was used by Robert Kromer a member of President Johnson’s NSC staff in the mid-1960s. FRUS, Volume XVIII 
(1964-67), Document 140; also (partially) quoted in Robert D. Johnson, “Lyndon Johnson and Israel: The Secret Presidential 
Recordings,” The S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, Tel Aviv University, July 2008, p.19. 
19 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, London, Phoenix Press, 1982, pp.203-4. 
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Ultimately, the undeniable influence of the various pro-Israel lobby groups in the US—particularly in the 
late 1970s, 1980s and more so during the post-Cold War era—is attributable not only to their 
effectiveness or their command of important financial assets, but also to the fact that the very ideas they 
promote derive at least in part from the institutional, bureaucratic and political precedents governing US 
aid and assistance. These assurances were granted by successive administrations not as a result of lobby 
pressure but on the basis of expediency, and a belief in their being conducive to the US’s (short-term) 
political and strategic interests. In this respect, the research agrees with the assertion of Noam Chomsky, 
as expressed in his text Fateful Triangle that ‘no pressure group will dominate access to public opinion or 
maintain consistent influence over policy-making unless its aims are close to those of elite elements with 
real power’.20 
 
Examinations of US support for Israel must therefore account for both ‘intangible’ and ‘tangible’ forces, 
where the former represent the foundational architecture of the relationship, and the latter its ‘add-ons’. 
While the twin pillars of shared values and political affinities provided an important baseline of support, it 
was this growing overlap between ‘interests’ and ‘values’—with the former still debated by some21—that 
transformed US-Israel ties into a ‘special’ relationship. It is consequently necessary to analyse all three of 
the pillars of US support—shared values, political affinities and strategic cooperation—in order to 
appreciate how US ties have developed since 1948 and why the relationship, in all its dimensions, looks the 
way it does today. 
 
2.2 Domestic Constraints, Linkage and the ‘Asset/Burden’ Debate 
 
Commonly described as ‘unwavering’, ‘steadfast’ or ‘unshakable’ US support for Israel stems from a 
number of principles and conventional wisdoms that act as parameters within which each successive 
administration develop policy for the region. Deviation from these parameters is both rare and politically 
unsound, given the widespread popular support they enjoy and the engrained assumption that they are 
integral to US interests in the region. It is in response to these concepts—starting with a fundamental US 
commitment to provide for Israeli security stemming from Truman’s 1948 recognition of Israel—that 
successive US administrations have provided incremental increases of aid and assistance to Israel; and, it 
is as a result of the perceived political and strategic benefits flowing from such aid that every US 
administration since Truman has consistently outdone its predecessor in augmented qualitative and 
quantitative support for Israel. 
 
Perceptions of Israel as an ‘asset’ or ‘burden’ were never limited to the regional and international levels, 
but also included an appreciation of the domestic political costs (or benefits) an administration could 																																																								
20 Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, op.cit.,p.17 (quote), pp.9-32. 
21 The most articulated and critical examinations of the ‘asset/burden’ debate are provided by: Walt and Mearshimer, The Israel 
Lobby, op.cit, pp.49-78; Mansour, Beyond Alliance, op.cit., pp.1-67; Chas W. Freeman, Jr., America’s Continuing Misadventures in the 
Middle East, Charlottesville, Just World Books, 2016, pp.23-28 & 64-75. 
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incur if appearing to stray from a commitment to Israeli security. The Israel ‘asset/burden’ debate 
therefore relates to both the domestic and systemic levels of analysis—a highly important feature that is 
sometimes overlooked in studies focussing on the Cold War to explain the incremental development of 
US support for Israel. Indeed, while there is still today some debate as to the real ‘strategic’ benefits 
derived by the US from its ‘special’ relationship with Israel (particularly in the post-Cold War era), there is 
no questioning the political benefits that support for Israel can deliver to a sitting US administration. 
 
While a majority of the Jewish-American community in the United States have traditionally given their 
support to the Democratic Party, the bipartisan nature of US support has meant that Republicans are also 
impacted by these domestic pressures. Differently from their Democratic counterparts, Republican 
leaders have tended to focus more on the strategic dimension of US-Israel relations. Thus while the 
Democratic Party has traditionally based its support on the pillars of shared values and political affinities, 
the Republican Party’s increased emphasis on Israeli military deterrence during the 1970s was instead 
born out of a greater focus on the global Cold War dimension of US foreign policy. 
 
In this context, Republican leaders have traditionally been less constrained by domestic political 
considerations in supporting Israel, given that Jewish-American voters have tended to be liberal and 
Democratic-leaning. Yet, by the 1970s and especially the 1980s, this trend began to change, not least in 
light of the growing identification of conservative US Christian communities with Israel and important 
socio-cultural and political changes occurring both in Israel and the US. Republicans in the 1970s and 
1980s approached the question of Israel with a mixture of emotional and strategic consideration, 
increasingly coming to view Israel as an important tool of US deterrence in the region, a dynamic that would 
also create some overlap with the views of the right-wing Israeli Likud party, which secured its first 
electoral victory in 1977.  
 
Such an emphasis on Israeli military might was indeed conducive to the broader objectives of Israeli 
policy, and Israeli leaders had long lobbied the US to publicly recognize Israel’s strategic value for US 
policy. For Israel, such recognition would help to solidify important linkages with the United States, 
diminish feelings of dependence on its superpower benefactor while moving Israel closer to its goal of 
establishing an exclusivist relationship with the US in the Middle East. Early US leaders tended to see 
Israeli services as important but not comparable to the strategic significance of the Arab world. They 
moreover tended to approach this question from more of a self-interested standpoint, seeking to extract 
concrete assurances from Israel in exchange for increased US aid and support, essentially seeking to co-
opt Israel and transform it into a client or proxy of the United States. 
 
Indeed, during the 1950s the Eisenhower administration adopted a narrow interpretation of the US 
commitment to the survival and independence of Israel, recognizing the territorial integrity and viability of 
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all states in the Middle East through the adoption of a balanced and even-handed policy in the region. A 
1953 Statement of Policy by the NSC declared that the US would: 
 
Make clear that Israel will not, merely because of its Jewish population, receive preferential 
treatment over any Arab state; and thereby demonstrate that our policy toward Israel is 
limited to assisting Israel in becoming a viable state living in amity with the Arab states.22 
 
The underlying principles here can be framed in accordance with what has become known as the ‘linkage 
doctrine’, which emphasized the tension between US ‘values’ and ‘interests’ in the Middle East and the 
consequent need to pursue a balanced and even-handed policy vis-à-vis both Israel and the Arab states as 
to block Soviet advances and preserve the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf while also providing for 
Israeli security. Implicit in this approach was an appreciation of the links and tensions between the two 
strategic zones of US policy in the Middle East: the Near East (or the central zone of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict) and the Persian Gulf, the key area of strategic interest for access to oil.  
 
In this context, during the 1950s US planners sought to employ Israel’s feelings of insecurity and 
encirclement as potential levers to moderate Israel’s negotiating positions and increase its propensity for 
compromise with the Arab states.23 More pronounced however were the risks or potential ‘burden’ on US 
policy, as administration officials were well aware that US societal sympathy for Israel could force an 
administration to come to Israel’s assistance in the event of an existential threat. US planners feared such 
eventualities could lead to a direct confrontation between the two superpowers in the Middle East. It was 
resulting from these considerations, and the risk that increased Soviet arms to Arab states could result in a 
new conflict with Israel, that the US gradually ended its policy of ambiguity and began to directly supply it 
with arms to maintain the military balance in the region.24 
 
As a result, what had previously been considered systemic constraints preventing overt US-Israeli 
cooperation would, by the late 1950s and more so during the 1960s and 1970s, be transformed into 
systemic justifications for increased aid and support, given the deepening Soviet presence in Egypt and the 
growing depiction of Arab nationalism as a threat to US interests. Conceptualizations of Israel’s role and 
value changed as a result, with Israeli military strength being increasingly framed as conducive to wider 
US interests and concerns, by virtue of being able to preserve the status quo and offset the potential of 
renewed conflict that would force the US to intervene more forcibly on the side of Israel.25 																																																								
22 FRUS, Volume IX Part 1 (1952-1954), Document 145. 
23 The deepening fragmentation between the Arab states—and in particular between Egypt and Saudi Arabia during the mid-
1950s and 1960s—would complicate these early diplomatic efforts by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, eventually 
facilitating closer US-Israeli cooperation. 
24 While largely of secondary importance for much of the 1950s, given that Israel’s security needs were provided for via the 
French and West Germans with tacit US approval, such ambiguity ended by the early-to-mid 1960s, when such supplies were 
interrupted forcing the US to step in with direct assistance. 
25 As noted in a 1965 memorandum to President Johnson, ‘Israel’s aims are rather different from our own. They’ve consistently 
felt nervous about US support […] so have long favoured tying us to them publicly (security guarantees, arms aid), regardless of 
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While during the 1950s and early 1960 US policy had entertained the idea of extending a formal US 
security guarantee to Israel in exchange for a more accommodating Israeli policy vis-à-vis the US’s wider 
strategic interests in the Middle East, by the late 1960s Israel would receive what amounted to a de facto 
security guarantee without any formal quid pro quo in terms of Israeli policy or strategy in the region.26 
This de facto guarantee stemmed from this linkage between Israeli security and military might and the US’s 
broader Cold War interests. While successful in advancing short-term US Cold War interests, and 
consolidating political support at home, this marriage between ‘interest’ and ‘values’ in US support for 
Israel would gradually have far-reaching implications for US leverage over Israel as the US’s own military-
strategic posture in the Middle East became increasingly reliant on this Israeli pillar. 
 
In practical terms, the US commitment to directly supply Israel with weapons and aid to offset similar 
sales of Soviet weaponry to the Arab states represented the first important breakthrough in the history of 
US-Israel ties. These processes would gradually evolve into another article of faith governing US Middle 
East policy: a pledge to preserve Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) through the direct supply of 
weaponry to offset the combined military, demographic and technological margins of Israel’s Arab 
neighbours.27 
 
Early variations of the QME principle are detectable since the Johnson administration and the signing of a 
first, highly important US-Israel MoU in 1965 (see Appendix A). This agreement emerged as result of a 
US promise to compensate Israel with superior quantities of weapons in response to a sale of US tanks to 
Jordan. It also contained important pledges to support Israeli military deterrence and long-term margin, 
establishing an important precedent that has lasted to this day. In exchange, Israel pledged to abide by its 
now famous doctrine of nuclear ambiguity, promising that it ‘will not be the first to introduce nuclear 
weapons into the Arab-Israel area’.28 
 
An element of inducements designed to ‘buy’ Israeli acquiescence was present in these sales, as was 
securing important domestic support for the administration. As noted by Robert Komer, a member of 																																																																																																																																																																												
whether this would throw the Arabs into Soviet hands or cost us our position in the Arab world. We’ve always felt that such 
course would be disastrous to Israel as well as us. […] We want to avoid another major Arab-Israeli clash, because we’d probably 
have to step in to stop it. We’d be caught in the middle again too. The best way to avoid such a clash is to maintain an adequate 
deterrence balance. I’d now argue that this will sooner or later require us to sell arms to Israel.’ FRUS, Volume XVIII (1964-
1967), Document 138. 
26 US officials have traditionally been reluctant to offer Israel an official security guarantee. As noted in a 1963 State Department 
memorandum, ‘The security arrangements Israel seeks with the United States would in our judgment harm our interests in the 
area and weaken rather than strengthen Israel’s ultimate security. […these] could result in comparable Soviet-Arab ties, bringing 
the Soviets back in […] We should retain freedom of decision and action in the Near East […] Advance security arrangements 
with Israel would tie our hands undesirably. […] In short, we propose that your letter again make clear our concern for Israel’s 
integrity, but convey our strong sense that there must be a balance in our approach to the Near East and that we conceive this, 
our present approach, as in Israel’s best interests.’ FRUS, Volume XVIII (1962-1963), Document 327. 
27 A formal and legally binding definition of the QME principle was approved by the US Congress in 2008. Sharp, “US Foreign 
Aid to Israel,” op.cit., pp.1-5. 
28 FRUS, Volume XVIII (1964-67), Document 185. 
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President Johnson’s NSC, in a 1965 memorandum, ‘I kept pressing on State [Department] to face up to 
the fact that if we agree to sell to Jordan, we’d have to sell to Israel too—as the only way of protecting our 
domestic flank’.29 
 
Elements of the QME concept can also be detected earlier, during the Kennedy administration, the first 
to publicly refer to a ‘special relationship’ between the United States and Israel, and the first to formally 
invite a sitting Israeli prime minister to visit the White House (this occurred after Kennedy’s death, 
however, in 1964).30 Kennedy was also the first president to sell advanced weapons to Israel—the HAWK 
ground-to-air missiles—in 1962. Like the later sales of F-4 Skyhawk bombers in 1966 or the 1968 sale of 
Phantom Jets by Johnson31, pledges contained in the secret 1965 MoU, Kennedy’s sale of defensive 
weaponry also rested on a mixture of efforts to dissuade Israel from going nuclear, consolidate domestic 
support for the sitting administration and compensate Israel for the sale of Soviet weaponry to the Arab 
states. 
 
According to David Tal, ‘Israel’s quest for HAWK missiles was a sham’, a means to extract from the 
United States ‘a clear, formal, and preferably public US guarantee of Israel, either a formal security pact or, 
failing that, an agreement to sell weapons systems’.32 This would signal the beginning of reoccurring 
efforts by Israel to employ inflated security concerns as important leverage over US policy. 
 
With the advent of the Republican Nixon administration in 1969, the military dimension of US-Israel ties 
received a significant boost. US aid was increased from an average of about $100 million annually during 
the Johnson presidency to $500–600 million under Nixon, meaning that the ‘United States was now 
providing Israel more aid in one year than during the entire Kennedy and Johnson administrations’33 put 
together. The 1970s also witnessed the conclusion of a number of important bilateral agreements 
reflecting this emerging strategic dialogue, establishing important elements of path dependency for future 
US administrations.34 
 																																																								
29 FRUS, Volume XVIII (1964-67), Document 140. 
30 Warren Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the US-Israel Alliance, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
31 In 1968 the US and Israel also signed a secret intelligence sharing agreement. Known as the CYR Agreement, it was signed 
between the Israeli Defence Forces, the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Department of Defence (DoD) and the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). The agreement would supersede the earlier 1951 unsigned understandings reached 
with the Eisenhower administration on the topic of intelligence cooperation. The existence of the CYR Agreement emerged in 
2014 with the release of NSA documents by Edward Snowden. See, Preamble of 1999 US-Israel Intelligence Sharing Agreement, 
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/08/04/israel-us-1999-agreement.pdf. The CYR Agreement was subsequently ‘adjusted, 
broadened, reinforced and extended’ in a 1988 agreement known as ‘Ice Castle’, again updated and expanded with the 1996 
‘Stone Ruby’ agreement and finally, in 1999, by the above cited agreement released by Snowden. 
32 David Tal, “Symbol Not Substance? Israel’s Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles, 1960-1962,” The International History Review, 
Vol.22, No.2 (June 2000), pp.304-317, p.304. 
33 Charles Lipson, “American Support for Israel: History, Sources, Limits,” in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), US-Israel Relations at the 
Crossroads, London/Portland, Frank Crass, 1999, p.141. 
34 In the 1970s these included. A December 1970 Master Defence Development Data Exchange Agreement; A November 1971 
agreement on ‘Production in Israel of US Designed Defence Equipment’; a 1973 joint Weapons Systems Evaluation Group; and 
finally, by 1975, the key US-Israeli MoA containing unprecedented assurances and preferential treatment for Israel negotiated by 
Henry Kissinger in the context of the post-1973 war negotiations. See Appendix B for the full text of the 1975 MoA. 
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In December 1971, the two countries signed the first ‘long-term US military supply agreement’,35 
consolidating long-term US military sales to Israel. This agreement, which came on the heels of the 1970 
Jordanian crisis,36 led to significant benefits for the US defence industry as US ‘military credits to Israel’ 
increased from $30 million in 1970 to $545 million in 1971.37 As noted by Karen L. Puschel, ‘the 1970s 
would show just how different Israel’s value could be perceived […] at the time none of this was ever 
called strategic cooperation. Yet these were the beginnings of the conceptual process and debate from 
which the formal strategic cooperation programme [of the 1980s and the Reagan administration] would 
eventually grow’.38 
 
Following the 1967 war, Israel therefore slowly began to be seen as a potential asset in advancing US 
interests in the region, an important development that points to a significant change of perception in 
Washington and a slow weakening of the fundamentals of the ‘linkage doctrine’. As noted by Joe Stork, 
the ‘asset slogan also served as a cancellation notice: Washington’s earlier assumption, that a settlement of 
the Palestinian question was integral to maintaining the US grip on the Gulf, was misplaced’.39 
 
US planners thus began to consider the region as divided into different zones, with Israel representing the 
bastion of US interests in the Near East (Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria) while Iran and 
Saudi Arabia were transformed into the ‘twin pillars’ guarding US interests in the Persian Gulf.40 Such a 
conceptualization would help to ‘de-link’ US-Israeli relations from the other key US interests in the 
region, indicating a slow fraying of the ‘linkage doctrine’ and the related focus on the tensions between 
the three central US interests in the Middle East: supporting Israel, preserving the flow of oil and limiting 
Soviet expansionism. 
 
The added benefits in terms of political capital at home were also significant, particularly to offset 
domestic pressure in the context of the US war(s) in South-East Asia. This, in turn, would help to solidify 
the image of Israel as both as ‘strategic ally’ and ‘political asset’ for successive US administrations. Once 
established as Israel’s security provider, US policy would be constrained from adopting aid and assistance 
as levers to extract concessions from Israel. As the US became Israel’s sole security provider in the post-
1973 era, the impact of this constraint would be further entrenched. ‘US policymakers, Republican as well 
as Democrat, have usually been reluctant to link Israeli financial assistance to political concessions’, noted 
Wolf Blitzer, for many years The Jerusalem Post’s Washington Correspondent and today lead CNN news 
anchor. ‘Many of them, of course, might have loved to try such a course of action. But for the most part 																																																								
35 Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel,” op.cit., p.246. 
36 The Jordanian Crisis in 1970 and the role of Israel (and the US) in helping to deter Syria from intervening on the side of the 
Palestinians in Jordan would lead to increased rhetorical focus on Israel’s ‘strategic benefits’ for US interests in the Cold War. 
Many have disputed the actual contribution of Israel. See, Harry J. Shaw, “Strategic Dissensus,” Foreign Policy, No.61 (Winter 
1985-86), pp.125-41. 
37 Mansour, Beyond Alliance, op.cit., p.105. 
38 Ibid., p.17. 
39 Joe Stork, “Israel as a Strategic Asset,” MERIP Reports, No.105 (May 1982), pp.3-13 & 32, p.8 (quote). 
40 Mansour, Beyond Alliance, op.cit., p.114. 
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their hands were tied by a combination of built-in political and military circumstances which have helped 
to shape the contours of the American-Israeli relationship’.41 
 
Even if a given crisis were precipitated by Israeli actions, US policy would tend to reflexively support 
Israel and work to contain the damage while maximizing Israeli security gains. The thinking behind such 
an approach relates to the growing juxtaposition between Israeli security and wider US interests and 
concerns tied to solidifying the status quo in the region and limiting Soviet expansionism. It also relates to 
a conscious US effort to establish a ‘prolonged stalemate’42 in the strategic zone of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, allowing the US to downplay those areas of political and strategic disagreement with Israel and 
instead focus on the global dimension of US policy and interests, both in the region and further afield. 
 
Significantly, this growing emphasis on Israeli security and military superiority was not limited to hard 
military questions but could (and eventually would) be extended to cover other key areas such as 
economic security, political-diplomatic security and energy security.43 It would also extend to Israel’s right 
to self-defence, a concept that has further complicated US strategy given that Israel’s policy of military 
reprisals or the disproportionate use of force has often been cited as a serious concern by US leaders. In 
the absence of any clear and mutual definition or ranking of these threats, US policy is effectively left in 
the uncomfortable position of having to recognize Israeli interpretations of its security and self-defence 
needs, with an understanding that these are routinely inflated and exaggerated by Israel in order to ensure 
increased US support.  
 
In precipitating a crisis in the region, Israel could rest assured that the United States would be jolted into 
action and that such action would essentially come down on Israel’s side, given the predisposed American 
sympathy towards Israel and the premising of US policy on the need to preserve Israel’s military 
superiority in accordance with slow emergence of the QME concept. The pervasiveness of this concept 
has represented a considerable institutional constraint on US Middle East policy. President Obama 
himself was reported to have asked his advisors why the US should maintain Israel’s QME, given the 
radically changed conventional threats Israel faces in the region, while other officials have repeatedly 
complained about the impediment this commitment places on US-Arab military cooperation.44 
 
This growing linkage between US deterrence and Israeli military strength would be further solidified 
through a whole series of bureaucratic and institutional agreements approved by the Reagan 
administration during the 1980s. This would represent a ‘transformative moment’ for the relationship, a 																																																								
41 Wolf Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem. A Reporters Notebook, New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985, p.12. 
42 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, op.cit., pp.195-227, p.196 (quote). 
43 These commitments were contained in a 1975 MoA signed by Henry Kissinger. The full text of the 1975 MoA is reprinted in 
Appendix B. 
44 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/; Robert Gates, Duty: Memories of a 
Secretary of State at War, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 
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‘turning point’ that led to the establishment of an ‘institutional umbrella for all sorts of cooperation that 
never existed before [and has been] inherited and built on by all successive administrations’, noted Dennis 
Ross.45 
 
In a polemical 1982 article, Steven Spiegel pointed out how diminishing US support for Israel would be 
‘devastating’ for the region’s ‘stability and our [US] own credibility’: ‘we would have to become the 
protector of a weakened Israel, which would place us in a far more uncomfortable position than in the 
past’.46 This fear of undermining US prestige, deterrence and credibility in the Middle East because of a 
diminishing commitment to support Israel’s military and economic margin became something of a side-
effect of the US’s growing emphasis on Israel’s military superiority as conducive to US interests. It 
moreover points to the fundamental weakening of the ‘linkage doctrine’, with its emphasis on balance and 
even-handedness in US policy. 
 
While no doubt weakened, the principles contained in the ‘linkage doctrine’ would still retain explanatory 
relevance for US policy towards Israel during the Nixon and Ford administrations, as well as that of 
Jimmy Carter. Indeed, while the US developed a vested interest in strengthening Israel’s security and 
military margin, the fundamentals of this policy towards Israel were still inherently linked to the need to 
resolve the conflict (on US and Israeli terms) in order for the US to reap the full strategic dividends of this 
‘Israeli asset’. 
 
The unprecedented increases in US aid and military assistance, including the ground-breaking assurances 
made by Henry Kissinger to Israel in a 1975 MoA, were all linked to a broader US effort to channel 
progress in the negotiations according to US and Israeli interests, solidify the status quo and slowly 
‘prepare the conditions’ for peace in the region. The end goal of (bilateral) Arab-Israeli peace agreements 
was always present in such calculus, as was an appreciation of the underlying hardship and political costs 
entailed in eventually ‘delivering’ the territorial concessions needed to seal an Arab-Israeli agreement. It 
was largely as a result of political expediency, therefore, combined with the prioritization of Cold War 
interests, that US planners sought to delay progress on the diplomatic track. 
 
While short-term strategic and political interests might have coincided in the late 1960s and 1970s, neither 
side has ever ignored the existence of fundamental areas of disagreement between the long-term strategic 
and political visions of the region and Israeli security. In this respect, the growing depiction of Israel as a 
potential ‘asset’ for US interests was inherently linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ability of the US 
to employ the ‘special’ nature of US-Israeli ties to attract the Arabs closer to the US. Such considerations 
were not lost on Israel, which deeply resented such linkage and instead strove for a quasi-exclusivist 
relationship with the US in the Middle East.  																																																								
45 Interview, Dennis Ross, op.cit. 
46 Spiegel, “The Middle East: A Consensus of Errors,” Commentary Magazine, 1 March 1982.  
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Indeed, Israel would use those same territories—and their ‘special’ significance and linkage with broader 
US strategic interests and objectives—as bargaining chips to advance Israel’s own interests’ vis-à-vis the 
US. Chief among these stood Israel’s effort to ensure constant and reliable US support and aid. This 
would translate into an effort to fashion an exclusivist relationship with the US in the Middle East, one 
capable of keeping Israeli interests and concerns at front and centre of US policy and thereby providing 
assurances that US policy would not someday sacrifice Israeli interests in order to bring the numerically 
superior and energy-rich Arab states closer to the United States.  
 
A significant, yet rarely appreciated dimension of the US-Israel relationship, particularly in the security 
domain, has therefore been predicated on mutual, and largely covert, efforts to ‘Americanize’ Israeli policy 
and ‘Israelize’ US perceptions, as each actor sought to bring the approaches of the other closer to its own 
long-term vision and interests. While Israeli leaders had long sought to tie the US to Israel through a 
quasi-exclusivist relationship based on a supposed complementarity of interests and values, US leaders 
have tended to push back against these efforts. ‘There is much that is in common and parallel in Israeli 
and US policies’, noted US President Gerald Ford in a 1976 letter to his Israeli counterpart, ‘but they have 
never been and cannot be identical’.47 
 
It would be in this context that Kissinger, like all previous (and future) US policymakers, would struggle to 
convince Israeli leaders not to oppose evolving US efforts to co-opt the Arab states through arms sales 
and increased economic aid and support—not to mention eventual Israeli territorial concessions needed 
to ultimately seal a peace deal. As candidly noted by Kissinger in one meeting with the leaders of the 
organized Jewish-American community,  
 
It is very easy for a group like this to try to say that American and Israeli interests are identical. 
But this is not exactly so […] Israeli strength does not prevent the spread of communism in the 
Arab world. Israeli strength provides for Israeli security. The best defence against the spread of 
communism in the Arab world is to strengthen the moderate Arab governments.48  
 
Support for Israeli security, through an early articulation of what would become the QME concept, 
would therefore replace the previous emphasis on a balanced approach, becoming a means to 
conceptually justify increased aid and military assistance. Through an increased sense of security and self-
confidence, Israeli leaders (as well as US and Israeli society) could presumably be more easily convinced 
to engage in territorial withdrawals and compromise with Arab states. This would allow US policy to 
																																																								
47 Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, “Presidential Message to Rabin, January 1976,” Box 2 ‘Israel-Prime Minister Rabin’ 
Folder, National Security Advisor’s Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, pp.43-46, p.44 (quote), 
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0351/1555818.pdf. 
48 FRUS, Volume XXVI (1974-76), Document 189. 
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frame aid for Israel as an ‘investment for peace’ or ‘preparing the groundwork’ for peace in the region, 
while the real drivers represented political expediency at home and Cold War interests abroad.  
 
While the end goal of peace was delayed and downgraded during the 1970s and 1980, its key importance 
as a means to reconcile the ‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ dimensions of US Middle East policy was never ignored. It 
was in this context that the key themes of leverage and influence would come into play, and it would be 
in this arena that the Reagan administration would (perhaps unintentionally) depart from the legacy of 
Henry Kissinger. 
 
During the 1980s, US policy was to continue Kissinger’s approach independently from any diplomatic 
progress in the Arab-Israeli theatre. Indeed there was an acceleration of US support accompanied by a 
hardening of Israeli negotiating stances and increased evidence of Israel’s true intention of never 
withdrawing from the OPT. As a result, the ‘Israel asset’ slogan would effectively become ‘de-linked’ 
from the Arab-Israeli conflict, a conceptual shift that would have far-reaching implications for future US 
policy and in particular the theme of leverage and influence between Israel and the US. 
 
2.3 Security and the Paradox of Leverage: Balance vs. Exclusivity 
 
Beneath the surface of the ‘special relationship’ and other rhetorical flourishes meant to evidence the 
depth of US support for Israel, the top-level US-Israel relationship has actually been characterized by 
considerable tensions and disagreements. Robert Gates, who has worked in various capacities with 
successive US administrations since the 1970s, noted in his 2000 Oral History testimony that ‘every 
president I worked for, at some point in his presidency, would get so pissed off at the Israelis that he 
couldn’t speak. It didn’t matter whether it was Jimmy Carter or Gerry Ford or Ronald Reagan or George 
Bush. Something would happen and they would just [get] so angry and they’d sort of rant and rave 
around the Oval Office’.49 
 
These tensions were particularly pronounced in the context of Israel’s opposition to enhanced US-Arab 
cooperation. All US administrations have clashed with Israeli leadership about Israel’s insensitivity to the 
US’s wider concerns and interests. Such dynamics were of particular importance during the 1980s, when 
US policy sought to build up the strategic defences of key Arab states in close vicinity to the Persian Gulf 
in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution. Yet, the same dimensions were also on display in the context 
of Johnson’s sale of major offensive weaponry to Israel in 1966 and 1968, undertaken to compensate Israel 
for US arms sales to Jordan while seeking to dissuade Israel from going nuclear, rather than out of a 
tangible appreciation of Israel’s ‘strategic services’ for the US.  
 
																																																								
49 George H.W. Bush Oral History Project, “Interview with Robert Gates – Transcript,” 23-24 July 2000, p.88, 
http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_2000_0723_gates.pdf. 
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Ultimately, Israel has pocketed successive increases of support in exchange for only limited, tactical 
modifications of a given policy—as opposed to revision of certain central tenets of Israeli strategy 
(nuclear weapons manufacturing, military reprisals, settlement construction, the status of Jerusalem, or 
opposition to US-Arab strategic dialogue, to name but a few). Opposition to enhanced US-Arab 
cooperation continued, as Israel viewed such dynamics as a threat to its own ‘special’ relationship, fearing 
that US policy would gradually move closer to the positions of the Arab states in exchange for increased 
commercial access and military basing rights. This would dilute the US-Israel relationship and threaten 
Israel’s quest for an exclusivist alliance with the US in the Middle East.  
 
As much as US leaders have repeatedly pushed Israel to demonstrate a greater sensitivity to the US’s wider 
interests and concerns, essentially requesting a ‘quid’ in exchange for America’s ‘quo’ of aid and support, 
these efforts have consistently fallen short. ‘I ask [Israeli Prime Minister] Rabin to make concessions, and 
he says he can’t because Israel is weak’, lamented Kissinger during the mid-1970s, ‘so I give him more 
arms, and he says he doesn’t need to make concessions because Israel is strong’.50 This is the context in 
which the first severe, top-level US-Israeli political crisis took shape during the Ford administration—the 
so-called ‘reassessment crisis’ of 1975. 
 
The crisis stemmed from Israel’s intransigence in the context of the Sinai I and II negotiations that 
followed the 1973 war, leading the Ford administration to threaten a complete ‘reassessment’51 of US 
policy towards Israel. The threat was ultimately undermined by the power of domestic constraints and the 
upcoming 1976 elections. An open letter signed by over three-quarters of the US Senate would call on 
Ford to repair relations and return US policy to its baseline of support for Israel, leading to Kissinger’s 
unprecedented offering of security, energy and political assurances contained in the secret 1975 MoA.52  
 
The significance of that agreement in laying much of the political and institutional groundwork for 
subsequent US-Israel relations, as well as US negotiating tactics, cannot be overstated. Israeli scholar Avi 
Shlaim has noted how from that point on the US-Israel relationship was an alliance in ‘all but name’.53 The 
practice of approaching US-Israeli negotiations through inducements and soft persuasion (‘carrots’) over 
sanctions or coercive diplomacy (‘sticks’) would also become a legacy of this agreement, as would the 
political lessons of Israel’s growing influence in Congress and an unprecedented assurance by the US to 
consult with Israel before any major policy initiative on the Arab-Israeli conflict (see Appendix B). 
 
																																																								
50 Quoted in Mansour, Beyond Alliance, op.cit., p.119 
51 FRUS, Volume XXVI (1974-1976), Document 156. 
52 For a detailed account of the 1975 reassessment crisis see, Aaron T. Walter, The Limits of Influence: Gerald Ford, Yitzhak Rabin and 
the 1975 Reassessment of US-Israel Relations, JoySpring (Kindle), 2014 (unpublished PhD); Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall. Israel and the 
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Similar disagreements have surfaced repeatedly throughout the history of US-Israel relations, and these 
have regularly been resolved through backchannel dialogue, the temporary suspension of military supplies 
or, in the most extreme of cases as happened in the mid-1950s and in 1975, by the threat of political and 
economic sanctions accompanied by significant benefits in the event of an Israeli backtrack. Ultimately, 
the incremental growth in US assistance has never halted, and has often increased exponentially in the 
wake of severe top-level political disagreements, as indeed would occur in 1975 and during the first two 
years of the Reagan administration.   
 
Leaders in both Israel and the United States have been well aware of how popular support for Israel 
could be used to ramp up political pressure on a sitting US administration. This support, and particularly 
that coming from the US Congress, could serve to either constrain or bolster a given US policy strategy, 
providing Israeli leaders and their US supporters with a significant means to push back against the clear 
power asymmetry between the US and Israel. This dimension has created significant frustration among 
US policymakers, who have consistently had to worry about ‘protecting the domestic flank’. From the 
standpoint of Israel, there is little doubt that such reservoirs of US societal support have represented a 
considerable ‘strategic asset’ for the advancement of Israeli interests vis-à-vis the United States. 
 
From the early 1950s onwards, Israeli leaders, representatives and their supporters in the United States 
have grown exceptionally adept at building on and exploiting this societal sympathy for Israel. After 
increased attention was given to improving coordination and organization within the America-Jewish 
community—though the founding of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish 
Organizations and the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in the mid-1950s—Israeli 
leaders and their US supporters gradually came to exert considerable influence over domestic debates 
about Israel and as a consequence on the development of US policy in the Middle East.54 The founder of 
what became AIPAC, Isaiah Kenen once defined the role of the organisation in these terms, 
demonstrating again the ‘bottom-up’ nature of early US support for Israel: ‘It is our job to lobby the 
Congress to tell the president to overrule the State Department.’55 
 
As a result, US policy towards Israel has largely resorted to the use of ‘carrots’ through provisions of 
inducements, soft persuasion and slow, mostly covert, attempts at assimilation or ‘Americanization’ as a 
means to increase US leverage and influence. While US administrations, including that of Ronald Reagan, 
have at times employed elements of negative conditionality vis-à-vis Israel, these have largely been 
momentary, symbolic moves aimed at sending a signal to the Arab world or international community that 
the US was still capable of ‘playing fair’ in the Middle East. Announced with much fanfare, and inevitably 																																																								
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leading to storms of criticism and pressure on a sitting US administration, these instances of political, 
economic or military pressure on Israel have been extremely short-lived or cosmetic, with large 
dimensions of the US-Israel relationship remaining unaffected. 
 
This has not produced significant incentives for Israeli leaders to modify the fundamentals of their policy, 
and may indeed have further increased Israel’s propensity not to compromise on its maximalist objectives. 
At each crisis point, even in those instances when a continuation of a given Israeli policy was arguably 
harmful to the country’s own interests, Israel could count on the United States to come to the rescue by 
supplying incentives for a reversal of said policy, thereby offsetting most, if not all, of its costs.  
 
In justifying his threat to ‘reassess’ US policy towards Israel in 1975, President Gerald Ford noted how 
this principle of linking Israeli military superiority to increased flexibility and leverage had not 
materialized, and that some form of coercion was needed to convince Israel to modify its policy.56 Ford 
complained that the United States ‘cannot be in a position to isolate ourselves from the rest of the world 
simply in order to stand behind the intransigence of Israel’,57 later writing in his memoirs: 
 
For the past twenty-five years, the philosophical underpinning of US policy towards Israel had 
been our conviction—and certainly my own—that if we gave Israel an ample supply of 
economic aid and weapons, she would feel strong and confident, more flexible and more willing 
to discuss a lasting peace. […] The Israelis were stronger militarily than all their Arab neighbours 
combined, yet peace was no closer than it had ever been. So I began to question the rationale 
for our policy. I wanted the Israelis to recognize that there had to be some quid pro quo.58  
 
This same thinking would define the approaches of successive US administrations vis-à-vis Israel, yet, as a 
result of domestic pressures and a increased reliance on Israeli deterrence and military might, most 
administrations have been significantly reluctant to engage in prolonged public battle with Israel, unless a 
key and central US strategic interest is threatened. In this respect, Camille Mansour is right to point out 
that policy, especially in a time of crisis, is ‘made out of expedient measures’59 rather than clear-cut 
strategic logic or long-term vision. Given the engrained and predisposed US sympathy towards Israel, 
decision-makers have often found themselves augmenting the bureaucratic nature of US preferential 
treatment even while identifying Israeli actions as the cause for the present crisis. Moreover, a highly 
important trend in US-Israel relations and the theme of leverage relates to the fact that in times of crisis, 
or military contingencies, US policymakers are inherently constrained from not backing Israel in public, a 
dynamic that has further limited US and presidential leverage over Israel while supplying Israel’s leadership 
with important indirect means to solidify US support and assistance: that of heightening military tensions 																																																								
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Books, 2017.  
57 FRUS Volume XXVI (1969-1976), Document 150. 
58 Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald Ford, New York, Harper, 1979, pp.244-45; Also quoted in Mansour, 
Beyond Alliance, op.cit., p.118.  
59 Mansour, Beyond Alliance, op.cit., pp.90-95. 
		 59	
or even of catapulting a crisis in the region as a tactical means of returning US policy to its baseline of 
support for Israel while enhancing tensions in US-Arab relations. 
 
This was the case in the mid-to-late 1950s, when increasingly violent Israeli military raids against Nasser’s 
Egypt would further Cairo’s need for arms and security from the Soviets, in turn leading to the increased 
militarization of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, by 1958, increased US involvement on the side of Israel.60 A 
similar scenario was repeated during the 1968–70 War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt, when deep 
Israeli bombing raids in the outskirts of Cairo led Egypt to install Soviet-made SAM anti-aircraft batteries, 
in turn forcing the US to increase its military and diplomatic support for Israel (much the same was to 
occur in Lebanon, with Syria moving Soviet SAM batteries into the country in the early 1980s in response 
to Israeli military actions). 
 
With regard to this latter event, Kissinger noted in his diary how the US was ‘preoccupied with Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos, shaken by domestic upheaval, [and] more than half convinced that Israeli belligerence 
had provoked the Soviet move’.61 In the end, US policy once again favoured Israel, with Kissinger 
justifying this approach by noting that ‘the question of what causes a Soviet move becomes irrelevant; 
American policy must deal with its consequences, not with its causes’.62 
 
As a result, US policy has gradually come to view preservation of the status quo in the Middle East as 
holding the fewest (political and strategic) risks for a US administration, given that any more proactive 
approach would entail pursuit of a diplomatic breakthrough between Israel and the Arabs, which in turn 
could result in prolonged political crisis with Israel that could be exploited by the Soviet Union.US 
frustration over Israeli unwillingness to make territorial concessions should not be exaggerated, however. 
This delay was in fact part and parcel of US policy approach to the region. As articulated by Henry 
Kissinger, ‘it was not in our interest to seek subservience. […] Once it was proved that we could make 
Israel do anything, Arab demands would escalate. Then we would be blamed for Israel’s failure to meet 
Arab terms. […] Our strategy depended on being the only country capable of eliciting Israeli concessions, 
but also on our doing it within a context where this was perceived to be a difficult task’.63 
 
Ultimately therefore, US policy sought become the sole negotiator and guarantor of the Arab-Israeli 
diplomatic process, employing this process to maximize Israeli security and US influence, while at the 
same time not assuming the ultimate responsibility for Israeli intransigence and the ensuing diplomatic 
deadlock. Thus, US policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict in the post-1967 period prioritized ‘process’ over 																																																								
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‘peace’, and the power of institutionalized precedents, along with the gradual increase in interdependence 
between the US and Israeli military and security doctrines, has ensured a continuance of this prioritization 
in the post-Cold War era as well. 
 
Little did it matter that this Israeli intransigence was (and is) made possible through US aid and military 
support. And, little did it matter that this same support was largely predicated on an effort to diminish 
Israeli intransigence. Edward Sheehan, who travelled with Secretary of State Kissinger during his frantic 
shuttle diplomacy in the 1970s, highlighted this fundamental incongruence: 
 
During the abortive negotiation of March 1975 Kissinger lamented his failure to extract 
concessions [from Israel] first; immense arms shipments to Israel ‘was naïve—my biggest 
mistake’ [Kissinger recalled]. Following the second Sinai agreement, Kissinger argued that the 
new arms would encourage Israeli flexibility. He had said the same five years before, when he 
assumed concessions would result once Israel was invincible. Dr. Kissinger had come full 
circle.64 
 
From this early stage therefore it was becoming clear that increasing US leverage over Israel, or even 
making sure that it would abide by past assurances, would be an extremely difficult task. While some of 
this was tactical, US leaders could not hide their discomfort when push came to shove and Israel would be 
called upon to make the necessary concessions.  
 
Indeed, Israel always seemed to demand more and with few or no strings attached. Richard W. Murphy, 
former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs between 1983 and 1989, noted 
in an interview with the author how Israel seemed have a ‘bottomless pit of apprehension and fear’65 when 
it came to its security. Although much of this was ‘justified’, it was widely known that Israel tended to 
exaggerate threats as a means to elicit increased US support. Israeli historian Avi Shlaim has quoted 
Israel’s Defence Minister Moshe Dayan to sum up Israel’s general approach to US aid: ‘Our American 
friends give us money, arms and advice. We take the money, we take arms but we decline the advice’.66 
 
To explain the apparent lack of leverage over Israel it is therefore necessary to dissect the conceptual 
frameworks governing US aid and support. It is important here to appreciate how US support for Israeli 
security and military margin began being framed as a complementary component of a broader strategy 
aimed at consolidating US hegemony over the region to the detriment of the Soviet Union. It is in the 
context of this growing reliance on Israeli military strength, and a related effort to downplay the centrality 
of those areas of incompatibility between US and Israeli strategic interests and long-term visions for the 
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region, that the US embrace of a policy predicated mainly on inducements and soft persuasion should be 
understood. 
 
While this approach would begin to crystallize the notion of Israel being a potential ‘asset’ for US 
strategic objectives, the true determinants of this ‘asset’ related not to Israel’s ‘strategic services’ but rather 
to its linkage with the Arab-Israeli conflict and ability of the US to employ this conflict in such a way as to 
advance US Cold War interests while staying true to the US’s fundamental commitment to Israel’s 
security. This overlap between shot-term US Cold War interests and domestic pressures to support Israel 
would facilitate an erroneous portrayal of complementarity in US and Israeli strategic interests in the 
Middle East. Such portrayals would help to entrench the notion that ‘what is good for Israel is good for 
the US’, leading eventually to a policy of support for Israel ‘right or wrong’ that has significantly 
weakened the US’s professed role as a mediator in the region.  
 
Ultimately, such a scenario has undermined the real ‘asset’ that Israel provides US policy: providing an 
entry-point for the US to become the sole guarantor of an Arab-Israeli agreement that could consolidate 
US hegemony over the Middle East and finally reconcile the ‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ dimensions of US policy.  
 
By consistently downplaying the very real elements of incongruence between US and Israeli long-term 
visions for the region and simply assuming that the US could gradually ‘save Israel in spite of herself’67 
through a slow process of ‘Americanization’ of Israeli policies, the US has—perhaps unwittingly—
established itself as the ultimate guarantor of Israeli security and survival without any tangible increase in 
leverage or assurances from its small Middle Eastern ally. 
 
In effect, the US has lost potential leverage over Israel as a result of policy options being consistently 
narrowed by the need to place Israeli security concerns—and Israel’s definition of these concerns—at 
front and centre of US policy. Ultimately, the US would become ‘entrapped’ in a quasi-exclusivist US-
Israeli relationship in the Middle East, precluding it from using its vast potential leverage over Israel as a 
tool to advance its strategic interests in the region.  
 
While President Carter had tried to direct US policy to a greater focus on the Palestinian question, political 
tensions with Israel were such as to undermine these efforts. Some form of autonomy was all the US 
could extract from Israel’s leadership and it is indeed here, in the context of the OPT, that the true limits 
of US leverage—and the power of ‘security’ as an Israeli trump card over US policy, not to mention 
Palestinian rights or security—are best demonstrated. Israeli leaders had long refused any notion of a 
possible withdrawal from these territories on the basis of security concerns, and there appeared little the 
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US could do about the situation. As noted by Moshe Dayan in a 1977 interview with Newsweek 
Magazine:  
 
If the US insists on a Palestinian State, I think that any Israeli government would reject it. And 
if we have to make the choice tomorrow of what to do: have a breach with the US […] or 
accept a Palestinian state, we would rather have these problems with the US than agree to a 
Palestinian state, which we seriously think would eventually bring the destruction of Israel.68 
 
This soft approach to Israel was further cemented by the Carter administration, which granted 
Israel another round of unprecedented sweeteners and preferential treatment in the context of the 
1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. The key strategic goal of concluding a peace agreement with 
Egypt, and thereby solidifying Cairo’s passage into the Western camp, would override the value of a 
prolonged political crisis with Israel over the Palestinian question. As a result, and based on the 
policy approach developed by Kissinger during the Sinai I and II negotiations, US policy under 
Carter and even Reagan would proceed along similar path dependency, prioritizing inducements 
and soft persuasion in negotiations with Israel. 
 
Indeed, many of the same policymakers who worked on Kissinger’s team would be called back to 
serve in the Reagan administration, ensuring a level of continuity in the US’s approach to the 
Middle East during 1980s. Given the widespread—but rather misplaced—perception in 
Washington that Egypt’s Sadat had sued for peace due to the military superiority of Israel and its 
‘special’ relationship with the United States, there was little apparent reason to change this 
approach. 
 
Yet, there were fundamental differences between the Reagan administration’s approach to Israel 
and that of previous Republican and Democrat presidents. Differently from Nixon and Ford, 
Reagan, a former democrat, Hollywood actor and native of California, would approach Israel by 
infusing a potent mixture of populism into all three pillars of US support. Reagan and his team would 
emphasize a ‘moral obligation’69 to support Israel while also elevating the third pillar of strategic 
cooperation to new and unprecedented heights. Differently from the past, however, this emphasis 
on Israel as a ‘strategic asset’ would gradually become de-linked from the Arab-Israeli conflict or 
diplomatic efforts in that arena, with the Reagan administration more interested in forging a Cold 
War alliance with an offensive posture in the region.  
 
By the time of the 1980 election, Republican candidate Reagan would highlight the extent to which the old 
portrayal of Israel as a ‘liability’ for US foreign policy had effectively been superseded by this new 																																																								
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emphasis on the strategic benefits of US-Israel cooperation. Speaking at a campaign rally at the annual 
B’nai B’irth forum in September 1980, Reagan said: 
 
While morality is most frequently given as a motive for actions, the true and abiding motive is 
self-interest. Well, the touchstone of our relationship with Israel is that a secure, strong Israel 
is in America’s self-interest. Israel is a major strategic asset to America. Israel is not a client, 
but a very reliable friend. […] While we have since 1948 clung to the argument of a moral 
imperative to explain our commitment to Israel, no administration has ever deluded itself that 
Israel was not of permanent strategic importance to America. […] To weaken Israel is to 
destabilize the Middle East and risk the peace of the world.70 
 
This emphasis on the strategic value of Israel was thus born out of a process by which certain 
fundamental assumptions about US Middle East policy changed in reaction to the interplay between 
international developments tied to the Cold War, US-Arab relations and domestic pressures to support 
Israel. In essence these changes would lead to a gradual chipping away of the central principles of the 
linkage doctrine, pushing US policy to abandon its previous emphasis on balance and even-handedness as 
the best means to maintain influence and leverage over both Israel and the Arabs, and closer to Israel’s end 
goal of a quasi-exclusivist relationship with the US in the Middle East. 
 
As the end-game of peace was downgraded below the US’s other priorities tied to the Cold War and 
domestic politics, US policy shifted to focus on those regional, international and domestic ‘conditions’ 
that US planners believed promised the best chance of achieving peace. Even-handedness was therefore 
replaced by an overtly pro-Israel policy justified on the basis of serving the US’s geostrategic (and 
domestic/political) interests. Fundamentally, however, this embrace of strategic rationalizations for US 
support emerged as a by-product of the US’s commitment to Israeli security, a development that in turn 
materialized as a result of US societal support for Israel and the impact of these intangible feelings on 
high-level US decision-makers charged with developing Middle East policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
US support for Israel is derived from a mixture of ideational, religious and moral considerations that in 
their entirety can be summarized by reference to the twin pillars of shared Judeo-Christian values and 
political affinities. Joining these intangible forces, in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and Israel’s 
occupation of large swaths of Arab territory, US planners began to add a further layer of strategic 
justifications for US support, eventually crystallizing the third, and most controversial pillar in the US-
Israel relationship: ‘strategic cooperation’. 
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This third pillar has never achieved the same level of consensus as the twin pillars of shared norms and 
values. Shai Feldman has noted how ‘the strategic dimension of America’s motivation for supporting 
Israel never comprised the core of these relations. [… It] never approached that of the other elements in 
the U.S.-Israel relationship’.71 
 
This is largely explained by the fact that Israel’s potential value for US interests would be linked and 
constrained to the strategic zone of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Near East. Israel began having value for 
US interests through its linkage to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the related efforts by the US to establish its 
hegemony over the diplomatic process in such a way as to advance key US Cold War interests, not as a 
result of Israel’s ‘strategic services’ for US interests. 
 
Israel’s ‘strategic value’ for US policy would therefore be inherently linked the US’s avowed ability to 
deliver Israeli concessions to the Arab states that would help to solidify their reliance on the Western 
camp in the Cold War. Yet, when the moment came for the US to seek to deliver these Israeli 
concessions, as was the case with Kissinger in the mid-1970s, Carter in the late 1970s, Bill Clinton in the 
1990s or Barak Obama and John Kerry in 2014, the significant limits of US leverage and influence over 
Israel have been manifestly evident. 
 
Constrained from employing hard conditionality, let alone sanctions or cohesive diplomacy, US 
policymakers have ultimately employed soft persuasion accompanied by a slow, largely covert, effort to 
‘Americanize’ Israeli policies and long-term viewpoints as the best—and most cost effective—means to 
influence Israeli behaviour. Predicated mainly on political expediency and short-term strategic gain, the 
translation of such approaches into institutional and bureaucratic commitments granting Israel 
preferential treatment in the economic, military and political domains would solidify into path 
dependency for future US policy. The cumulative results of these ad hoc agreements and commitments 
would establish something akin to a straitjacket determining the policy of successive administrations, even 
when strategic developments would suggest another course of action. 
 
Each successive administration has thus consistently outdone its predecessor with increased aid for Israel 
notwithstanding the repeated occurrence of severe top-level disagreements with that country. This 
incremental development and the related expansion of preferential treatment for Israel have created a 
distinct dimension to the US-Israel relationship: one defined by repeated (political) crises and (policy) 
continuity.72 This continuity is based on the depths of US popular support for Israel and a series of 
concepts and perceptions developed by elite opinion and executive agency about the best means to 																																																								
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reconcile this commitment with the advancement of broader US interests in the Middle East and the 
Cold War.  
 
Most fundamentally, however, this policy has survived in light of the politically charged nature of US 
support for Israel and the engrained notion that a strong and militarily secure Israel is conducive to the 
advancement of other US interests. Commonly described as an ‘investment for peace’, massive US aid to 
Israel continues to this day to be predicated on the need to ensure Israeli security as a (pre)condition for 
peace in the region. After half a century of pursuing this approach, the time has come to reassess the 
fundamental premise governing US military aid to Israel, analysing its (in)effectiveness as a means to 
increase US leverage and thereby helping the US to move from a focus on ‘conditions’ to actual peace in 
the Middle East.73 	
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Chapter 3 
 
The Reagan Revolution 
 
Ronald Reagan’s election as the 40th President of the United States was a watershed moment in US 
politics. As the first US president to serve two consecutive terms in office since the 1950s, the eight years 
of the Reagan administration left a deep mark on the US national consciousness and foreign policy style.  
 
Rallying supporters under the banner of a resurgent nationalism and a restored belief in the greatness and 
exceptionalism of the American experience, the ‘Age of Reagan’ would herald a new conservative and 
militarized turn in American politics. From economics, to social policy, the role of government, religion 
and a renewed emphasis on military might as tool to revive national greatness at home, many of the 
political and ideological principles introduced by the Reagan administration continue to impact and even 
define contemporary policy debates in the United States. 
 
Such has become the appeal of Reagan that a cult-like following has formed around the former president, 
who died of Alzheimer’s disease at his ranch in California in 2004. Both Democratic and Republican 
politicians routinely pay homage to his persona and legacy, seeking in no uncertain terms to assume for 
themselves a portion of the former president’s popularity. During the 2008 Democratic Party primary, 
Barack Obama described the 1980 election as ‘different’; ‘Ronald Reagan changed the trajectory of 
America in a way that […] Richard Nixon did not and in a way that Bill Clinton did not. He put us on a 
fundamentally different path’.1 
 
During the 2016 presidential election campaign and the Republican and Democratic primaries, Reagan 
would surface repeatedly in the speeches of various contenders. Republican nominee Donald Trump 
unabashedly assumed for himself Reagan’s election slogan, promising to ‘make America great again’, 
while his Democratic rival Hilary Clinton repeatedly asked ‘what would Ronald Reagan say?’ as a means 
to remind her audience of the extent Trump had strayed from Reagan’s political legacy and philosophy.2 
 
More than a decade since the former president’s death, Reagan’s aura looms large over American politics 
and state-society relations, often scoring high marks in opinion rankings of the ‘greatest US president’ in 
history.3 Differentiating between the image and reality of Reagan’s personal legacy is no easy task however. 
His detached leadership style and tendency to delegate decisions to subordinates have led some to 
describe Reagan as little more than a figurehead in the so-called ‘Reagan Revolution’. Reagan’s biographer 																																																								
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Lou Cannon recalled how Reagan ‘may have been the one president in the history of the republic who 
saw his election as a chance to get some rest’,4 going further to report how the NSC’s morning briefings 
were moved from the early hours of the morning to 9.30 am. 
 
Reagan’s leadership style would lead to significant bureaucratic haggling and personal animosities within 
the administration. Donald Reagan, the president’s Secretary of the Treasury and later Chief of Staff, 
recalled how ‘in the four years that I served as secretary of the treasury, I never saw President Reagan 
alone and never discussed economic philosophy. […] After I accepted the job he simply hung up and 
vanished.’5 Another former administration official, Kenneth Adelman, went further, noting how ‘in terms 
of US foreign policy decision making, the Reagan administration was the messiest I’ve ever seen’.6 
 
Setting aside these controversies, few would dispute Reagan’s physiological impact and the broader legacy 
left by his administration after eight years in power. Such was the appeal of Reagan’s demeanour, a dynamic 
also helped by the failed assassination attempt in 1981, that repeated scandals and controversies did little 
to harm what became known as the ‘Teflon presidency’. Indeed, after eight years in office, the Republican 
Party would defy expectations and secure a virtual third term in the November 1988 elections under the 
leadership of George H. W. Bush, Reagan’s Vice President, a highly unusual feat in American politics and 
one that has largely been explained by Reagan’s popularity. James Baker III, Reagan’s first Chief of Staff 
and a member of the president’s famous troika of advisors charged with running the day-to-day business 
of the White House, would recall in a recent interview how the ‘secret to Reagan’s success’ was simply 
that he made ‘people feel good’.7 
 
This chapter will examine the primary political and ideological components of the Reagan administration, 
tracing their roots back to the significant socio-political, economic and demographic changes occurring in 
America throughout the 1970s. Having twice failed to secure the Republican nomination in 1968 and 
1976, Reagan’s election in 1980 was very much a product of the times. In order to understand the 
administration’s ideological inclinations, its strategic vision and priorities, it is therefore necessary to 
examine the specific ideational and historical context in which Reagan’s political career would take shape, 
leading finally to his successful bid for the presidency in November 1980. 
 
In so doing the chapter will examine the so-called ‘Reagan revolution’, focusing on the foreign policy 
dimensions of his administration and the ways in which enhanced militarism abroad was increasingly 
considered a function of the administration’s broader political, psychological and ideological objectives at 																																																								
4 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1991, p.116.  
5 William Leuchtenburg, “Behind the Reagan Myth,” Salon, 27 December 2015, 
http://www.salon.com/2015/12/27/behind_the_ronald_reagan_myth_no_one_had_ever_entered_the_white_house_so_grossl
y_ill_informed_2/. 
6 “Interview with Kenneth Adelman,” Ronald Reagan Oral History Project, 30 September 2003, p.18, 
http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_2003_0930_adelman.pdf. 
7 Quoted from, CNN Special Miniseries, “The Eighties: The Reagan Revolution (episode 2),” 31 March 2016. 
		 68	
the domestic level. In framing the ‘Reagan Revolution’ the chapter will examine two slogans—‘Kicking 
the Malaise’ and ‘Peace through Strength’—that together encapsulate the important interplay between 
domestic and foreign politics during the Reagan administration. 
 
The chapter will further examine the administration’s sources of domestic support and the composition 
of its foreign policy team, highlighting the emergence of new generation of policymakers and advisors 
and analysing their impact on the articulation of US foreign policy during the 1980s. The emphasis will be 
placed on the emergence of a more proactive and militarized American policy on the world stage, but the 
analysis will examine the existence of significant domestic and bureaucratic constraints to this promised 
‘revolution’ in foreign affairs. 
 
3.1 The ‘Age of Reagan’: Ideology and Politics 
 
Often referred to as the ‘Age of Reagan’, the 1980s had a transformative impact on US politics and 
society. Historians, sociologists, economists and foreign policy specialists have all referred to this decade 
as a key turning point in the modern history of the United States, contributing to the popularization of 
the term ‘Reagan Revolution’ to broadly capture the significance of Reagan’s election in 1980. The central 
and most defining feature of this ‘revolution’ was its ideological dimension; the extent in which Reagan’s 
election would signal an overturning of traditional political alliances and herald the beginnings of a new, 
conservative and militarized turn in US politics.  
 
This ideological ‘revolution’ was on the one hand driven by a renewed period of tension and animosity in 
US-Soviet relations that began in 1979, but more fundamentally reflected the culmination of a series of 
socio-political, economic and demographic trends in the US that combined to create the general 
backdrop to Reagan’s political rise. In this regard, Reagan’s election and his ideological predispositions 
was very much a product of the times, a watershed moment that has come to signal the end of one 
political-ideological era and the beginning of the next.  
 
Known as the ‘great communicator’, Reagan’s most valuable political asset was his ability to connect with 
the average citizen, instilling a renewed sense of optimism and pride in US society and politico-military 
capabilities. Synthesizing—or more often oversimplifying—complex realities into potent one-liners, 
Reagan’s rhetorical style was born out of a deep conviction in the moral superiority of US values and way 
of life and an ardent and seemingly uncompromising anti-Communist worldview. In this respect, 
Reagan’s ideological predispositions and rhetorical style represented a significant departure from the 
moderate, even tamed leadership of Jimmy Carter. 
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While Carter talked about a ‘crisis of the American spirit’, warning that ‘a majority of our people believe 
that the next five years will be worst than the past’,8 Reagan would forcibly push back against this general 
sense of decline. Exonerating the American people, Reagan placed the blame on detached political elites, 
thereby introducing a new strand of populist politics in the United States that continues to hold sway 
today. ‘Government is not the solution to our problem, it is the problem’,9 Reagan famously declared 
during his inaugural address in 1981, a statement that in itself represents a vivid representation of 
Reagan’s ideological predispositions. The ‘American dream lives’—Reagan exclaimed in a later speech 
from 1983—‘as long as that dream lives, as long as we continue to defend it, America has a future, and all 
mankind has reason to hope’.10 
 
Countering America’s perceived sense of decline, creeping isolationism and tendency for self-criticism 
became the top priorities of the new administration. ‘There was indeed a sense of pessimism in the US’ 
on the eve of the 1980 election, recalled Nicolas Veliotes. The economy was suffering from massive 
inflation and rising energy costs, the civil rights movement and ‘culture wars’ were leading to mounting 
social tensions in many US cities and the humiliating defeats in Vietnam and Iran were very much present 
in the collective mind of US society. ‘It was easy to take advantage of this [pessimism] to claim weakness 
in national security policy’, added the former Ambassador to Jordan and Assistant Secretary of State for 
the Near East in the early years of the Reagan administration.11 
 
Reagan and his team therefore quickly worked to distance their administration from Carter’s legacy. 
Human rights and efforts to restrict arms sales were used by the Reagan campaign to accuse the 
Democratic administration of abandoning US allies, starting from the Shah in Iran who was overthrown 
in 1979, but also including South Africa, El Salvador and Pakistan to name but a few. In this regard, 
Reagan’s electoral victory came to symbolize a mighty return of the globalist framework in US foreign 
policy. Regional conflicts and challenges were either ignored or considered in zero-sum terms, in light of 
their potential to alter the strategic and military balance between the US and the Soviet Union. 
 
Reagan’s first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, would outline the new administration’s policy in his first 
press conference following the election. On 29 January 1981, Haig declared to the media that 
‘international terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern’12, further expressing his view 
that the Soviet Union was itself the major sponsor of international terrorism. In support of these claims, 
the Reagan administration would champion the recent work of investigative journalist Clair Starling, who 																																																								
8 APP, “Jimmy Carter. Address to the Nation on Energy and National Goals: ‘The Malaise Speech’,” 15 July 1979, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/carter-crisis/. 
9 APP, “Ronald Reagan. Inaugural Address,” 20 January 1981, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43130. 
10 RRPL, “Ronald Reagan: Remarks at the Annual Washington Conference of the American Legion,” 22 February 1983, 
https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1983/22283b.htm. 
11 Interview, Nicolas Veliotes, op.cit. 
12 Philip Taubman, “US Tries to Back Up Haig on Terrorism,” NYT, 3 May 1981, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/03/world/us-tries-to-back-up-haig-on-terrorism.html?pagewanted=all. 
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in 1981 published The Terror Network in which she outlined the role of the Soviet Union in sponsoring the 
activities of various left-wing movements across Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.13 
Using these claims to justify its criticism of détente and arms negotiations with the Soviets, the Reagan 
campaign and administration would assail Carter for lacking resolve in foreign policy. In one campaign 
speech in 1980, Reagan would criticise the Carter administration as ‘still guided by that same old doctrine 
that we have nothing to fear from the Soviets—if we just don’t provoke them’14. 
 
Military strength, in both its offensive and deterrent capacity, became the central driving feature of the 
Reagan administration. Increasing military budgets and employing tough rhetoric in public 
pronouncements on the Soviet Union also represented an easily quantifiable means to evidence Reagan’s 
departure from the past. ‘We should do more’, said Alexander Haig during one early NSC meeting where 
arms sales to Saudi Arabia were discussed, ‘we do not want to appear to be merely rubber stamping a 
Carter policy’.15 In another early meeting of the NSC, Reagan expressed his opinion that ‘we must change 
the attitude of our diplomatic corps so that we don’t bring down governments in the name of human 
rights. None of them is as guilty of human rights violations than Cuba and the USSR. We don’t throw out 
our friends just because they can’t pass the “saliva test” on human rights. […] we need people who 
recognize that philosophy’.16 
 
It was precisely this ‘new’ philosophy that came to represent the defining feature of the so-called ‘Reagan 
revolution’. ‘We certainly changed philosophies’, noted former US Ambassador Thomas Pickering in his 
oral history interview, ‘there was a deeply different group coming in’.17 Significantly, this philosophy was 
not limited to the more extreme, conservative strands of American society but also included the moderate 
wings of the Republican Party as well as an increasing number of disillusioned former Democratic voters. 
‘They were ideologically predisposed but most of them on a particular issue or two not in what one would 
call a general theory’, added the former US ambassador to Jordan, El Salvador, Israel and the United 
Nations.18 
 
This new political coalition would coalesce around the Reagan campaign team, united by Reagan’s 
promise for a radical break from the past and a revived emphasis on military strength abroad as a tool to 
boost feelings of national pride at home. Announcing an end to America’s policy of détente, the Reagan 
administration promised to revive America’s military and return to offensively block Soviet moves in the 
Third World. ‘Détente—isn’t that what a farmer has with his turkey until Thanksgiving Day?’ Reagan 																																																								
13 Clair Sterling, The Terror Network. The Secret War of International Terrorism, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981. 
14 APP, “Ronald Reagan. Address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention in Chicago,” 18 August 1980, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85202. 
15 RRPL, Executive Secretariat: NSC Meeting Files, NSC 00003 2/18/1981. 
16 RRPL, Executive Secretariat: NSC Meeting Files, NSC 00001 2/06/1981. 
17 Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, “Ambassador Thomas Reeve Pickering,” Initial Interview Date: 1 April 2003, Copyright 
2017, p.150-1. https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Pickering-Thomas-Reeve-1.pdf. 
18 Ibid. 
		 71	
famously pronounced in a 1978 radio address.19 ‘America has never gotten into a war because we were 
too strong’, Reagan noted during a televised presidential debate with Jimmy Carter on 23 October 1980. 
As the ‘leader of the Free World’ American carries the ‘burden of maintaining the peace’ added the 
Republican candidate; ‘to maintain that peace requires strength’.20 
 
While ‘kicking the malaise’ became an effective slogan to evidence Reagan’s domestic priorities—
particularly in the realm of economic policy and efforts to curtail inflation—‘peace through strength’ 
came to represent the Reagan administration’s underlying conception of US foreign policy. The essence 
of both these slogans related to their ability to synthesize the Reagan administration’s priorities, a means 
to evidence the extent of his departure from Jimmy Carter and transmit a renewed sense of pride in the 
US’s ‘divine mission’ on the world stage. The deeper psychological and ideological significance of these 
two slogans and their related emphasis on the interplay between domestic and foreign policy were never 
far from the surface during the 1980s.21 
 
Another theme that united the disparate elements present within the Reagan administration was support 
for Israel. During the Carter-Reagan campaign, US support for Israel became an important wedge issue in 
the election. US policymakers and intellectuals who were calling for an increase in US military budgets 
came to consider Israel, and its network of Jewish-American supporters in the United States, as valuable 
allies to drive home their policy objectives. By embracing increased support for Israel, these personalities 
knew they would increase domestic support for their recommendations, while at the same time ensuring 
that US military industries expand to meet the increased demands for weapons and military aid.22 
 
In many respects this was the birth of a new and more consolidated ‘alliance of convenience’ between 
ardent, and ideologically driven Cold War hawks, Jewish-American supporters in the United States, and 
the right-wing Likud government in Israel. This alliance began to emerge during the Nixon years23 and 
was also grounded in the growing support of conservative evangelical Christian communities in the US 
and would gradually transform the ‘new’ Republican Party into an ardently pro-Israel, and pro-Likud, 
political force in the US.24 																																																								
19 Michale Kramer, “When Reagan Spoke from the Heart,” New York Magazine, 21 July 1980, p.21. 
20 Commission on Presidential Debates, “The Carter-Reagan Presidential Debate,” October 28, 1980”, 
http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-28-1980-debate-transcript.   
21 During the 1984 GOP convention, Richard Darman, a senior aid to Reagan’s campaign team summarized their election 
strategy: ‘We should continue to lay claim to the future’, paint Ronald Reagan as ‘the personification of all that is right with, or 
heroized by, America. Leave [Democratic candidate Walter] Mondale in a position where an attack on Reagan is tantamount to 
an attack on America’s idealized image of itself—where a vote against Reagan is, in some subliminal sense, a vote against a 
mythic “AMERICA”.’ Quoted in, Jane Blankenship and Janette K. Muir, “The Transformation of Actor to Scene: Some Strategic 
Grounds of the Reagan Legacy,” in Michael Weiler and W. Barnett Pearce (eds.), Reagan and Public Discourse in America, 
Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 2006, pp.135-162, p.146 (quote). 
22 See for instance, Edward Luttwak, “Why We Need More ‘Waste, Fraud, and Mismanagement’ in the Pentagon,” Commentary 
Magazine 73, February 1982. 
23 Noam Kochavi, Nixon and Israel: Forging a Conservative Partnership, New York, NY State University Press (Sunny Series in Israeli 
Studies), 2009. 
24 See for instance, Donald Wagner, “Evangelicals and Israel: Theological Roots of a Political Alliance,” The Christian Century, 
November 1998,pp.1020-26; Ibid, “Reagan and Begin, Bibi and Jerry: The Theopolitical Alliance of the Likud Party with the 
		 72	
 
As noted by American historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Reagan’s electoral victory ‘represented a 
mighty comeback of messianism in foreign policy’.25 In this sense, the 1980 Carter-Reagan election can be 
described as a manifestation of the classical pendulum swing in US politics. This moves between periods 
of relative retrenchment, often characterized by inward-looking feelings of self-criticism and doubt, to a 
reinvigorated sense of pride and confidence in the universal appeal of US values and political institutions, 
beliefs employed to justify a more ideologically driven and proactive foreign policy. 
 
Reagan’s election therefore did herald a significant revolution in style, rhetoric and ideology. In terms of 
its impact on US policy, however, it is important to stress that much of this ‘revolution’ was in actuality 
restricted to changes in focus, emphasis and resources. Indeed, when it came to US foreign policy, 
particularly in the greater Middle East, rather than a ‘revolution’, Reagan’s approach represented more of 
an ‘evolution’26 from that implemented by the Carter administration during its final years in office. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, it was Carter that began laying the groundwork for a militarized turn in 
American foreign policy in the Middle East, a strategy that was then inherited and considerably expanded 
by the Reagan administration during the 1980s. 
 
This ‘evolution’ was driven in the first instance by money, with Reagan ordering an across-the-board 
increase in the US defence budget, but more fundamentally reflected the rise of a new generation of 
advisors who shared Reagan’s ideological drive and were united in viewing military strength abroad as a 
function of the administration’s broader psychological, economic and political objectives at the domestic 
level. This political coalition formed gradually, throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, a time that coincided 
with the formation of Reagan’s political career. In order to capture the essence of Reagan’s ideological 
‘revolution’, and in turn examine its impact on US foreign policy, it is therefore important to look back to 
the gradual emergence of this new coalition, identifying its central elements and pull factors while 
contextualizing them into the broader socio-political, economic and demographic trends occurring in US 
society in the run-up to Reagan’s election. 
 
3.2 Political Coalition and Philosophy 
 
Campaigning on a platform that promised a radical break from the past, the Reagan administration was 
quickly confronted with a series of institutional and structural constraints that would limit the reach of 
Reagan’s promised ‘revolution’ in US politics, both foreign and domestic. As has traditionally been the 																																																																																																																																																																												
Christian ‘Right’,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.20, No.4 (Fall), pp. 33-51; Tevi Troy, “How the GOP Went Zionist,” Commentary 
Magazine, 1 December 2015, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/gop-went-zionist/. 
25 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Cycles of American History, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986, p.55.  
26 In this respect, the thesis embraces Mattia Toaldo’s description of the ‘Reagan Revolution’, understood as a ‘profound change 
in [political] coalitions and ideas, whereas in actual policies it is probably wiser to say that there was an “evolution” from the last 
years of the Carter administration.’ Ibid, The Origins of the War on Terror. Lebanon, Libya and American intervention in the Middle East, 
New York, Routledge, 2012, p.17. 
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case in American history, rigid ideological convictions and populist rhetoric clash with structural and 
bureaucratic constraints on executive agency and the vast responsibilities associated with being a 
superpower on the world stage. These dynamics can in turn help to explain the US’s deeply engrained 
tradition of pragmatic realism, a tendency that has allowed the US to pursue broad, at times contradictory 
variations in policy depending on the precise context, personalities and objectives involved. 
 
Setting aside the often-constructed depiction of Reagan as a die-hard conservative, the Reagan 
administration was no exception to this general US tradition, contributing to a more accurate description 
of Reagan as a ‘pragmatic ideologue’,27 willing and able to compromise on his ideals on the basis of 
political or tactical necessity. 
 
The composition of the Reagan administration, which included Democrats and Republicans, 
conservatives and moderates, ideologues and realists, was itself proof of the president’s embrace of 
pragmatic realism. This allowed Reagan, differently from other ideologically driven yet unsuccessful 
presidential hopefuls such as Republican Barry Goldwater or Democrat Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, to reach 
out and create a broad coalition of political support. After vehemently criticizing established elites from 
both parties, Reagan would reach an accommodation with the more moderate wings of the Republican 
Party, while also cultivating important Democratic constituencies throughout its time in office. Reagan 
‘held ideological beliefs but was pragmatic enough to apply those beliefs selectively’,28 noted Charles A. 
Hantz in his study of Reagan’s worldview.  
 
In summarizing Reagan’s political philosophy, John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill have written that 
Reagan ‘combines the libertarian’s distrust of government in the economic sphere with a more 
traditionally conservative belief in moral absolutes and in the need for a strong defence against external 
threats’. His philosophy rested on a premise that ‘economic growth will flow from the inherent 
entrepreneurial spirit and enterprise of the American people; that social problems can be largely solved by 
church, family and neighbourhood; that freedom is our greatest national asset; and that its protection 
requires, above all, military strength’.29 
 
This philosophy represented an amalgamation of various trends and approaches that had been developing 
in American society since at least the late 1960s. Its central defining elements related to the conservative 
Jacksonian tradition, but in line with Reagan’s underlying pragmatism, the administration would 
eventually tame these more extreme tendencies.30 This would allow for a degree of contradictions 																																																								
27 Robert M. Collins, Transforming America: Politics and Culture in the Reagan Years, New York, Columbia University Press, 200, 
pp.29-59. 
28 Charles A. Hantz, “Ideology, Pragmatism and Ronald Reagan’s World View: Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying?” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly, Vol.26, No.4 (Fall), 1996, pp.942-49, p.946. 
29 John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, The Reagan Record, Cambridge, Ballinger Publishing, 1984, pp.1-23, p.2 (quote). 
30 As noted by Walter Russell Mead, ‘Jacksonian tradition is embraced by large numbers of people who know very little about the 
wider world in which the United States finds itself. Jacksonian political philosophy is often an instinct rather than an ideology, a 
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between Reagan’s Jacksonian base and the advice coming from his more moderate GOP advisors and the 
ideologically driven neoconservatives that made up his team. Indeed, joining the Jacksonian undertones 
of the Reagan administration was also an underlying attachment to the Jeffersonian tradition and 
emphasis on American exceptionalism, the political-ideological superiority of American values and a more 
ardent internationalist vocation that aimed to expand and promote American values of freedom and 
democracy.31 
 
Reagan’s political career was launched by his 1964 ‘A Time for Choosing’ speech in support of 
Republican Senator Barry Goldwater’s controversial bid for the presidency against Lyndon B. Johnson. 
This event was followed two years later by Reagan’s successful election as Governor of California. A 
long-standing Democratic Party stronghold where ‘Democrats outnumbered Republicans almost five to 
three’,32 Reagan’s 1966 election as Governor of California was in itself a reflection of wider demographic, 
social and political changes in the US. These socio-political trends reflected the slow fraying of the liberal 
coalition that had underpinned Democratic support for a growing federal budget needed to expand on 
the New Deal policies of the past. On the other hand, they reflected the emergence of a new constituency 
of Republican politicians who gradually scaled the ranks of the party to emerge as contenders against the 
more moderate, at times isolationist but domestically liberal wing of the Great Old Party (GOP). 
 
These more traditional Republican elites were centred in the affluent North-western states and are 
sometimes labelled ‘Rockefeller Republicans’. The first challenge to this established elite came precisely 
from Barry Goldwater’s bid for the presidency, pitting the so-called ‘Goldwater Republicans’ against their 
Rockefeller rivals. As noted by Republican Senator John McCain, who effectively succeeded Goldwater as 
Senator of Arizona, Goldwater’s unsuccessful bid for the presidency helped transform ‘the Republican 
Party from an Eastern elitist organization into the breeding ground for the election of Ronald Reagan’.33 
 
On the other side of the political aisle, Reagan would cultivate important political backing from former 
supporters of the Democratic Party, particularly a group of liberal intellectuals who had grown 
disillusioned by their party’s anti-war slant and growing reluctance to offensively confront the Soviet 
Union. Like Reagan, these individuals longed for the more proactive foreign policies implemented by the 
early leaders of the Democratic Party. It was these early leaders who had launched the global Cold War by 
moving to embrace a more offensive policy of containment in the late 1940s and early 1950s, leading to 
the US intervention in Korea in June 1950. 
 																																																																																																																																																																												
culturally shaped outlook that the individual may not have worked out intellectually, a set of beliefs and emotions rather than a 
set of ideas.’ Mead, Special Providence, op.cit., p.244 (quote), pp.218-64. 
31 Ibid., p.212-20. 
32 Gil Troy, The Reagan Revolution. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp.12-18, p.18 (quote). 
33 Lloyd Grove, “Barry Goldwater’s Left Turn,” The Washington Post, 28 July 1994, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwater072894.htm. 
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In this respect, some authors have compared Reagan’s election to that of Kennedy in the early 1960s. Gil 
Troy has described Reagan as the ‘conservative Kennedy, charismatic enough for the masses, ideological 
enough for the partisans and intellectuals’. 34  His greatest achievement according to Troy laid in 
‘reviving—and transforming—American nationalism’,35 uniting the many strands of US conservatism into 
a cohesive political movement that would catapult Reagan into power in 1980. Kennedy’s election, like 
that of Reagan, also represented another example of the pendulum swing in US politics. 
 
Reagan and Kennedy were both catapulted into power following a popular wave of perceived decline, 
particularly in terms of military capabilities and an actual or exaggerated fear of the Soviet’s mounting 
strength. While Kennedy would employ dubious evidence of an impending ‘missile gap’ to attack the 
previous administration for being weak on defence, Reagan would use similar language emphasising a so-
called ‘window of vulnerability’ vis-à-vis Soviet capabilities. As noted by Nicholas Veliotes, ‘just because 
something is not true does not mean it cannot be effective politically, […] there is the usual desire of the 
opposition to be perceived as bringing new policies to the table to overcome real or imagined problems 
or alleged weaknesses of its predecessors’.36 
 
Reagan himself had cited Kennedy, together with other early leaders of the Democratic Party, as 
important sources of inspiration for his entry into politics. A registered Democrat for most of his adult 
life, Reagan switched parties in 1962, slowly emerging as the standard bearer of a new strand of US 
conservatism and the living symbol of a growing generation of Democrats who had grown alienated from 
their party. ‘I was a Democrat once […] but in those days, the leaders of the Democratic Party weren’t in 
that ‘blame America first’ crowd’, exclaimed Reagan in a 1984 campaign speech; ‘its leaders were men like 
Harry Truman, Senator [Henry] Scoop Jackson, John F. Kennedy—men who understood the challenges 
of the times’.37 
 
Alienated Democrats would become an important source of support for the administration. Mostly made 
up of white male blue-collar workers from the Northern and Midwestern states, these individuals would 
gradually become known as ‘Reagan Democrats’, joining the future president in championing a more 
ideologically driven and militarized foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its allies. These ‘Reagan 
Democrats’ would combine with a revitalized conservative strand in the South, where religion, opposition 
to big government, workers unions and a greater focus on ‘family values’ created a strong basis of support 
for Reagan’s political rise. ‘A conservative trend had been developing for at least thirty years before it 
propelled Reagan into office in 1980’ wrote Alexander Haig in his memoirs.38 Other authors have echoed 																																																								
34 Troy, The Reagan Revolution, op.cit., p.17. 
35 Ibid., p.XVI. 
36 Interview, Nicholas Veliotes, op.cit. 
37 APP, “Ronald Reagan. Remarks at a Reagan-Bush Rally in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,” 3 November 1984, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=39376.  
38 Alexander Haig Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy, New York, Macmillan,1984, p.21. 
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this depiction. In his 2014 study The Invisible Bridge, Rick Perlstein noted how Reagan’s electoral victory 
could be described as a continuation—and indeed a considerable expansion—of Richard Nixon’s 
‘southern strategy’ focused on attracting the so-called Sun Belt states into Republican ranks.39 
 
Further elements of support came from the so-called Christian right and the emerging alliance with 
southern evangelical Christian communities who were united in their opposition to the Democrats’ 
support for abortion and growing debates on gay rights and ‘family values’. Reagan’s alliance with the 
Moral Majority movement led by Southern Baptist pastor Jerry Falwell would help the Republican Party’s 
‘southern strategy’, enhancing political support for Reagan’s election from the so-called Bible Belt states 
of the United States. 
 
In November 1980, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin awarded Falwell the Jabotinsky medal in 
recognition for his support for Israel, the first time such an award was given to a non-Jew. Falwell’s 
support for Israel stemmed from the evangelical Christian’s attachment to the Holy Land and represented 
a growing identification between conservative trends in the US and Israel’s right-wing Likud Party. 
Falwell would not disappoint Israel. ‘America’s Bible belt, is Israel’s safety belt’,40 exclaimed the pastor in 
one 2003 interview. During a speech in Israel in the early 1980s, Falwell went further, declaring: ‘the day 
is coming when no candidate will be elected in the United States who is not pro-Israel’.41 
 
The greatest success of the so-called ‘Reagan Revolution’ therefore rests in the former president’s ability 
to unite various strands of American conservatism together with a new breed of former Democratic 
voters who shared Reagan’s ideologically driven sense of mission on the world stage. Uniting traditional 
Republican moderates—such as James Baker III; George Shultz; Caspar Weinberger; and George H. W. 
Bush—with more ideologically driven Cold War hawks that became known the neoconservative wing of 
the GOP, would allow for a considerable boost in electoral support for the administration. Chief among 
these neoconservatives was Reagan’s pick for UN Ambassador, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, who shared Reagan’s 
views on downgrading America’s focus on human rights and cooperating with autocratic regimes to 
advance US interests in the Cold War.42 
 
Following Kirkpatrick were a number of officials who had coalesced around Democratic Senator Henry 
‘Scoop’ Jackson during the 1970s. A US Congressman and later Senator from the State of Washington, 
Henry Jackson was among the few Democratic Senators supportive of the Vietnam War, convinced 
about the need to employ US economic and military assets to remake the world in America’s image. 																																																								
39 Rick Perlstein, The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2014. 
40 Craig Horowitz, “Israel’s Christian Soldiers,” New York Magazine, 29 September 2003, 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/religion/features/n_9255/.  
41 Quoted in, Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out. People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby, WestPoint, Lawrence Hill, 1985, 
p.244. 
42 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary Magazine, 1 November 1979, 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/dictatorships-double-standards/.  
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Described as the ‘patron saint of the neoconservatives’,43 many of Jackson’s most successful aids—
including Richard Pipes, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams and Douglas Feith—would form 
a core group of neoconservative policymakers in both the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations. 
From their new positions of influence, these individuals worked tirelessly to carry forth an ideologically 
driven sense of America’s role in the world and related embrace of a sort of US ‘mission civilisatrice’ on a 
global scale. 
 
Another important thread uniting these former Democratic officials to the Reagan administration was 
shared support for Israel, both as an ideological, military and political ally in the Cold War and as a kind 
of Western-liberal outpost in a strategically vital region of the world. As noted by Nicholas Veliotis: ‘the 
Neo-cons had a second agenda, aside from looking to strengthen American defences and project an 
image of strength, they had an “Israeli agenda”. Indeed, they believed that one of the ways to strengthen 
the US was through Israel. They saw Israel as a “strategic asset” in this way. This was against all odds of 
reality. There was no true strategic basis to this description of Israel’.44 
 
United by a conviction that Soviet capabilities had been purposely underestimated, these individuals had 
campaigned hard during the 1970s in an effort to convince American political elites and broader society 
to again embrace a militarized foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This activism was to form the 
intellectual foundation of Reagan’s foreign policy. In this context, it was the neoconservative wing of the 
Reagan administration that introduced many of the founding elements of the Reagan Doctrine’s support 
for anti-revolutionary groups in the Third World, and a more general embrace of ‘peace through 
strength’, as the guiding principle of Reagan’s approach to foreign policy. 
 
3.3 Foreign Policy: ‘Peace through Strength’ 
 
The intellectual foundations of Reagan’s militarized turn in foreign policy therefore reflected the 
culmination of a series of socio-political trends in the United States. Just like Reagan’s warning about a 
‘margin of vulnerability’ represented a rehashing of Kennedy’s focus on a ‘missile gap’, so did Reagan’s 
emphasis on ‘peace through strength’ grow out of the gradual emergence of a new constituency of 
experts and concerned citizens who had long been clamouring against a supposed erosion of the US’s 
strategic posture on the world stage. 
 
The roots of this new political coalition can be traced back to the mid-1970s, when increasing numbers of 
political elites from both parties reacted to the emergence of a new isolationist trend in US politics that 
followed the disastrous wars in South-East Asia and the Watergate scandal. These events resulted in the 																																																								
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spread of anti-war protests across America and a considerable expansion of legislative ‘checks and 
balances’ on executive agency. Meant to rein in the so-called ‘Imperial Presidency’, Congress’s increased 
oversight powers worried many Cold War hawks. These would organize into public committees that 
aimed to awaken elites and wider society to the impending threat of increased Soviet capabilities, what 
Reagan would call the growing ‘margin of vulnerability’. 
 
The Vietnam syndrome and the series of laws enacted by Congress to restrain the presidency’s authority 
to deploy military forces were to emerge as considerable constraints on the Reagan administration’s 
promised ‘revolution’ in foreign policy. In itself this can also explain the above label of ‘evolution’ as 
opposed to ‘revolution’ applied to the foreign policy of the Reagan administration. The 1973 War Powers 
Resolution, requiring that a US president receive approval from Congress before dispatching US troops 
into military operations, represents a first example of the rising influence of domestic and bureaucratic 
constraints on executive agency. The joint resolution also included an important clause that could impose 
a 60-day time limit on the use of US troops in the event that Congress refused to approve the 
continuation of military action.45 
 
In addition to the War Powers act, another legislative constrain is given by the 1976 Clark Amendment to 
the US Arms Export Control Act. This effectively prevented the US government from sending military 
aid to UNITA rebels fighting the MPLA, the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. 
Documents from the Reagan administration reveal how the new president and his cabinet were frustrated 
by these legislative impediments. In one early meeting of the NSC in February 1981, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, lamented how ‘we cannot send more than six [military] 
advisors into a country without congressional approval. The law ties our hands.’ During the same 
meeting, the newly appointed CIA Director and close friend of president Reagan, William J. Casey, called 
on the administration to ‘seek the repeal of the Clark Amendment’46 in order for the United States to 
send Cuba and the USSR a stern message of strength in Africa. 
 
The Clark Amendment was ultimately repealed in 1985, but Congress would pass further restrictions that 
touched on a signature Reagan policy priority; support for the Contra rebels intent on overthrowing the 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua. These legislative actions took place between 1982 and 1984 and are 
known collectively as the Boland Amendments. The significance of these legislative restrictions would 
have been credited with pushing US policy into the covert domain, planting the seeds for the Iran-Contra 
scandal, in which Reagan and his advisors, with Israeli support, diverted funds from the sale of weapons 
																																																								
45 The Law Library of Congress, “War Powers”, Legal Reports, Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-
powers.php.  
46 RRPL, Executive Secretariat: NSC Meeting Files, NSC 00001 2/06/1981. 
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to Iran to continue supporting the anti-Sandinista civil war in Nicaragua in defiance of congressional 
bans.47 
 
In its efforts to overturn congressional and societal opposition to a more militarized foreign policy, the 
Reagan team drew important backing from a series of expert committees and newly strengthened policy 
research centres founded throughout the 1970s. Chief among these was the conservative Heritage 
Foundation, founded in 1973 in Washington DC. In 1980, the foundation published its ‘Mandate for 
Leadership’ containing over 2,000 policy recommendations for the next administration, covering 
everything from domestic and economic policy to defence spending and new military technologies. The 
document was described in the press as ‘a blueprint for grabbing the government by its frayed New Deal 
lapels and shaking out 48 years of liberal policy’.48 Over 60% of the 2,000 recommendations were 
adopted by the Reagan administration, with the president reportedly distributing copies of the document 
to all of his cabinet members.49 
 
Other research centres that would hold influence over US policy, particularly in the US-Israel security 
domain, would include the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), founded in 1976, the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), founded in 1985, as well as AIPAC, which in the 
1980s increased funds and personnel dedicated to public diplomacy and detailed research studies on US-
Israel relations in many domains.50 AIPAC’s budget grew from around $300,000 in 1973, to $1.4 billion in 
1980 and $1.8 billion in 1981. Meanwhile, registered contributors grew from 9,000 households in 1980 to 
55,000 in 1987.51 
 
Working with or supporting the activities of JINSA and other research centres, were a number of 
influential individuals who played important roles in the Reagan administration, including Michael 
Ledeen—a neoconservative intellectual and former executive director of JINSA who together with 
investigative journalist Clair Sterling was influential in concocting the theory that the Soviet Union was 
behind the 1981 assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II52—Howard Teicher, who served on 																																																								
47 Malcolm Byrne, Iran-Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power, University Press of Kansas, 2014. 
48 Andrew Blasko, “Reagan and Heritage: A Unique Partnership,” Commentary, The Heritage Foundation, 7 June 2004, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2004/06/reagan-and-heritage-a-unique-partnership; Trevi Troy, “The Dilemma 
of the DC Think Tank,” The Atlantic, 19 December 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/presidents-
and-think-tanks/548765/. 
49 Molly Ball, “The Fall of the Heritage Foundation and the Death of Republican Ideas,” The Atlantic, 25 September 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/the-fall-of-the-heritage-foundation-and-the-death-of-republican-
ideas/279955/. 
50 See, AIPAC Papers on US-Israel Relations, a special series of 14 studies published throughout the 1980s.   
51 Wolf Blitzer, “The AIPAC Formula,” Moment Magazine, November 1981; David K. Shipler, “On Middle East Policy, A Major 
Influence,” NYT, 6 July 1987,  
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/06/world/on-middle-east-policy-a-major-influence.html. For a detailed account of the 
Israel Lobby in the 1980s see, Thomas, American Policy Towards Israel, op.cit. 
52 In 2002, Jonah Goldberg coined the term “Ledeen doctrine”, which he described, quoting from a Ledeen speech, as follows: 
‘Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to 
show the world we mean business.’ See, ibid, “Baghdad Delenda Est, Part Two, The National Review, 23 April 2002, 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2002/04/baghdad-delenda-est-part-two-jonah-goldberg/; Also see, Jessica T. Mathews, “What 
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Reagan’s NSC, and Eugene V. Rostow, former undersecretary of state under Lyndon B. Johnson. 
Rostow, who signed the founding document of the JINSA53, was a highly important figure in articulating 
a legal rational opposing the contention that the Geneva Convention applied to the OPT. 
 
Eugene Rostow was also a founding member of the revitalized Committee on Present Danger (CPD) in 
1976. Formed by a group of intellectuals, policy makers and academics, the 1976 CPD was a 
reincarnation of a previous Committee formed in 1950 to organize and promote public support for 
Truman’s embrace of proactive ‘containment’ of the Soviet Union. After being disbanded in 1953, the 
CPD was reorganized in 1976, again uniting a number of concerned private citizens, ex-government 
officials and academics to warn about the impending Soviet threat.  
 
The revitalized CPD included both Democrats and Republicans, and was convened on behest of Rostow, 
then director of the Coalition for Democratic Majority (CDM). Described as a ‘group of Democratic 
Party hawks who objected to the increasing influence of progressives and anti-war activists within the 
party’, the CDM had close ties to Democratic Senator Henry Jackson and 13 out of its 18 members, 
including Jeane Kirkpatrick, would follow Rostow into the CPD.54 Ronald Reagan was himself a member 
of the 1976 CPD. By 1988, a total of 50 members of the CPD had served in Reagan’s national security 
apparatus, including his first National Security Advisor, Richard Allen; UN Ambassador, Jeane 
Kirkpatrick; CIA Director, William J. Casey; and Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, who had 
previously advised AIPAC and would emerge as among the most prominent supporters of enhanced US-
Israeli strategic cooperation in the 1980s.55 
 
Other influential personalities that joined the Reagan team and were associated with the work of the CPD 
were a group of individuals who had drafted a controversial national security estimate of Soviet military 
capabilities in 1976, shortly before the founding of the CPD. Known as the ‘Team B’ report, a group of 
hawkish outside experts were invited by President Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, at the time 
director of the CIA, to complete an outside review of Soviet military and strategic capabilities.56 Driven 
by an underlying belief that US intelligence agencies had underestimated Soviet capabilities, the Team B 
report would later be cited as justifications for a massive increase in military spending and more 
aggressive foreign policy against the Soviet Union. 
 																																																																																																																																																																												
Trump is Throwing Out the Window,” The New York Review of Books [NRRB], 9 February 2917, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/02/09/what-trump-is-throwing-out-the-window/. 
53 Thomas, American Policy, op.cit.,p.34-9. 
54 Tom Barry, “US: Danger, Danger Everywhere,” Asia Times, 23 June 2006, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/HF23Aa01.html. 
55 David Shribman, “Group Goes from Exile to Influence,” NYT, 23 November 1981, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/23/us/group-goes-from-exile-to-influence.html?pagewanted=all; Blitzer, “The AIPAC 
Formula,” op.cit. 
56 See, “Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis. Soviet Strategic Objectives. An Alternative View,” Report 
of Team ‘B’, Georgetown National Archives, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB139/nitze10.pdf. 
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Leading experts who had worked on drafting the report—including the ‘team leader’ Richard Pipes and 
Paul Wolfowitz, a member of the Pentagon’s Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the time—
would hold key roles in the Reagan administration. As noted by Tom Barry, these personalities ‘shaped 
the ideological foundation and new directions of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy, including its 
rollback strategies, anti-multilateralism, tactical human-rights policies, democratization programs and the 
consolidation of the US-Israel strategic alliance through close ties with Likud party hardliners’.57 
 
The underlying emphasis on ‘peace through strength’ was clearly visible in the work of these committee 
groups. Their alliance with corporate America, ideological Cold War hawks, pro-Israel supporters and the 
large US arms industry, did much to influence US policy during the 1980s. Among their chief objectives 
was to overcome the Vietnam Syndrome. Détente had to be replaced up by a menacing conventional 
deterrence capacity backed up by offensive prodding of the enemy through covert action in areas of the 
Third World. The authors of the Team B report took particular issue with the declining readiness of US 
forces. The report criticized intelligence agencies for having a ‘tendency to view deterrence as an 
alternative to a war-fighting capability rather than complimentary to it’.58 
 
Their recommendations and public relations activism in the media and universities sat well with Reagan’s 
own objectives. Together they worked to sensitize US society to the need for renewed spending on the 
military and a restored resolve in confronting the Soviet Union. ‘We must not resign ourselves to life as a 
second-rate power, tempting aggression with our weakness’—stated President Reagan in a 1982 speech—
‘America has never gotten into a war because it was too strong. We must rebuild our defenses and secure 
our freedom so that once again America will be second to none in the world’.59 
 
These pronouncements were in perfect synergy with the activities of the CPD and the Team B report, 
and it is no coincidence that many influential members, including the president himself, came to occupy 
central roles in carrying forth the so-called Reagan revolution. Corporate America and the military-
industrial complex stood to profit enormously, as would Israel, its ruling right-wing Likud Party and the 
networks of organized Jewish-American groups in the United States. 
 
In foreign policy, the testing ground for the Reagan administration’s militarized approach to offensive 
deterrence was the greater Middle East. Together with Central America, these regions quickly became the 
battleground for the Second Cold War. From Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and Libya, 
Lebanon and Syria, the US quickly found itself involved with direct military force in many Middle Eastern 
settings. The 1980s would thus symbolize a mighty return of the globalist zero-sum framework in US 																																																								
57 Barry, “US: Danger,” op.cit. 
58 Team B Report, op.cit., p.8. 
59 APP, “Ronald Reagan. Remarks at a Rally for Senator Malcolm Wallop in Cheyenne, Wyoming,” 2 March 1982, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42226. 
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foreign policy thinking. Localized problems were either ignored or viewed through an east-west prism. All 
in all, these heightened threat perceptions and increased ‘messianism’ in the US’s approach to foreign 
policy would propel the United States into a ‘Second Coming’ to the Middle East. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The ‘Reagan revolution’ was real and its impact far reaching. Independently from the still raging debate 
regarding Reagan’s leadership style, the chapter has focused on the deeper level of the Reagan 
administration’s legacy; examining its ideological and political components while highlighting their 
important impact on US foreign policy during the 1980s. 
 
In both foreign and domestic politics, Reagan would symbolize a radical break with the past. The 
ideological reverberations of the Reagan revolution were felt well beyond America’s borders. From the 
global confrontation with the Soviet Union to the emerging international financial system, the ‘Age of 
Reagan’ has had far ranging implications for the post-Cold War international system. While it is correct to 
describe Reagan’s impact on US foreign policy as an ‘evolution’ from that of the last years of the Carter 
administration—especially in terms of expanding on Carter’s initial focus on the Persian Gulf and 
working to enhance direct US military capabilities in the Middle East—the ideological predispositions of 
the Reagan team, combined with the more general sense of ‘malaise’ and decline associated with the late 
1970s would overshadow these important dimensions of continuity from the final years of Carter. 
 
Reagan’s fiery rhetoric and the significant personnel changes would facilitate this impression of a radical 
break from the past. As was noted above, however, a careful scrutiny of the issues shows how the 
primary elements of this ‘revolution’ were a shift in focus (embracing the globalist east-west prism), 
emphasis (away from localized issues such as human rights or restricting arms sales) and resources (most 
notably in Reagan’s comprehensive increase in military budgets). The combination of these three 
dimensions, and their successful implementation, would earn the president his reputation for successfully 
positioning the United States to ‘win’ the Cold War. 
 
Ultimately, however, it was Reagan’s ability to form, and maintain, a broad and diverse coalition that 
represented the greatest ingredient for his success. This success was in turn derived from Reagan’s 
pragmatism and openness to compromise, features of the Reagan presidency that are often overlooked in 
more partisan and ideologically motivated depictions of the actor turned president. 
 
The Second Cold War and the global confrontation with the Soviet Union remained throughout the 
1980s the primary prism applied to foreign policy. This return to zero-sum calculations, balance of power 
considerations and a related embrace of the doctrine of offensive deterrence would define the Reagan 
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administration’s approach. Yet, the administration was quickly confronted with the harsh realities of 
institutional and bureaucratic constraints on executive agency. In 1980, the GOP had successfully secured 
a majority in the Senate for the first time since 1955. This dominance was largely lost following the 1982-
midterm elections, when the Democratic Party gained an important majority in the US House of 
Representatives, from where it would enact a more efficient opposition to Reagan’s priorities.60 
 
The Vietnam syndrome continued to represent a formidable obstacle to Reagan’s promised revolution in 
foreign policy. This reality, more than any other issue, was to impact the direction and articulation of US 
foreign action during the 1980s. As a result, the Reagan administration would move to seek reliable allies 
who could shoulder some of the burden of implementing Reagan’s doctrine of offensive deterrence 
throughout the Third World. Military assistance programmes, combined with covert action, would 
therefore emerge as key instruments for the Reagan administration to overcome societal and 
congressional opposition. 
 
Throughout the eight years of the Reagan administration, the White House would repeatedly sanction the 
direct use of force, particularly in small, contained settings that were thought to be ‘easy wins’ for the 
administration. In the Middle East these interventions spanned from the naval exercises off the coast of 
Libya in 1981, the dispatching of US troops to Lebanon in 1982, the enhanced US military presence in 
the Persian Gulf during the mid-to-late 1980s, including the 1987-8 US reflagging operation during the 
‘Tanker War’, and the 1986 bombing strikes against Libya’s Gheddafi. These interventions fit into a more 
general twin-pronged strategy and can in certain instances be related to what has been termed the ‘Leeden 
Doctrine’.61 On the one hand these actions were meant to signal a change of direction in the US’s 
national security strategy, with the adoption of a more militarized and offensive deterrence doctrine in 
place of détente. On the other, it aimed to gradually (re)sensitize American society and political elites to 
the use of US military forces abroad. 
 
These were small steps that aimed to overcome the disastrous legacies of Vietnam and the Watergate 
scandal and restore confidence in the US military and the office of the presidency. In these efforts, Israel 
and other US allies would emerge as important stakeholders in this return of ‘messianism’ in American 
foreign policy. The next chapter will zero-in to focus on Israel and the Middle East, examining the 
rationales behind Reagan’s embrace of Israel as a ‘strategic asset’ in the Second Cold War and the 
implications of this gradual institutionalization of US-Israel strategic cooperation were to have on US 
strategic priorities in the Middle East and, specifically, on US efforts to increase leverage and influence 
over Israeli policy 																																																								
60 Steven R. Roberts, “Democrats Regain Control in House,” NYT, 4 November 1982, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/04/us/democrats-regain-control-in-house.html. 
61  See Note 51. These military contingencies were limited to the greater Middle East, but other important actions also took place 
in Central America, Africa and South-East Asia. Most important among these were the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 and 
Panama in 1988. All were part of what Fred Halliday has termed the ‘Second Cold War’ (1917-89). 
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Chapter 4 
The Second Cold War in the Middle East: 
Strategic Outreach to Israel and the Arab states in the 1980s 
 
The 1980s would herald something of a new beginning for US Middle East policy, a ‘Second Coming’ to 
the region that would see the United States lay the groundwork for an enhanced military presence in the 
Middle East for decades to come. Long considered of secondary importance compared to the strategic 
theatres of Europe and the Far East, the region was to become a major staging area for superpower 
competition during the 1980s and the ‘Second Cold War’. 
 
Between 1945 and 1980 the United States invoked direct military force in the region on only one 
occasion, in 1958 when President Eisenhower dispatched US marines to Lebanon to shore up the central 
government against the rising tide of Arab nationalism. During the eight years of the Reagan 
administration, US troops would engage in direct combat with no less than five Middle Eastern countries, 
Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Indeed, as recently noted by Andrew J. Bacevich, ‘from the end of 
World War II to 1980, virtually no American soldiers were killed in action while serving in the region. 
Within a decade, a great shift occurred. By 1990, virtually no American soldiers have been killed in action 
anywhere except in the Greater Middle East’.1 
 
Called to react to a radically different strategic landscape as a result of the 1979 revolution in Iran and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Reagan administration would inherit and significantly expand on 
Carter’s national security strategy for the region. During the 1980s, US trainers and advisers flowed into 
the region, and in particular the strategically vital zone of the Persian Gulf, working to develop 
contingency plans, access agreements and basing rights to allow the US to directly project force into the 
region. 
 
These efforts resulted in strong degrees of path dependency for future US policy, important for the 
understanding of subsequent US engagements, commitments and alliance frameworks in the broader 
Middle East in the post-Cold War era. Many of the central elements of these policies were formalized 
during the Reagan period, when the geostrategic map of the greater Middle East became consolidated. 
Indeed, the regional order that emerged from the 1979 revolution in Iran—the key transformative event 
for the region and harbinger of this American ‘Second Coming’ to the Middle East2—would remain 
largely unchanged until the 2003 US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, a new rupture with significant 
implications for the contemporary Middle East. 
 																																																								
1 Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East, New York, Random House, 2016, p.11 [emphasis original]. 
2 David W. Lesch, 1979 The Year That Shaped the Modern Middle East, Boulder, Westview Press, 2001. 
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Many of the key figures on the Middle Eastern chessboard were set during this period, as were the broad 
contours of the emerging US policy on terrorism, the consolidation of the US-Israeli, but also US-Saudi 
and US-Egyptian alliances and the growing animosity between the US, Syria and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Whether it be Lebanon and the formation of Hezbollah, the Gaza Strip and the emergence of 
Hamas, mounting Palestinian anger and disillusionment manifested in the first Intifada in 1987, the 
completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian Sinai in 1982 or Israel’s subsequent invasion and 
occupation of Lebanon that same year, key developments of the 1980s remain highly relevant today. 
Further east, in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, efforts to enhance regional cooperation among 
the US’s Arab Gulf allies with the 1981 formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and, later, the 
formal establishment of CENTCOM in 1983, also implicate this decade as a crucial starting point for 
unwrapping the many complexities of the contemporary international relations of the Middle East. 
 
Most significantly, the 1980s were formative in the development of the US’s overall military-strategic 
approach to the region. From the US’s response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the 
subsequent build-up of US military forces in Saudi Arabia in the context of the First Gulf War, all the way 
to the formation of Al-Qaeda or the ill-fated decision to invade Iraq in 2003, the origins of these policies, 
as well as their legal and theoretical justifications, can be traced to the late 1970s and, more so, the 1980s 
and the Reagan administration.3 
 
Rather than providing a chronological analysis of the many developments, crises and interventions 
involving the US in the region during this period, this chapter will identify three broad priorities and three 
specific challenges facing US Middle East policy in the 1980s. By assessing the balance between priorities 
and challenges, the analysis will examine the decision-making processes in the Reagan administration vis-
à-vis Israel and the Arab states during the ‘Second Cold War’. 
 
While Israel emerged as the chief benefactor of this US ‘Second Coming’ to the Middle East, the chapter 
will demonstrate how many of these agreements stemmed not from Israel’s ‘strategic value’ but rather 
from a need to compensate Israel for the US’s central strategic concern of the time: outreach towards the 
so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states, chief among them Saudi Arabia. 
 
4.1 Strategic Priorities: The Middle East in the 1980s 
 
Three broad priorities can be highlighted in US Middle East policy throughout the Reagan period. These 
retained a significant influence over the articulation of US policy during the eight years of the Reagan 
administration and can serve as general ‘organizing principles’ structuring the subsequent analysis while 
																																																								
3 Toaldo, The Origins of the US War, op.cit., pp.155-66. 
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avoiding the morass of deep description inherent in chronological or purely historical accounts of the 
period. 
 
The three priorities are: 
 
• A solid return to the globalist, East-West prism as applied to regional and international 
developments in the context of the Second Cold War; 
 
• The urgent need to develop enhanced military-strategic plans for the defence of the Persian Gulf 
based on strategic cooperation with key Arab allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan and 
Egypt; 
 
• A parallel focus on upgrading strategic cooperation with Israel through enhanced efforts to 
overtly integrate it into the US’s global alliance framework, including through close coordination 
and complementarity with NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean, a second strategic zone for the 
Reagan administration. 
 
4.1.1 The Globalist Prism and the ‘Second Cold War’ (Priority 1) 
 
The first key priority—what may also be described as a general conceptual framework for the Reagan 
administration—revolves around a solid return to the globalist prism applied to regional and international 
developments seen from Washington. The Soviet Union and its ‘proxies’ resumed precedence over all 
other issues and concerns.4 Complex phenomena such as terrorism, Palestinian resistance, the Iran-Iraq 
war, developments in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Libya and Iran were all boiled down to their impact on the 
global distribution of power and influence between the two superpowers. 
 
Sparked by the succession of events that rocked the greater Middle East (and the world) in the fateful 
year of 1979, the resurgence of the globalist prism rested in large part with the individuals staffing the 
Reagan administration. Foreign policy, and in particular the need to project an outward image of strength 
and resolve in international affairs, became an important function of the domestic, political and 
psychological objectives of the administration. 
 
The implications of the 1979 events were by no means limited to the Middle East. The year is also 
recognized as the start of the ‘Second Cold War’, a period of heightened social, political and military 
tensions between the two superpowers that would lead to significant animosities across the Third World 
in general, and Latin America, Africa and the Middle East in particular.5 The greater Middle East was 
therefore only one theatre in this heightened period of tensions, but one that would become a key testing 																																																								
4 Author Interview, Geoffrey Kemp, Washington DC, September 2015. Geoffrey Kemp served in the first Reagan administration 
as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on 
the NSC Staff. 
5 Fred Halliday coined the term ‘Second Cold War’. Halliday noted the existence of ‘four major phases into which post-1945 
history can be divided. […] Phase I, the First Cold War, 1946-1953; Phase II, the period of Oscillatory Antagonism, 1953-1969; 
Phase III, Detente, 1969-1979; Phase IV, the Second Cold War, 1979 onwards’. Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War, 
London, Verso Books,1986, p.3. 
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ground for the Reagan administration’s embrace of the concepts of offensive deterrence, ‘rollback’ and 
‘peace through strength’.6 
 
When it came to the Middle East, the primacy of the globalist prism would translate into an overturning 
of strategic priorities, the downgrading of regional disputes and a heightened focus on threats to the flow 
of oil from the Persian Gulf. US ‘national interests’ in the region—protect Israel; ensure access to oil; and 
limit Soviet advances—remained unchanged. What changed was the balance between competing 
perceptions and ideological slants in Washington, leading to a different prioritization and sequencing of 
policies compared to the past. 
 
The need to instil confidence among its Arab allies topped the list of strategic priorities for the 
administration. The loss of Iran as a major regional ally, coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and followed by the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, demonstrated the need for enhanced US preparedness 
in this strategic zone of the Middle East. Fear of an impending Soviet advance into Iran, which would put 
the USSR on the shores of the strategically vital Persian Gulf, threatening the global supply of oil as well 
as Saudi Arabia, America’s oldest ally in the region, became a nightmare scenario for the US. 
Policymakers thus rushed to update Carter-era blueprints for the greater Middle East, contributing to the 
consolidation of a second key priority for the Reagan administration: defence of the Persian Gulf. 
 
4.1.2 The Persian Gulf and US-Arab Strategic Cooperation (Priority 2) 
 
The second central priority of US Middle East policy during the 1980s concerned the urgent need to 
enhance US strategic preparedness and military access to the Persian Gulf. In this respect, during the 
1980s, US threat perceptions shifted from the Near East—the strategic zone of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and a central concern of the Ford and Carter administrations—back to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian 
Peninsula, arguably America’s original hook or pull factor in the 1930s Middle East. 
 
It was to the Persian Gulf that US planners would dedicate the most resources in an effort to strengthen 
US capabilities, consolidate alliances and enhance the US’s ability to directly project force into the area. 
And it was here that Reagan officials and planners reached a rare consensus on policy and the need for 
urgent action.7 With the exception of the ill-fated US intervention in Lebanon (1982–84), accompanied by 
the unveiling of Reagan’s largely forgotten ‘Peace Plan’ for the Palestinians in September 1982, this shift 
in focus to the Persian Gulf was sustained throughout the two terms of the Reagan administration.8 																																																								
6 Interestingly, it was events in the region—and in particular the Iranian Revolution and subsequent Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan—that are generally considered as ‘sparks’ for the Second Cold War, just as tensions in Iran and Azerbaijan in 1946 
are credited with launching the Cold War. Fred Halliday, “The Great Powers and the Middle East,” Middle East Research and 
Information Project (MERIP), Vol.18 (March/April), 1988, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer151/great-powers-middle-east. 
7 Interview, Geoffrey Kemp, op.cit. 
8 Other exceptions included the US’s confrontations with Libya in 1981 and 1986. 
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The administration’s drive to regain the strategic advantage and project an image of force vis-à-vis its 
adversaries did lead to growing military ties with key Arab allies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and 
Oman.9 These states were deemed indispensable to mount a credible defence of the Persian Gulf and 
were complemented with major expansions of the US military base, port, airstrip and staging area located 
on the island of Diego Garcia deep in the Indian Ocean.10 
 
The goal of obtaining permanent bases in the Arabian Peninsula resumed, yet Arab reluctance continued, 
leading US planners to place much emphasis on increased coordination and joint military exercises to 
reassure and strengthen Arab allies with aid, weapons and diplomatic-political support. The consensus 
within the administration on the need for an enhanced US presence in the Gulf reflects the fact that plans 
and contingencies for such efforts had been developed during the late Ford and Carter administrations.11 
 
Following the 1979 Iranian revolution and the collapse of the US’s ‘twin pillar’ policy of support for Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, in January 1980 Carter announced the ‘Carter Doctrine’ declaring the Persian Gulf a 
‘vital interest’ and that America would not permit any ‘outside force’ to gain control of the area.12 The 
announcement was followed in March 1980 by the formal establishment of a Rapid Deployment Joint 
Task Force (RDJTF) charged with emergency military interventions in the region and composed of a 
mixed force including elements from the US navy, marine and air force.13 By May 1980, Brzezinski was 
calling for a ‘unified command structure for the region; ground forces exercises in the region […]; more 
basing access (rear base in Egypt, forward basing in the Persian Gulf)’ as well as ‘institutionalized military 
and internal stability ties with Saudi Arabia’.14 
 
With the election of Ronald Reagan and his entry into the White House on 20 January 1981, Carter’s 
strategic blueprint for the region was considerably expanded. By 1983, the new administration had created 
a unified military command exclusively focused on the Middle East. The establishment of CENTCOM 
with its headquarters in Tampa, Florida, and modelled on the similar command centres such as EUCOM 
																																																								
9 Further bases were secured in Kenya and Somalia. Oman became the first Arab country to grant the US access and use of its 
military facilities, on 4 June 1980. Joseph A. Kechichian, “The Sultanate of Oman and the US,” in Robert E. Looney (ed.), The 
Handbook of US-Middle East Relations. Formative Factors and Regional Perspectives, New York/Oxon, Routledge, 2009, p.442. 
10 Stivers, America’s Confrontation, op.cit., pp.28-37. 
11 A number of high-level US officials, including Paul Wolfowitz, Dennis Ross and Geoffrey Kemp, would collaborate in drafting 
a major 1979 strategic report entitled ‘Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian Gulf’. All three individuals held 
important roles in the Reagan administration. See, Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, op.cit, pp.75-85. 
12 APP, “Jimmy Carter. State of the Union Address,” 23 January 1980, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=33079; Also see, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library [JCPL], Presidential 
Directive/NSC-68, “Persian Gulf Security Framework,” 15 January 1981, 
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd63.pdf. 
13 Discussion on a Rapid Deployment Force dated back to the early years of the Carter Administration, as demonstrated by 
Carter’s Presidential Directive 18 of 24 August 1977. See, JCPL, “Presidential Directives (PD),” 
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/presidential_directives. 
14 FRUS Volume, XVIII (1977-1980), Document 80. 
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focused on Europe, demonstrated the rising importance of the region in the US’s national security 
doctrine. 
 
Both the RDJTF and CENTCOM were directed not only at deterring outside intervention, but also inter-
state conflict and internal subversion, as had occurred in the context of the Iranian Revolution or the 
1979 siege of Mecca in Saudi Arabia. Reagan had given voice to this new American commitment in 
October 1981, emphasizing that the US ‘will not permit’ Saudi Arabia to become another Iran.15 This 
statement, sometimes termed the ‘Reagan Corollary to the Carter Doctrine’, effectively expanded the US’s 
commitment to protect the Persian Gulf from ‘outside forces’ to a commitment to preserve the territorial 
integrity of Saudi Arabia and the survival of the monarchy.16 As noted by George Lenczowski, ‘whether 
by design or by an accident of history, the United States assumed a protective role in the Gulf, and it was 
hard to imagine how it could abdicate this responsibility without causing a major shift in the power 
relationships in the world’.17 
 
US outreach and engagements in the Persian Gulf would continue throughout the Reagan administration, 
leading by 1987 to a major military deployment in the context of the US Operation Ernest Will. Aimed at 
providing protection to Kuwaiti oil tankers in the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq 
war, the operation represented ‘the deployment of the largest contingent of American forces in a crisis 
situation since the Vietnam war. It constituted both a test and a culmination of the defence policy during 
the Reagan era’.18 
 
Strategic plans were not limited to the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia, however. Jordan had been 
earmarked as a key location for the pre-positioning of military hardware and the stationing of a Rapid 
Reaction Force. Efforts to earmark secret funding and arms for the train-and-assist programme had 
advanced during 1983–84, only to be undermined by Israeli and Congressional opposition. The failure to 
establish a Jordanian strike force—what at the time was called the Joint Logistical Planning (JLP) 
agreement—led to significant recriminations by Jordan as to America’s double standards in the Middle 
East.19 
 
Having secured basing rights in Kenya and Somalia, Oman fell into place in 1980; and since then US-
Arab military cooperation has mushroomed profusely. The Egyptian-US Bright Star military exercises, 
part of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, kicked off in December 1980, but the following year the 																																																								
15 APP, “Ronald Reagan. The President’s News Conference,” 1 October 1981, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=44327. 
16 Bruce R. Kuniholm, “The Carter Doctrine, the Reagan Corollary and prospects for United States Policy in Southwest Asia,” 
International Journal, Vol.41, No.2 (Spring), 1986, pp.342-61; Also see, William Safire, “The Reagan Corollary,” NYT Opinion, 4 
October 1981, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/04/opinion/essay-the-reagan-corollary.html. 
17 George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, New York, Duke University Press, 1990, p.283. 
18 Lenczowski, American Presidents, op.cit., p.254. 
19 Middle East Contemporary Survey Vol.8, 1983-1984, pp.527-30; J. E. Peterson, Defending Arabia, Chapter 5: US Military Options 
in the Gulf. Online edition from www.JEPeterson.net (posted September 2000), p.4; Laham, Crossing the Rubicon,op.cit., pp.121-42. 
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exercise was considerably expanded with a mock amphibious exercise landing a joint Egyptian-US force 
on the coast of Oman. Media sources at the time noted how ‘the Egyptian phase of Bright Star was given 
maximum publicity by the Department of Defence. The present [Omani] phase [known as Jade Tiger], 
which is being carried out in a critical area near the Strait of Hormuz, is receiving far less attention in the 
Middle East’.20 
 
By 1985, the US held its greatest military exercise in the region with the participation of five states. This 
show of force was meant to send a signal to Iran and the Soviet Union, but was also an indication of 
support for local Gulf monarchies. In launching Operation Earnest Will in 1987, the US directly 
intervened in the Persian Gulf and Iran-Iraq war with massive military strength. The Kuwaiti tanker 
reflagging operation was seen as a significant opportunity for the US military to enhance its direct 
presence in the Gulf, and a first step towards extracting concessions to allow US access and basing rights. 
 
US-Arab military cooperation only added to Israel’s threat perceptions regarding the potential erosion of 
its privileged partnership with the US. Indeed, in addressing arms sales and military-to-military 
cooperation with the US’s Arab allies, this outreach was bound to cross lines with the longstanding US 
commitment to provide for Israel’s military superiority. 
 
Aware that the US’s strategic focus was shifting to the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, and that any 
credible defence of the area would necessarily rely on close US-Arab coordination, Israel worried that US 
policy would slowly move closer to Arab positions. In particular, Israel dreaded the possibility that US 
policy would move back to the concept of linkage between US-Israel relations, including in the military 
and assistance spheres, and Israeli actions vis-à-vis its Arab neighbours and the Palestinians. Inherent in 
the linkage concept was the need to balance relations with Israel and the Arab states, an approach that 
threatened Israel’s preferential relationship with the US. Israeli leaders therefore sought to undermine, to 
the extent possible, the emerging US-Arab strategic dialogue on the Persian Gulf, striving to promote 
Israel as the central pillar for this evolving US military strategy in the region. 
 
4.1.3 Strategic Cooperation with Israel and the Eastern Mediterranean 
(Priority 3) 
 
In conjunction with the first and second priorities of a pronounced return of the globalist prism and a 
growing strategic focus on the Persian Gulf, a third priority was to emerge in high-level discussions: the 
Eastern Mediterranean and strategic cooperation with Israel. Here, and largely during the middle-to-late 
years of the Reagan administration, US planners worried that the balance of forces between the Western 
																																																								
20 Drew Middleton, “Bright Star: Omanis Play Balancing Act; Military Analysis,” NYT, 7 December 1981, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/12/07/world/bright-star-omanis-play-balancing-act-military-analysis.html. 
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alliance and the Soviets had shifted in favour of the latter and that this sub-region represented a potential 
source of vulnerability in US global contingencies. 
 
Threat perceptions stemmed from the deepening Soviet-Syrian alliance and Damascus’s dominance over 
war-torn Lebanon as well as the consolidation of the Palestinian and PLO presence in the country.21 
Further afield, increased Soviet influence over the Marxist-leaning government of the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and the growing regional activism displayed by Libyan 
leader Muammar Gheddafi, himself often portrayed as a Soviet ‘proxy’, also added to this general feeling 
of a weakened US presence and resolve in the Middle East.  
 
These actors were united in opposing the US-led breakthrough at Camp David that led to the signing of 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement in 1979, the full implementation of which was expected for April 
1982. In this context, preserving the peace treaty and ensuring that Israel complete its redeployment from 
the Egyptian Sinai without delay, topped the strategic priorities of the early Reagan administration for the 
Near East. Stability in the southern area of the Near East—a major dividend of the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
agreement—was also considered indispensable to allow the US to concentrate on the Persian Gulf. 
 
Yet, during the electoral campaign in 1980, the Reagan team had made much of his intention to rely on 
Israel as a ‘strategic asset’ in the Middle East, even going so far as describing Israel as the natural 
substitute for the loss of the Shah of Iran.22 It was in this context, and in seeking to make true on its 
campaign pledges to enhance US-Israel strategic cooperation, that the third key priority of the Reagan 
administration would become established. After some tensions and challenges, the Eastern Mediterranean 
would emerge as the key testing ground for the ‘strategic asset’ slogan. 
 
Unlike past administrations, which tended to focus on the Near East and would thereby accord some 
importance to balancing opposing camps (and partners) in the context of Arab-Israeli diplomacy and 
mediation, the Reagan administration’s emerging focus on the Eastern Mediterranean effectively allowed 
the US to sidestep questions related to the conflict. In part explained by the return of the globalist prism 
in Washington, during the 1980s efforts moved to rather sterile estimates of the military balance among 
US allies and partners in the region, comparing these to Soviet capabilities in an effort to discern 
strengths and vulnerabilities in the event of an all-out war.  
 
																																																								
21 Recent media reports have put the number of Russian ‘volunteer’ soldiers serving in Syria between 1983-84 to about 6,000 
units. See, Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia may Aid ‘Comrade Tourists’ Who Were Really Soldiers,” NYT, 21 December 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/world/europe/russia-may-aid-comrade-tourists-who-were-really-soldiers.html. 
22 In a 1979 Washington Post article, Reagan wrote: ‘The fall of Iran has increased Israel’s value as perhaps the only remaining 
strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely’. Ronald Reagan, “Recognizing the Israel Asset,” WP, 15 
August 1979. 
		 92	
In this context, calculations of Israel’s geographical positioning, military capabilities and compatibility 
with the US were made in comparison to other allies and locations, including Greece, Cyprus and Turkey 
but also others such as West Germany and Italy. Such studies would promote the view of Israel as a 
‘force multiplier’ for US interests as well as a valuable staging area for ‘force projection’ contingencies, as 
US support for Israel became more ‘explicitly linked to deterrence’, noted Dennis Ross.23 
 
Significantly, much of the impetus for these calculations, including detailed assessments of the military 
balance and forces, also came from prominent pro-Israel lobby groups and personalities in the US, who 
had long argued for an overt integration of Israeli military capabilities into the US’s Cold War alliance 
framework, including though closer relations with NATO.24 Throughout the 1980s, Israeli leaders and 
ministers would repeatedly outline Israeli strategic, intelligence and military capabilities, pushing forward 
the argument that Israel was the natural staging area and key reliable partner in the region.25 
 
Such viewpoints did garner support within the administration, notwithstanding a lack of consensus 
among top planners and military experts regarding the concrete strategic benefits Israel could provide to 
US interests.26 Eventually, a fragile consensus, or compromise, was reached among sceptics and supporters 
of US-Israel strategic cooperation within the administration. This revolved on limiting the focus of such 
cooperation to Eastern Mediterranean contingencies, in order to contain the potential damage such overt 
forms of strategic cooperation might have on the US’s other key interest: outreach to the Arabs and 
defence of the Persian Gulf. 
 
The consensus also rested on a deeper set of objectives: devising means to restrain Israel’s tendency to 
embark on unilateral military policies vis-à-vis its Arab neighbours, which did much to complicate the 
emerging US-Arab strategic cooperation. Significantly, it was this belief that by institutionalizing the US-
Israel alliance the US would enhance its leverage over Israeli policy, while simultaneously strengthening 
the administration’s pro-Israel credentials in Washington and thereby enhancing US abilities to focus on 
the Persian Gulf that created the basis for this emerging compromise among sceptics and supporters 
within the administration. 
 
Beyond the Eastern Mediterranean and in the context of the Near East, the implications of this third 
priority of enhancing strategic cooperation with Israel led the Reagan administration to ‘freeze’ 
developments in the Arab-Israeli theatre, prioritizing the full implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli 
redeployment scheduled for 1982, while sidestepping the question of the Autonomy negotiations with the 
Palestinians. When it came to the strategic zone of the Arab-Israeli conflict, therefore, US policy during 																																																								
23 Interview, Dennis Ross, op.cit. 
24 See, AIPAC Papers on US-Israel Relations in the 1980s, No.1-13; Steven Spiegel, “Israel as a Strategic Asset,” Commentary 
Magazine, 1 June 1983; Steven Spiegel, “US Relations with Israel: The Military Benefits,” Orbis 30, No.3 (Fall 1986). 
25 Interview, Nicholas Veliotis, op.cit. 
26 Interviews, Geoffrey Kemp; Nicholas Veliotis; Dennis Ross, op.cit. 
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the Reagan period, essentially boiled down to a continuation of the Kissinger-era strategy of forcing the 
Arab states to the negotiating table through a massive build-up of Israeli military strength. 
 
This, in essence, was what the administration intended with the phrase ‘create more Egypts for Israel to 
make peace with’, a concept repeatedly voiced by Reagan and his administration throughout the 1980s.27 
However, and differently from the Kissinger approach during the 1970s, the Reagan team never 
effectively used conditionality or pressure on Israel in the context of the Arab-Israeli diplomacy, 
employing such measures only in the event of a clear Israeli violation of US laws or as a means to send a 
signal to other Arab states about the reliability of the US. This tendency reflected the hierarchy of 
priorities in the administration, with waging the ‘Second Cold War’ topping the list, followed by US-Arab 
and US-Israeli strategic cooperation to advance that goal. As a corollary of this focus, the administration 
would argue against recognition of the Arab-Israeli conflict or the issue of Palestine as central elements of 
US Middle East policy, in itself a considerable shift compared to the Carter era approach. 
 
Instead, and as a result of this emphasis on deterrence and the global Cold War, Israel grew to be viewed 
as an overt tool that could help ‘rollback’ Soviet influence and that of its ‘proxies’, while helping to alter 
the balance of forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, and also differently from Kissinger’s more 
cautious, ‘step-by-step’ approach, the Reagan administration, and in particular Secretary of State Haig, 
appeared willing to consider a more forceful and proactive strategy, one that would make use of Israel’s 
military muscle to establish new ‘facts on the ground’, particularly vis-à-vis Lebanon, the PLO and Syria. 
It was in this context that Secretary Haig, a staunch advocate of close US-Israeli strategic cooperation, 
pronounced a now-famous quote describing Israel as ‘the largest American aircraft carrier in the world 
that cannot be sunk, does not carry even one American soldier, and is located in a critical region for 
American national security’.28 
 
It was in this globalist context of East-West rivalry that discourses about Israel’s strategic value to US 
interests would become consolidated. While ultimately this emphasis on the Eastern Mediterranean 
represented a more restricted focus than many in Israel had originally hoped for, the tangible economic, 
military and political dividends that flowed from this recognition would amount to a considerable 
breakthrough in the history of US-Israel relations, setting the stage for a critical, institutionalizing juncture 
that continues to hold relevance even today.  
 																																																								
27 Reagan officials, including the President himself, would repeatedly use this phrase. Three examples are given here. On 21 June 
1982, during Begin’s visit to the United States in the midst of the Lebanon war, Reagan used the term three times. See, RRPL, 
Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC Records (Box 12). Also see, APP, “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with 
Regional Editors and Broadcasters on the Situation in Lebanon,” 24 October 1983, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40678; APP, “Interview with Representatives of Independent Radio 
Networks,” 26 January 1985, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38910. 
28 Quoted in Jeffrey Goldberg, “Is Israel America’s Ultimate Ally?” The Atlantic, 26 April 2011, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/04/is-israel-americas-ultimate-ally/237864/. 
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The next chapters will zero-in to focus on the implications of such efforts and the path dependency they 
created for future US policy towards Israel and the broader Middle East. They will further dissect the 
competing views and perspectives of key Reagan officials and decision-makers—and in particular 
between the supporters and sceptics of US-Israel cooperation—in an effort to discern the major 
rationales, risks and expected benefits that would flow from overt cooperation with Israel.  
 
It is however first necessary to appreciate a number of key challenges facing US policy. Specifically, and 
stemming from the three broad priorities outline above—a return of the ‘globalist’ prism in the context 
of the ‘Second Cold War’; the need to build up the defences of the Persian Gulf; and a parallel effort to 
better integrate Israel into strategic contingency planning for the Eastern Mediterranean, also by adding 
complementarity between the US-Israel relationship and NATO—there are three deeper challenges that 
need to be highlighted.  
 
The interplay between these three broad priorities and the consequent challenges facing US policymakers 
in seeking to integrate them into a coherent strategy will help to frame US policy towards the region 
during the Reagan era. The fact that Reagan officials only shared consensus when it came to the second 
priority—defence of the Persian Gulf—and were divided on both the regional policy strategy to wage the 
‘Second Cold War’ and the goal of upgrading strategic cooperation with Israel, would significantly 
complicate policymaking in the administration, contributing to many inconsistencies and incoherencies 
present in US policy during the 1980s. 
 
4.2 Squaring the Circle: Reconciling US Middle East Priorities in the 1980s 
 
The three priorities outlined above can be described as a general policy framework (‘Second Cold War’) 
followed by two overarching regional priorities governing US policy in the 1980s (the Persian Gulf, and 
Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean). Yet, the concrete policy implications that flowed from these 
priorities would quickly present a whole new set of challenges. 
 
The essence of these challenges lay in seeking to enhance the US’s military and strategic relations with 
both Israel and the Arab states, without any concrete movement in the realm of Arab-Israeli diplomacy. 
Such hardships were not new. They simply represented a rehashing of the age-old challenge facing all past 
and future US administrations. Indeed, and in seeking to square the circle and develop a coherent strategy 
that would enhance Israel’s strategic value as well as the US’s wider strategic interests in the Persian Gulf, 
the Reagan administration would inevitably be confronted with the challenge of reconciling the ‘Arab’ 
and ‘Israeli’ components of US strategic priorities. Moreover, the Reagan administration’s fixation with 
the global East-West divide and consequent tendency to ignore regional disputes and apprehensions 
would only accentuate the tension between the two strategic zones of US policy: the Near East and the 
Persian Gulf. 
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4.2.1 Overcoming Opposition to US-Arab Strategic Cooperation (Challenge 
1) 
 
The first challenge concerned the need to overcome significant opposition to the US’s central focus on 
building up the defences of Arab allies in the Gulf. In this context, US policy faced considerable 
pushback and opposition at both the US domestic level and regionally, complicating the US’s parallel 
pursuit of its three central priorities. 
 
Indeed, while there was considerable consensus within the administration on the need to strengthen the 
US’s strategic posture, and in particular to enhance its capacity to directly project force into the Persian 
Gulf in the event of a conflict—even representing a rare area of agreement between Secretary of State 
Haig and Secretary of Defence Weinberger—agreement within the administration did not translate into a 
political consensus in Washington or a ‘strategic consensus’ among the US’s regional allies. 
 
Significant constraints to this US build-up in the Persian Gulf were evident in the heated congressional 
debates and hearings on major US arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and others during the 1980s. Here, 
Reagan officials struggled to articulate their rationales, often framing them on both strategic and moral 
grounds. This was done by highlighting the valuable contribution these Arab states could make to US 
interests in the Cold War and in preserving the flow of Gulf oil, but also in the realm of other US 
interests tied to the Camp David process and the goal of ‘creating more Egypts’.  
 
Thus, major arms packages for such Arab states as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and others would 
routinely be marketed at home, in Congress and the realm of public opinion, as helping create the 
‘groundwork for peace’ in the region by virtue of rekindling Arab trust in the US while driving a wedge 
between the Soviet Union and its regional allies. While such marketing worked with US public and elite 
opinion early in the administration, the challenge was harder to overcome with Israel itself, particularly 
ruling right-wing Likud government led by Prime Minister Menachem Begin and his first Defence 
Minister, Ariel Sharon. Israeli misgivings were well known to the administration. Reviving debates about 
Israeli efforts to consolidate an exclusivist relationship with the United States, Reagan officials recognized 
that Israeli acquiescence to this enhanced strategic focus on the US’s Arab allies was key to its success.  
 
Many had moreover learned from Reagan’s past electoral bids, including as Governor of California, the 
importance of maintaining good relations with elements of the Jewish-American community, whose 
political and financial support was deemed crucial for the Republican Party and in particular for the so-
called ‘Reagan Democrats’ and neoconservatives who joined his administration. As a result, polishing 
Reagan’s pro-Israel credentials and reassuring Israel and the Jewish-American community of the 
administration’s staunch support were understood as key priorities of the Reagan team. In was in this 
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context, and even before the actual votes were cast, that the Reagan campaign enthusiastically embraced 
the ‘strategic asset’ slogan as applied to Israel, elevating it to a central theme of the electoral campaign.29 
 
Indeed, the Reagan campaign did everything possible to deploy Israel as an important wedge issue during 
the election.30 An early example included publicly labelling Israel a ‘strategic asset’ for the US and 
breaking with previous language to label the PLO a terrorist organization. A similar reversal was applied 
to the longstanding US policy on Israeli settlement construction. Reagan declared in a New York Times 
interview on 3 February 1981, ‘they’re not illegal’,31 while conceding that such actions were ‘unnecessarily 
provocative’. 32  Reflecting the prevalence of the globalist prism in the administration, the Reagan 
administration would repeatedly make reference to the Soviet Union’s financial and military support for 
the Palestinians, as well as the PLO’s lack of democratic credentials, as a further rationale for the 
administration’s hostility towards the group.33 
 
While administration officials hoped these public platitudes would be sufficient to secure Israel’s tacit 
acquiescence to the US’s increased focus on the Arab states, they would soon discover otherwise. 
Replicating what has been a general trend in US-Israel relations, particularly under Republican 
administrations that tended to have more of a transactional understanding emphasizing the need for a 
quid pro quo from Israel in return for US aid and politico-military support, US officials were particularly 
disturbed by this Israeli rigidity. ‘My dedication to the preservation of Israel was as strong when I left the 
White House as when I arrived there’, wrote President Reagan in his biography years after leaving office, 
‘even though this tiny ally, with whom we share democracy and many other values, was a source of great 
concern for me while I was president’.34 
 
‘Support for the peace process must be a prerequisite for arms sales to any Arab state’, reads one three-
page memorandum dated 24 March 1981 and described as a ‘wish list’ of Israeli desires in the context of 
discussions on US sales to Arab states and the need for adequate compensation for Israel.35 Another 
example of Israeli opposition emerged from a 1981 meeting in Israel where arms sales to Jordan and 																																																								
29 Significantly, by elevating this concept the Democratic Party also moved closer towards the ‘strategic asset’ slogan, as 
demonstrated by its 1980 platform.  
30 Samuel W. Lewis, the US ambassador to Israel at the time, has noted how Carter’s advisors ‘ultimately blamed the New York 
Jews and Israel for his [electoral] defeat’, also noting how ‘Begin himself strongly hoped for a Reagan victory’. See, Foreign 
Affairs Oral History Project [FAOHP], “Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis,” Oral History Transcript, 1998, pp.148-9, 
https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Lewis,%20Samuel%20W.toc.pdf. 
31 RRPL, Kemp Files, “Israeli Settlements 1981,” Box 3; Also see, RRPL, Executive Secretariat Country File, Near East and 
South East Asia, “Israel/Iraq – Book II (4),” Box 37. 
32 Such language gradually became crystallized into the depiction of settlements as ‘an obstacle to peace’, a standard mantra of US 
policy until 2017, when President Donald J. Trump seemingly further diluted this statement referring to settlements as ‘unhelpful 
for peace’. 
33 The US’s Defence Intelligence Agency study on ‘PLO Support to Central American Revolutionaries’ had a rather more 
nuanced interpretation. RRPL, Kemp Files, “Israel (07/24/81-07/31/81)”, Box 2.  
34 Reagan, An American Life, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1999, p.410. As noted by many, Reagan never mentioned strategic 
rationales in his biography or diary as a reason for the US’s support for Israel, limiting such emphasis to shared values, political 
affinities and the legacy of the Holocaust.  
35 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country Files, “Israel (3/12/1981-4/5/1981),” Box 37. 
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Saudi Arabia were discussed. In outlining Israel’s opposition to the sales, Israel’s Deputy Defence 
Minister Mordechai Zipori stressed how ‘it was about time that the governments of both Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia realized that the other (along with the US) guarantor of their continuing existence is 
Israel’,36 adding in a second meeting that ‘the security of Jordan depends more on weakness than on 
strength’.37 
 
Israel wished to guard against an erosion of its preferential relationship with the US. Significantly, this 
erosion had partially begun in the context of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the emerging 
development of US-Egyptian military cooperation it entailed. Notwithstanding the inclusion of major US 
assurances towards Israel—including more aid and more advanced and numerous weapons compared to 
those provided to Egypt—Egyptian-US cooperation in the strategic and military domain would create 
some apprehension in Israel, but nowhere near the concern caused by the US’s emerging contacts with 
Jordan or Saudi Arabia. 
 
Such Israeli tendency to guard its exclusivist and preferential relationship with the US created much 
headache for US military planners. A cable summarizing meetings held by Defence Minister Weinberger 
in Oman while on a tour of the Middle East in February 1982 shines a light on these frustrations: 
 
US friendship with one country should not be at the expense of raising antagonisms with other 
friends. In the past year Israel had taken actions which were disturbing and destabilizing and 
had not engaged in the requisite consultations with the United States. […] It sometimes 
seemed that the Israelis were pursuing policies designed to place us in a situation where we 
must choose between friends.38 
 
Such considerations reflect the continuation of the age-old challenge facing US Middle East policy and 
the inherent tension, if not incompatibility, between the two central strands of US policy in the region. 
Reagan planners sought to reconcile these policy components through an approach that included the 
following elements: 
 
• Compensation for Israel to allow for expanded military-supply agreements with Arab states; and 
 
• Efforts to establish a form of ‘strategic consensus’ between the US’s Arab allies and Israel based 
on shared hostility towards the Soviet Union. 
 
With this Reagan officials hoped to overcome domestic and Israeli concern over the evolving US 
cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Ultimately, the approaches gained momentum because 
they were considered conducive to advancing the administration’s three central priorities: fighting the 
‘Second Cold War’, strengthening military preparedness in the Persian Gulf and building up Israel as a 
																																																								
36 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country Files, “Israel (02/09/1981-02/20/1981),” Box 37. 
37 Ibid. 
38 RRPL, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, 1983-89, Box 91987. 
		 98	
‘strategic asset’ for US interests. Compensation for Israel thus became an indispensable component in 
furthering the administration’s goals. 
 
Through compensation for Israel and strengthening its military superiority in the Near East and the 
Eastern Mediterranean, US officials believed they were fulfilling campaign pledges but also advancing the 
goal of creating ‘more Egypts’ by discouraging attacks on Israel through the power of US-supplied 
weaponry. Further benefits were also expected at the domestic level. By polishing the administration’s 
pro-Israel credentials US policy would be free to focus on US-Arab cooperation while also assisting the 
GOP’s objective of driving a wedge between the Jewish-American community and the Democratic Party 
in an effort to ‘re-brand’ the Republicans as a reliably pro-Israel force in the US. Here, carry-on benefits 
also played a role, such as the knowledge that pro-Israeli supporters in Congress and in the US-based 
research and think tank community would make important allies on other Reagan administration 
priorities, such as increasing military budgets and implementing more proactive military plans to counter 
Soviet inroads in Central and Latin America, as well as in Africa and in Asia. 
 
It appeared that the Reagan team had successfully developed a coherent strategy for the region and one 
capable of extracting strategic benefits from both sets of regional allies. It was in this context that the 
legacy of the Kissinger years and the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement become visible. Inherent in the 
final conclusion of the peace agreement was a commitment by the US to provide superior quantities and 
qualities of weapons and aid to Israel compared to Egypt, a dynamic that would be replicated and 
institutionalized by Reagan, leading finally to the 2008 normalization of the QME concept outlined in 
Chapter 2. 
 
Yet, by ensuring that Israel’s military margin would be consistently upgraded while never ‘getting tough’ 
with Israel on a whole series of issues on which the two administrations disagreed, a new set of challenges 
would emerge for US policy. Indeed, a compelling argument can be made that through this focus on 
compensation for Israel, Washington was effectively undermining the second approach centred on 
establishing a ‘consensus of strategic concerns’ among the US’s disparate allies in the region, while 
essentially moving closer to Israel’s wish for a quasi-exclusivist relationship in the Middle East.  
 
4.2.2 Compensation for Israel and the Lack of ‘Strategic Consensus’ 
(Challenge 2) 
 
The administration’s hopes that compensation and public platitudes for Israel combined with a focus on 
the shared threat of the Soviet Union would be enough to reconcile the ‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ components 
of US policy proved misplaced. 
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Compensation might succeed in assuaging Israeli and domestic opposition to enhanced strategic ties with 
Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, but these latter countries would also expect assurances from 
the US that it’s developing strategic alliance with Israel would not be deployed against Arab states or the 
Palestinians. Moreover, the propensity of Saudi Arabia and Jordan to agree to overt forms of cooperation 
and access agreements with the US would also be weakened by open US-Israeli alliance, particularly in the 
realm of Arab public opinion. Meanwhile, overt US-Israel cooperation could also strengthen the influence 
of so-called ‘rejectionist’ Arab states such as Syria, which was also a Soviet ally.  
 
This then was the stage on which US efforts to establish ‘strategic consensus’ between the diverse set of 
US allies in the region were played out. ‘We believe it is fundamentally important’, noted Secretary of 
State Haig before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in March 1981, ‘to begin to develop a consensus 
of strategic concerns throughout the region among Arab and Jew and to be sure that the overriding 
danger of Soviet inroads into this area are not overlooked’.39 
 
While not based on any formal alliance framework—an eventuality rendered impossible by the 
unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1980s, as it had in the 1950s during US-British efforts to establish a 
Middle East Treaty Organization—the ‘strategic consensus’ argument reflected the latest attempt to 
reconcile the ‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ components of US Middle East policy. Specifically, these efforts were 
directed towards Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, but there was a need to also ensure buy-in and 
support at the domestic political level in Washington and in Israel, making compensation and the 
‘strategic asset’ slogan crucial complements to this outreach towards the Arabs. 
 
Reagan officials seriously underestimated both the depth of Israeli-Arab rivalry and the fact that threat 
perceptions in both Riyadh and Tel Aviv were directed more at regional developments (Lebanon, Syria, 
the Iran-Iraq war and Iran) than at Moscow. Moreover, the second track of this approach, ‘strategic 
consensus’, would be undermined by Israel’s repeated unilateral military engagements in the early 1980s. 
While compensation for Israel in exchange for arms and military support could be accepted by the US’s 
Arab allies, the same could not be said about Israel’s repeated violations of their national sovereignty or 
use of US-supplied arms against fellow Arab states. 
 
During the first years of the Reagan administration, and starting even earlier with the announcement of 
the Jerusalem Basic Law in July 1980, the Israeli government embarked on numerous unilateral actions, 
culminating in the 1982 invasion and occupation of Lebanon, which effectively buried any hope for 
consensus between the US’s set of allies in the region. Indeed, these events—which included the 1981 
bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor, the 1981 bombing of the PLO offices in Beirut, the 1981 annexation 
of the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan Heights and repeated violations of Saudi, Lebanese, Syrian and 																																																								
39 Bernard Gwertzman, “Haig Says US Seeks Consensus Strategy in the Middle East,” NYT, 20 March 1981, 
 http://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/20/world/haig-says-us-seeks-consensus-strategy-in-the-middle-east.html?pagewanted=all. 
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Jordanian airspaces by Israel, not to mention settlement construction and the ultimate failure of the 
Autonomy negotiations—would only enflame Arab opposition to Israel (and the US). This would 
significantly complicate the US’s ability to argue for increased access and basing rights or to counsel 
patience in Washington’s ability to extract concessions from Israel in the context of diplomacy and 
mediation. 
 
It was precisely for these reasons that US officials had traditionally sought a balanced policy for the 
Middle East, in accordance with the ‘linkage doctrine’ and a related understanding that Israel’s ‘strategic 
value’ for the US stemmed from the Arab-Israeli conflict, not its advanced arms or strategic positioning. 
These were important, but would not benefit the US until a peace agreement was reached, as such overt 
displays of alliance would significantly hamper broader US interests that rested with the Arab states. 
 
Moreover, there was a distinct feeling, both in the region and in Washington that the Reagan 
administration’s willingness to label Israel an ‘asset’ and openness to discussing new forms of strategic 
cooperation were only contributing to Israeli hubris and tendency to engage in offensive unilateral 
actions.40  
 
It was largely as a result of these events—and in particular the Israeli 1981 annexation of the Golan 
Heights followed by its 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the bloody siege of Beirut—coupled with the 
continued opposition to US arms sales to Arab allies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, that the idea of 
‘strategic consensus’ was officially buried. Once again, a US administration was confronted with the 
inability of reconciling the ‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ dimensions of US Middle East policy, effectively preventing 
the articulation of a ‘grand strategy’ for the region and condemning US policy to ‘muddling through’,41 as 
lamented by Secretary of State Dulles back in the mid-1950s. 
 
Resulting from these complexities, US policy effectively reverted to approaching its two strategic zones in 
the Middle East—the Persian Gulf and the Near East/Eastern Mediterranean—as distinct and separate 
areas, in which key US allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, would emerge paramount. Ultimately, these efforts 
manifested in the establishment of CENTCOM, with its restricted Area of Responsibility that excluded 
Israel, Lebanon and Syria, and the parallel revival of US-Israeli strategic cooperation in late 1983 centred 
on the Near East and Eastern Mediterranean. 
 
This realization was not going to come easily for the administration. Indeed, there was also a third central 
challenge facing US Middle East policy in the 1980s that remained to be addressed: how to restrain Israel 
and thereby curtail the risk it posed to US priorities in the Persian Gulf. It was indeed amid high-level 																																																								
40 David K. Shipler, “Israeli Raids on Lebanon: A Change in US Position,” NYT Analysis, 18 April 1981, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/18/world/israeli-raids-on-lebanon-a-change-in-us-position-news-analysis.html. 
41 FRUS, Volume XII (1958-1960), Document 4. 
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debates and disagreements within the administration surrounding this third central challenge that the 
institutionalization of the US-Israel alliance and an increased emphasis on the Eastern Mediterranean 
emerged as a compromise solution advancing all three of the US’s priorities: fight the Second Cold War, 
enhance strategic preparedness in the Persian Gulf and build on the ‘strategic asset’ slogan. 
 
4.2.3 Restraining Israel (Challenge 3) 
 
Efforts to restrain Israel in order to focus on the US’s strategic goal of enhanced US-Arab cooperation in 
the Persian Gulf revived debates on how best to employ US leverage over Israel. These debates revolved 
around two central themes, dynamics that were not born in the 1980s but can be traced back to the 
earliest days of the US-Israel relationship. 
 
These themes centred on extracting greater Israeli acknowledgement of broader US interests and 
commitments in the region, engagements that necessarily had a significant Arab component. The US had 
long argued against an exclusivist US-Israeli relationship, given that US and Israeli interests could not 
always coincide. At most, therefore, the US-Israel relationship would have to rest on preferential rather 
than exclusivist treatment, allowing the US to also use its diplomatic, financial and military leverage with 
other regional actors as well. 
 
The second central theme surrounding efforts to restrain Israel and enhance US leverage and influence 
had more to do with domestic politics and the ability of Israel and its network of supporters to 
significantly complicate administration plans, not only in the Middle East and with respect to Israel but 
on a whole number of other policy issues. In this respect, debates on leverage vis-à-vis Israel also had a 
political component, as they represented efforts to ‘protect the domestic flank’, seeking to avoid public 
clashes or disagreements that could lead to important losses of political capital in Washington. 
 
It was in this context of growing US frustration with Israel’s unwillingness to mute its opposition to 
enhanced strategic ties with Jordan and Saudi Arabia, that the key debate between supporters and sceptics 
of US-Israel strategic cooperation took place within the administration. The former group argued for a 
full-blown integration of Israel into the US alliance frameworks. According to these voices, 
institutionalization of US-Israel relations represented the most coherent means to advance US interests in 
the region, while also staying true to Reagan campaign pledges and US moral and ideological support for 
Israel as a Western-oriented democratic state and close ally in the Cold War. Indeed, supporters of US-
Israel strategic cooperation would argue, the best means to restrain Israel was to augment its security and 
deterrence capabilities by integrating it into the Western alliance framework, providing a security 
guarantee and even enhancing interdependence with NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
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The argument was that only a confident and militarily secure and superior Israel would be willing to 
negotiate territorial withdrawals with the Arabs and Palestinians. Israeli security and military superiority 
had already become codified as a central tenet of US Middle East policy, yet US-Israel strategic 
cooperation was all but non-existent in early 1980s, and it was in this realm of overt security cooperation 
that supporters of the concept began arguing for further movement. Meanwhile, efforts to enhance US-
Israel strategic cooperation would also be conducive to the US’s broader interests and concerns, 
regionally, internationally and domestically. By building up the defences of Israel, opposition to the 
central priority of US-Arab strategic cooperation would be overcome, allowing the US to concentrate its 
resources and diplomatic efforts towards the Persian Gulf. 
 
Fear that the US’s Arab allies would be discouraged to cooperate with the US should not represent an 
obstacle, argued the supporters, as the US remained the only security provider for such states. Moreover, 
the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict no longer represented the central regional concern, as 
Arab states in the Gulf were thought to be worried by Iran and preoccupied with assisting Iraq in waging 
its war against Tehran. ‘The major Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, have no alternative to US support’, 
reads a NSC memorandum drafted by Richard Pipes on 29 July 1981, ‘they have nowhere else to go, no 
matter what they threaten; for this reason they need not be appeased and should be pressured to give up 
support for the PLO’.42 
 
At the domestic level, such openness to recognizing Israel as an asset would help with the 
administration’s broader goals via support in Congress and US public opinion. Public disagreements with 
Israel’s leadership could be avoided by institutionalizing channels of communication and coordination, 
while Israeli supporters and lobby groups in the US would be more willing to support other US policies 
and objectives, beginning with the massive increase in US military budgets announced by Reagan. 
 
Opposing such views stood the sceptics of US-Israel strategic cooperation. Contrary to the supporters, 
the sceptics argued that a major reason for Israel’s recent uptake in unilateral actions and military 
adventurism stemmed from Israel’s impunity and a belief that US support would be forthcoming. 
Sceptics also believed that such overt forms of cooperation with Israel would irreparably damage US 
credibility and influence in the region, unless accompanied by a stern and sustained focus on the Arab-
Israeli conflict and linked to Israeli policy in such domains. 
 
																																																								
42 FRUS Vol.III (1981-1983), Document 77. Richard Pipes had also been ‘team leader’ of the controversial 1976 Team B report 
discussed in Chapter 3. His son, Daniel Pipes, also a US official and founder of the pro-Israel Middle East Forum (MEF), has 
most recently, in April 2017, helped found the Congressional Israel Victory Caucus in the US. As described by the MEF website, 
‘The caucus calls for a new U.S. approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, ending the emphasis on Israel making "painful 
concessions" and instead putting the onus on Palestinians—they must give up the goal of destroying Israel and recognize Israel 
as the Jewish state’. See, “Announcing the ‘Congressional Israel Victory Caucus,’” MEF, 24 April 2017, 
https://www.meforum.org/articles/2017/announcing-the-congressional-israel-victory-caucu. 
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They further argued that the best means to employ US influence and leverage over Israel was to hold out 
on a full-blown integration of Israel into the US and Western alliance frameworks, keeping such 
cooperation as the ultimate form of inducement needed to convince Israel to show more flexibility in the 
context of peace negotiations. Most importantly, these sceptics argued that Israel’s strategic value to the 
US was in all actuality quite limited. Israel could at best provide services in the limited zone of the Eastern 
Mediterranean, but compared to the vitally strategic Persian Gulf such services were on the whole 
negligible. 
 
These debates characterized the first years of the Reagan administration, broadly speaking until late 1983, 
when a high-level decision was made by to resume and further expand on the original push to 
institutionalize the US-Israel relationship. Importantly, during these long drawn-out debates, there was a 
moment when the sceptics came out on top, only to then be overcome by the supporters at a later stage. 
The key variable for these debates was Lebanon and the Israeli invasion of 1982, an event that 
significantly complicated, if not buried, the US’s early efforts to establish some form of ‘strategic 
consensus’ amongst its disparate allies. Indeed, the balance between the two groups moved from 
supporters to sceptics and back to supporters throughout the first years of the administration, a time that 
coincided with some of the roughest and most serious US-Israeli disagreements. 
 
Against the backdrop of the Lebanon war, and following the US’s first, bloody encounter with terrorism 
and suicide attacks, the sceptics and supporters of US-Israel strategic cooperation came to agree on a 
fragile compromise and it was this that would lay the groundwork for the critical, institutionalizing 
juncture of the US-Israel relationship. This consensus was largely based on short-term urgency of 
extracting the US from the Lebanon conflict, without losing face and while preserving the limited tactical 
gains made by Israel in that country vis-à-vis the Soviet ‘proxies’ of Syria and the PLO. It was moreover 
based on the belief that such institutionalization would enhance US influence over certain fundamentals 
of Israeli policy, helping to diminish the tension over the US’s parallel outreach to the Arabs, while 
consolidating domestic support for the administration.  
 
More fundamentally however, the basis for this fragile consensus was the opinion shared by both sceptics 
and supporters that the US’s intervention in Lebanon was distracting it from the central priority of the 
administration’s Middle East policy: defence of the Persian Gulf. Once again—and just as had been the 
case with the issue of compensating Israel in order to allow the US to enhance its agreements with its 
Arab allies—the US’s central priority of a focus on the Persian Gulf and the prevalence of a number of 
constraints limiting or distracting the US from this focus, would result in an unprecedented upgrading of 
US-Israel ties. It would be in this context that efforts to integrate Israel into the Western alliance 
framework, including through enhanced interdependence with NATO, would begin to take shape. In 
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turn, this growing interdependence between US and Israeli deterrence capabilities in the Near East would 
gradually make large dimensions of US Middle East policy dependent on Israeli backing and approval. 
 
Motivated by a hope that such institutionalization would limit opposition to US-Arab strategic 
cooperation and enhance US leverage over Israeli policy, the sceptics did succeed in restricting US-Israel 
strategic cooperation to the Eastern Mediterranean. From the standpoint of the supporters of US-Israel 
strategic cooperation, this limited focus still represented a valuable starting point. Indeed, the pre-
positioning of US military hardware in Israel, along with a multitude of other agreements and forms of 
preferential treatment, would fundamentally transform the nature of the US-Israeli relationship, 
enhancing interdependence while increasingly moving the US closer to Israel’s goal of a quasi-exclusivist 
relationship in the Middle East. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The chapter has highlighted three central priorities governing US foreign policy in the Middle East during 
the Reagan period, and three challenges facing US policymakers as they sought to develop a coherent 
strategy capable of advancing these objectives in synergy with one another. The significance of these 
priorities—a return of the globalist prism in the context of the Second Cold War; a strategic focus on the 
Persian Gulf; and a parallel focus on enhancing Israel’s ability to act as a ‘strategic asset’ for US 
interests—would remain unchanged throughout the eight years of the Reagan administration. 
 
The influence of the three challenges facing US policy—overcoming opposition to enhanced US-Arab 
strategic cooperation; the need to compensate Israel for such cooperation while supporting a ‘strategic 
consensus’ among regional allies; and a parallel effort to limit Israel’s most adventurist tendencies—all 
stemmed from the age-old challenge of reconciling the ‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ components of US Middle East 
policy, a theme identifiable since the earliest US-Israel relations and indeed even before Israel’s formal 
announcement of independence in 1948. 
 
A key theme emerging from this analysis is the centrality of priorities one and two, and the lack of 
consensus within the administration on the third objective: enhancing strategic cooperation with Israel 
and better integrating Israel into the US-led Western alliance framework. 
 
Divergence within the administration would result in contradictory statements and policies. Yet, the fact 
that compensation for Israel emerged as the key means for the administration to follow through on its 
priority of building up the defences of Arab allies in close vicinity to the Persian Gulf, demonstrates the 
influence exerted by Israel over the articulation of US policy. It further highlights how Israel already 
enjoyed ample leverage to influence US policy in the region according to its own interests, as well as the 
continued presence of deep disagreements between high-level US and Israeli officials, particularly 
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revolving around the preferential or exclusivist nature of the US-Israel relationship and a lack of 
appreciation by Israeli leaders of the US’s broader interests and concerns.  
 
Against the backdrop of a ‘Second Coming’ by the US to the region, both sets of US allies and partners 
would lock horns in a concerted effort to promote their strategic services and garner support and 
assistance from the Reagan administration. Israel worried that the shifting strategic focus of the 
administration from the Near East to the Persian Gulf would endanger its preferential relationship with 
the US. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and others were concerned by Reagan’s early campaign pledge to recognize 
Israel as a ‘strategic asset’ and sought assurances that the administration would not completely sidestep 
issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinians. 
 
Ultimately, however, Arab allies were under no illusions that their relationship might one day supersede 
that enjoyed by Israel. They were incensed, however, by the inability of the Reagan administration to 
make true on its commitments to sell weapons due to congressional (and Israeli) opposition. Such 
instances seemed to confirm that the US had essentially abdicated its responsibilities as a mediator and 
would no longer be able to restrain Israel and ‘deliver’ those concessions needed for a peace agreement. 
Significantly, these were precisely the arguments deployed by the sceptics of US-Israel strategic 
cooperation present in the administration. 
 
Paradoxically therefore, despite (or indeed because of) the reoccurrence of severe political disagreements 
between Washington and Tel Aviv during the early years of the administration—and reaching a climax in 
the context the Lebanon war—and the more general urgency (and consensus) within the administration 
on the need to focus on the Persian Gulf, a renewed impetus towards strategic cooperation with Israel 
was consolidated in the battlegrounds of Lebanon. By late 1983, Israel was seeing its relationship with the 
US institutionalized and upgraded. Meanwhile, the hopes and expectations forming the basis of a fragile 
consensus between supporters and sceptics of US-Israel strategic cooperation failed to materialize. 
 
The next chapter will turn to these debates and discussions, introducing the first concrete agreements—
and in particular the 1981 MoU on US-Israel strategic cooperation—addressing the implications this 
embrace of compensation and inducements vis-à-vis Israel would have for US policy in the region 
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Chapter 5 
 
‘Strategic Dissensus’: 
Debates and Dividends of US-Israel Strategic Cooperation 
 
This chapter1 will examine the first concrete policy initiatives adopted by the Reagan administration to 
build on the ‘strategic asset’ slogan. Centred on the first year of the new administration, the chapter will 
demonstrate how the administration came into office extremely well disposed towards Israel and ready to 
consider new areas of cooperation in the military and strategic domain. However, Israel’s sustained 
opposition to the parallel US-Arab strategic dialogue and repeated unilateral actions in the political and 
military domain between 1981–82 would dampen this enthusiasm, leading to significant debates and turf 
wars within the Reagan administration on how best to restrain and influence Israeli policy while not 
harming the administration’s wider priorities. Debates took place between sceptics and supporters of 
closer strategic cooperation with Israel, with each side seeking to advance their own perceptions and 
priorities vis-à-vis Israel and the broader Middle East. 
 
These debates, which characterized the full first year of the administration, continue to have relevance 
today. The underlying implications of these approaches—what essentially amounted to a catch-22 in that 
US policy seemed to have little other option than to successively augment cooperation with Israel as a 
means to advance broader US interests and concerns—would create significant path dependency, 
manifested in the slow emergence of a ‘policy straitjacket’ constraining US policy options in the broader 
Middle East. 
 
In this context, powerful precedents and path dependency were created in particular by the negotiations 
over the sale of advanced surveillance aircraft (AWACS) and sophisticated add-ons for Saudi Arabia’s 
fleet of F-15 fighter jets, and the parallel necessity to compensate Israel with superior arms and assistance. 
This was the beginning of a policy approach that would become set in law decades later, in 2008, with the 
formalization of the QME concept. 
 
While this compensation approach can be traced to the mid-1960s and the first US-Israel MoU 
negotiated by the Johnson administration in 1965, it was Reagan who solidified preferential compensation 
for Israel as standard practice. Building on the legacy of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and motivated 
by pursuit of the three central priorities of the administration’s Middle East policy, the Reagan period 
created new conceptual and institutional frameworks governing US-Israel relations, whereby Congress 
and pro-Israel supporters in the US would subsequently be able to further their influence not only on US-
Israel relations but on broader elements of US Middle East policy as well. 																																																								
1 The term ‘strategic dissensus’ is borrowed from Shaw, “Strategic Dissensus,” op.cit. 
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5.1 The Early US-Israel Dialogue on Strategic Cooperation 
 
The first discussions on augmenting the US-Israeli strategic relationship took place in the late Nixon and 
Ford administrations. During this time, and again in the context of severe disagreements between the US 
and Israel during the post-1973 war negotiations, enhanced efforts to institutionalize strategic dialogue 
were conducted by Secretary of State Kissinger and, in a more structured fashion, by Secretary of 
Defence Donald Rumsfeld.2 
 
The main impetus for such dialogue was to seek understandings, exchange of best practices and advanced 
planning on Israeli defence and military needs, which in the post-1973 war era became entirely dependent 
on US supplies and aid. The Israelis’ ‘dependence on one source, the US, made them uncomfortable’, 
recalled Nicholas Veliotes. ‘Israeli leaders decided that having a moral basis for the relationship was no 
longer sufficient, they had to become important, and this evolved into the idea of being a “strategic 
asset”’.3 
 
Significantly, these early efforts to enhance structured dialogue with Israel, like the more advanced 
initiatives taken by the Reagan administration, were driven on the US side by an effort to diminish 
tensions between US-Arab and US-Israeli relations and enhance coordination between the respective 
policy approaches of Israel and the US. On the US side, there was a need to honour commitments to 
preserve Israeli security, while also seeking recognition from Israel of the US’s global interests and 
responsibilities, including those resting on US-Arab cooperation.4 In essence, these debates can be framed 
with reference to Israel’s goal of establishing an exclusivist relationship with the US and parallel US 
efforts to push back against such goal, arguing that preferential but not exclusivist relations served the 
best interests of both countries. 
 
While structured dialogue between US and Israeli intelligence services, the first institutionalized 
dimension of US-Israel strategic cooperation, can be traced to the 1950s and 1960s, such efforts were 
extremely restricted both in scope and in publicity, also facing considerable pushback from the large 
majority of officials working in the State Department, the Pentagon and across the foreign policy 
bureaucracy.5As the bilateral relationship progressed, intelligence ties were augmented by increased 
economic and military aid and a number of key political agreements and commitments, most notably the 
1975 MoA assurances provided by Kissinger in the context of the Sinai II negotiations and the 1979 side 
agreements signed in the context of the Israel-Egyptian peace treaty, the 1979 US-Israel MoA (see 
Appendix B and C). 																																																								
2 Ross, Doomed to Succeed, op.cit, pp.172-76. Donald Rumsfeld would serve as a part-time administration consultant during the 
1980s, then serving as Reagan’s Personal Representative in the Middle East between November 1983 and May 1984. 
3 Interview, Nicholas Veliotes, op.cit. 
4 For a comprehensive analysis of US-Israel strategic dialogue see, Puschel, US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation, op.cit., pp.11-32. 
5 Ibid., pp.1-32; Teicher, Twin Pillars, op.cit, pp.88-98,116-30; Raviv and Melman, Friends in Deed, op.cit., pp.47-80. 
		 108	
 
The victory of the Israeli Likud Party in the country’s 1977 elections, leading to the first right-wing 
government in Israeli history, would add a further impetus to such efforts. Indeed, a key driver for 
recognition of Israel’s ‘ally’ status came from Israel, not the US. While previous US administrations had 
been reluctant to agree to such overt forms of cooperation, this hesitance was swept away by the Reagan 
administration. The 1980s were a ‘transformative’ moment for the relationship, recalled Dennis Ross. 
This represented a turning point, ‘not just institutional or programmatic but in terms of a new outlook in 
the National Security bureaucracy that view Israel in different light’. A ‘new sociology was added to the 
relationship’, continued the former Reagan official and a key supporter of US-Israeli strategic 
cooperation.6 
 
The US had long appreciated the ‘strategic’ nature of its ties to Israel in the context of Arab-Israeli 
diplomacy and broader US efforts to push the Soviets out of the region (as well as in the US domestic 
political setting). Such viewpoints restricted the ‘strategic’ relationship to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
Near East, however. This linkage had long worried Israeli leaders, and it was these efforts to ‘de-link’ the 
US-Israel relationship from the conflict that motivated Israel’s heightened emphasis on its strategic 
contributions to US interests. This would eventually be mirrored in the US’s emphasis on the Eastern 
Mediterranean as a key zone for US-Israel strategic cooperation, a focus that effectively allowed the US to 
downplay questions related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinians and move to consider Israel in 
the framework of the Second Cold War and the balance of military forces vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and 
its ‘proxies’ in Lebanon and Syria. 
 
While the Israeli left, and in particular Yigal Allon, Israeli Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister until 
1977, had begun emphasizing the two-way complementarity that characterized US and Israeli interests in 
the mid-1970s, arguing that support for Israel served US interests and was not simply a form of ‘charity’7, 
Prime Minister Begin and the Likud Party took such efforts to a new level, orchestrating, in the words of 
Karen S. Puschel, a ‘full-fledged campaign for US recognition of Israel’s strategic value’.8 
 
Low-level strategic dialogue did progress in the Carter years,9 directed by the Secretary of Defence Harold 
Brown, yet the practical expressions of these efforts were extremely limited.10 Indeed, the general 
tendency of the administration was to see such forms of cooperation, such as increased port calls at Haifa 
by the US navy during the late 1970s, as a kind of ‘reward’ for Israeli ‘good behaviour’ in negotiations 
with the Arabs. As noted by Yehuda Avner, long-term advisor and speechwriter for successive Israeli 
																																																								
6 Interview, Dennis Ross, op.cit. 
7 Puschel, US-Israeli, op.cit., pp.23-4. 
8 Ibid., p.24. Also see, Ariel Sharon, Warrior. An Autobiography, New York, Simon&Schuster, 2001, pp.408-22. 
9 Interview, Nicholas Veliotes, op.cit.. 
10 Teicher, Twin Pillars, op.cit. pp.90-1. 
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prime ministers, including Begin, ‘Carter had issued explicit instructions to all his aides never to use the 
terms ‘ally’ or ‘alliance’ when characterizing the US-Israel relationship’.11 
 
5.2 Reagan and US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation: Sceptics vs. Supporters 
 
With Reagan’s election in 1980, both Israel and the US were, for the first time, governed by right-wing 
conservative governments. The twin concepts of ‘peace through strength’ and ‘offensive deterrence’ 
encapsulated the strong ideological affinity between the two governments and this too would become an 
important dynamic in the renewed impetus for US-Israeli strategic cooperation. Indeed, the Israeli 
government of Menachem Begin was aware of the primacy of the Soviet threat in Washington, and Israeli 
language and proposals would quickly adapt to the new priorities of the US administration. 
 
A number of communications by people close to the Reagan administration would further Israel’s 
expectations about the new leadership in Washington. ‘I think […] you’ll be pleasantly surprised as to 
how our new president views the Middle East’, Max Fisher, an influential Jewish-American 
philanthropist, lobbyist and key foreign policy advisor on Israel and the Middle East for successive 
Republican administrations since Eisenhower, told Prime Minister Begin during a visit to Israel in June 
1981.12 Reagan ‘sees the region almost exclusively through Cold War lenses; its black and white’, 
continued Fisher, who founded the National Jewish Coalition in 1985 aimed at strengthening links 
between American-Jewish community and the Republican party.13 ‘We [the US] stand by Israel because 
Israel is on our side, while many of the Arab countries are allies of the Soviet Union. It’s as simple as that. 
That’s how he [Reagan] views the Lebanon situation, for instance’.14 
 
Discussions on the scope and nature of US-Israeli strategic cooperation began early, in the context of 
efforts to build upon and expand Carter’s blueprint for the Middle East Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). 
The US had secured limited basing rights in Egypt—where intense negotiations were held throughout the 
early 1980s for access to the Rans Banas military airstrips and naval port15—in addition to the already 
mentioned bases in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and Sudan. 
 
Meanwhile, intense discussions were held with Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf nations to explore 
potential access agreements. During this period the US also expanded its major military base and airstrips 
																																																								
11 Yehuda Avner, The Prime Ministers. An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership, London/Jerusalem, Toby Press, 2012, p.569.  
12 Avner, The Prime Ministers, op.cit., p.560. Max Fisher, commonly referred to as ‘Mr. Israel’ in pro-Israeli Republican circles at 
the time, held close ties to the Reagan administration.  
13 Ibid. Today called the Republican Jewish Federation, the National Jewish Coalition was instrumental in deepening ties between 
the Reagan administration, the GOP and the American-Jewish community during the 1980s. 
14 Avner, The Prime Ministers, p.560. 
15 Negotiations for a major ‘rear staging base’ for the RDF in Egypt dragged on for many years over Egyptian reluctance to allow 
a major US presence and high run-on costs. Talks were ultimately terminated in 1985.  
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on the island of Diego Garcia. 16  Documents relating to the subsequent 1983 establishment of 
CENTCOM, with its headquarters in Tampa, Florida, demonstrate Israel’s trepidation towards this 
evolving US-Saudi relationship. ‘A major USCENTCOM presence in Saudi Arabia’, reads one such 
document found at the RRPL, would ‘be objectionable to Israel which sees any moves to strengthen the 
US-Saudi relationship as potentially harmful to its own special relationship with the US’.17 
 
Mindful of the need to preserve its special relationship, Israeli leaders were keen to propose Israel as a key 
staging area for the RDF. ‘Israel, as a permanent friend and ally of the US, is ready to cooperate in 
shaping a greater American role in the Middle East’, noted foreign minister Shamir in an early meeting 
with the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Republican Senator John Tower, during a 
tour of Israel in early February 1981. ‘It is not only possible, but necessary for the US and Israel to have a 
strong partnership in this regard. […] Israel will be in the Middle East forever, and will remain a 
democratic, reliable friend.’18 
 
While Senator Tower reminded his host that the US would have a ‘political problem with the Arab states 
were we to presume upon Israel to use its facilities’, Shamir countered by offering Israeli territory ‘for 
pre-positioning US equipment’ to be used by the RDF in the event of an emergency, contending that 
‘fewer political problems with simply storing equipment’ existed. The US was however seeking forward 
bases in close vicinity to the Persian Gulf, a dynamic that rendered Israeli (and Egyptian) facilities ‘far 
from the area of concern’, noted Tower, who quickly moved to reassure Israeli leaders about the US’s 
parallel efforts to remedy the US’s ‘deficiencies in air and sea lift’ in the Eastern Mediterranean but also 
extending to the Persian Gulf.19 
 
Media sources shine further light on the concrete ideas being discussed in the realm of US-Israeli strategic 
cooperation. As noted by a 1981 New York Times article, ‘a recent study by American experts for the 
Pentagon found that simply because of geography, arms stationed in Israel could be flown relatively 
quickly either to the Persian Gulf or to Western Europe, meaning that whatever was stockpiled in Israel 
could also be considered for potential NATO use’.20 
 
Such studies placed Israel in the context of contingency planning for the Persian Gulf and the RDF, but 
also with regard to Western Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean and NATO, signalling the beginnings of 
efforts to integrate Israel into the Western alliance framework. These would continue throughout the 																																																								
16 Expansion work on the US military base of Diego Garcia began in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution. Described as the 
‘most dramatic build-up of any location since the Vietnam War era’, the new base was operational in 1986. See, “Diego Garcia 
‘Camp Justice’,” GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/diego-garcia.htm.  
17 RRPL, Near East and South Asian Affairs: NSC Records, “Middle East-Centcom,” Box 90585. 
18 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, Israel (02/09/1981-02/09/1981), Box 37, Cable 63568. 
19 Ibid. 
20 David K. Shipler, “US-Israel Strategic Link: Both Sides Take Stock,” NYT, 2 October 1981, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/02/world/us-israel-strategic-link-both-sides-take-stock.html?pagewanted=print. 
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Reagan era, with a number of scholars arguing that the vast sums of US aid and military supplies provided 
to Israel were more than matched by Israeli services provided to advance US interests.21 Ultimately, by 
the mid-to-late 1980s, such efforts were translated into debates on ‘equal treatment’ and the 
‘NATOization’22 of Israel, leading ultimately to the recognition of Israel (along with Egypt) as a ‘major 
non-NATO ally’ by the US in 1987. 
 
Tangible indications of a new propensity to engage with Israel on strategic and military cooperation are 
provided by a number of sources and individuals who worked in the Reagan administration. Howard 
Teicher, who in early 1981 had moved from the Pentagon to the State Department and was to emerge as 
a key supporter for enhanced US-Israeli strategic cooperation, recalls how he had proposed Israel’s Ben 
Gurion international airport as a staging area for US B-52 bombers for the RDF in the early 1980s.23 
 
While the plan was scrapped due to opposition from the highest levels, in particular from Secretary of 
Defence Weinberger, Teicher emphasized how ‘a new receptivity to the notion of strategic cooperation 
with Israel’ was taking shape ‘throughout the national security and foreign policy bureaucracy’24 in the 
Reagan administration. Teicher describes how there existed ‘a broad range of potential benefits for the 
US military posture in the Middle East if America and Israel could [undertake] genuine strategic 
cooperation’.25 ‘Israel’s geographic location […] air and naval facilities [could serve as] excellent staging 
areas, depots and distribution points for US forces embarking on various operations in Southwest Asia’26 
and beyond, from the Eastern Mediterranean, in Syria and Lebanon, to the Red Sea and Ethiopia, Yemen 
and the Persian Gulf. 
 
Yet, by the early 1980s ‘Washington’s relationship with Israel did not, in fact, have an operative strategic 
dimension’, recalled Teicher; ‘not only was there no planning for combined operations, exercise activity 
or other forms of routine military cooperation, but most US government officials, be they civilian or 
military, went out of their way to deny reports of US-Israeli military ties and to resist all efforts to 
promote strategic cooperation’.27 
 																																																								
21 Spiegel, “Israel’s Value to the US”, op.cit; Steven Rosen, “The Strategic Value of Israel,” AIPAC Papers on US-Israel 
Relations, No.1, Washington DC, 1983. 
22 Global Jewish Advocacy, “Review of the Year 1988,” American Jewish Year Book, New York, 1988, p.161, 
http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajc_data/files/1988_4_uscivicpolitical.pdf. 
23 Teicher, Twin Pillars, op.cit, pp.114-6. Media reports from 1980 also make reference to this possibility. George G. Wilson, 
“Egypt Base Could Cost $400 Million,” WP, 26 August 1980, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/08/26/egypt-base-could-cost-400-million/4a4183fb-303b-4ba3-8339-
0d044bff12a9/?utm_term=.8dc0594fd397. 
24 Teicher, Twin Pillars, op.cit, p.115. Teicher also recounts his relationship with Dennis Ross, noting how ‘one area we agreed on 
in particular was the need for strategic cooperation with Israel’ (p.91). Interestingly, following the signing of the 2015 Iran 
Nuclear Deal, Ross called on the Obama administration to send B-52 bombers to Israel to assuage its security concerns, enhance 
Israel’s deterrence capacity and repair damaged relations. Dennis Ross, “Former Obama Advisor: Send B-52 Bombers to Israel,” 
Ha’aretz, 17 July 2015, https://www.haaretz.com/former-obama-adviser-send-b-52-bombers-to-israel-1.5307262. 
25 Teicher, Twin Pillars, op.cit., p.95. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., p.92. 
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Joining Teicher as a key supporter of strategic cooperation with Israel was Dennis Ross, who worked on 
the NSC staff and in the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment during the 1980s. Ross, together with Paul 
Wolfowitz, was also involved in the early strategic dialogue with Israel under the late Ford and Carter 
administrations and has retained a key role on US Middle East policy and the relationship with Israel in 
successive administrations ever since. 
 
In an interview with the author, Ross noted how ‘a new logic was behind this push to institutionalize the 
relationship. A group of people, and I was one of them, wanted to counterbalance what had been a 
traditional viewpoint within the bureaucracy that saw the US-Israel relationship as all costs and no gains. 
We wanted to show that support for Israel also held important benefits for US interests’, emphasizing 
that ‘Israeli capabilities could act as a force multiplier’ for US interests and that ‘pre-positioning allowed 
for greater and quicker force projection’ into the region.28 
 
Yet, on the other side of the debate, the sceptics of US-Israeli strategic cooperation contended that Israeli 
services and capabilities, particularly in the event of an all-out war with the Soviets, were rather limited. 
Moreover, any such contribution would likely be more than offset by the expected damage it would cause 
to US-Arab cooperation. Weinberger, like other Pentagon officials, repeatedly cautioned to ‘keep in mind 
the limitations of Israeli capabilities in the event of a US-Soviet war in the region’.29 Indeed, the sceptics 
of US-Israel strategic cooperation had long argued that a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be 
needed as a precondition to allow the US to make full use of Israeli capabilities and strategic location. 
 
Such views were also held by State Department officials, including Nicholas Veliotes, who had worked in 
the Carter administration and stayed on as Assistance Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs in the 
early Reagan years, before moving to become US ambassador to Egypt in 1984. In an interview with the 
author, Veliotes explained how ‘during the Cold War, in any scenario involving hostilities with the USSR, 
Israel was a non-factor. During the Iran-Iraq war, Israel would be of no use militarily if we had to deploy 
to the Gulf in the event of an Iranian break-through in southern Iraq’. Throughout the early 1980s a 
number of individuals in the administration, the ‘neo-cons’ as Veliotes described them, ‘continued to put 
forward proposals such as deploying to the Gulf with Israeli troops’. These proposals were ‘designed to 
support their view that Israel was, indeed, a strategic asset. To this idea, I noted that under such 
circumstances our Arab friends, with tears in their eyes, would fight us! […] The whole illusory concept 
of Israel as a strategic asset was motivated and sustained by the exigencies of US domestic politics’,30 
concluded the former Reagan era official. 
 																																																								
28 Interview, Dennis Ross, op.cit. 
29 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, 1981-1987, NSPG 0073 10/18/1983 
[Middle East]. 
30 Interview, Nicholas Veliotes, op.cit. 
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Significantly, there was a degree of overlap between sceptics and supporters for enhanced US-Israel 
cooperation, where they diverged however was on the sequencing and tactics of this cooperation. The 
sceptics were not opposed the idea of integrating Israel into the Western alliance framework. They too 
agreed on the need for the US to stand by Israel and employ this relationship to strengthen US influence 
in the region, and they too wanted to devise means to limit Israel’s adventurist tendencies and increase 
US leverage over Israeli policy. 
 
A 1981 article by Shai Feldman in Foreign Affairs goes some way toward summarizing the views of the 
sceptics and their underlying embrace of the concept of ‘linkage’ between US-Israel relations, the Arab-
Israeli conflict and Israel-Arab relations.31 ‘Israel should be made an integral part of the alliance’s system 
to secure Western interests in the Persian Gulf”, argued Feldman. ‘Negotiating Israel’s withdrawal [from 
Arab and Palestinian lands] should be linked to its new role in the alliance: only if the latter is achieved 
would Israel be able to implement the former. […] The United States should welcome such a quid pro 
quo. […] Without the assumption of such a role, Israel would not make the aforementioned concessions’. 
 
This approach ‘would differ markedly from past suggestions that Israel should trade its control of the 
West Bank for an American security guarantee’, noted the author. ‘Whereas a guarantee would 
institutionalize dependence—with a debilitating effect on the nation’s moral—the concept advanced here 
would establish interdependence. Israel would be dependent on the Western alliance, but the alliance would 
also become more dependent upon Israel’.32 
 
Such an emphasis on linkage was deeply opposed by the supporters of strategic cooperation. These 
argued that an explicit linkage and quid pro quo would undermine as opposed to increase US leverage 
over Israel, weakening Israel’s sense of security, diluting support for the US’s Arab outreach while not 
succeeding in restraining Israeli unilateral tendencies, which would only increase due to Israel’s growing 
threat perceptions. Documents from the RRPL demonstrate the extent of these debates. 
 
A response to Shai Feldman’s article delivered to Douglas Feith, at the time a member of Reagan’s NSC, 
in early May 1981 and written by Marvin Feuerwerger, a member of the Pentagon’s Policy Planning staff, 
is particularly revealing: 
 
I object to the explicit linkage of cooperation with Israel and negotiations on the future of the 
West Bank. […] I believe instead that by refusing to move toward cooperation with Israel we [the 
US] have hurt ourselves in the past and would both hinder out capabilities and endanger the 
prospect of future movement in the peace process. […] If our goal is to develop Israeli faith in 
our commitment to Israel’s security and in our joint commitment to Western interests, we should 
first pursue cooperation as the foundation for US-Israeli relations in all spheres. Restored US 																																																								
31 Shai Feldman, “Peacemaking in the Middle East: The Next Step,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.59, No.4 (Spring 1981), pp.756-780. 
32 Ibid, p.767 [emphasis added]. 
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credibility within Israel will undoubtedly assist any future negotiation process without the need for 
explicit linkage to that process.33 
 
These passages present the broad contours of the debate between supporters and sceptics of US-Israel 
strategic cooperation in the Reagan administration. As a result of the pro-Israel predisposition of many 
administration officials, the general tendency was to approach questions related to Israeli contributions of 
US strategic interests in a favourable light. Israeli opposition to Arab arms sales was a challenge, but such 
opposition was deemed easy to overcome, if only the US could ‘sweeten the pot for Israel’34 with 
mounting forms of compensation. ‘I know the Jewish lobby very well’, noted Vice President Bush in one 
NSC meeting on 1 April 1981 where arms sales to Saudi Arabia were discussed. ‘I feel that if there is a 
range of quid’s for the quo, we can get the [Saudi arms] deal if we orchestrate our tactics properly’.35 
 
5.3 Expected Dividends of US-Israel Strategic Cooperation  
 
In order to better contextualize the decision-making process and balance of opinions that led to the 
institutionalization of the US-Israel relationship, there is a need to carefully consider a range of effective 
benefits and services that Israel could provide the US administration. These ranged from political to 
strategic and ideational considerations, and a holistic appraisal is necessary in order to clarify the 
motivating drivers behind this push to institutionalize relations with Israel during the 1980s and the 
expected dividends in store for the US as it moved forward with this process. 
 
Strategic Dividends 
 
Beginning from the strategic domain, the above passages have highlighted a number of rationales—
relating to geographic positioning, advanced military and technological preparedness and interoperability 
with US forces and technologies—that created the groundwork for enhanced strategic dialogue with 
Israel. While these services were debated by some, particularly in the Pentagon, few disputed that Israeli 
covert and intelligence capabilities were important assets for the US, especially when it came to receiving 
information on developments in Iran or in gathering intelligence on Soviet moves in Syria and Lebanon. 
Covert and intelligence cooperation would gradually emerge as the most tangible strategic dividends 
provided by Israel to the US. 
 
While US-Israeli intelligence cooperation stretches back to the early 1950s, growing in particular 
following the secret 1968 CYR Agreement signed by Lyndon Johnson, during the 1980s the rising threat 
of terrorism, combined with Reagan’s fixation on US hostages in Lebanon, would increase the urgency of 
this cooperation. This also stemmed from the 1983 bombing of the US embassy in Beirut, which 																																																								
33 RRPL, Kemp Files, Israel (05/01/81-05/19/81), RAC Box 2 [emphasis added]. 
34 The term was used by Caspar Weinberger in a NSC meeting on 1 April 1980. RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting 
Files: Records 1981-88, NSC 00007 04/01/81. 
35 Ibid. 
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effectively decimated the CIA’s capabilities in the Arab world. While intelligence ties and covert 
cooperation would emerge as tangible areas of US-Israeli strategic cooperation, many within the 
administration debated whether these ‘services’ were enough to justify a further upgrading of the 
relationship as these were commonly framed as the minimum that could be expected from Israel in 
exchange for the US’s generous aid. 
 
When it came to Iran, a number of high-level Israeli officials repeatedly argued during the 1980s that the 
US should employ Israeli contacts and middlemen to open a secret channel of dialogue with so-called 
‘moderate’ elements within the Islamic Republic.36 These discussions, which stretch back to the earliest 
days of the Reagan administration and actually began during the 1980 campaign, would subsequently 
mutate into the conduit for the Iran-Contra affair.37 In 1980–81, news broke that Israel was secretly 
selling Iran military spare parts, actions that clearly contravened stated US policy but which according to 
some had received tacit, if unofficial, approval by certain officials in the Raegan administration.38 
 
Further Israeli services in the strategic domain extended to the Third World, both in Africa—in such 
places as Chad, South Africa and Angola, where the US and Israel secretly cooperated in seeking to 
rollback Soviet influence—and in Central America. In both areas, congressional opposition was limiting 
the administration’s ability to fulfil Reagan’s campaign pledge to ‘win’ the Cold War. Israeli services in 
these domains could help circumvent congressional bans on the sale of weaponry or the sending of 
trainers. Significantly, many Arab states—including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan—were also involved 
in assisting the US’s covert offensive in the Third World, in particular by providing funding and Soviet 
arms to US-linked proxies in Central America, Asia and Africa. 
 
While much of this US-Israeli covert cooperation during the 1980s remains classified, a number of 
authors have begun to dissect this secret cooperation. Media sources from the time also make veiled 
references to such cooperation.39 In August 1981, for instance, Israel’s Economic Affairs Minister, 
Yaacov Meridor, was quoted as saying: 
 
We are going to ask you, the United States government, not to compete with us in arms. […] 
Don’t compete with us in Taiwan. Don’t compete with us in South Africa. Don’t compete with us 																																																								
36 See, Robert Parry, “When Israel/Neocons Favored Iran,” Consortiumnews, 28 July 2015, 
https://consortiumnews.com/2015/07/28/when-israelneocons-favored-iran/; A compendium of relevant official documents 
relating to the Iran-Contra affair is provided by Brown University, 
https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/documents.php; A comprehensive account is 
provided by Byrne, Iran-Contra, op.cit. 
37 This research does not address the so-called ‘October Surprise’ scandal and the freeing of US hostages in Iran on the day of 
Reagan’s swearing in as 40th President, due to a lack of primary sources. Nicholas Veliotes described the theory as ‘nonsense’ in 
an interview with the author. 
38 Robert Parry, “Rethinking Iran-Contra: A Much Darker Story?,” Global Research, 30 May 2016, 
https://www.globalresearch.ca/rethinking-iran-contra-a-much-darker-story/19992. 
39 See for instance, Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, “US-Israeli-Central American Connection,” The Link, Americans for Middle East 
Understanding, Vol.18, No.4 (November 1985); Milton Jamail and Margo Gutierrez, “Israel in Central America,” MERIP 140, 
Vol.16 (May/June 1986); Dan Goodgame, “Israel Asks US to Finance Sales to Latin America,” Miami Herald, 13 December 1982. 
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in the Caribbean or in other countries where you couldn’t directly do it. […] Let us do it. […] You 
sell the ammunition and equipment by proxy. Israel will be your proxy. And this will be worked 
out with a certain agreement with the United States where we will have certain markets […], 
which will be left for us.40 
 
A leaked copy of an official US General Accountability Office report on US assistance to Israel in 1983 
demonstrates how US arms deliveries to Israel had been consistently downsized in official published 
figures, with the extra material most likely being sent or sold by Israel to third parties across the many 
hotspots in the Third World.41 
 
Political Dividends 
 
Moving to the political domain, benefits were expected not only in the form of assuaging Israeli and 
congressional opposition to enhanced arm sales to the Arabs, but also in the consolidated support of 
these same actors in aiding US efforts to overcome congressional restrictions such as the Clark and the 
Boland Amendments discussed in Chapter 3. It was the covert domains, and Israeli ‘subsidiary services’42 
in support of Reagan’s promised ‘revolution’ in foreign affairs, that became particularly attractive for 
high-level Reagan officials. While the US’s Arab allies could provide money and arms, they could not 
compete with the vast influence enjoyed by Israel in the US domestic political setting, one important 
dynamic when weighing and comparing the potential dividends that could flow from the parallel US-
Israel and US-Arab strategic dialogues. 
 
Moreover, and in light of Reagan’s success in attracting 40 percent of the Jewish-American vote in 1980, 
officials believed there were a number of deeper political benefits in store if the US progressed with 
strategic cooperation with Israel. In this respect, GOP officials had long sought to attract votes and 
funding from the traditionally Democrat-leaning Jewish-American community. It was in this domain that 
personalities like Max Fisher and his National Jewish Coalition as well as Reagan’s successive Special 
Representatives for Jewish Affairs would become indispensable for the administration’s objectives of 
maintaining close relations with the Jewish-American community and Israel. As noted by Thomas 
Pickering in an interview with the author, the objective was to ‘peel away some votes from the 
Democratic Party’43 and, in particular, seek to secure funding for the administration and the Republicans 
from major Jewish-American organizations which had moved to assume a more conservative outlook 
matching the priorities of both Reagan and the Israeli Likud. 
 																																																								
40 Mel Laytner, “Israel hopes to double arms sales—with US assist,” United Press International, 17 August 1981, 
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/08/17/Israel-hopes-to-double-arms-sales-with-US-assist/7425366868800/. 
41 See, Claudia Wright, “US Assistance to the State of Israel Report by the Comptroller General of the United States,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Vol.13, No.1 (Autumn 1983), pp.123-36.  
42 Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, op.cit., pp.23-7. 
43 Author Interview, Thomas Pickering, Washington DC, September 2015. Thomas Pickering served as US ambassador to Israel 
between 1985 and 1988. 
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Documents from the private Max Fisher archive demonstrate these efforts. One memorandum dated 3 
February 1981 and entitled ‘Liaison Between the American Jewish Community and the Reagan 
Administration’ sent to Edwin Meese III, White House Counsellor to President Reagan (1981–85), is 
particularly revealing. It lists four priorities for this dialogue, including ‘to provide a mechanism for 
planning how to enlist the political support of the American Jewish community on matters of concern to 
the Administration’ and to ‘further the effort to broaden the base of the Republican Party in the Jewish 
Community’.44 To achieve these goals Fisher proposed the establishment of an ‘ad hoc Jewish Advisory 
Committee’ made up of high-level administration officials, including the President, Vice President, and 
Secretaries of State and Defence, that could meet on a regular basis with key members of the organized 
Jewish-American community, and in particular those who shared the administration’s ideological 
inclinations. Such contacts, noted Fisher, would serve as ‘indication to the Jewish community that the 
Administration recognizes the importance of the Jewish vote and the necessity for maintaining this in the 
future’. 45  ‘This committee should be composed principally of the key leadership of the [Reagan] 
Campaign […] who could again be very helpful in the campaigns for the future’.46 
 
When weighing the expected dividends that would flow from these efforts to institutionalize the US-
Israel relationship, domestic political considerations must also be taken into account. Indeed, as noted 
previously, depictions of Israel as a ‘asset’ for US policy always maintained both a ‘political’ (domestic) 
and ‘strategic’ (systemic) dimension, with the former generally being more influential than the latter. 
 
Moral-Ideational Dividends 
 
Given the traditional weight of the twin pillars of shared Judeo-Christian values and political affinities in 
US support for Israel, a number of moral-ideational rationales also need to be considered in the context 
of these efforts to institutionalize the relationship under Reagan. These related in the first instance to the 
need to support a reliable and democratic ally, Israel, but were also connected to a deeper set of 
considerations tied to US efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict as a necessary condition for regional 
stability and enhanced US influence across the Middle East. Indeed, and under the broad category of 
ideational considerations, the institutionalization of US-Israel strategic cooperation was framed as a 
means to advance the US’s interests and ‘prepare the ground’ for peace in the region. By enhancing Israeli 
security and military edge, and demonstrating that support for Israel would remain a constant of US 
foreign policy, US officials believed they were moving towards the creation of ‘more Egypts’ for Israel to 
make peace with. 																																																								
44 The Max Fisher Archives, “Ed Meese III Memorandum”, 3 February 1982, p.1, http://maxmfisher.org/resource-
center/document/ed-meese-iii-liaison-between-american-jewish-community-and-reagan. 
45 Ibid.pp.2-3. 
46 Ibid.p.3. Max Fisher was also involved in the so-called ‘Operation Independence’, a private initiative to raise funds to help 
Israel’s ailing economy in the mid-1980s, at precisely the same time as US and Israeli officials were intent on negotiating the US’s 
first ever FTA with Israel. See, “Prominent Businessmen Launch Worldwide Initiative to Help Develop Israel’s Economy,” JTA, 
1 May 1985, https://www.jta.org/1985/05/01/archive/prominent-businessmen-launch-worldwide-initiative-to-help-develop-
israels-economy. 
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Moreover, by strengthening Israel’s capabilities and military might, US officials also believed they would 
enhance Israel’s propensity to engage in territorial withdrawals needed for such peace agreement with the 
Arabs, thereby ostensibly enhancing US leverage over Israeli policy. This is what administration officials 
meant when they framed arms sales to both Israel and the Arab states as being ‘conducive to peace’. 
 
A Fragile ‘Compromise’: Restraining Israel 
 
As a result of these considerations, a growing number of officials in the Reagan administration became 
convinced that overall a range of potential benefits—political, strategic and ideational—were in store for 
the US if it moved to institutionalize its relationship with Israel. While there was no debating that the 
US’s true strategic priorities lay with the numerically superior and energy-rich Arab states, a holistic 
appraisal of potential dividends of US-Israel strategic cooperation cannot be ignored, particularly in the 
covert, intelligence and political domains. Such considerations would go some way towards bridging the 
gaps between supporters and sceptics of US-Israel strategic cooperation, as both sides of this debate 
could take solace in a number of expected dividends from these processes of institutionalization. 
 
The recommendations outlined by Max Fisher were therefore taken up by the administration, particularly 
following the first ‘crisis’ year of 1981, when Israel and the US repeatedly clashed in public on the Reagan 
administration’s efforts to approve major arms sales to Saudi Arabia, and on a series of Israeli unilateral 
military actions in the Middle East. Indeed, another key rationale behind the institutionalization of ties 
included avoiding public crisis with Israel. As noted by Daniel C. Kurtzer, ‘the idea of strategic 
cooperation was also born out of a desire to replicate something of the understandings the US has with 
Europe and European allies’. Here, and even in the midst of ‘top-level political crises and tensions, the 
relationship persists and does not collapse’ or spill into the domestic political scene, noted the former US 
ambassador to Egypt and Israel (2001–05) and State Department official during the Reagan 
administration, during which time he also served in Israel between 1982 and 1986.47 
 
There was indeed an urgent need to limit and contain the occurrence of public spats with Israeli 
leadership. These revolved around a number of unilateral Israeli actions that took place in coincidence 
with the US’s efforts to restore credibility with its Arab allies in the first year of the administration. First 
came the Israeli-Syrian missile crisis (April–May 1981), then the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear 
reactor on 7 June, followed on 17 July by a major bombing raid on the PLO offices in Beirut, which 
caused over 120 dead and 550 wounded according to media sources at the time.48 These events, like the 
subsequent Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981 and the Israeli invasion and 
occupation of Lebanon in June 1982, caused consternation in Washington, not least in light of the fact 																																																								
47 Author Interview, Daniel C. Kurtzer, New York City, September 2015. 
48 David B. Ottaway, “Israeli Jets Bomb Beirut; Palestinian Toll Heavy,” WP, 18 July 1981. 
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that the US was also relying on Saudi Arabia to mediate with Syria and PLO factions in Lebanon, while 
seeking to coax it (and Jordan) to join the Camp David process. 
 
Israel’s military raid to destroy Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak, employing US-supplied fighter jets and 
violating Saudi Arabian airspace on route to Iraq, reinforced US requests for prior consultation by Israel. 
While no doubt secretly admiring Israel’s resolve and military prowess,49 Reagan officials were ‘thunder-
struck’,50 fearing the action would bury US efforts to convince Arab states to agree to US basing rights 
and increased access. ‘From the standpoint of the Saudis, the Israeli attack can only be regarded as an act 
of war also involving violations of their sovereignty’,51 noted one diplomatic cable from the US embassy 
in Riyadh. ‘Unless it gets the right message, Israel may feel it can do anything’, complained Arab 
ambassadors to the US in a joint meeting with President Reagan on 11 June 1981.52 
 
In the wake of the Israeli raid on Iraq, administration officials momentarily suspended the delivery of F-
16 jets, to send a signal to both Israel and the Arab states and seek to restore US credibility. ‘We did the 
minimum we could do under our law’, noted President Reagan during a tense meeting with Israeli 
ambassador to the US Ephraim Evron on 11 June. ‘You should understand we are not re-evaluating our 
relations with Israel; we are not engaged in any reassessment of our relations’, continued Reagan, referring 
to the 1975 ‘reassessment crisis’ during the Ford administration. ‘We were, however, caught by surprise. 
[…] We are concerned about the impact of the air strike on our ability to proceed with the peace process. 
[…] We must maintain credibility with both sides’.53 
 
Israel, however, was seeking assurances that the suspension of F-16 deliveries would soon be lifted. ‘Israel 
considers the suspension of arms supplies in the pipeline to be a grave step—a kind of ultimate step. […] 
It will be perceived that there is deterioration in US-Israel relations’, said the Israeli ambassador. This will 
‘weaken Israel in the eyes of Arab leaders. They may harden their negotiating stances and engage in a 
series of moves that challenge Israel’.54 Significantly, the same conceptual approach would later be 
adopted by Reagan himself, as evidenced by his diary entry for 9 June, in which he noted that the US will 
not be ‘turning on Israel’ as ‘that would be an invitation for the Arabs to attack’.55 
 
																																																								
49 An embassy cable by Samuel Lewis, US ambassador to Israel, notes how the attack will ‘instil a healthy fear of Israel’s military 
capabilities’. RRPL, Near East And South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, 1983-1989, “Israeli Raid Crisis (Cables),” Box 
91141. In a 2010 article, Richard Allen, foreign policy advisor to Reagan during the 1980 campaign and his first NSC Advisor, 
recalled how Reagan’s reaction upon hearing of Israel’s raid on Iraq was to exclaim ‘boys will be boys’. See, Richard Allen, 
“Reagan’s Secure Line,” NYT Opinion, 6 June 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/opinion/07allen.html. 
50 FAOHP, “Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis,” op.cit, p.161. 
51 RRPL, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, 1983-1989, “Israeli Raid Crisis (Cables),” Box 91141. 
52 RRPL, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, 1983-1989, “President’s Meeting with Five Arab 
Ambassadors re Israeli Raid,” Box 91141. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, op.cit., p.24. 
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These points encapsulate the underlying catch-22 of US policy towards Israel. On the one hand Israeli 
support was needed to allow the US to focus on the Arabs and overcome domestic and congressional 
opposition. As a result, Israel would be amply compensated for arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other 
Arab allies, but there was an expectation that Israel’s opposition would be muted.  
 
Yet, by compensating Israel, the US was effectively enhancing Israeli capabilities for unilateral action, 
which in turn was further harming US-Arab dialogue. 56 When the US then sought to restrain Israel, or 
put daylight between Washington and Tel Aviv in an effort to strengthen US credibility, Israel would 
contend that the US was weakening an ally, inviting an Arab attack and undermining prospects for peace. 
Supporters of US-Israel strategic cooperation in the administration would add to the debate, emphasizing 
that Israel’s propensity for unilateral action actually increased in times of US-Israeli tensions, due to 
feelings of Israeli isolation. As a result, the most that presidents have mustered against Israel in terms of 
accountability and conditionality has generally been restricted to temporary suspension of a given arms 
delivery or, in the most extreme cases, a decision to abstain in the UN on a resolution critical of Israel. 
 
This catch-22 helps explain the ‘tail wagging the dog’ scenario, a dynamic that is often present in US-
Israeli relations, as it clarifies the extent to which Israel can resist and even undermine elements of US 
policy it deems counter to its interests. Indeed, this dynamic was slowly but surely cemented during the 
1980s in the context of the bourgeoning strategic dialogue between the two actors, a dialogue that would 
considerably augment the grounds on which Israel could influence or undermine emerging US policy 
towards the region. 
 
5.4 Compensation, Linkage and the Search for Leverage 
 
The decision to delay the delivery of F-16s to Israel in the wake of the Iraqi and Beirut bombings, both of 
which used US arms and were therefore in violation of export laws, also came in the midst of complex 
negotiations with Congress (and Israel) over a $8.5 billion sale of weaponry, including AWACS planes to 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
The largest US military sale to date, talks on the sale almost consumed the full first year of the Reagan 
administration. The negotiations would result in significant degrees of path dependency for future US 
policy vis-à-vis Israel, becoming a test of US resolve in backing its primary strategic priority in the Middle 
																																																								
56 An article published by the CIA’s Centre for the Study of Intelligence notes how Israel used satellite imagery obtained from the 
US to plan and carry out the bombing raid on Iraq. Increased access to the intelligence had been granted in the context of 
negotiations for the approval of the US-Saudi arms package. The US realized that Israel had been obtaining intelligence and 
moved to restrict Israeli access to US satellite imagery following the raid. Reagan’s CIA Director would ignore the regulation, 
providing raw intelligence to the Israelis with little oversight. See, E. L. Zorn, “Expanding the Horizon. Israel’s Quest for 
Satellite Intelligence,” Centre for the Study of Intelligence, Vol.44, No.5 (1991), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no5/html/v44i5a04p.htm. 
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East—defence of the Persian Gulf—with considerable political capital and the active intervention of 
president Reagan. 
 
Indeed, while Reagan was conducting preparatory talks with Congress over the proposed Saudi sale, he 
was also deflecting criticism for having delayed the shipment of F-16s to Israel. The suspension was 
ultimately lifted on 17 August. As noted by one media source at the time, ‘had President Reagan tried to 
penalize Israel for the Iraq and Beirut raids by holding up the impounded planes any longer, he 
almost certainly would have been defeated in the Congress’57 on the proposed Saudi package. 
 
The Saudi arms deal was officially announced on 24 August 1981 and approved on 28 October by a 
slim but hard-fought margin of 52 to 48 votes.58 The deal, itself the a practical expression of the 
Reagan-Carter Doctrine of building up the defences of the Persian Gulf, would establish an 
important precedent, becoming a forerunner to the $60 billion 10-year Saudi arms deal signed in 
2010 by the Obama administration, followed by further sales to Saudi Arabia by the Trump 
administration in 2016.59 The precedent was not only limited to the US-Saudi relationship or the 
Persian Gulf, however. It also included Israel, which received ample compensation by way of 
superior quantities and qualities of weapons in accordance with the emerging QME commitment.  
 
The AWACS sale would therefore create considerable degrees of path dependency in both the US-
Saudi and US-Israeli relationships, solidifying a practice of compensation for Israel that remains in 
place today. Indeed, following the approval of the 2010 multibillion US arms sale to Saudi Arabia, 
the Obama administration embarked on long and complex negotiations with Israel over the next 
10-year military supply agreement, ultimately signed in late 2016 and amounting to $38 billion 
between FY2019-FY2028.60 
 
The Reagan administration was quick to internalize the lessons drawn from the AWACS experience. 
Indeed, while numerous new arms sales were proposed, negotiated and even approved by the 
administration, these would rarely receive go-ahead from Congress, and never did the 
administration expose itself in the way it did during 1981 on the AWACS issue.61 Rather, promised 
sales were delayed or cancelled altogether, causing deep annoyance among Arab allies. Towards the 
end of the administration in 1988, Frank C. Carlucci, Reagan’s second Secretary of Defence, was 																																																								
57 Joseph C. Harsch, “Why Reagan chooses Saudi arms deal for test of strength with begin,” The Christian Science Monitor, 28 
August 1981, https://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0828/082847.html. 
58 The deal would be formally submitted to Congress on 1 October 1981 and approved on 28 October. A prior announcement of 
the sale had been made on 21 April, but the official submission was delayed. On 24 August, the package deal is again announced 
by the State Department. “Following is a Chronology of the events that led…,” UPI, 28 October 1981, 
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/10/28/Following-is-a-chronology-of-the-events-that-led/9550373093200/. 
59 Deborah Jerome, “Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?,” Council on Foreign Relations, 24 September 2010, 
https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea.  
60 Sharp, “US Assistance,” (2018) op.cit.  
61 See, Charles R. Babcock, “Pro-Israel Lobbyists Target Sale of US Arms to Arabs,” WP, 7 August 1986, 
https://goo.gl/nVGKr4; Bernard Gwertzman, “New Arms Sales to Mideast Ended for a Few Months,” NYT, 31 January 1985. 
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quoted in the media as lamenting, ‘I see foreign soldiers and advisers on Jordanian and Saudi 
installations, providing training and maintenance assistance, where American servicemen have 
served until now. […] The real casualty, if the Congress ultimately deals the United States out of a 
military partnership in the Arab world, will be the peace process itself—a result equally damaging to 
Israel as well as moderate Arab states’.62 
 
The Israeli government would therefore receive ample compensation and inducements every time 
new proposed arms sales for the Arabs were discussed, even when congressional opposition 
ultimately undermined these sales. While justified on the basis of the QME concept and the ‘peace 
process’, the underlying rationale remained that of convincing Israel to mute its opposition to US-
Arab cooperation, the key central priority of the Reagan administration. When this did not occur, 
the US could not renege on its commitments, as such efforts would cause a storm of contestation, 
potentially undermining other US priorities or policies. Instead, a further round of inducements and 
compensation would have to be approved, even though officials were well aware that such 
approaches essentially amounted to ‘kicking the can down the road’, as increased Israeli 
accommodation would only be short-term and largely cosmetic in form. 
 
Indeed, by the time the US officially petitioned Congress on the Saudi AWACS deal in mid-August 
1981, Israel had already received significant forms of inducement from the US. These included a 
grant of 15 F-15 fighter jets, a commitment by the Pentagon to buy $200 million in Israeli-made 
equipment every year, increased access to US satellite intelligence, an agreement to allow Israel to 
export its Kifir fighter jet (which contained US technology) to third countries, beginning with 
Ecuador, and a hesitant agreement by the US to gradually transform yearly US foreign military 
financing from loans to outright grants.63 Once the formal AWACS package was sent to Congress, 
however, further forms of compensation were expected by Israel. 
 
As this complex balancing effort progressed, the administration was careful to ‘decouple’ sales to Israel 
and the Arab states, never linking them in public.64 Reagan officials, particularly Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig, avoided using the word ‘compensation’ when framing the issue of US military supplies to 
Israel. During his first trip to Israel in April 1981, Haig refused to endorse the word ‘compensation’ in a 
joint press conference with Begin. In a letter to Reagan dated 13 April 1981, the Israeli leader thanked the 
																																																								
62 Melissa Healy, “Carlucci Chides Foes of US Arms Sales to Arab World,” LAT, 22 October 1988, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-10-22/news/mn-288_1_arms-sales. 
63 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting Files: Records, 1981-88, “NSC 00003 02/18/1981”; “NSC 00004 
02/27/1981”; “NSC 00007 04/01/1981”. Also, Bernard Gwertzman, “Israel Asks US for Gift of Jets, Citing Saudi Sale,” NYT, 
4 April 1981, https://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/04/world/israel-asks-us-for-gift-of-jets-citing-saudi-sale.html. 
64 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting Files: Records, 1981-88, “NSC 00003 02/18/1981”. 
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Secretary of State for his language, particularly his reference to a ‘permanent alliance’ with Israel. Haig’s 
‘replies to questions put to him during our meetings with the media were gratifying’, noted Begin.65 
 
Such examples demonstrate the difficult balancing act facing US policymakers as they sought to augment 
the strategic relationship with Israel on the basis of US priorities and objectives. From the standpoint of 
the US these objectives included: (a) overcoming opposition to US-Arab strategic dialogue, (b) limiting 
domestic political costs of this outreach to the Arab states, or of clashing with Israel in public on the 
extent of this outreach and (c) enhancing US influence and ability to restrain Israeli unilateral tendencies 
while staying true to the US’s commitment to provide for Israeli security and QME. Such an approach 
would therefore also prove conducive to advancing the US strategic, political and ideational objectives 
outlined above, while allowing the US to better balance and perhaps even reconcile through ‘strategic 
consensus’ the ‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ dimensions of its foreign policy. 
 
Ideally, the best means of advancing this set of objectives while deriving the expected benefits of 
enhanced US-Israel strategic cooperation, would see the US and Israel negotiate a formal treaty of 
alliance. Here the respective roles and responsibilities of the two actors would be clearly delineated, as 
would accountability mechanisms for potential violations. Yet a number of obstacles prevented the US 
from pursuing this approach. Indeed, Israeli leaders had long objected to any formal alliance framework, 
which they feared would constrain Israel’s freedom of action and excessively irk the Soviet Union, 
potentially endangering Jewish communities living in Soviet territory. Moreover, the unresolved Arab-
Israeli conflict prevented the US for providing clear security guarantees, not least due to an absence of 
agreed and recognized borders delineating the State of Israel, while the US’s relations with a number of 
Arab countries that remained in an official state of war with Israel further prevented the pursuit of this 
option. 
 
As a result, debates focussed on more flexible arrangements, capable of meeting Israeli requests for 
support while facilitating the US aim of muting Israeli opposition to US-Arab strategic relations and 
enhancing (it was hoped) the US’s ability to influence Israeli policy. Implicit in such debates was also the 
hope that by assuaging Israeli security fears, and increasing US leverage over Israeli policy, US actions 
were ‘preparing the ground’ for peace by enhancing Israel’s propensity for compromise while working to 
create ‘more Egypts’. 
 
Yet, from the standpoint of Israel, the expected benefits of strategic cooperation did not match 
those of the US. Indeed, Israeli leaders had opted against a formal alliance treaty with the US 
precisely because they wished to preserve freedom of action, not be restrained by their superpower 
patron or risk being sacrificed on the altar of US-Arab interests. As noted by Dan Raviv and Yossi 																																																								
65 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File: Records, 1981-89, “Israel: Prime Minister Begin (8103572-8106360),” 
Box 16. 
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Melman, Begin and Sharon believed that ‘strategic cooperation should add to Israel’s freedom of 
action. They argued that the United States should trust Israel to protect Western interests in the 
Middle East—adding that the United States might well be spared embarrassment if Israel did not 
turn to it for permission every time action was needed’.66 
 
With these fundamental (miss)appreciations in mind the two sides prepared for the first face-to-face 
meeting between Prime Minister Begin and President Reagan in early September 1981. Reagan 
officials—particularly from the State Department—had already conducted a number of meetings 
with their Israeli counterparts by the time of Begin’s visit to Washington. These parallel channels of 
dialogue had been used to explore what Teicher describes as ‘creative thinking’67 on the Middle East 
and US-Israel relations, including the topic of strategic cooperation. These channels would also 
grow out of the contacts developed between the Reagan campaign team and members of the Israeli 
government, the same contacts and personalities that Max Fisher had referred to in his February 
1981 memorandum to the White House. 
 
As a result, when Begin arrived in Washington preparatory discussions had been held on what to 
propose to Israel in an effort to ‘buy off’ its opposition to the AWACS sale. It was from this 
meeting between Reagan and Begin that the first official US-Israel MoU on strategic cooperation 
emerged. It would be an extremely short-lived document, suspended by the US in December 1981 
following Israel’s unilateral annexation of the occupied Golan Heights and subsequently cancelled 
with much fanfare by Begin in reaction to this US suspension. 
 
The process by which the 1981 MoU was negotiated, approved and ultimately suspended 
encapsulates the contrasting expectations held by Israel and the US on strategic cooperation. It 
moreover serves as evidence for the key US interest and expected dividend that would stem from 
this agreement: a more cooperative Israel, one that would feel secure under a de facto US security 
umbrella and therefore less prone to oppose US-Arab strategic dialogue or embark on dangerous 
military actions that proved damaging to the US’s wider priorities. 
  
Begin’s reaction to the suspension of the MoU was so strong precisely due to apparent linkage 
made by the US between its strategic dialogue with Israel and US-Arab relations, a linkage that 
deeply disturbed Israel’s leadership. From Israel’s stand point, this linkage served to diminish the 
strategic nature of US-Israel ties, weakening the quasi-exclusivist relationship while consolidating 
the image of Israel as the junior partner—an asset but also and more fundamentally a US ‘proxy’—
in the US’s evolving strategic plans for the region. 
 																																																								
66 Raviv and Melman, Firends in Deed, op.cit., pp.167-207, p.203 (quote). 
67 Teicher, Twin Pillars, op.cit., pp.141-65, p.157 (quote). 
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5.5 The 1981 Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation 
 
The visit by Prime Minister Begin to the US in September 1981 was billed as a moment for the two 
countries to set aside their differences on the evolving US-Arab strategic dialogue. The visiting Prime 
Minister was welcomed to the US with full honours as the leader of a major US ally, a dynamic that was 
carefully prepared by US ambassador Samuel Lewis and deeply appreciated by Begin.68 
 
Begin was convinced that shared ideological inclinations would allow him to convince Reagan to expand 
ties with Israel, transforming it into a major launching pad for the US’s strategic plans. Much to his 
dismay, the one-on-one meeting with the president consisted of a very brief exchange of platitudes—read 
directly from Reagan’s talking points—with little or no time for Begin to outline his own views.69 Mindful 
of Reagan’s tendency to stray off script, his advisors had been careful to limit the on-on-one time 
between the two leaders. 
 
On the US side, the overarching priority was to reassure Israel of the US’s commitment to its qualitative 
military edge and receive assurances that Israel would not overtly oppose the US’s security dialogue with 
the Arab world, in particular the sale of AWACS aircraft and F-15 add-ons to Saudi Arabia. While Begin 
did not hide Israel’s opposition to the sale, as the leaders moved toward the meeting with respective 
cabinet members and advisors, the Israeli leader is said to have remarked to Reagan: 
 
You, Mr. President, kindly referred to my country just now as a strategic asset. While that certainly 
has a positive ring to it, I find it, nevertheless, a little patronizing. Given the bipolar world in 
which we live—democracy versus communism—the cherished values we share, and our 
confluence of interests on so many fundamental issues, might I suggest the time has come to 
publicly acknowledge that Israel is not just a strategic asset, but a fully fledged strategic ally.70 
 
Reagan’s response was more than welcoming. ‘I would be happy to acknowledge you in public anywhere, 
anytime’. Encouraged, Begin proposed ‘that consideration be given to an agreed document on this 
matter—on the strategic relationship between our two countries. […] I do not mean for our own 
defence, what I do speak about is strategic cooperation in defence of our common interests, in a region 
which is the target of Soviet expansionism’. Reagan agreed, instructing his Defence Minister to proceed 
with bilateral discussions on hammering out the details of the document.71 
 
Between September and November 1981, numerous meetings were held to translate this idea into reality. 
The result was the 1981 MoU on US-Israel Strategic Cooperation (see Appendix D), a rather bland and 																																																								
68 FAOHP, “Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis,” op.cit, pp.171-5. 
69 Avner, The Prime Ministers, op.cit., pp.567-8. 
70 The contents of the meeting are reported by Avner, The Prime Ministers, op.cit., pp.565-72, p.569 (quote); also see, FAOHP, 
“Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis,” op.cit,pp.170-81; FAOHP, “Ambassador Nicholas A. Veliotes,” Oral History Transcript, 29 
January 1990 (published 1998), pp.127-30, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Veliotes,%20Nicholas%20A.toc.pdf; Interview, 
Nicholas Veliotes, op.cit.; Teicher, Twin Pillars, op.cit., pp.141-57. 
71 Avner, The Prime Ministers, op.cit., p.570. 
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sterile document, but one that would establish a significant precedent for future US-Israel relations. As 
noted by Samuel Lewis in his Oral History testimony, ‘this [first Reagan-Begin] meeting set the tone for 
our relationship for the next two years and perhaps even until today’.72 Negotiations on the 1981 MoU 
would not be easy however. These reflected the contrasting understanding between Israel and the US on 
the dividends and responsibilities contained in the document, but also the deep divisions among US 
officials on the topic of strategic cooperation with Israel. By handing the task of negotiating the MoU to 
the Defence Department and Weinberger, Reagan had fuelled the ongoing turf wars between Secretary 
Haig—a key supporter of strategic cooperation with Israel—and the Pentagon, which made no secret of 
wanting a document ‘so general and so empty of content’73 that it would not seriously risk jeopardizing 
the US’s Arab relations.  
 
US officials were deeply worried by Ariel Sharon’s subsequent presentation during the Begin-Reagan 
meeting in Washington on Israel’s military and strategic capabilities. Nicholas Veliotes, who was present 
at the meeting, recalled in an interview how Sharon ‘had maps and many papers and talking points. I 
remember seeing that all the Arab and Muslim countries were coloured in red and he was saying that 
Israel could assist US interests throughout this area. All the way from Africa to Iran and the Persian Gulf. 
Even Egypt was coloured in red. I had to interrupt the Secretary of Defence to remind him that Israel 
had just signed a peace treaty with Egypt’, recalled the former US official. ‘To the surprise of the US 
officials present, Sharon referred to Israel's successful bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and suggested 
that Israel could bomb Pakistan's nuclear facilities. That such an action might somehow be in US interest 
just neglected the long US-Pakistan military relationship and our close cooperation in fighting the Soviet 
military invasion of Afghanistan.”74 
 
Sharon would add to US concerns over the course of the next months.75 During these negotiations, US 
officials were repeatedly subject to his bombastic and grandiose plans regarding US-Israeli strategic 
cooperation. While discussions also included efforts by the US to support and bankroll Israeli agricultural, 
medical and politico-military relations with African and Central American countries,76 the key focus 
remained on the Eastern Mediterranean and the potential to use Israeli facilities to pre-position military 
hardware as well as potential exchanges in the medical realm and in R&D technologies. Discussion also 
included the Autonomy negotiations as well as developments in Syria, in Lebanon and regarding the 
PLO, as officials began getting worrying signals from Israel about the growing potential for direct military 
campaign in Lebanon.77 
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Israel was seeking assurances that it would be made an integral part of US plans for the defence of the 
region including in the Persian Gulf. US officials pushed back against the most extreme ambitions of 
Israel, and especially Ariel Sharon, but were also careful to not overly alienate the Israeli leadership, as this 
could jeopardize other key US interests and concerns. The result was an uneven balance between 
competing interests not only among the two sides involved in negotiating the MoU, but also and more 
fundamentally within the US side, with the State Department and Pentagon effectively working at cross 
purposes. Nicholas Veliotes, who was involved in the negotiations on the US side, was called upon to act 
as a middleman in the difficult relations between State and the Pentagon on the MoU, which was finally 
signed in a closed-door ceremony by Weinberger and Sharon on 30 November.78 
 
As described in a joint statement given to the media, the MoU was ‘designed to enable the two countries 
to act cooperatively, to provide each other military assistance to cope with threats to the security of the 
entire region caused by the USSR or Soviet-controlled forces introduced from outside the region into the 
region’. 79  Significantly, the full text of the agreement was public and appeared in print in major 
international newspapers. This emphasis on Soviet-controlled forces ‘from outside the region’ reflected 
the US’s concern that the MoU would be interpreted by the Arab world as also directed against them. 
Indeed, the official text of the memorandum (Appendix D) contained the following clarification: ‘the 
strategic cooperation between the parties is not directed at any state or group of states within the region. 
It is intended solely for defensive purposes against the above-mentioned [Soviet] threat’. 
 
The most significant elements envisioned by the document included military-to-military cooperation, join 
naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean and cooperation in the establishment and maintenance of 
‘joint readiness activities’. In essence, many of these elements of strategic cooperation matched those the 
US was implementing with the Arab states, such as the military exercises Bright Star or Jade Tiger 
involving troops from the US, Jordan, Egypt, Oman and others. This dimension also serves to 
underscore how much of this bourgeoning US-Israel strategic cooperation had more to do with 
compensation than a real assessment of Israeli strategic services. 
  
Also important was the establishment of a number of joint working groups for R&D cooperation, 
defence trade, pre-positioning of military hardware and a whole number of other potential spheres of 
cooperation ‘as agreed upon by the parties’. It would be these working groups that would gradually 
transform the nature and depth of the US-Israel relationship, diffusing cooperation into the respective 
bureaucracies of the two countries while establishing the groundwork for enhanced interdependence 
between their respective foreign and security approaches towards the Middle East. 
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Yet, there was more to the MoU than was discussed in the media. Howard Teicher has outlined how the 
original 1981 MoU also laid the groundwork for other forms of compensation. These included ‘support 
for the manufacture of the Israeli-designed LAVI fighter aircraft [with US funds], increased US military 
assistance and the agreement to negotiate a free-trade agreement between the United States and Israel’.80 
These commitments would become codified gradually, between 1983 and 1989. Writing years after the 
event, Dennis Ross noted how a ‘fundamental threshold had been crossed’ with the MoU; ‘from this 
point forward we had a framework that would allow us to build a genuine military partnership’.81 
 
A memorandum dated 24 November 1981 goes further in demonstrating the underlying rationales 
advanced by these supporters. Drafted by Jack Stein, Reagan’s first Special Advisor on Jewish Affairs, the 
memorandum notes how ‘Israel is very nervous about its security in the aftermath of the Saudi Arms sale 
[AWACS]’. 
 
In the absence of substantive agreements with the US, I believe it likely that Israel will move in a 
decisive military action to remove the PLO threat [from Lebanon]. I believe it will also move to 
tighten her control of the West Bank and will be most reluctant to make any concessions during 
the Autonomy talks. Our national security interests are best served by stability in the Middle East. 
An essential element is an Israel that feels secure and remains confident that we take our 
commitment to her security seriously. I believe the President’s commitment to Israel’s security can 
be best made evident by building a US “safety net” under Israel. […] Only a close Israeli-
American partnership […] can provide Israel with the required sense of security so that she can 
negotiate peace with confidence.82  
 
Building a ‘safety net’ beneath Israel was precisely what would occur. Yet, while Israel would garner 
significant tangible benefits, it is debatable whether the US ever saw its side of the bargain fulfilled. If the 
US had hoped to receive assurances regarding Israel’s opposition to US-Arab strategic cooperation, 
administration officials, including the president himself, would soon find otherwise. Indeed, while both 
Begin and Sharon were under no illusions about the way Weinberger’s Department of Defence had 
actively worked to limit the extent of practical cooperation envisioned by the MoU, the prime minister 
attached much political and symbolic importance to the document. It had, in Teicher’s words, codified 
‘shared strategic interests without infringing on Israel’s freedom to manoeuvre’.83 Indeed, the unforeseen 
consequences of this agreement, and its subsequent resurrection and expansion in late 1983, would 
effectively further constrain US presidential freedom of action vis-à-vis Israel and the broader region 
while effectively ‘entrapping’ the US in a quasi-exclusivist relationship with Israel in the Middle East. 
 
Conclusion 
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The chapter has introduced the broad contours of the early US-Israeli dialogue on strategic cooperation. 
It has evidenced the risks and expected dividends for the US and Israel of such institutionalized forms of 
cooperation, and the continuation of different views and understandings as to the respective roles and 
responsibilities of the two sides. The deep internal divisions within the Reagan administration on the 
topic of US-Israel strategic cooperation also had a significant impact on this early dialogue, including 
most notably in the drafting of the 1981 MoU. 
 
Israeli services in the strategic domain are not enough to explain the administration’s push to 
institutionalize the relationship and agree to US-Israeli strategic cooperation. Such considerations must be 
paired with a broader set of expected dividends—political and ideational—that were hoped to flow from 
such institutionalization processes. Aside from assisting US efforts to ‘create more Egypts’ and advance 
the peace process, it was hoped that compensation for Israel, including the MoU, would free the 
administration’s hand to build up the military capabilities of Arab allies, muting domestic and Israeli 
opposition to such sales while helping the administration and broader GOP reap the full political benefits 
such pro-Israel policies entailed. 
 
Israel wished to preserve, and even enhance, its freedom of action, while the US sought to restrain Israel 
in order to focus on the Persian Gulf. Israeli leaders were well aware of these US priorities. Israeli Major 
General Avraham Tamir, a close associate of Ariel Sharon’s when the latter headed the Israeli defence 
ministry in the early 1980s, recalled, ‘Sharon thought he was going to be the strategic ally […] we had 
strategic dialogue talks, here and in the US. I was the head of the Israeli delegation, but I said to Sharon, 
“the United States is not being nice to you because of your blue eyes”. Sharon didn’t understand that the 
whole American policy was to draw the Arabs to the West’.84 
 
It was this fundamental incongruence between Israeli and US leaderships that would set the stage for the 
rapid unravelling of the agreement. When Begin moved to annex the occupied Golan Heights on 18 
December 1981, the Reagan administration was forced to respond. The Arab world rose in 
condemnation, and the administration quickly moved to suspend the MoU. Israel reacted to the 
suspension—and linkage between Israeli policy vis-à-vis the Arabs and its strategic cooperation with the 
US—with rage, abrogating the agreement altogether on 20 December. Begin called US ambassador Lewis 
to his residence, launching into an assault on the US in what became known as Begin’s ‘banana republic’ 
speech, the full contents of which were subsequently passed to the media, a significant breach of 
diplomatic protocol.85  
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The contents of the speech evidence the depths of the divide between US and Israeli viewpoints when it 
came to the expected dividends of US-Israeli strategic cooperation and Israel’s deep opposition to any 
form of linkage between the US-Israeli relationship and Israeli policy vis-à-vis the Arab world or US-Arab 
relations. 
 
Over the last six months, the United States Government has punished Israel three times. […] You 
don’t have the right, from a moral perspective, to preach to us regarding civilian loss of life. We 
have read the history of World War II [...] we have also read the history of the Vietnam War, and 
your concept of “body counts”. […] Are we a vassal state of yours? Are we a banana republic? 
Are we 14-year-olds who, if we misbehave, we get our wrists slapped? […] You will not frighten 
us with punishments. […] You are trying to make Israel a hostage to the memorandum of 
understanding. […] The people of Israel have lived 3,700 years without a memorandum of 
understanding with America and will continue to live without it another 3,700 years. […] As to 
the future, kindly inform the Secretary of State that the Golan Heights law will remain in force. 
There is no power on earth that will bring about its repeal. As to the claim that we surprised you, 
the truth is that we did not want to embarrass you.86 
 
As recalled by Samuel Lewis, Washington was ‘furious at this broadside attack’.87 If anything, the brazen 
statements by Begin proved that US hopes of restraining Israel through compensation and increased 
strategic cooperation would not be easily realized. The speech also caused significant embarrassment for 
the US in the Arab world, particularly in light of the absence of any real follow-up or accountability for 
the statement. Aside from the planned dialogues contained in the MoU, US-Israel relations progressed as 
normal. The White House soon received many angry letters and petitions by members of the organized 
Jewish-American community complaining about the president’s decision to suspend the MoU.  
 
To one such letter sent from the President of the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington on 
21 December, the White House responded on 5 March 1982. ‘The spirit of that agreement [MoU] 
obliged each party to take into consideration in its decisions the implications for the broad policy 
concerns of the other’, read the White House response. ‘We do not believe that spirit was upheld in the 
case of Israel’s decision on the Golan. […] We have stressed however that we are in no way interrupting 
the flow of military equipment to Israel’.88 
 
While US-Israel relations entered a ‘deep freeze’89 at the end of 1981, the subsequent years—while still 
rife with challenges and deep disagreements—would demonstrate the extent to which new ground was 
being broken in US-Israel relations. The fundamental catch-22 of US policy was also implicit in Begin’s 
forceful rejection of the US suspension. Indeed, directly following his meeting with Ambassador Lewis, 
Begin is reported to have requested a cabinet meeting to approve his plans to invade Lebanon and 
																																																								
86 “Transcript of Prime Minister Begin’s Statement to the US Envoy to Israel,” NYT, 21 December 1981, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/12/21/world/transcript-of-prime-minister-begin-s-statement-to-the-us-envoy-to-israel.html.  
87 FAOHP, “Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis,” op.cit., p.189. 
88 RRPL, Jacob Stein Files, Series I: Subject Files, “Golan Heights,” OA9242.  
89 FAOHP, “Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis,” op.cit, p.191. 
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destroy PLO and Syrian presence in the country. 90  The Israeli cabinet refused, resulting in its 
postponement until June 1982, when Israel did invade Lebanon, dragging the US into the conflict along 
the way. 
 
As noted by Dennis Ross, in proceeding immediately with an effort to garner approval for the Lebanon 
operation ‘it was as if he [Begin] intended to show us [the US] that if you penalize us [Israel], we have 
little to lose and we will take other steps that might draw your wrath but will solve the problem we 
face’.91 This passage clearly demonstrates how Israel retains significant capacity to influence US policy 
whereas US freedom of action is rather limited. Indeed, in the context of the negotiations over a loose 
and somewhat ill-defined concept of strategic cooperation, it was Israel not the US that appeared to have 
the most leverage and influence. Moreover, it demonstrates how Israel was aware of the US’s alternative 
motives in seeking to institutionalize the relationship, and would lose no opportunity to push back 
against any semblance of ‘linkage’ between US-Israel and Israeli-Arab relations. 
 
If the US hoped to restrain Israel and buy its approval for US-Arab cooperation through the MOU, the 
Israeli government would be quick to demonstrate otherwise. Prior coordination or consultation with 
the US would be refused on the grounds that Israel did not want to ‘embarrass’ the US, or rather did not 
want to be put in a position in which the US said ‘no’ and Israel would go ahead anyway. This should 
have run alarm bells in Washington that its expected dividends would not in fact materialize. However, 
and again demonstrating which side in the relationship held the most influence and leverage, 
notwithstanding this growing realization among US officials, US policy did not have any alternative to 
that of an incremental increase in compensation for Israel, given that the risks inherent in taking a 
different path were considered more grave, particularly from a domestic political perspective. 
 
Coming from a key supporter of US-Israeli strategic cooperation, and an individual who had long 
promoted this line of ‘hugging Israel closer’ in order to limit political disputes and ostensibly enhance US 
leverage over Israeli actions, the above passage from Dennis Ross’s book speaks volumes about the 
catch-22 affecting US policy towards Israel. The fact that US policy was effectively going around in 
circles, unable to extract minimum assurances from Israel that it would indeed use greater caution in its 
regional policies, did not serve to further US credibility in the region. Meanwhile, the US was effectively 
becoming locked into a game of successive, incremental forms of compensation for Israel every time it 
sought to pursue its wider strategic interests in the Middle East. 
 
																																																								
90 Ibid., pp.190-5; Amir Oren, “With Ariel Sharon Gone, Israel Reveals the Truth about the 1982 Lebanon War,” Ha’aretz, 17 
September 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/with-sharon-gone-israel-reveals-the-truth-about-the-lebanon-war-
1.5451086. 
91 Ross, Doomed to Succeed, op.cit., p.191. Throughout Ross’s book it is often confusing (or telling) the way the US official 
interchanges the ‘us’ referring to both Israel and the US. 
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Highlighting such characteristics may today seem almost naïve. However, it was the period of the 1980s 
that would solidify the format of US-Israeli relations in the post-Cold War era. It was under Reagan that 
the policy of compensation, later codified into the QME doctrine, was first institutionalized as standard 
practice in US policy. It was under Reagan that Israeli efforts to formalize Israel’s quasi-exclusivist 
relationship with the US would make headway in US policy, foreshadowing the ‘tail wagging the dog’ 
scenario and ultimately the slow ‘Israelization’ of US policy and approaches to the Middle East. 
Significantly, while Begin complained about the US’s intention to ‘make Israel hostage’92 to the MoU, the 
outcome of these processes of US-Israeli institutionalization between 1981 and 1989 would have the 
opposite effect; further augmenting the political, strategic and ideational straightjacket constraining US 
policy towards Israel and the wider Middle East. 
 
These latter dimensions would become more salient in the context of the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon and the US’s decision to reinstate strategic cooperation with Israel beginning in late 1983. It is 
to these dimensions that the next chapter now turns. 	
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Chapter 6 
 
A Baptism of Fire: The Lebanon War and the Rebirth of US-Israel 
Strategic Cooperation 
 
The Israeli annexation of the occupied Golan Heights and the subsequent suspension of the MoU on 
strategic cooperation in late December 1981 would set the stage for two difficult years in US-Israeli 
relations. Marked by a further deepening of bilateral tensions, the 1982–83 period nonetheless resulted in 
a new push to institutionalize the US-Israel relationship, resuming and expanding on the cooperative 
strategic planning that had begun early in the first year of the administration. 
 
The administration entered 1982 having made little or no progress on the three central priorities of US 
Middle East policy. Efforts to focus on the global dimension of fighting the Cold War and create a form 
of ‘strategic consensus’ among the US’s regional allies were undermined by Israel’s annexation of the 
Golan Heights, which returned the question of Palestine and the Autonomy negotiations to centre-stage 
in the region and internationally. This, combined with the succession of unilateral Israeli actions during 
1981, reignited Arab-Israeli tensions and raised Arab concern as to the inability of the US to restrain its 
ally Israel, damaging US credibility and weakening Washington’s strategic plans for the defence of the 
Persian Gulf and the containment of Iran. 
 
The US had secured an important victory in Congress over the sale of advanced weaponry to Saudi 
Arabia, but the battle came at significant political cost, and the Reagan White House would think carefully 
about confronting Israel and its supporters in the court of US public opinion. While the sale had resulted 
in a hesitant Saudi willingness to publicly outline its principles for Arab-Israeli negotiations through the 
unveiling of the eight-point Fahd Plan in early August 1981, Israel’s vehement opposition to these 
principles would quickly dampen the administration’s enthusiasm regarding efforts to attract Saudi Arabia 
into the peace process. Ultimately, it was the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia, and the need to 
compensate Tel Aviv, that created the impetus for the signing of the 1981 MoU, but on US terms. 
 
The deep divisions between the State Department and Pentagon had defined this early dialogue on US-
Israeli strategic cooperation. The resulting document, the 1981 MoU, fell well short of Israeli desires. Its 
provisions were more reflective of US concerns: to not overtly irk its Arab allies and to restrain Israeli 
unilateral actions, even while simultaneously allowing the administration to reap the expected dividends 
of amicable US-Israeli relations.  
 
Israel was well aware of these US efforts and would resist what it considered an infringement on its 
freedom of action. Israel’s leadership was particularly worried about a slow dilution of its ‘special’ 
relationship with the US. Mindful of agreeing to the 1981 MoU in light of its political and symbolic 
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significance, Israel would continue its efforts to convince the US of the centrality of Israeli services and 
capabilities for strategic planning in the Middle East, including in the Persian Gulf. Faced with sustained 
reluctance by a number of Reagan officials, the Israeli government would move to consider other, more 
indirect means to achieve its objectives. 
 
Israel never muted its opposition to arms sales for the Arab states or agreed to a formal exchange of 
assurances for prior consultation or coordination with the US. Indeed, the Likud government of 
Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon would never miss an opportunity to drive home the point of Israel’s 
independence, developing a tendency to respond forcibly to any indication of potential conditionality in 
US policy towards Israel or, even worse, a linkage between US aid and Israeli actions vis-à-vis the Arabs 
and Palestinians. 
 
Resulting from these failures, the original MoU on strategic cooperation was quickly suspended, setting 
the stage for a stubborn Israeli reaction aimed at demonstrating the dangers implicit in a US policy of 
pressure or conditionality, particularly if undertaken in an effort to reassure the Arab world. Embrace of 
the ‘linkage doctrine’ threatened Israel’s quest for a quasi-exclusivist relationship with the US in the 
Middle East, augmenting the risk that the US would someday sacrifice Israeli interests in order to advance 
its strategic ties with the Arabs. 
 
The US’s suspension of the MoU in December 1981 was indeed deemed necessary as a public display of 
displeasure with Israeli actions and an effort to drive home the importance the US placed on the principle 
of coordination, prior consultation and ‘no surprises’ in the US-Israeli relationship. The Department of 
Defence, where Caspar Weinberger was particularly incensed by the Israeli move, actually demanded 
more serious repercussions, but these requests were diluted by the State Department and NSC, leading to 
the limited decision to suspend the MoU without touching other elements of US assistance. 
 
Media reports at the time noted how Prime Minister Begin had informed the Israeli Parliament that he 
did not consult with the US prior to the Golan move due to the likely ‘no’ from Washington. ‘I say again 
to our American friends, we shall continue to be allies, but no one will dictate our lives to us, even the 
United States of America’.1 More significantly still, Begin had denounced the US’s suspension of the 
MoU due to what he described as Washington’s attempts to make ‘Israel a hostage’ to the agreement, and 
consequently lost no time in seeking to demonstrate the futility of US efforts to restrain Israeli actions 
and orchestrate what essentially amounted to a patron-client relationship under the guise of strategic 
cooperation. 
 
																																																								
1 David K. Shipler, “The Golan Height Annexed by Israel in Abrupt Move,” NYT, 14 December 1981, 
http://events.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1214.html. 
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Mutual efforts to protect respective interests, while enhancing the ability to influence or constrain the 
policy initiatives of the other, therefore continued to define US-Israeli dialogue on strategic cooperation 
in the 1982–83 period. Having embraced a policy of inducements and compensation for Israel 
throughout 1981, in the wake of the Golan Heights annexation and Begin’s public assault on the US, the 
Reagan team shifted momentarily to a policy of pressure on Israel. While motivated by the need to send a 
signal to ‘convince the Arabs that we [US] could be fair’2 in the Middle East, US policymakers were well 
aware of the costs that freezing strategic cooperation with Israel could entail for its wider priorities. 
 
US officials thus lost no time in seeking means to restore US-Israeli ties and overcome political 
differences that had matured over the course of the first year of the administration. Yet, the one 
fundamental driver motivating the original US decision to upgrade US-Israeli ties in the strategic 
domain—assurances from Israel of a greater appreciation of the US’s wider interests and concerns—was 
never resolved and would soon resurface with a vengeance in the context of the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in June 1982. 
 
Indeed, if US-Israel ties had entered a ‘deep freeze’ as a result of the Golan Heights annexation and the 
suspension of the MoU, these tensions would be dwarfed by the unprecedented disagreements over 
Lebanon. If the objective of the original 1981 MoU and parallel agreements was to ensure a greater 
degree of consultation and coordination between the US and Israel, the Lebanon war and Israel’s 
campaign of misinformation vis-à-vis the US would demonstrate the catch-22 of US policy and the 
difficulties inherent in a policy of pressure or restraint on Israel. Banking on almost automatic US support 
in the event of hostilities, the Begin government appeared to be orchestrating a series of events that 
would ‘entrap’ the US in a joint war effort that would severely damage US-Arab relations, thereby helping 
to revamp the preferential US-Israeli relationship.  
 
6.1 Entrapment vs. Exclusivity: Strategic Cooperation beyond the 1981 MoU 
 
Two years passed between the signing of the original MoU on 30 November 1981 and its revival in the 
midst of the joint US and Israeli deployment in the Lebanon war on 29 November 1983. During this 
period, debates on how best to strike a difficult balance between restraining Israel and increasing US 
leverage while securing the expected dividends of close US-Israel cooperation would consume the 
internal workings of the Reagan administration. 
 
Disagreements between State and DoD continued, with the latter insisting that Israeli commit to an 
explicit exchange of services for the US’s willingness to revive the MoU, delaying US policy responses 
																																																								
2 Reagan, An American Life, op.cit., p.412. 
		 136	
and resulting at times in contradictory statements and proposals that only added confusion to public 
perceptions of US Middle East policy. 
 
There was consensus within the administration on the need to signal the US’s displeasure with Israeli 
actions on the Golan Heights, yet the Reagan White House was divided on the extent of this 
‘punishment’. Ultimately, the decision was made to suspend the MoU and, after some hard negotiations 
at the UN, support a watered down Security Council resolution (UNSC 497) calling Israel’s annexation 
‘null and void’3 while refraining from imposing sanctions on Israel. 
 
‘While the Israelis will be pressing us to lift the MoU suspension’, reads a recently declassified 
memorandum from Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan dated 5 January 1982, ‘maintaining it for 
some time is important to US-Arab relations. The Saudis have indicated that the success of Cap’s 
[Weinberger] visit in early February [1982] to lay the groundwork for closer security cooperation […] is 
linked to some extent to our suspension of the MoU remaining in effect at least beyond the time of Cap’s 
visit. How we proceed with the MoU will involve a delicate balancing of several important interests, 
above all the need to restore confidence into the basic US-Israeli relationship’.4 
 
The administration was aware that Israel and the Jewish-American community did ‘not view the agreed 
Memorandum of Understanding as substantive’.5 The White House was soon inundated with angry letters 
calling on it to reinstate the agreement and repair US-Israel relations. Letters would specifically reference 
Israel’s growing isolation in the region and the need to restore Israeli confidence in the US’s commitment 
to its security and self-defence, lest Israel feel compelled to take action on its own behalf. 
 
The assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in early October 1981 combined with the 
heightened Arab-Israeli tensions that followed Israel’s unilateral military actions, caused concern in 
Washington that Israel’s redeployment from the Egyptian Sinai might flounder. These considerations 
added further constraints to a policy of pressure vis-à-vis Israel for fear that it might lead to collapse of 
the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, or a renewed round of hostilities in Lebanon. 
 
Incidentally, these were precisely the reactions that Begin was hoping to cause with his decision to annex 
the Golan Heights.6 Israel had repeatedly sent signals to the US administration, both during and after the 
negotiations over the 1981 MoU that it intended to strike Syrian SAM-batteries in Lebanon, an action 
that was likely to precipitate a wider military crisis and further complicate US objectives. 																																																								
3 UNSC Resolution 497, 17 December 1981, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/497. 
4 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: Head Of State File: Records, 1981-1989, “Israel: Prime Minister Begin 
– Cables,” Box 16 (declassified in 2013). 
5 RRPL, Jacob Stein Files, 1981-82, Series III: Correspondence and Schedules, “Memos to Elizabeth Dole,” OA10852 
(continued). 
6 Oren, “Wish Sharon Gone,” op.cit.  
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Following the suspension of the MoU in late December 1981, Begin’s failure to garner Cabinet approval 
for an attack on Lebanon would offset these risks, at least momentarily. US officials were consequently 
pleased to receive assurances that Israel would refrain from unilateral measures in Lebanon or vis-à-vis 
Syria. ‘Begin has blinked’, wrote Secretary Haig in a memorandum to the President on 5 January 1982. 
‘Begin’s emissary gave me two significant assurances: first, that Israel will not move into Lebanon 
militarily unless attacked from Lebanon on a significant scale; second, that Israel will not strike the Syrian 
missiles in Lebanon as long as Israel is not attacked by the Syrians’.7 
 
On the basis of these assurances, the State Department prepared a ‘firm but friendly’8 letter to Begin, 
outlining the US stance on the MoU and planned actions at the UN, while reassuring Israel of the US’s 
commitment to Camp David and Israel’s security. ‘Israel is an ally, not a vassal state’, noted Reagan’s 
letter dated 8 January 1982: 
 
My belief is that a just peace is the greatest boon that could be bestowed upon the people of 
Israel. […] Our task has not been made easier, however, by the Israeli decision about the Golan 
[…] The Israeli action has brought international focus on this issue in a way that will continue to 
pose problems for us both. […] I continue to believe that Israel in the period ahead should help 
ameliorate the current situation and also view the relationship with the United States in its true 
light. In this regard, […] I was particularly gratified to learn […] of your assurances [on Lebanon 
and the Syrian SAM missiles]. […] It is my hope that the spirit in which our Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed can be restored over time. It is important that each of our governments 
take into consideration the broad policy concerns of the other.9 
 
Less than ten days after the suspension of the MoU, efforts were being made to restore the US-Israeli 
relationship on the basis of short-term expediency and the need to both restrain and reassure Israel. 
Significantly, in the State Department memo outlining the contents of the letter, Haig explicitly noted the 
limited US leverage over Israel: ‘While we have no guarantee that there will be no new ‘surprises’, this 
[assurance on Lebanon and Syria] is the most that we can get Begin to give at this juncture. At the same 
time, Begin has a way of slipping off the hook and it is important that we pin him down in writing in at 
least this general way’.10 The warning seems ominous and indeed was soon justified, with Israel making a 
new bombing raid in Lebanon on 21 April 1982 (and again on 9 May) in retaliation for the death of an 
Israeli soldier on patrol in South Lebanon.11 During the raid on PLO training camps, Israeli jets downed 
																																																								
7 RRPL, “Israel: Prime Minister Begin – Cables,” op.cit. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. A summary of Begin’s response is contained in the same box at the RRPL in a memorandum for the president dated 21 
January 1982. Under the heading ‘US-Israel Strategic Cooperation’, the memo outlines how Begin had complained that ‘the initial 
US proposals for strategic cooperation with Israel were very one-sided, e.g., Israel was expected to provide military assistance to 
the US but not vice versa’. 
10 Ibid. 
11 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Agency File, Records, 1981-85, “Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (03/15/1982-
04/21/1982),” RAC Box 6 (Box 91377); “Israel and the PLO: 7 Years of Strife,” NYT, 8 June 1982, 
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two Syrian MIG-23s, in what amounted to a clear violation of the US-mediated ceasefire agreements 
concluded in 1981.12 
 
As Secretary Haig travelled to Israel and Egypt in late January 1982, new talks were held with Sharon and 
Begin on efforts to reinstate the MoU and repair US-Israel relations. The US delegation was treated to a 
new set of threats from Sharon regarding plans for a Lebanon invasion, but Haig reiterated the US’s 
position that Washington would support a limited operation only if there was a prior and commensurate 
provocation. This position was restated in late May 1982 in Washington, just weeks before the Israeli 
invasion and by which time media reports were openly talking about the administration’s intention to 
reinstate the MoU.13 
 
Meanwhile, shortly after Haig’s Middle East trip, Secretary of Defence Weinberger travelled to the region, 
for talks with Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan and other Arab states on strategic planning for the RDF and 
CENTCOM, but not Israel (this was the trip to which Secretary Haig had made reference in his 
memorandum to Reagan in January 1982, expressing the need to maintain the suspension of the MoU to 
ensure the success of Weinberger’s meetings).14 
 
During the trip, media sources attributed to Weinberger a number of critical statements on Israel and 
reported an impending US decision to supply military hardware to Jordan, which caused a storm of 
controversy that necessitated significant damage control in Washington.15 Indeed, it was during this trip 
that Weinberger complained to his Omani guests about Israel’s tendency to pursue ‘policies designed to 
place us [the US] in a situation where we must choose between friends’, as reported in the official cable 
back to Washington found at the RRPL. Explaining Washington’s tepid reaction to Israel’s annexation of 
the Golan, the Secretary of Defence reminded his Arab counterparts that they had to ‘realize how 
difficult it is to take actions in the US Congress which appear to be against Israel’.16 
 
A letter containing the signatures of more than 120 leaders of Jewish-American groups in the US was 
delivered to President Reagan on 24 February 1982 condemning the proposed sale to Jordan.17 In an 
effort to dampen Israel’s concerns, extracts from a letter to Begin were released in the media. Reagan 
reassured Israel ‘that recent reports have presented incorrect and exaggerated commentary regarding US 																																																								
12 These were the first bombing raids in Lebanon since 1981. RRPL, “Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (03/15/1982-
04/21/1982),” op.cit. 
13 Haig, Caveat, op.cit., pp.329-30; Hendrick Smith, “US Willing to Revive Israeli Accord,” NYT, 14 May 1982, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/14/world/us-willing-to-revive-israeli-accord.html. 
14 Israel was originally included as one of the countries Weinberger was due to visit. Following the Golan annexation, the 
Secretary of Defence opted to cancel the stop in Israel, further infuriating the Israeli leadership. 
15 RRPL, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, 1983-1989, “Sec Def Trip to the M.E.,” Box 91987; 
Bernard Gwertzman, “Reagan Says US Has Not Altered Policy on Israel,” NYT, 17 February 1982, 
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16 RRPL, “Sec Def Trip to the M.E.,” op.cit. 
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military assistance policies for the Middle East. […] There has been no change regarding our military 
supply relationships with Jordan. […] Israel remains America’s friend and ally. However I believe it is in 
the interest of both our countries for the United States to enhance its influence with other states in the 
region. I recognize the unique bond between the United States and Israel and the serious responsibilities 
which this bond imposes on us both’.18 
 
The above clearly demonstrates how Israel and the United States were still approaching the question of 
strategic cooperation and the institutionalization of US-Israel ties from their respective standpoints and 
with little appreciation for the inconsistencies between these two approaches. From the US standpoint, 
the central concern had not changed from early 1981, and rested on the urgent need to reconcile the 
‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ components of US Middle East policy in such a way that one did not undermine the 
other. During Weinberger’s February 1982 trip to the Middle East, he was given hesitant assurances that 
Saudi Arabia would support US strategic plans in the region—including by overbuilding its military bases 
to be used by the US in the event of an emergency. 
 
During his meetings in Saudi Arabia, Weinberger reported back to Washington that Crown Prince Fahd 
saw ‘Israel offering only friendship and alliance with US against Soviets. While Arabs possessed extensive 
strategic territory, major oil reserves and growing economic opportunity for US business’. The cable 
added that ‘Fahd considers it possible for US to enjoy both sets of benefits if it refrained from supporting 
either side in actions against the interests of the other [... and] followed a fairly balanced even-handed 
program in Mid-East’.19 
 
Such expressions no doubt represented tactical means of attracting greater US support and assistance, and 
demonstrated a willingness on behalf of Saudi Arabia to acknowledge the wider dimensions of US policy 
and interests, including Washington’s need to stand by Israel. Such understandings were precisely what 
US leaders hoped to extract from Israel, yet these efforts would clash with Israel’s own primary concern: 
preserving its quasi-exclusivist relationship with the US in the Middle East. In this respect, tensions and 
heightened threats of military clashes represented the best means to rekindle close and increasingly quasi-
exclusivist relationship between the US and Israel in the Middle East. 
 
The developing US-Saudi dialogue was particularly troubling to Israel’s leadership. Threat perceptions 
were further compounded by the hesitantly supportive reception the US granted to the eight-point Fahd 
Plan on Arab-Israeli peace, unveiled by Saudi Arabia in early August 1981, just prior to the formal US 
announcement of the AWACS arms package deal. The 1981 Fahd Plan, which received Arab League 
approval in a slightly modified form on 9 September 1982 (and in concomitance with the unveiling of 
Reagan’s own plan for Arab-Israeli negotiations on 1 September), was vehemently opposed by Israel. 																																																								
18 Reprinted in, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, “Ronald Reagan: 1982 [Book 1],” p.177. 
19 RRPL, “Sec Def Trip to the M.E.,” op.cit. [emphasis added]. 
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The Reagan administration viewed the document as a slow movement by Saudi Arabia towards a greater 
willingness to accept Israel’s existence and negotiate on the basis of agreed UN resolutions. The fact that 
the Fahd plan was announced concurrently with the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia only heightened 
Israel’s concern, seemingly indicating that the US was moving closer to Arab positions in the context of 
growing strategic planning for the Persian Gulf. 
 
It would be these efforts by Israel to undermine the nascent US-Arab strategic dialogue and thereby 
deepen its preferential and quasi-exclusivist relationship with the US that would define its approach to the 
Reagan administration in the post-1981 MoU environment. While the administration had sought, in 
Begin’s words, to ‘make Israel a hostage’ to the MoU, the Israeli government lost no time in orchestrating 
a number of events—beginning with the Golan annexation and extending to the 1982 Lebanon War—
that would result in a rekindled US-Israeli relationship and a deepening of US-Arab animosities. 
 
From Israel’s standpoint, capitulating a crisis in the region—particularly if related to Palestine or 
involving Israeli-Arab military hostilities—was the best means to undermine US efforts to co-opt the 
Arabs. By returning the question of Palestine to centre stage, Israel could drive a wedge between the US 
and the Arab world. Washington would no doubt be angry at Israel, but it would also be hard pressed not 
to push back against the Arab reaction—as indeed had happened in the case of Israel’s bombings of Iraq 
and Beirut in 1981 as well as the annexation of the Golan Heights. 
 
Such a crisis, and the expected Arab reaction, would also complicate US efforts to garner congressional 
approval for US arms sales, particularly given that the administration was ‘marketing’ these sales by 
framing them as conducive to Arab-Israeli peace. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Israel’s annexation 
of the Golan Heights was followed shortly thereafter by major hostilities between Israel, Syria and the 
PLO in Lebanon. Coming on the heels of the Fahd Plan and the US sale of advanced weaponry to Saudi 
Arabia, Israel’s move to annex the Golan Heights has indeed been described as tactical ploy aimed at 
catapulting a regional crisis that would scuttle Israeli redeployment from the Egyptian Sinai, undermine 
the Autonomy negotiations and likely result in sufficient provocation by Syria or the PLO to warrant a 
major Israeli assault on Lebanon.20 
 
Knowing full well that the US administration would be hard pressed domestically not to come to Israel’s 
aid in the midst of a war and that Israel’s adversaries in Lebanon—Syria and the PLO—were both 
considered Soviet ‘proxies’ by the administration, Israeli leaders were banking on almost automatic US 
approval. This dynamic was also no doubt strengthened by the Reagan administration’s willingness to 
publicly label Israel a ‘strategic asset’. Indeed, the processes by which Israeli leaders would purposely 																																																								
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mislead the Reagan administration, concealing the true nature and extent of their military plans in 
Lebanon, while playing on the administration’s fixation with the Soviet Union and fear that criticism of 
Israel would scuttle the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, lend further support to this hypothesis. 
 
There is more to the hypothesis, however. A number of documents found at the RRPL demonstrate that 
members of the Reagan administration were secretly conducting a dialogue with the PLO through 
intermediaries and the auspices of Saudi Arabia during 1981–82.21 Nicholas Veliotes recalled how he 
requested, and received, personal approval from Reagan to open a secret dialogue, notwithstanding the 
official assurances provided by Kissinger to Israel in the 1975 MoU that the US would not talk (directly) 
to the PLO unless the latter first recognized Israel and UN resolution 242.22 
 
Israel was aware of these secret talks. The fact that these were also being brokered by Saudi Arabia would 
have been of serious concern to Tel Aviv, indicating a potential dilution of Israel’s ‘special’ relationship 
with the US. A further motivation for Israel’s invasion of Lebanon—particularly in light of Begin’s efforts 
to obtain Cabinet approval in December 1981—may therefore have been preventing the US-PLO, as well 
as the more general US-Arab dialogue from progressing and potentially bearing fruit. As the fundamental 
fault line in the region, no single issue held greater potential to disrupt nascent US-Arab dialogue than the 
question of Palestine and the future ownership of the lands occupied by Israel in 1967. 
 
6.2 Reagan’s National Security Strategy and Policy Review on the Middle 
East 
 
Reagan’s National Security Strategy (NSDD-32) released on 20 May 1982 described the importance of 
security assistance to allies and partners as a ‘vital, integral component’ of US strategic planning and an 
‘essential complement’ to the US’s efforts to augment its ‘own force structure’ to meet US security 
interests abroad.23 When it came to the Middle East (or Southwest Asia as it was called at the time), the 
NSDD-32 noted that the US ‘will support the development of balanced and self-contained friendly 
regional forces and will emphasize assistance to certain key states for regional contingency roles’.24 
 
																																																								
21 Bruce Weber, “John Edwin Mroz, Clandestine Envoy to Arafat, Dies at 66,” NYT, 20 August 2014, https://goo.gl/K6s2q9. 
22 Author Interview, Nicholas Veliotes, op.cit. On top of these conditions, which US Congress formalized into law in 1985, the 
Reagan administration added a third condition for recognition of the PLO: denouncing terrorism and ending its armed struggle 
against Israel. This condition was included in the 1985 law, heavily criticized by Reagan, as was a subsequent law passed in 1987 
that called for the shutting of PLO offices in New York and Washington. See, Robert Pear, “Effect of a PLO Shift on US Policy 
Unclear,” NYT, 13 November 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/13/world/effect-of-a-plo-shift-on-us-policy-
unclear.html; APP, “Ronald Reagan: Statements on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 
1989,” 22 December 1987, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=33853; Dov Lieber, “Mission Impossible: How 
an old US law could scotch peace talks before they start,” The Times of Israel, 20 November 2017, 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/mission-impossible-how-an-old-us-law-could-scotch-peace-talks-before-they-start/. 
23 FAS, NSDD-National Security Decision Directives Reagan Administration, “US National Security Strategy,” NSDD-32, 20 
May 1982, p.6, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-32.pdf. 
24 Ibid., pp.3-4. 
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Documents relating to the internal discussions on the drafting process for NSDD-32 provide further 
details of the evolving US military and strategic planning for the region. US planners focussed on ‘access, 
improvement of facilities, HNS [Host-Nation Support], and prepositioning in Egypt and Oman. In Saudi 
Arabia’, reads the draft document, ‘we should seek through contingency discussions to identify the 
facilities available to deploying US forces’—i.e., the overbuilding of military bases. Pakistan was also 
mentioned as possible staging area for US forces in the event of a crisis. ‘Israeli capabilities’, however, 
were relegated to a secondary plane. These ‘could provide a considerable benefit during direct Soviet 
attacks in SWA [Southwest Asia] or in a US-Soviet war which involves hostilities in the Mediterranean’.25 
 
The Reagan administration’s emphasis on security assistance and arms transfers—in some ways a return 
to the Nixon Doctrine’s ‘Vietnamization’ strategy—would stand out as a significant area of discontinuity 
with the Carter administration.26 Yet, the administration also faced a number of challenges in seeking to 
expand the use of such assistance. In an NSC meeting on 27 April 1982 the contents of the NSDD-32 
were discussed. As noted by the NSC official in charged with chairing the meeting, ‘the major problem is 
that though there are more than 150 nations in the world, 60 percent of our security assistance goes to 
two countries—Israel and Egypt. If you add Turkey and Greece, 75 percent of our security assistance 
goes to four countries. […] A second problem is that we are hamstrung in Congress’.27 
 
Secretary Haig and Weinberger both agreed on the urgent need to expand the US’s ability to provide 
assistance, and on quick notice. ‘[We must] straighten out the confusing set of legislative restrictions and 
the inability to respond responsively to valid security assistance requests’, noted Haig. CIA Director Casey 
highlighted during the meeting how ‘eleven countries located near chokepoints are being threatened [by 
Soviet proxies]’ across the globe; ‘they do not require sophisticated arms. They need light weapons and 
communication gear. We must remember that a little gets a lot done when it comes to security 
assistance’.28  
 
It was also in these contexts that the administration began expanding its covert offensive throughout the 
Third World. Here, the assistance of allies and partners—and incidentally both Israel and a number of 
Arab states—became increasingly important. Thanks to Israel’s influence in Congress, however, Tel Aviv 
maintained a significant advantage in making its case with the Reagan administration, a dynamic that 
would become increasingly important for the decision to restore formal strategic cooperation in 1983. 
Meanwhile, and in coincidence with the planning phases for NSDD-32, it was clear that US policy had 
reached an impasse in the Middle East and consequently a major policy review was undertaken by the 																																																								
25 Documents relating to the drafting process for NSDD-32 are available online via: The Reagan Files archive collection by Jason 
Saltoun-Ebin. See, “NSSD 1-82, Part III, Section B. The Role of Allies and Others. Conclusions,” pp.2-3 [emphasis added] 
http://www.thereaganfiles.com/nssd-1-82-part-iii-b.pdf. 
26 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting Files: Records, 1981-88, “NSC 00047 04/27/1982,” p.4. 
27 Ibid., pp.3-4. 
28 Ibid., p.8. 
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administration through National Security Study Directive (NSSD) 4-82, approved by Reagan on 19 March 
1982.29  
 
The review took eighteen months to come to a conclusion, demonstrating the deep divisions within the 
administration on the necessary steps to take in the region. The length of the review is also explained by 
the fluidity of events in the Middle East and the reoccurrence of ‘mini-crises’ that necessitated quick 
reaction and damage control by the US. Ultimately, NSSD 4-82 resulted in the approval of NSDD-99, 
signed by Reagan on 12 July 1983.30 
 
The review would rekindle debates on how best to precede vis-à-vis Israel on the suspended MoU and 
US-Arab relations. Weinberger insisted that Israel agree to mute its opposition to arms sales to Jordan as 
the needed quid for the US quo of reinstating the MoU.31 This was opposed by Secretary Haig and his 
team at the State Department, who argued against overt linkage, as this would further Israel’s concerns 
and thereby undermine the desired effects of the memorandum. According to the State Department, the 
best means to enhance influence and restrain Israel’s unilateral tendencies was by reassuring Israel, 
building a ‘safety net’ beneath  Israel while and ‘hugging it closer’. 
 
Israel’s bombing raids on Lebanon and military engagements with Syria on 29 April 1982 and 9 May 
respectively, just as the administration was preparing the ground for the sale of arms to Jordan in an 
effort to dissuade it from seeking Soviet arms, would further complicate these internal debates.32 
Ultimately, when in late May the US was already publicly talking about reinstating the 1981 MoU and 
moved to approve a $2.5 billion sale of 75 F-16 fighter jets to Tel Aviv33, it was unable to push through 
even a more limited Jordanian request for security assistance. 
 
The Israeli quid for the American pro was again a resounding ‘no’. ‘Israel will not be reconciled to these 
steps’, noted Foreign Minister Shamir on 26 May 1982. ‘Supplying the advanced missiles and airplanes to 
Jordan is a continuation of the policy of supplying sophisticated AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia’.34  
Arms sales and increased security assistance for Jordan would remain a major sticking point in US-Israeli 																																																								
29 FAS, National Security Study Directives of the Reagan Administration, “US Strategy for the Near East and Southwest Asia,” 
NSSD 4-82, 19 March 1982, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nssd/nssd-4-82.pdf. 
30 FAS, NSDD of the Reagan Administration, “US National Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia,” NSDD-99, 12 
July 1983, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-99.pdf. 
31 Dated 12 May 1982, just prior to the arrival of Ariel Sharon in the US, a memorandum from Howard Teicher to Jack 
[Geoffrey] Kemp reads: DOD: ‘does not believe that a decision in principle has yet been made to implement the MOU. Sec. Def. 
apparently believes that the purpose of his meeting with Sharon will be to extract a quid—possible acquiescence of F-5Gs 
[planes] for Jordan, moratorium on settlements, etc.—that will then allow for the MOU’s implementation.” RRPL, Howard 
Teicher Files, “Chron May 1982,” Box 91667. 
32 Madiha Rashid al Madfai, Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 
pp.79-81. 
33 Ann Shutt (ed.), “US to sell Israel 75 F-16 fighters,” CSM, 27 May 1982, 
https://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0527/052724.html.  
34 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Remarks by FM Shamir on US Arms Sales to Jordan,” 26 May 1982, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook5/Pages/130%20Remarks%20by%20Foreign%20Minister%
20Shamir%20on%20US%20Arms.aspx. 
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relations for much of the Reagan administration. US officials had earmarked Jordan as a major staging 
area for the Middle East RDF, and plans for a smaller rapid reaction force in Jordan for deployment in 
the Persian Gulf were particularly troubling for Israel. 
 
Indeed, it was during this period that US diplomacy was doing everything possible to attract Jordan into 
the Camp David process, a plan that came close to fruition in the mid-1980s, but ultimately got nowhere 
in light of the internal divisions in Israel’s coalition government and the inability of the Reagan 
administration to extract Israeli concessions. The US’s failure to approve sales to Jordan would also lead 
the Kingdom to become an important Soviet arms purchaser, with Moscow overtaking Washington as 
Jordan’s largest arms supplier in the late 1980s.35 
 
6.3 War in Lebanon: Deception, Hubris and the Revival of US-Israel 
Strategic Cooperation 
 
Much has been made of the ‘amber light’ allegedly provided by US Secretary of State Alexander Haig to 
Israel’s Defence Minister Ariel Sharon in the run-up to the 1982 Lebanon war.36 While the US was most 
definitely misled about the true extent of the impending Israeli operation, there is no debating that a 
number of US policymakers were secretly quite content to see Israel deal a strategic blow to Syria and the 
PLO in the context of Lebanon. 
 
Was the Lebanon war, and the US’s decision to come to Israel’s aid with the deployment of a 
peacekeeping force separately from the UN mission already in the country, the first public expression of 
overt US-Israeli strategic cooperation? Had the US privately given Israel the go-ahead for the Lebanon 
invasion, believing that Israel’s US-supplied arms could serve US interests in weakening Soviet influence 
by hitting its so-called ‘proxies’ in Syria and the PLO? Had Israel succeeded in convincing Washington 
that a Lebanese government headed by Bachir Gemayel, leader of the Lebanese Christian Phalanges and a 
key Israeli ally in Lebanon, would transform Lebanon into the ‘next Egypt’ for Israel to make peace with? 
Could the US move into the post-war environment and orchestrate a new breakthrough for peace as had 
been done by Henry Kissinger in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War? 
 
These questions began circulating in public debate, in the wake of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon on 6 June 
1982. Similar debates were also taking place within the Reagan administration, as it sought to navigate the 
fallout from the Israeli invasion. In this context, the administration was caught between its deep 
antagonism towards the Soviet Union and its regional ‘proxies’, and the continued urgency to convince 
Arab allies in close vicinity to the Persian Gulf to agree to access agreements and basing rights for the US. 																																																								
35 Anthony H. Cordesman, After The Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East, London/New York, Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2007, pp.291-30. 
36 See; Ze’ev Schiff, “The Green Light,” Foreign Policy, No.50 (Spring 1983), pp.73-85; David Hirst, Beware of Small States. Lebanon, 
Battleground of the Middle East, London, Faber & Faber, 2010, pp.116-73. 
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‘The war in Lebanon represents a major setback for US diplomacy which requires a fundamental and 
immediate review of our Middle East policy’,37 reads a memorandum for the president dated 14 June 
1982. 
 
Yet, once the war was underway, the administration immediately sought to make the most of the situation 
and indeed there were a number of deeper rationales favouring US support for Israel in the context of 
Lebanon. These revolved around the political costs that would be incurred by any sustained US pressure 
on Israel for a unilateral withdrawal—as experienced by President Carter in the context of the limited 
1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, when the US threatened sanctions on Israel—and a belief that while the 
Israeli operation had damaged US credibility with the Arabs, a unilateral Israeli withdrawal—like the one 
demanded by Eisenhower in the 1956 Suez Crisis38—would be interpreted as a victory for Soviet-backed 
forces in Syria and Lebanon.  
 
Preferable, from the US standpoint, would be to transform the crisis into an opportunity—in itself a 
reoccurring theme in the history of (re)active US policy in the Middle East—in terms of weakening Soviet 
influence, changing the balance of forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and reviving a US willingness to 
deploy military force abroad. It was in this context, and particularly within the State Department, that US 
officials sought to make the most of crisis, including buying into the Israeli-promoted view that Lebanon 
could be transformed into the ‘next Egypt’ and thereby brought into the Camp David format. 
 
The Reagan administration had made no secret of its deep hostility to the PLO and Syria. Documents 
from the RRPL demonstrate the extent to which a number of administration officials viewed the PLO as 
Soviet-sponsored ‘international terrorists who are working against US interests’.39 Another example is 
provided by Richard Pipes, who drafted a memorandum in the NSC on 29 July 1981, outlining how the 
Soviet Union was seeking to ‘transform the PLO gunmen in Lebanon from a hit-and-run force into a 
modern army that would spearhead an assault on Israel.’40 Yet, as noted above, Reagan was also secretly 
conducting a dialogue with the PLO, through intermediaries and with the assistance of Saudi Arabia.41 
 
The dialogue represented a continuation of previous efforts, and in the wake of the Reagan electoral 
victory the PLO had sought to make contact with the administration. Dated 5 March 1981, a 																																																								
37 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG): Records, 1981-1987, “NSPG 0039 
06/14/1982,” Box 91305. 
38 A document found in the Dennis Ross files at the RRPL made specific reference to Eisenhower’s 1956 decision to force a 
unilateral Israeli withdrawal and the fact that ‘the Soviets, and not we [the US], were the big beneficiaries as a result. 
Paradoxically, Soviet support, resupply and threats of intervention during the 1973 war didn’t pay off because we were seen as 
the only one capable of stopping the Israelis and then delivering on Israeli withdrawals’. These were the beginnings of the 
doctrine of support for ‘Israel, right or wrong’. RRPL, Dennis Ross Files, 1986-1988, “Lebanon: Dennis Ross,” Box 1. 
39 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting Files, “NSC 00057 08/04/1982.” The phrase was used by UN ambassador 
Jean Kirkpatrick. 
40 FRUS, Volume III (1981-1988), Document 77.  
41 Author Interview, Nicholas Veliotes, op.cit; Also see, David Ignatius, “The Secret History of US-PLO Terror Talks,” WP, 4 
December 1988, https://goo.gl/VTvpeC. 
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memorandum found at the RRPL contains a number of points the PLO wished to transmit to the Reagan 
administration that would form the basis for a ‘plan’ by which ‘the PLO would be prepared to recognize 
Israel’ in exchange for a Palestinian state encompassing ‘all of the West Bank and Jerusalem’ and 
‘dedicated to peaceful purposes’.42 
 
The points raised by the PLO included a reassurance that a Palestinian state would ‘live in coexistence 
with Israel’ and that the PLO were ‘not leftists or Marxists but nationalists’ whose future state would ‘not 
be in alliance with the Soviet Union or give bases to it or to anyone else’.43 While President Reagan had 
personally authorized these contacts, the secret dialogue with the PLO would ultimately be buried by the 
Lebanon war and the PLO’s exile to Tunisia in the wake of its evacuation from Beirut under US 
auspices.44 
 
The possibility that Israel was spurred into action in Lebanon in order to undermine this evolving US-
PLO dialogue cannot be discounted out of hand. This may well have been a further objective of the 
Israeli operation, together with broader efforts to complicate US-Arab strategic dialogue on the Persian 
Gulf, undermine the eight-point Fahd Plan while seeking to push back PLO and Syrian influence from 
Lebanon.  
 
The US’s premier CIA operative in the Arab world, Robert Ames, was also key to this evolving dialogue 
with the Palestinians, and the PLO had indeed been particularly cooperative in helping to provide security 
for US officials and embassy staff in Lebanon since the mid-1970s.45 Ames’s death in the 1983 bombing 
of the US embassy in Beirut on 18 April would give a serious blow to US intelligence capabilities and 
contacts across the Arab world, also leaving the US in a position of having to rely more heavily on Israeli 
intelligence—a dynamic that would help to spur closer US-Israeli strategic cooperation but would result 
in the US increasingly assuming Israeli viewpoints and assessments.46 
 
In the run-up to the Israeli invasion, Secretary of State Haig had called Israel to ‘exercise complete 
restraint’47 in Lebanon and not retaliate militarily unless provoked. Yet, while the US was obviously 																																																								
42 RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, “PLO 1981,” RAC Box 7-Kemp (Box 90220). 
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concerned about the potential fallout from a war in Lebanon and particularly its likelihood of 
complicating US-Arab strategic dialogue, further documents from the RRPL demonstrate that some in 
the administration did consider the possibility of employing Israel’s military muscle to defeat the PLO, 
thereby helping to eliminate a major irritant in US-Arab relations.  
 
A heavily redacted, unsigned and undated document found in the Geoffrey Kemp files at the RRPL in a 
folder box titled ‘PLO 1981’ outlined a twin-pronged approach including ‘diplomacy’ and ‘force’, ‘to lay 
the groundwork for diplomatic progress by launching a multifaceted campaign against the PLO’. The 
document advised a diplomatic campaign to discredit the PLO and highlight its links to the Soviet Union 
and lack of democratic credentials. Under the heading ‘force’, the document reads: ‘A “green light” to 
Israel to destroy the PLO’s military capabilities’.48  
 
While this is not the place to enter into an extensive investigation as to the true nature and extent of US-
Israeli coordination in the context of the Lebanon war, it remains beyond doubt that Israeli leaders 
purposely misled the administration about their intentions in Lebanon. There is also no doubt that a 
number of more pro-Israeli voices in the administration were supportive of Israeli views and became 
convinced that from the ashes of Beirut a new set of realities would be created that could represent an 
opportunity for US (and Israeli) interests in the region. 
 
Nicholas Veliotes, who took part in many of the meetings between Haig and Sharon, recalls how Haig 
inadvertently provided what amounted to an ‘amber light’49 to Israel by not clarifying forcibly that the US 
opposed a military intervention in Lebanon. While Sharon was described by the former Reagan official as 
having ‘lied all the way to Beirut’,50 divisions within the administration and signals coming from the State 
Department are sure to have increased Israel’s self-confidence that US support would be forthcoming. 
One UK diplomatic cable sent from Washington to London on 15 June 1982 demonstrates the extent of 
internal divisions in the administration and the significant influence of the more pro-Israel voices in the 
Reagan White House: ‘The Americans are concerned at the extent to which the Israelis have misled them 
at every stage of their Lebanese operation […] but it looks increasingly likely that, as usual, the pro-Israeli 
faction will have its way’.51 
 
On the whole, therefore, it is likely that Israel’s government was banking on US support in the war. Even 
more likely was the Israeli calculation that such a crisis would result in a further weakening of US-Arab 
cooperation, an end to the covert US-PLO dialogue and closer US-Israeli relations, particularly in the 
military realm. As it turned out, these were precisely the outcomes of the war, even though at first it 																																																								
48 RRPL, Kemp Files, “PLO 1981” op.cit. 
49 Author Interview, Nicolas Veliotes, op.cit.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, “UKE Washington to FCO (‘Lebanon’)”, Documents Archive, 16 June 1982, 
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appeared as if Israel had grossly miscalculated, risking the wrath of the US administration while triggering 
a hesitant and short-lived US return to the underlying concepts of the ‘linkage doctrine’. 
 
Indeed, following the Israeli assault on Lebanon, and with Israeli forces encircling Beirut and engaging in 
combat with Syrian forces, the US realized the extent of the operation—far beyond the assured 40 KM 
waypoint that had been originally outlined as the Israeli objective. While the US was willing to back Israel 
in the war effort and in public opinion, a number of Israeli concessions, both in Lebanon and, more 
importantly, in the context of the Autonomy negotiations and the Arab-Israeli conflict, were expected in 
return. 
 
This momentary embrace of linkage—encapsulated in the unveiling of the Reagan Plan for Arab-Israeli 
negotiations on 1 September 1982—was quickly overtaken by events and the deepening of the US’s 
military engagements on the side of Israel and its allies in Lebanon, which in turn transformed US troops 
from peacekeepers to active participants (and targets) in the conflict. This dynamic would in turn emerge 
as a further impetus for closer US-Israeli cooperation in the midst of the Lebanon morass, particularly 
following the twin bombings of the US embassy complex and marine barracks in April and October 1983 
and the considerable uptake in US and foreign hostages abducted in Lebanon. 
 
However, during the initial Israeli push towards Beirut and between June and September 1982, the US 
administration was largely on the same page in terms of seeking to extract a concession from Israel in 
exchange for coming to its aid in the Lebanon war. Knowing that support for Israel in the conflict was 
necessary for political reasons, US officials moved to the second-best option, employing US support for 
Israel in the war as a ‘positive inducement’ to extract the same concessions and assurances that Reagan 
officials had in 1981: diminished Israeli opposition to the US’s Arab outreach and increased ‘flexibility’ in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
 
In Washington, a fragile consensus of opinion therefore formed around the notion of linkage between 
the war and Israeli policy in the OPT, an approach that received the backing of the NSC, State and the 
Pentagon, as well as the CIA. 52  Divisions existed regarding the pursuit of positive or negative 
conditionality with Israel, with the Pentagon demanding more forceful measures. Indeed, the Department 
of Defence was entirely opposed to the notion—promoted by Israel—that the US should dispatch troops 
to Lebanon as a peacekeeping force, and given that this seemed inevitable Weinberger and the Pentagon 
were pushing for a concrete quid for the US quo of coming to Israel’s aid. 
 
‘In the process of discussing the pros and cons of linking our Lebanon policy to the West Bank and 
autonomy negotiations’, reads a memorandum prepared for an National Security Planning Group 																																																								
52 RRPL, NSPG: Records, 1981-87, “NSPG 0039 06/14/1982,” Box 91305.  
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(NSPG) meeting on 14 June 1982, ‘it is critically important to keep in mind how to exploit our leverage 
over Begin to the maximum extent without provoking counterproductive Israeli actions’.53 In seeking US 
leverage over Israel, NSC staff, like the State Department, counselled against the use of ‘punitive 
sanctions’, as these would likely further increase Israel’s noncompliance. As a result, Weinberger’s request 
to ‘use the supply of US military assistance to Israel as a lever to extract concessions’ was discarded by the 
administration. 
 
Instead a ‘variety of positive inducements’ were outlined. While these were described as ‘costly in 
political, military and economic terms’, they also held the potential to ‘yield significant strategic benefits 
for us throughout the Middle East, including the [Persian] Gulf’. In turn, it was hoped that the US’s 
‘willingness to help Israel deal with its northern security needs and the stabilization of Lebanon will 
provide us with significant leverage that you [Reagan] can use with Prime Minister Begin over Israeli 
occupation policies in the West Bank and concessions in the autonomy negotiations’.54 
 
Such hopes were grossly misplaced however, and notwithstanding the Reagan administration’s efforts to 
‘extract a price from Begin for pulling his chestnuts out of Lebanon’,55 the short-sightedness of this 
approach rested on a belief that US leverage over Israel was ‘inherent in Begin’s own need to leave 
Lebanon’, and ‘not […] out of any particular threats we might make’.56 The underlying fallacy of this 
approach vis-à-vis Israel is captured by one sentence contained in a memo drafted by Howard Teicher, 
Geoffrey Kemp and Oliver North in occasion of the above meeting: ‘The President should make clear 
how difficult it will be for us to deliver without Begin’s full agreement to our ‘linkage’ approach’.57 It is 
difficult to see how Begin would be convinced to agree to such linkage, given that he and his 
government—as well as the Israeli Labour party before him—had made opposition to ‘linkage’ a major 
constant of Israeli foreign policy.  
 
This momentary US embrace of linkage would climax—and quickly deflate—following the unveiling of 
the ‘Reagan Plan’ for Arab-Israeli peace on 1 September 1982.58 The plan was quickly overtaken by 
events, as the US failed to press for its implementation after Israel’s adamant rejection of the initiative.59 
Israel’s refusal to provide any such assurances was put on clear display during the second Reagan-Begin 
meeting in the midst of the Lebanon war, on 21 June 1982. A full summary of the meeting was 
declassified by the RRPL in 2010 and provides much insight into the nature of US-Israeli relations. 																																																								
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Indeed, similar discussions had been held during 1981, yet to little avail. In 1982, in the midst of Lebanon 
and following Israel’s completion of the Sinai Redeployment, the Reagan administration still could not 
muster sufficient political will to stand up to Israel. In fact, throughout the Lebanon war the most that 
the administration could approve in terms of negative conditionality vis-à-vis Israel boiled down to a 
momentary suspension of cluster bomb munitions and the now-famous Reagan threat to review the 
entire US-Israeli relationship if Begin did not order an immediate halt to the bombing of Beirut in August 
1982, which Reagan described as a ‘holocaust’ over the phone with Begin. 
 
Yet, on the twin US strategic goals of seeking to extract greater Israeli acquiescence to the evolving US-
Arab strategic dialogue, let alone an agreement to show more flexibility in the context of the Autonomy 
negotiations or its occupation policies in Palestine, the Israeli government never backed down, including 
during the tense face-to-face meeting between Reagan and Begin. 
 
‘I was genuinely shocked’, noted Reagan as he met with Begin in the White House on 21 June 1982. 
‘Israel has lost ground to a great extent among our people as a result of your action’. He went on, 
 
‘Your actions in Lebanon have seriously undermined our relationships with those Arab 
governments whose cooperation is essential to protect the Middle East. […] I am prepared to 
expend considerable political capital in order to help meet Israel’s basic needs in Lebanon […] 
However, I must have from you explicit commitments that Israel will take those steps necessary 
to achieve a breakthrough in the autonomy negotiations. […] I may take actions with which you 
do not agree. For example, […] providing military equipment to those Arab nations who have 
come to rely on us. […] I believe this strengthens Arab confidence in us, improves our strategic 
position, and encourages them to take risks for peace. I don’t expect you to come out and 
approve this, but for heaven sakes, please don’t oppose us. […] I would hope that your 
reactions reflect an appreciation that the vital interests of both our nations are served by 
mutually beneficial relations between the United States and key Arab nations’.60 
 
Begin’s response completely skirted the issue of assurances and flexibility, and instead emphasized Israel’s 
contribution to US Cold War interests. ‘There were ten times more Soviet weapons’ in Lebanon than 
expected, noted Begin, ‘we now realize that this area had been turned into a Soviet base, the principal 
center of Soviet activities in the Middle East. […] A true international terrorist base’. Promising to share 
with the US all the intelligence gathered from Lebanon, Begin emphasized how the Israeli action had 
‘rendered a great service to the United States and to the free world’. Outlining how Israel had successfully 
‘shot down over 100 [Syrian] MIGs with not one Israeli loss’, Begin promised to share Israel’s technology 
used to destroy Soviet SAM-batteries in Lebanon, noting how ‘the prestige of US weapons vis-à-vis 
Soviet weapons went up’.61 																																																								
60 RRPL, Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC Records, Box 91987 (box 12).  
61 Ibid. Significantly, Ariel Sharon would refuse to share much of this information, dragging his feet with the Reagan 
administration. Such reluctance would end when Shorn was replaced by Moshe Arens as Israel’s Defence Minister in February 
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Without ever mentioning the Palestinians, Begin requested US assistance and aid for Zaire and Sudan, 
two countries that were hesitantly moving towards recognizing Israel, as well as further increases in 
bilateral aid for Israel. Brushing aside Reagan’s point that public opinion in the US was moving against 
Israel, Begin complained about an alleged media ‘bias’ against his country, while finding solace in the fact 
that, beyond the media, ‘public opinion is not so bad’. ‘Your Jewish citizens are strongly behind us’, 
continued Begin, ‘there are millions of Christians in the US supporting us. […] I think we do indeed have 
a lot of support and understanding’.62 Such statements amounted to a veiled threat against the Reagan 
administration and represent a clear indication of Israel’s unwillingness to be pressured into agreeing to a 
quid pro quo with the US. 
 
The administration’s true priorities were also outlined in this meeting. No significant pushback occurred 
on Palestine, while some discussion was held on the topic of US arms sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. 
Notwithstanding Reagan’s efforts to assure Israel that the ‘US would not sell these arms and then stand 
back and see the weapons used against Israel’, the response from Begin and Moshe Arens, Israel’s 
Ambassador to the US, was less than forthcoming. ‘The US should not arm the Arabs’, said Begin, 
pointing to the erosion of Israel’s QME, while Arens expressed his view that ‘arms should not be sold to 
the Arabs before they join the peace process’.63 
 
The results of the meeting were less than satisfactory for the US.64 The administration’s support for 
Israel, particularly in public, continued however, even in the midst of severe political crises and 
recriminations surrounding Israel’s repeated breaches of ceasefires, overwhelming use of force in 
Lebanon, the Sabra and Shatila massacre and the mounting instances of Israeli harassment against US 
marines dispatched to Lebanon to oversee the evacuation of the PLO.65 Reagan’s public support for 
Israel throughout the early months of war even led AIPAC to send the president a private letter, saying 
the organization was ‘proud of the stand you and your administration took during the Lebanon crisis. It 
was clear that your administration, unbending to foreign pressure and true to your commitment to 
combat terrorism, permitted Israel to effectively carry out its operations’,66 
 
																																																								
62 Ibid.  
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64 In a subsequent conversation between Reagan and Senator Percy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
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Resulting from these initial US reactions to the Lebanon war, the fundamental components of US policy 
towards Israel, its embrace of compensation and positive inducements, and consequent avoidance of 
pressure or negative conditionality would become entrenched. These would remain largely unaltered for 
the remainder of the administration, leading the US to abandon its hesitant embrace of linkage following 
the issuing of the September 1982 Reagan Plan, and proceeding to work on strengthening US-Israeli 
relations as the foundation for US-Israeli dialogue and cooperation in all fields. 
 
Indeed, having failed to garner Begin’s approval of a quid pro quo, or support for the Reagan Plan, the 
US administration essentially reverted to revamping US-Israeli strategic cooperation as a form of ‘positive 
inducement’ in exchange for tactical Israeli actions in the context of the Lebanon negotiations and US 
efforts to enforce a phased Israeli (and Syrian) withdrawal from the country as called for by the 17 May 
1983 agreement negotiated by the US and signed by Israel and Lebanon (but not Syria). 
 
The US’s complete abandonment of the concept of linkage was put on clear display with the issuing of 
Reagan’s NSDD-99 on 12 July 1983, completed a little over a year after the Israeli invasion and two 
months after the signing of the 17 May agreement that would create the key impetus for the resumption 
of US-Israeli strategic cooperation. Representing an initial outcome from the internal review of the US’s 
national security strategy for the Middle East, NSDD-99 outlined US strategic objectives, relations with 
allies and potential threats to US interests. Under the heading ‘cooperation with Israel’, NSDD-99 reads:  
 
I acknowledge that our ability to defend vital interests in the Near East and South Asia would be 
enhanced by the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, in recognition of Israel's 
strategic location, developed base infrastructure, and the quality and interoperability of Israeli 
military forces, we will undertake to resume cooperative planning with Israel expanding on the 
work begun earlier. To this end, we should conduct an internal review on where we could profit 
militarily from cooperative planning for major Soviet involvement and aggression which threaten 
vital western interests in the Near East and South Asia.67 
 
NSDD-99 would therefore formalize the decision to resume strategic cooperation with Israel, prompting 
a further set of debates as the administration launched a review assessment of Israeli capabilities to 
support US interests. Such efforts ultimately resulted in the approval of NSDD-111 on 28 October 1983, 
followed shortly thereafter by NSDD-115.68 This latter document, entitled ‘visit of [Israeli] Prime 
Minister Shamir’ and approved on 26 November 1983, would set the groundwork for the formal 
resumption of US-Israel strategic cooperation, leading between 1984 and 1989 to a considerable 
expansion of bureaucratic and institutional frameworks governing US-Israel relations, which will be 
addressed in Chapter 7. 
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While considered indispensable in order for the US to pursue a number of short-term interests in the 
context of the Lebanon war, the decision to ‘develop a more mature strategic relationship with the 
Government of Israel’69 as outlined by NSDD-115 would have far-reaching implications for the future, 
the theme of US leverage and influence over Israeli policy and the growth of domestic and increasingly 
bureaucratic constraints on US decision-making. Most significantly, the decision to reinvigorate 
cooperative planning with Israel would set the stage for the formalization of the quasi-exclusivist US-
Israeli relationship in the Middle East, securing an important victory for Israeli policy by virtue of this 
agreement’s potential to place Israeli concerns and interests front and centre of US Middle East policy 
well into the future. 
 
6.4 US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation Revived: The 1983 MoU 
 
On 29 November 1983, Yitzhak Shamir, Israel’s new Prime Minister, visited Washington to discuss 
developments in Lebanon and the resumption of formal US-Israeli strategic cooperation. The meeting 
would formalize the revival of the 1981 MoU, yet the two participants would also draw a number of 
lessons from these previous efforts.70 Differently from 1981, no official document was issued to the 
public, with details of the agreements being limited to brief public remarks by Reagan and Shamir 
following two days of intensive talks in Washington. The agreement would however become a launching 
pad for much broader elements of US-Israeli cooperation, setting in motion an accelerated growth in 
bilateral ties that were by no means limited to the strategic or military realm. 
 
The 1983 agreements included a commitment to negotiate an FTA with Israel, the approval of US 
funding for the Israeli Lavi fighter jet (including through the use of US FMF through offshore 
procurement of Lavi components manufactured in Israel that was heavily opposed by the Pentagon), 
allowing Israeli companies to ‘participate in the production of US weapons systems’, and increasing US 
‘security assistance to Israel’.71 Further elements included the revival of the previous commitment by the 
US DoD to purchase $200 million a year of Israeli made equipment and further efforts to strengthen 
Israel’s economy and defence sector, particularly for export purposes, through the approval of export 
sales to third countries.  
 
Yet, arguably the most important competent of the revived MoU was the formal establishment of a ‘joint 
political-military group [JPMG] to examine ways in which we can enhance U.S.-Israeli cooperation’.72 The 																																																								
69 “NSDD-115,” op.cit.,p.1 
70 For a detailed examination of the differences between the 1981 MoU and the 1983 revival based on the viewpoints of key 
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JPMG would become the first in a series of important bilateral working groups that would meet on a 
periodic basis to discuss wide-ranging issues of a strategic, military, economic and political nature. At the 
time Reagan described the group as giving ‘priority attention to the threat to our mutual interest posed by 
increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East. Among the specific areas to be considered are 
combined planning, joint exercises, and requirements for prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Israel’.73  
 
The group was in fact charged with developing detailed plans for joint exercises, prepositioning of 
military equipment in Israel, the negotiation of joint R&D ventures and the exchange of best practices in 
countering mutual threats ranging from Soviet weaponry to the sharing of intelligence and the 
organization of covert US-Israeli cooperation across the Third World. Held under a strict aura of secrecy, 
the joint meetings of the JPMG would begin in January 1984, setting the stage for a considerable 
expansion in people-to-people contacts among the respective bureaucracies and expert practitioners in 
the two countries.  
 
Through these channels the Reagan White House and the Israeli government continued their mutual 
efforts to inform each other’s policies. For the US, the benefits lay primarily in creating a venue for high-
level dialogue on mutual concerns but also for disagreements, in an effort to avoid their spilling over into 
the public domain where they could cause considerable political damage. The group also represented a 
locus for more long-term planning for Israeli aid and security requests, and an avenue to influence Israeli 
policy and long-term viewpoints. From Israel’s standpoint, the benefits were more tangible and direct. 
They not only included the abovementioned political, economic and military commitments, but also a 
direct route to influence US perceptions and policies about the Middle East, setting the stage for a slow 
but sustained process whereby Israeli tactics, viewpoints and concerns vis-à-vis Middle East 
developments and actors were increasingly adopted by the US. The JPMG would therefore become a 
means to reinforce the preferential and quasi-exclusivist nature of the US-Israeli relationship, a key 
avenue to strengthen this gradual process of ‘Israelization’ of US viewpoints and approaches to the 
Middle East. 
 
Yet, what was the basic motivation for the administration’s reversal away from linkage, and how could 
the US justify this volte-face in the absence of concrete Israeli assurances in the peace process or US-
Arab relations? We have seen how the preliminary decision to reinstate US-Israeli strategic cooperation 
was already contained in NSDD-99 of 12 July 1983, and was further articulated in NSDD-111, signed by 
Reagan on 28 October 1983, about a month before the formal revival of the MoU in November 1983. 
The contents of NSDD-111 go some way towards elucidating a number of key rationales that would lead 
the US to revamp US-Israeli strategic cooperation. 
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Coming on the heels of the August 1982 evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, the 17 May 1983 agreement 
between Lebanon and Israel (ostensibly meant to lay the groundwork for a Lebanon-Israel peace deal and 
the simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces from Lebanon), realities in Lebanon represented 
the first rationale for the US’s return to close cooperation with Israel. In this respect, the US sought to 
cut its losses in Lebanon, limit the political fallout and use Israel as ‘cover’ for a hasty withdrawal. By 
October 1983, the realities in Lebanon had become unbearable for the administration, particularly in light 
of the original hopes that a quick and successful campaign in Lebanon would be a morale-booster that 
could help kick the Vietnam-syndrome. By that time, the US had also in effect taken sides in the Lebanon 
war, largely as a result of Israeli actions at Sabra and Shatila and the ensuing decision to return US troops 
to Beirut. Moreover, Syria’s refusal to endorse the 17 May agreement, which effectively stonewalled US 
policy in Lebanon, would create a further impetus for stronger cooperation with Israel. 
 
The main architect of the deal, George Shultz, who in the meantime had replaced Alexander Haig as 
Reagan’s second Secretary of State, had neglected seeking Syrian participation in the 17 May agreement, 
even though the terms called for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, effectively placing the Syrian 
presence in the country on par with that of the invading Israeli army. Such an outcome, with Syria 
opposing the agreement, leading to its collapse, followed shortly thereafter by the collapse of the 
confessional government of Lebanon, left the US facing a humiliating disaster in Lebanon, leading to a 
hasty US retreat by March 1984.74 
 
It may be an irony of history that this turn of events was predicted in one of Reagan’s talking points for 
an NSPG meeting in April 1983 found at the RRPL. ‘The approach of offering Israel a great deal merely 
in return for a signature on an agreement with Lebanon does not go far enough. We run the real risk that 
Israel will indeed sign an agreement with Lebanon [i.e., the 17 May agreement], but it will be unacceptable 
to Moslem elements in Lebanon and the moderate Arabs. We will then have given away things to Israel, 
but the agreement will be unacceptable to Syria; Syria will not withdraw, and the Israelis will stay in 
Lebanon as well. This will be the worst of all worlds for us’.75 
 
As if out of prophetic wisdom, the talking point matches the succession of events in the context of the 
Lebanon war and the gradual means by which the US would become ‘entrapped’ in a vicious circle of 
incremental increases in sweeteners for Israel while receiving very little in return. If ‘entrapping’ the US in 
a semi-exclusivist US-Israeli relationship by orchestrating the crisis in Lebanon was indeed among Israel’s 
plans, these were advancing beyond its wildest dreams. 
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As a result, the US moved—even before the formal conclusion of the 17 May agreement—to ‘re-establish 
the basis sense that we share fundamental common interests [with Israel] and […] relegate differences to 
a lower plane’,76 as noted by Shultz in a memo for the same NSPG meeting on 22 April 1983. But there 
was more at stake for the US than the conflict in Lebanon, mounting US casualties and hostages, fuelling 
its need for a quick and face-saving withdrawal from Lebanon. There were developments in the Iran-Iraq 
war, which by late 1983 was moving further towards Iran’s advantage, and the upcoming US presidential 
elections of 1984. 
 
The combination of these developments would give the final and unrelenting push to formalize US-
Israeli strategic cooperation on the occasion of Shamir’s visit to the US in November 1983. Iran’s 
effective counterattack against Iraq caused significant concern in Washington, as well as among those 
same ‘moderate’ Arab allies the US was courting for access agreements and basing rights. Indeed, Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf states were highly concerned about a potential Iranian victory and turned to the 
US for assistance. This, for many in the administration, eased the prospect of the US moving to ‘widen 
and enhance’ its ‘strategic cooperation with Israel’ 77 as called for by NSDD-111, and of granting 
assurances of cooperation in the strategic realm.78 
 
Indeed, it was during this period that the US was moving to create CENTCOM and establish a forward 
basing presence for its logistical and contingency planning needs. Eventually, by mid-1984, Bahrain was 
identified as the location for this base—first in the form of a floating naval operations room and 
eventually as the major contemporary US military and naval facilities dotting the Arabian Peninsula. 
Meanwhile extensive airfield and bases were ‘overbuilt’ by Oman and Saudi Arabia for US use in the 
event of an emergency. Such preparatory planning would eventually come to fruition during the 1987–88 
Tanker War (Operation Earnest Will), when the US military deployed en masse to the Persian Gulf and 
more so during the 1990-1 Gulf crisis.  
 
While developments in the Iran-Iraq war diminished fears about alienating the Arab world, the upcoming 
1984 elections would add a significant impetus for a quick revival of strategic cooperation with Israel. The 
fundamental question of a quid pro quo, or the need for Israel to ‘desist from active campaigns in the 
United States against our arms sales to the Arabs’ as noted in NSDD-111, remained unfulfilled, and yet 
the US moved wholeheartedly towards Israel. Most importantly, the Reagan administration effectively 
formalized the rejection of linkage, let alone negative conditionality, as official US policy, noting in 
NSDD-111 that: 
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Strategic cooperation should not become a bargaining chip for specific ends. [...] Specifically, 
this means that we should not hold hostage progress on our strategic planning with either 
Israel or the moderate Arabs to progress on Lebanon or the peace process.79 
 
The document amounted to an abdication of responsibility on the side of the US in terms of Israeli 
obstructionism. Instead, the US would revert to delaying the inevitable, pushing back areas of US-Israeli 
disagreement while simultaneously moving to ‘give the store to Israel’ in the hope of gaining a number of 
short-term tactical benefits while ostensibly accumulating leverage and credibility with Israel that could be 
cashed in at a later date. 
 
This statement was contained in a diplomatic cable sent by Charles H. Price, US ambassador to the UK. 
Upon hearing of the public resumption of US-Israeli strategic cooperation, Price sent a worried cable to 
Reagan’s NSC Advisor Robert McFarlane, complaining that the agreement amounted to a ‘last minute 
decision to “give the store” to Israel for political reasons’.80 McFarlane’s response was to highlight how 
the administration had implemented a ‘thorough, systematic’ eighteen-month review of US strategy in the 
Middle East and that the decision therefore could not be linked to the upcoming elections or to political 
calculations.81 
 
That fact that the outcome of this ‘thorough, systematic review’ of US policy boiled down to a decision 
(and implicit admission) that the only way the US could hope to make Israel budge was through 
incremental increases in aid, and that such assistance was needed in order to limit the tendency for Israel 
to oppose US-Arab strategic cooperation—which Israel would go on opposing anyway—speaks volumes 
about the nature of US-Israel ties and the distribution of leverage between the sides. That the only way in 
which the US would be able to salvage even this limited and arguably unsatisfactory policy was through a 
further declassing of the Palestinian issue and a complete disavowal of linkage and negative conditionality, 
would only further the perception that it was the Israeli tail that was wagging the US dog when it came to 
the Middle East.  
 
Indeed, the ‘tail wagging the dog’ allegory was explicitly made by Nixon’s former Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Joseph P. Sisco, almost at the onset of the Lebanon war. 
During a meeting with Secretary of State Shultz, Sisco counselled the newly appointed Secretary to 
explore a number of means to increase US sway over Israel, including through linkage and negative 
conditionality, in order to dispel the growing view of the US-Israeli relationship as one of ‘the tail wagging 
the dog’. ‘Much of America’s political strength in the area had been based on the perception in the Arab 
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world, that while the Soviets can help them militarily to use force, only the US can help them make peace. 
This means “producing” Israel’.82 
 
Yet, by 1983, it appeared that the US had all but abandoned its efforts to ‘produce Israeli concessions’, 
particularly if these were construed as an explicit exchange for US support. Instead, US policy essentially 
turned this approach on its head, seeking to ‘reassure’ Israel and build a ‘safety net’ below its Middle 
Eastern ally as had been advised by Jack Stein back in late 1981, while postponing the expected Israeli 
concessions to an ill-defined future. It was first necessary to augment the US-Israel strategic, political, 
military and economic relationship as the foundation of US-Israel relations. This, it was hoped, would 
establish a grounding of goodwill with Israel that would somehow translate in the long term to greater US 
leverage over Israel, out of a misplaced belief that once Israel’s feelings of insecurity and encirclement 
were addressed, it would show greater willingness to follow the US lead in the Middle East. Such 
expectations demonstrate on the one hand how the US administration misread or underestimated Israel, 
and on the other the extent to which Israel was able to come out on top of this mutual struggle for 
influence and leverage. 
 
Ultimately, by sidestepping the deep areas of disagreement if not incompatibility between long-term US 
and Israeli interests in the Middle East—most clearly evidenced in the US belief that peace and not Israeli 
military superiority represented the best insurance for Israel’s long-term security as well as a means to 
finally reconcile the ‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ strands of US policy—the US was essentially diluting its own 
leverage over Israel, weakening US arguments that could be used to extract Israeli concessions. 
 
Indeed, when the moment came for the US to cash in on this sustained demonstration of goodwill and 
support for Israel—whether for the approval of arms sales to Jordan or Saudi Arabia, or increased Israeli 
flexibility in the occupied territories and in negotiations with the Palestinians or its Arab neighbours—
there was little left for the US to offer Israel that it had not already gained through compensation or 
inducements. The systemic catch-22 of US policy was becoming crystallized. No matter how 
unresponsive to US concerns and wider interests, Israel could rest assured that more sweeteners would 
soon flow from Washington to Tel Aviv, either to overcome a momentary crisis in the relationship or to 
compensate Israel for the US’s wider interests and concerns. 
 
Ultimately, therefore, this building of a US ‘safety net’ under Israel was only furthering the creeping 
incrementalism of this policy straightjacket that prevented Washington from employing the full weight of 
its leverage over Israel to extract needed concessions. Instead, and largely in result of these two phases of 
debate on US-Israeli strategic cooperation, US policy would become locked in an incremental game of 
inducements and compensation, even in those instances when Israeli policy was running counter to US 																																																								
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interests. Meanwhile, it was Israel’s own central concern, a quasi-exclusivist relationship with the US that 
would benefit most from this policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The decision to reinstate formal US-Israeli strategic cooperation taken by NSDD-99 and formalized by 
NSDD-111 of 29 November 1983 established the groundwork for a considerable blossoming of US-
Israeli cooperation. More important than the quantitative nature of US support however, was the 
qualitative and conceptual significance of this agreement. It was these elements that would establish the 
greatest degrees of path dependency for future US policy. 
 
The tangible benefits in store for Israel, in the economic, military and political domains would result in a 
mushrooming of people-to-people contacts, joint ventures, military exercises and the considerable 
blurring of boundaries between Israel and the United States. The degree to which Israel is recognized 
today as the ‘51st state’ can be traced back to this period, representing the climax of a long and gradual 
familiarization process that would result in a considerable normalization of US-Israeli relations in various 
domains. 
 
The 1981 MoU was based on a US effort to extract clear Israeli assurances and quid pro quo from Tel 
Aviv. The 1983 MoU was altogether different. It almost appears as if the roles of the two players had 
changed, with Israel, not the US, holding most leverage and consequently succeeding in developing a set 
of relationships that came closer to meeting its concerns and desires. While in 1981 the US pushed back 
against Israel’s most ambitious desires, and essentially sought to establish a patron-client relationship with 
Israel under the guise of strategic cooperation, by 1983 the priorities had changed. The urgency of 
reassuring ‘moderate’ Arab states of the US’s credibility had diminished due to heightened fears of a 
potential Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq war. Meanwhile, in the midst of the Lebanon morass, it was the 
US’s short-term goals of hastening an honourable exit from Lebanon, while consolidating domestic 
political support in Washington in preparation for the 1984 elections that took precedence in the context 
of negotiations with Israel over the revival of strategic cooperation. 
 
As a result, the US was more willing to move closer to Israeli desires. The compromise was reflected in 
the fact that no official document was issued containing the details of the 1983 memorandum. Details 
were kept vague and the extent of this US-Israeli cooperation was left open, expanding on the basis of 
mutual need and interest through the high-level dialogues contained in the JPMG and associated working 
groups. This approach would essentially open the floodgates of US-Israeli cooperation, placing no limits 
on the dialogue and thereby ensuring its eventual extension to other domains and issues. 
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While the JPMG was originally conceived as a forum to voice concerns and repair political disagreements, 
it would soon evolve into a venue for broad discussion and coordination between Washington and Tel 
Aviv. Indeed, the JPMG would soon be augmented by a whole new set of bureaucratic agreements and 
bilateral working groups. These included a Joint Security Assistance Planning group (JSAP), a Joint 
Economic Development Group (JEDG) and, finally in 1988, the launching of Joint Political 
Consultations (JPC) (see Appendix D and E).  
 
As noted by Dennis Ross, following the 1983 decision to revive US-Israeli strategic cooperation, ‘the 
political intention was created and formalized’83 and it was hard to see how such agreements could be 
pulled back by the administration. ‘The formal undertakings that Reagan established with Israel 
strategically in the area of military, intelligence, counterterror, and security cooperation would create a 
baseline for all subsequent American presidents. Indeed, even those subsequent presidents who might not 
have instinctually viewed Israel as a strategic asset would respect these undertakings and build on them’.84 
 
It is to this blossoming of US-Israeli bureaucratic agreements and working groups, and their broader 
implications on US policy and the path dependency they created for the future that the research now 
turns. 	
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Chapter 7 
 
From Theory to Practice: Institutionalizing the US-Israel 
‘Special Relationship’ 
 
The revival of the US-Israel MoU on strategic cooperation in late 1983 would signal a final 
‘coming out’ stage for the bilateral relationship, emerging into the open as a de facto geostrategic 
alliance. Progressing in an incremental manner between 1984 and 1989, an expanding web of 
interpersonal, economic, bureaucratic, military and covert ties would transform both the 
conceptual foundations governing US policy towards Israel and the tangible expressions of US-
Israeli cooperation, opening a new phase in the bilateral relationship. 
 
On the one hand, this phase would be characterized by an unprecedented institutionalization of 
the relationship, and a normalization of Israel’s long-term dependence on the US. On the other, 
it would signal the beginnings of an accelerated process of interdependence and assimilation 
between the respective viewpoints and approaches of Israel and the United States in the Middle 
East. These reflected what was a growing process of ‘Americanization’ of Israel, leading certain 
dimensions of Israeli society, economy and politics to grow closer to US models of state-society 
relations and a parallel increase in the ‘Israelization’ of US approaches and viewpoints on the 
Middle East. 
 
Such processes were welcomed by the US. Washington believed them conducive to the twin 
goals of enhancing Israeli security while increasing US leverage. In essence, the US hoped that by 
institutionalizing the US-Israeli relationship, Washington was enhancing future leverage over 
Israeli policy, increasing its ability to counsel Israeli restraint while fulfilling US commitments to 
preserve Israeli security and wellbeing. Through the establishment of a number of bilateral 
working groups charged with discussing various dimensions of the relationship, the Reagan 
administration also believed it was shielding US policy from unwanted influences of Congress 
and domestic politics. This would enhance the ability of the administration to directly coordinate 
policy with Israel and representatives of the organized Jewish-American community, thereby 
limiting public disagreements that did much to harm the administration’s domestic standing. 
 
Conceptually, this approach rested on a belief that by consistently demonstrating US goodwill 
towards Israel, without expecting a direct and tangible exchange of services as had originally been 
sought by the Reagan administration in 1981–82, the US was ‘preparing the ground’ for peace, 
reassuring Israel’s security fears by providing it with a ‘safety net’ that would ensure that Israel’s 
traditional mistrust of the US’s motives in the Middle East be finally put to rest. 
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This would ostensibly provide the US with leverage that could someday be employed to 
orchestrate a peace agreement, understood as indispensable to allow Washington to reconcile the 
‘Arab’ and the ‘Israeli’ components of US policy while ensuring Israel’s long-term security and 
survival. Such an approach stemmed from political expediency, and a reluctance to employ 
negative conditionality on Israel, as this risked undermining wider components of US policy 
without providing any assurance of progress in the negotiations or change in Israeli policy. 
 
Preferable, therefore, would be to delay progress on the diplomatic track—as this would 
inevitably lead to a clash with Israel’s leadership—and continue the Kissinger-era step-by-step 
approach, predicated on supplying weapons to Israel to force the Arab states and the Palestinians 
to capitulate to US and Israeli desires. However, while Kissinger understood the need for an 
outward image of balance and did employ a careful mixture of carrots and sticks vis-à-vis both 
Israel and the Arab states in the post-1973 period, such subtleties were lost on the Reagan 
administration, particularly following the revival of US-Israel strategic cooperation after 1983. As 
a result, during the latter half of the 1980s, balance would be replaced by a policy of ‘hugging 
Israel closer’ and a related upgrading of overt forms of bias and preferential treatment for Israel 
that would signal the slow emergence of a policy of support for Israel ‘right or wrong’. 
 
Indeed, and in parallel with this slow ‘Americanization’ of Israeli state-society relations, these 
processes of assimilation were having deeper, perhaps unforeseen, consequences. Such processes 
of assimilation were not one-sided. Just as US models and experiences were being carried over 
into Israel, the opposite was also bound to occur. Thus, along with the institutionalization of ties 
during the second half of the 1980s came a process of ‘Israelization’ of US policy and viewpoints 
on the Middle East as a by-product of an increased reliance on Israel in the strategic zone of the 
Near East. 
 
As noted by a scholar who has closely followed these parallel processes of ‘Americanization’ of 
Israel and ‘Israelization’ of US Middle East policy: ‘This liberalization and militarization of Israel 
society in the 1980s […] re-created the Israeli society in the image of the United States. When US 
aid to Israel reached $3 billion a year, the relationship between the two countries became 
intertwined, with Israel dependent on the US, and with people and officials living off this 
relationship,’ noted Marwan Bishara in a 2003 interview. ‘With the Americanization of Israel, […] 
three faucets of power, Christian fundamentalists, neo-conservatives and Israeli lobbyists became 
important factors in the Israelization of American foreign policy. They grew along with the 
relationship […] Israelis were following the example of America, economically and culturally, 
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while Israel’s right-wing friends (in the US) were asking Washington to take the example of 
Israel. Hence the marriage; the Americanization of Israel and the Israelization of America.’1 
 
The bilateral working groups charged with high-level dialogue and consultation on a whole 
number of strategic, military, economic and political issues would become particularly important 
vehicles for Israel to increase its own influence over US policy. By virtue of being consulted in 
the development of US strategy, and mindful of the administration’s aversion to public crises, 
Israeli officials enjoyed ample means to transmit their desired policy approaches to the US and to 
limit, dilute or even undermine certain elements of US policy that were deemed to run counter to 
Israeli interests. 
 
Most importantly, the administration’s embrace of compensation and ‘positive inducements’ for 
Israel and the articulation of what would become a US commitment to preserve Israel’s QME 
would bring the US closer to establishing a quasi-exclusivist relationship with Israel in the Middle 
East. As Israeli concerns, first and foremost the ill-defined concept of Israeli security, were 
placed at front and centre of US policy, Israel’s leadership was effectively granted a semi-veto 
power over large dimensions of US Middle East policy, particularly in the strategic zone of the 
Near East. 
 
This outcome was precisely what had motivated successive Israeli governments to seek closer 
relations with the US. Yet, Israel had repeatedly stood firm against unwanted interference over 
Israeli policy, insisting that it would never compromise on Israel’s freedom of action or fall prey 
to a classic patron-client relationship. Significantly, establishing a de facto patron-client relationship 
with Israel had long represented a US objective, the clearest means to reconcile the ‘Arab’ and 
‘Israeli’ components of US policy in such a way as to advance US interests while fulfilling the 
domestic political need to support Israel. 
 
This objective, and the related need to compensate Israel to allow for a greater US strategic focus 
on the ‘moderate’ Arabs, had informed the original efforts of the DoD and the Reagan 
administration to negotiate the 1981 MoU with Israel. By calling out this intention, and refusing 
to allow itself to become ‘a hostage’ to the MoU, while subsequently catapulting a crisis in the 
region that would result in much closer US-Israeli cooperation and ultimately even a revival of 
the MoU, Israel succeeded in achieving two major strategic goals: securing and institutionalizing a 
de facto geostrategic alliance with the US, complete with overt forms of strategic cooperation of 
greater significance and depth than those bestowed on the US’s Arab allies, without 
compromising on the fundamentals of Israeli policy that the US had long opposed. 																																																								
1 George S. Hishmeh, “America and Israel: best of allies, worst of friends,” The Daily Star, 9 October 2003, 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=42084&mode=print. 
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It is to this blossoming of US-Israeli cooperation between 1984 and 1989 that the chapter will 
turn, placing significant emphasis on the conceptual rationales underpinning these approaches 
and assessing their continued path dependency for future US policy towards Israel and the 
broader Middle East. 
 
7.1 The Blurring of Boundaries: Compensation, ‘Equal Treatment’ 
and the NATOization of Israel 
 
Between 1984 and 1989 the US-Israel relationship would expand to previously unforeseen 
extents. All dimensions were affected, building on the already ‘special’ nature of ties and elevating 
them to the standing of ‘unique’. As the Reagan administration moved to disavow linkage and 
downplay the principles of balance and reciprocity, the floodgates of cooperation opened, 
providing a considerable windfall of benefits to Israel, which finally found official recognition in 
its status as ally and partner of the United States. 
 
The revived MoU on US-Israeli strategic cooperation, and the conceptual foundation on which it 
rested, would set the stage for an unprecedented normalization and institutionalization of the 
relationship. Cooperation was diffused into the respective bureaucracies of the two countries, as 
the establishment of a number of key bilateral working groups forged permanent channels of 
dialogue, facilitating an accelerated process of familiarization between expert practitioners in the 
two countries. Professional contacts and exchanges of visits became particularly important, 
helping to create friendly and supportive constituencies of experts within various branches of the 
federal government, in particular the US Department of Defence, State Department and 
Intelligence Communities. Such constituencies would gradually counterbalance the traditional 
scepticism towards overt forms of US-Israeli cooperation present among older generations of 
practitioners in these branches of government. ‘In these human encounters, both sides benefit’, 
noted James G. Roche, a former US navy captain and future secretary of the Air Force; ‘we train 
them, and they train us. We learn from them, and they learn from us. And the more the two sides 
work together, the more they like each other’.2 
 
Contacts became especially important in the military domain, both at the highest level, where 
generals and Joint Chiefs of Staff would begin to visit Israel on a reoccurring basis, and at the 
societal level, where thousands of US soldiers, particularly from the navy, began spending 
prolonged periods of leave in Israel. The Israeli port of Haifa, was transformed into the major 
docking area for the US’s Sixth Fleet, emerging as a significant demonstration of this new phase 																																																								
2 Quoted in, Raviv and Melman, Friends in Deed, op.cit., pp.245-6 (quote), pp.225-51. 
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of overt cooperation.3 Joint military exercises, particularly between the navy and air force, began 
in the mid-1980s, while joint medical cooperation and drills became another important 
dimension of the evolving relationship. By 1989, the US and Israel had conducted at least 29 
different joint military exercises.4 
 
By 1987, the US had approved almost $70 million of pre-positioned military hardware in Israel 
for use in eventual emergencies, including by Israel’s own forces in the event of need, with 
funding increasing to $100 million in 1989.5 Financial and military aid swung upward, and by the 
mid-1980s began stabilizing at just over $3 billion annually, with all assistance transferred from 
loans to grants from FY1985 onwards.6 Moreover, all aid was provided to Israel in the first 
month of the year, a unique Israeli benefit that began in 1985 and allows Israel to re-invest the 
extra money and make a sizable profit on the interest. 
 
That same year, the two countries also concluded a free trade agreement, the first bilateral FTA 
entered into by the US, which consolidated financial, trade and economic links between the two 
countries. Called for in the original 1981 MoU on strategic-cooperation, the FTA has had an 
important impact on US-Israeli relations. Since its conclusion in 1985, bilateral trade has 
increased tenfold, reaching $49 billion in 2016.7 The significance of the FTA is also found in joint 
ventures and R&D research, which by the end of the 1980s reached a value of $2.9 billion for a 
total of 321 joint ventures.8 
 
The FTA was considered indispensable to save Israel from economic disaster. Indeed, during 
1984–85, US Secretary of State Shultz would essentially commandeer Israel’s economy, pushing 
through structural reforms while providing emergency assistance and the conclusion of an FTA 
to boost Israeli exports and self-sufficiency. Interestingly, such efforts—which included approval 
of a $1.5 billion emergency aid package for Israel in FY1986 that brought total US aid that year 
to a whopping $3.66 billion9—were described domestically and in Congress as indispensible not 
only to save Israel’s economy and ‘prepare the groundwork for peace’ in the region, but also to 
allow Israel to slowly decrease its dependence on foreign—i.e., US—aid and to increase its ability 
to repay loans. 
 
																																																								
3 Dov S. Zakheim, “The United States Navy and Israeli Navy. Background, Current Issues, Scenarios and Prospects,” 
CNA Strategic Studies, February 2012, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/D0026727.A1.pdf. 
4 Feldman, The Future of US-Israel, op.cit., p.15. 
5 Sharp, “US Assistance,” op.cit., pp.18-19; Raviv and Melman, Friends in Deed, op.cit., pp.242-5. 
6 Sharp, “US Assistance,” op.cit. (December 2016 version), p.37, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/586f57444.pdf. 
7 US Embassy in Israel, “Fact Sheet US-Israel Economic Relationship,” https://il.usembassy.gov/our-
relationship/fact-sheet-u-s-israel-economic-relationship/. 
8 Raviv and Melman, Friends in Deed, op.cit., p.249. 
9 Sharp, “US Assistance” (2016), op.cit., pp.37-8.  
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Also significant was the US’s demands for Israeli structural and economic reforms in exchange 
for this aid, forms of conditionality that were never brought to bear on other issues of long-
standing political concern, such as Israel’s occupation policies or its sustained opposition to US 
arms sales to Arab states. Significantly, during the prolonged negotiations for the FTA, the FBI 
opened a number of investigations into the alleged leaking of classified information related to the 
US’s economy and negotiating stances, including investigation of the pro-Israel lobby group 
AIPAC for having allegedly passed information to the Israeli government.10 
 
This, combined with the now-famous Pollard Affair, exemplifies the extent to which these 
processes of institutionalization were also increasing Israel’s ability to access sensitive 
information, blurring the boundaries between the US and Israel and providing ample means for 
Israel and its supporters to mould and influence US policy.11 The victory of the administration in 
pushing through the FTA, in the face of ample opposition from US industry, further highlights 
the important role of the pro-Israel community in the US, in particular AIPAC, which was 
especially instrumental in rallying support for the agreement in Congress.12  
 
Indeed, this was a prime example of how the Reagan White House would increasingly rely on 
pro-Israel groups in Congress to push through desired policy initiatives—a dynamic that 
conversely also goes some way towards explaining the considerable growth in influence and 
access enjoyed by groups such as AIPAC during the 1980s.13 
 
Meanwhile, the FTA would enable joint US and Israeli ventures in various domains and a 
considerable expansion of investments provided to Israel’s high-tech sector, which together with 
the defence industry was identified by US and Israeli economists as key to Israel’s economic 
revival and export potential. These efforts would transform Israel’s economy, propelling it to its 
current status as a ‘start-up’ nation and pioneer in cutting-edge technology. The importance given 																																																								
10 A collection of documents relating to this affair is available online from, The Israel Lobby Archive. The Institute for 
Research: Middle Eastern Policy, “AIPAC, Espionage and the US-Israel Free Trade Agreement,” 
http://www.israellobby.org/fta/. 
11 Indeed, there is a marginal constituency in the US which has long argued that the FTA was imbalanced in favour of 
Israel, with many noting how the US trade deficit with Israel skyrocketed in the years that followed. See, “Israel ‘free’ 
trade agreement delivers $144 billion deficit to US,” Institute for Research: Middle East Policy, 
https://www.irmep.org/05122016_IsraelFTA.asp. 
12 See, John Haldane, “The Price of Free Trade,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs [WRMEA], 7 October 1985, 
https://www.wrmea.org/1985-october-7/the-price-of-free-trade.html. Significantly, according to Martin Indyk, an ex-
AIPAC official who then founded the WINEP in 1985, just as the FBI was investigating AIPAC over the alleged 
transfers of classified information to Israel, ‘the US-Israel Free Trade Agreement served as a wedge that opened up the 
Congress to Free Trade Agreements throughout the world, including the NAFTA agreement. No doubt there are 
some downsides to it, but otherwise it's been a very positive thing’. Quoted in, “Israel ‘free’ trade,” op.cit.  
13 Documents from the RRPL provide examples of this growing tendency to rely on pro-Israel lobby groups in 
Congress. Examples include efforts to overcome congressional bans on weapons sales to the third world, or increased 
military budgets, but also efforts to garner support in Congress for the dispatch of US marines to Lebanon. RRPL, 
Presidential Handwriting File: Presidential Telephone Calls: 1981- 1989, “10/13/1983 Call to Tom Dine,” Folder 75. 
Also, “Lobby Activities,” WRMEA, 20 February 1984, https://www.wrmea.org/1984-february-20/lobby-
activities.html. 
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to high-tech, R&D and the defence sector were evident in another set of sweeteners provided to 
Israel, including an agreement that allowed Israel to use FMF for offshore procurement of 
Israeli-made components for the Lavi jet fighter as well as an agreement for the US to purchase 
$200 million worth of Israeli military equipment annually. 
 
Provisions for offshore procurement of Lavi components, which amounted to $250 million in 
1983, would remain another established feature of the uniquely preferential US-Israeli 
relationship. When the decision was ultimately made to cancel joint US-Israeli production of the 
Lavi fighter in 1987—with costs increasingly being covered by US funds and thereby essentially 
supporting a market competitor to the US’s own domestic defence sector14—Israel convinced 
the Reagan administration to increase offshore procurement funding to $400 million to offset the 
cancellation, allowing the use of these funds for other projects and items.15 
 
By 1988 the offshore procurement clause was ‘incorporated into the annual Foreign Assistance 
Act’,16 thereby becoming another institutionalized dimension of US preferential treatment for 
Israel. Significantly, by 2009 Congress had increased the proportion of offshore procurement to 
26.3 percent of annual US FMF to Israel. This figure is in reality closer to 40 percent, as costs for 
the purchase of jet fuel and other military combustibles are also included. In 2015–16, the 
Obama administration included a specific clause in the newly signed ten-year military supply 
agreement with Israel that would gradually phase out offshore procurement benefits. The efforts 
caused a storm of criticism in Israel, and ultimately the administration succeeding in approving 
only a very slow and gradual phase-out that is expected to last until FY2028.17 
 
Further boosts to the Israeli defence and high-tech sectors were provided by Israel’s inclusion in 
Reagan’s signature Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), announced in May 1986, and Israel’s 
recognition as a ‘major non-NATO ally’ in December 1987. This latter agreement would provide 
Israel access to more funds and exemptions, and became a further means to increase US support 
to Israel without increasing official bilateral aid. As noted by Helen Cobban, the major non-
NATO ‘category had been created by Congress the previous year [in 1986]. It was publicly listed 
as including Israel, Egypt, South Korea, Japan, and Australia; however, when the House of 
																																																								
14 John W. Golan, Lavi: The United States, Israel, and a Controversial Fighter Jet, Potomac Books, 2016.  
15 Significantly, following the cancellation of the Lavi programme, a number of other countries, including China, 
developed jet fighters with significant similarities to the original Lavi model, raising questions as to whether Israel had 
secretly sold components or technology to China, a major adversary of the US. Jim Mann, “US Says Israel Gave 
Combat Jet Plans to China,” Los Angeles Times, 28 December 1994, http://articles.latimes.com/1994-12-28/news/mn-
13774_1_combat-planes. 
16 Dov S. Zakheim, “Fund Israel’s Military, Not its Settlements,” The National Interest, 9 August 2016, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/fund-israels-military-not-its-settlements-17295?page=show.  
17 Sharp, “US Assistance” (2018), op.cit., pg6. 
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Representatives tried to list specific weapons systems to receive funding under this program, all 
six of these systems were Israeli’.18  
 
The ‘NATOization’ of Israel, as it was originally termed before the formal establishment of the 
‘major non-NATO allies’ category, represents the clearest indication of the continued efforts to 
integrate Israel into the Western alliance framework. Yet, it also highlights how compensation, 
rather than recognition of Israeli services, was the major driver. ‘There was a kind of strategic 
imbalance between the two’, noted Thomas Pickering in an interview with the author. ‘We were 
very aware of this, but we always approached the issue [of strategic cooperation] “as equals”.	Yes, 
Israel could be and had been helpful for us in some domains, but this was not the determining 
factor for our strategic capabilities in the region’, recalled the former US ambassador.19 
 
Indeed, given the US reluctance to integrate Israel into strategic plans for the defence of the 
Persian Gulf, there was a need to find another collocation for Israel’s strategic services, leading to 
a prioritization of the Eastern Mediterranean and finally NATO. Recognizing Israel as a ‘major 
non-NATO ally’ could go some way towards assuaging Israeli concerns and allow the US to find 
other means of augmenting the military and strategic relationship. It was in this context that 
AIPAC and a number of other recently founded research centres and think tanks, such as the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the Jewish Institute for National 
Security of America (JINSA), as well as a some figures in Congress and within the academic 
community, began preparing detailed studies of Israel’s strategic capabilities in the military 
domain.20 
 
One such example is Steven Spiegel, who wrote a paper on ‘Israel’s Value to the US’ in 1984 in 
which he contended that Israel ‘has saved the United States at least $125.6 billion since the 
country’s birth in 1948—an average of approximately $3.5 billion per year’ given that ‘Israel has 
fulfilled the exact responsibilities America has had to shoulder in other regions’. 21  Other 
examples are provided by a number of detailed studies produced by the conservative Heritage 
foundation, outlining the benefits in store for the US from enhanced US-Israeli strategic 
cooperation, or by the writings and campaigns run by the conservative Commentary Magazine 
headed by Norman Podhoretz.22 																																																								
18 Cobban, “The US-Israeli Relationship,” op.cit., p.13. 
19 Interview, Thomas Pickering, op.cit. 
20 See, AIPAC Papers on US-Israel Relations, No.1-13.  
21 Spiegel, “Israel’s Value to the US,” op.cit, p.1; Similar arguments were made by A. F. K. Organski in his 1990 text, 
The 36 billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in US Assistance to Israel. 
22 See, Charles Brooks, “High Dividends From a US-Israeli Partnership on Strategic Defence,” Backgrounder, The 
Heritage Foundation, 4 November 1986, http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/1986/pdf/bg543.pdf; James A. 
Philips, “America’s Security Stake in Israel,” Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, 7 July 1986, 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/1986/pdf/bg521.pdf; Benjamin Balint, Running Commentary. The Contentious 
Magazine That Transformed the Jewish Left into the Neoconservative Right, New York, Public Affairs, 2010, pp.131-79. 
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Aside from the symbolic importance, there were significant tangible benefits in store for Israel’s 
economy and defence sector from this recognition as ‘major non-NATO ally’. ‘Israeli 
government sources’, noted a media report from 1987, expected ‘important economic 
advantages’ from the recognition, including ‘lower prices for U.S. weaponry, access to some 
NATO research and development funds and preferential status in bidding on NATO contracts 
for equipment, spare parts, and military services’.23 
 
While the significance of these initiatives has been downplayed by US officials and 
practitioners—with both Nicholas Veliotes and Thomas Pickering noting in separate interviews 
how such recognitions were motivated by ‘domestic politics’ 24  and amounted to ‘window 
dressing’25—in the long term these agreements would have far-reaching and largely unforeseen 
implications for future US policy. 
 
Efforts to find ‘creative’ ways to increase US aid and preferential treatment for Israel became 
particularly important during this period, both as a result of Israel’s economic crisis and out of a 
growing need by the US to mask the true nature and extent of US-Israeli cooperation, particularly 
in the covert domain. Thus, Israel’s inclusion in the SDI programme, its recognition as a major 
non-NATO ally, agreements for offshore procurement and the purchasing or leasing of Israeli 
equipment for the US army, as well as other accords allowing Israel to export military hardware 
with US technology, or to purchase US companies involved in military procurement in the US 
defence sector, were all sought out as means to augment the preferential relationship with Israel 
while not increasing official US aid. 
 
As noted by Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, obtaining major non-NATO ally status represented a 
significant breakthrough for Israeli diplomacy. In its quest to garner such recognition, the pro-
Israel AIPAC group was also very significant. The two authors quote an unnamed Israeli 
diplomat as saying, ‘we were looking for ways to increase US military aid, with the $1.8 billion 
annual assistance on something like an “automatic pilot.” It was approved year after year, but we 
also knew that it would be difficult to ask for an increase. So we initiated the idea of turning 
Israel into a Major Non-NATO Ally. We told AIPAC, which started rolling the idea up and 
down Capitol Hill corridors until it was accepted’.26 
 
																																																								
23 Dan Fisher, “US Is Granting Israel Non-NATO Ally Status,” Los Angeles Times, 16 February 1987, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1987-02-16/news/mn-2391_1_egypt-non-nato-ally. 
24 Interview, Nicholas Veliotes, op.cit. 
25 Interviews, Thomas Pickering, op.cit. 
26 Quoted in, Raviv and Melman, Friends in Deed, op.cit., p.248. 
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Yet, as with the original 1981 MoU, the fundamental rationale for these initiatives remained 
inexorably linked to the US’s key central priority of the time: defence of the Persian Gulf through 
enhanced forms of US-Arab strategic cooperation. As a result, most of these elements of 
preferential treatment for Israel boiled down to forms of compensation, not recognition of Israel’s 
strategic value for US interests.  
 
Tangible contemporary expressions of joint cooperation in the military and R&D sector that can 
be traced back to decisions taken during the latter half of the Reagan administration can be 
found in close US-Israeli cooperation in missile defence and in particular in the joint 
development of the Arrow programme, a direct outgrowth of the SDI project, as well as 
sustained US support for Israel’s multi-tier missile defence system, which also includes the Iron 
Dome and David Sling systems.27 The US was indeed building a ‘safety net’ below Israel, yet it 
appeared that such forms of compensation and reassurance were never enough to reassure Israel 
of the US’s motives. 
 
There was a degree of resentment on the Israeli side that the US opposed overt forms of US-
Israeli cooperation in the strategically vital Persian Gulf. ‘For us Americans’, noted Nicholas 
Veliotes in an interview, ‘the enemy was the Soviet Union. But many Israelis saw the strategic 
notion as aimed at Syria. The American focus in that region was defending the oil in the Gulf. 
And try as we might, we couldn’t come up with a role for Israel’.28 Here, US planners continued 
to rely on US-Arab cooperation, while Israel services were relegated to a secondary ‘back-up’ role 
in the (unlikely) event of a direct US-Soviet conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean. This 
continued to be an irritant in US-Israeli relations, although in the post-1984 period, Israeli fears 
of a possible dilution of the ‘special’ US-Israeli relationship were offset somewhat by the 
unprecedented degrees of preferential treatment granted by Washington.  
 
Such reluctance continued to worry Israeli leaders. ‘Where’s the meat?’ exclaimed Ehud Olmert, 
Israeli Cabinet member and close associate of Prime Minister Shamir at the time. ‘We wanted 
more tangible results from the alliance. They [the US] wanted symbolic gestures’.29 Yet, with 
patience, Israel was reaping benefits that would far outstrip any joint military exercise or overt 
cooperation. 
 
Indeed, the significance of the revival of US-Israeli strategic cooperation extends beyond tangible 
expressions of military cooperation. It holds a more holistic and conceptual significance, one that 																																																								
27 Andrea Dessì, “La Sicurezza di Israele e il Sistema di Difesa ‘Iron Dome’,” Atlante Geopolitico 2013, Treccani; 
Yaakov Katz, The Weapons Wizards. How Israel Became a High-Tech Military Superpower, New York, St. Martins Press, 2017. 
28 Quoted in, Raviv and Melman, Friends in Deed, op.cit.,p.242. 
29 Ibid.,p.241. 
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would take time to mature but would have a revolutionary impact on the relationship and US 
policy. As noted by Thomas Dine, the executive director of AIPAC, in a 1986 speech in 
Washington: 
 
This relationship has entered a revolutionary era. We are no longer talking about a 
transformation in the relationship, we are talking about a revolution. The old order in 
which Israel was regarded as a liability, a hindrance to America’s relationship with the 
Arab world, a loud and naughty child—that order has crumbled. In its place, a new 
relationship is being built, one in which Israel is treated as—and acts as—an ally, not 
just a friend, an asset rather than a liability, a mature and capable partner, not some 
vassal state. […] I submit to you, these changes in the strategic, economic, and 
diplomatic spheres will be felt for decades to come. […] The whole story of this 
revolution in strategic cooperation cannot yet be told, because many of the most 
important steps are in an embryonic stage and both countries feel that greater progress 
can be achieved without an undue burden of publicity. Let me, however, share with you 
what Secretary of State George Shultz recently explained. He said the point of strategic 
cooperation is, and I quote, “to build institutional arrangements so that eight years from 
now, if there is a secretary of state who is not positive about Israel, he will not be able 
to overcome the bureaucratic relationship between Israel and the U.S. that we have 
established”.’30 
 
Thomas Dine was implicitly referring to the significant conceptual changes occurring in US 
policy towards Israel during this time, correctly identifying this dimension, instead of the tangible 
expressions of increased US aid or joint military cooperation, as the most important aspect of 
this ‘revolution in US-Israeli relations’. This was most clearly reflected in the US’s disavowal of 
the linkage doctrine and its related embrace of exclusivity and bias vis-à-vis Israel as a policy 
prescription in its own right.  
 
As noted by Dennis Ross, the important ‘turning point’ established by Reagan revolves around 
the overturning of previous conceptions about Israel and the Middle East and the slow 
emergence of a ‘constituency of experts that looks at Israel through a different lens’.31 While the 
alliance was still devoid of a formal and legally binding treaty agreement, the blossoming of US-
Israeli cooperation and the establishment of whole number of bilateral working groups would 
essentially come close to this outcome, albeit without the implicit responsibilities and constraints 
that a legal alliance would have imposed. While ‘not a legal alliance’, continued Dennis Ross, 
‘these groupings have created a number of institutional forums and trappings, that have 
subsequently taken on a life of their own and these have gradually created the conditions for the 
relationship to assume much of the equivalent characteristics of legality’. With the revival US-
Israeli strategic cooperation in 1983, ‘the political intention was created and formalized’, ‘people 
began meeting and became involved. These were gradually exposed to the details and tangible 
																																																								
30 Dine, “A Revolution in US-Israel Relations,” op.cit., pp.134-43. 
31 Interview Dennis Ross, op.cit. 
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benefits that could emerge from this cooperation’, helping to sensitize US bureaucracies and 
thereby gradually increase the balance of viewpoints supportive of US-Israeli cooperation.32	
 
Thomas Dine, like Dennis Ross and others within the Reagan administration, had long been 
promoting the line of ‘hugging Israel closer’ as the best means to allay Israeli security fears and 
thereby increase US leverage and influence over Israeli policy. Such viewpoints tended to 
emphasize that the Arab-Israeli conflict did not represent the major faultline in the Middle East, 
and that any pressure on Israel or overt linkage between US-Israeli relations and Israeli policy vis-
à-vis the Arab world would ultimately prove counterproductive for US interests.  
 
This would not result in US leverage or moderating Israeli policy—which instead would be more 
prone to take unilateral action out of its feelings of insecurity—and it would not result in more 
Arab concessions, as these states would only harden their demands in times of crisis in the US-
Israeli relationship. In would be in this context, and even in the midst of some of the most severe 
top-level political crises between Israel and the US, that sympathetic supporters of Israel in the 
Reagan administration would counsel against any public indication of a weakening of the US-
Israeli relationship. Even in the midst of the Palestinian Intifada, when Israel’s disproportionate 
use of force was causing international outcry, Dennis Ross counselled the Reagan administration 
that the US could help by ‘standing by Israel so that others cannot put a wedge between us’.33 
 
An opinion article entitled ‘Pressuring Israel is Dumb’ and penned by Thomas Dine in February 
1983 for The Washington Post outlines the conceptual approach against linkage and balance. ‘It’s 
time for the administration to open its eyes to the realities of the Arab world, instead of being 
blinded by the myth of “moderation”’.34 ‘Although the administration denies that it considers 
massive pressures an appropriate way to deal with an ally like Israel, it has in fact invoked more 
sanctions over a longer time period than any preceding administration’, complained Dine in 
reference to the rocky years of tensions between 1981 and 1983. ‘Officials in Washington are 
dreaming that they can impose dramatic changes on Israeli policy [...]. This foolish attitude has 
produced grave errors in U.S. policy’.35 
 
‘We should put to rest the myth of a “balanced” US policy in the Middle East’, Democratic 
Senator Alan Cranston from California exclaimed in a speech quoted by media sources in 1986. 
‘We should tell all the nations in the region that we will not take a “balanced” view of PLO 																																																								
32 Ibid. 
33 RRPL, Dennis Ross Files, “Chron File, January 1988,” Box 8. 
34 Thomas A. Dine, “Pressuring Israel is Dumb,” WP, 13 February 1983, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1983/02/13/pressuring-israel-is-dumb/9835460e-7023-48a3-
be98-29376d0634c3/?utm_term=.46f7f51a3848. 
35 Ibid. 
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terrorism or those who aid and abet terrorism, or of Syrian or Libyan or Iraqi extremism’.36 
Further demonstrations of the influence and pervasiveness of such approaches are provided by a 
number of think tank reports and media analyses of US-Israel relations and US policy in the 
Middle East. One such study, written by Dennis Ross and entitled ‘Acting with Caution: Middle 
East Policy Planning for the Second Reagan Administration’, provides examples of the shifting 
nature of expert debates on US Middle East policy in this period. 
 
Published in 1985 as the first policy paper prepared by the newly founded WINEP, a research 
think tank with close ties to the pro-Israel community, the document listed a number of policy 
recommendations for the administration on key issues such as the peace process, arms sales to 
Arab states and the role of the Soviet Union. Under the heading ‘peace process’, the author 
noted the US needs to ‘adopt our own strategy of motion while patiently awaiting real movement 
from local parties’.37 
 
Such an approach amounted to purposely delaying diplomacy and mediation, as a means to avoid 
hard discussions with Israel, while placing all the onus on a prior Arab recognition of Israel, 
thereby essentially excusing the US from any responsibility for the diplomatic stalemate. The 
conceptual rationale contained in this approach towards Israel would over the years become 
codified in a conventional wisdom repeatedly affirmed by US officials and policymakers dealing 
with the Arab-Israeli conflict. This dictum—that the US cannot want peace more than the parties 
involved and consequently cannot be expected to impose a solution on the parties38—represents 
a rehashing of these efforts to excuse US policy from its inability to orchestrate a peace 
agreement, masking this lack of US leverage (or political will) vis-à-vis Israel under the guise of 
preparing the ‘groundwork for peace’ while delaying negotiations out of short-term expediency 
and political calculations. 
 
A further recommendation listed by Dennis Ross under the heading ‘peace process’ included the 
appointment of a ‘non-Arabist special Middle East envoy to give the impression of seriousness 
while conveying the clear message that the ball is in the Arabs’ court and that the U.S. objective is 
																																																								
36 Charles R. Babcock, “The Special Relationship,” WP, 5 August 1986, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/08/05/the-special-relationship/99f36dfb-786f-4ebc-bb98-
65148eef59a1/?utm_term=.6dd693db37ec. 
37 Dennis Ross, “Acting With Caution: Middle East Policy Planning for the Second Reagan Administration,” Policy 
Paper No.1, WINEP, 1985, p.iv, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PP_1_ActingwithCaution.pdf.  
38 This dictum has been repeated by all US administrations since Reagan. Significantly, this same language, present in a 
number of official US declarations and speeches from the 1980s, also appeared in a second WINEP report published 
in 1988 in which the authors—including Martin Indyk, Dennis Ross, Donald Rumsfeld, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Frank 
Fukuyama, Richard Haass and many other foreign policy luminaries in the US—expressed their view that ‘the US 
cannot make peace for these parties; it can only assist them once they are willing to do so’. Building for Peace. An 
American Strategy for the Middle East, WINEP Presidential Study Group on US Policy in the Middle East, 1988, p.xii, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Building_for_Peace.pdf.  
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to get Jordan—not the PLO—to negotiate with Israel’.39 This criticism of so-called ‘Arabist’ 
viewpoints on US Middle East policy would become a major theme in WINEP studies, in itself 
an indication of the emergence of new constituencies of expert practitioners as a result of 
generational changes and broader socio-political developments at the domestic level in the US. A 
further example of WINEP seeking to overturn traditional viewpoints on Israel and the Middle 
East is a 1986 paper written by Michael Lewis in which the author criticized the preeminent US 
foreign policy journal, Foreign Affairs, for leaning ‘toward the Arab and “Arabist” perspective on 
how the conflict should be understood and what solutions should be adopted’.40 
 
Moving to the issue of arms sales—a key component of US strategy to coax Jordan to recognize 
the Camp David process while sidelining Arafat and the PLO, and yet a policy which Israel 
consistently refused to support—Dennis Ross’s policy recommendations emphasized that ‘it is 
no longer credible to claim that [arms sales for Arab states] will encourage moderation’, a 
reference to the US’s ‘marketing’ of these sales in the court of US public opinion (and with 
Israel) as conducive to advancing the groundwork for peace. Rather, it was necessary for the 
‘Saudis and Jordanians [to] first take positive steps to advance the peace process’, before being 
provided with weaponry. In this respect, the US’s ‘primary concern’, noted Ross, was to ‘avoid an 
all-consuming fight with Congress that will damage the domestic consensus, humiliate the Arabs, 
alienate Israel, and prevent the development of a coherent strategy’.41 Preferable therefore was to 
simply coordinate everything with Israel and its supporters prior to such formal notifications to 
Congress or the Arabs, as this would offset most of the political risks for Washington. 
 
The possibility that such overt siding with Israel would alienate the Arab world was discarded by 
Ross, who argued—as had Richard Pipes at the NSC in July 198142—that ‘Saudi Arabia’s policy 
is driven by weakness not strength. The Saudis will press us to move on the peace process but 
are not interested in real movement if it requires taking sides and supporting us’.43 The need for a 
complete Arab capitulation to US demands is implicit in this recommendation. 
 
It was in these domains that the institutionalization of the US-Israeli relationship under the guise 
of ‘strategic cooperation’ and the establishment of the JPMG, JSAP, JEDG and, finally, by 1988, 
the launching of Joint Political Consultations (JPC) would become so important. In this respect, 
and when dealing with Israel in the context of US efforts to garner approval for US arms sales to 																																																								
39 Ross, “Acting with Caution,” op.cit., p.iv. 
40 Michael Lewis, “Foreign Affairs on the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Retrospective Analysis,” Middle East Review, 
Vol.19,No.1 (Fall 1986), p.21,pp.21-9. In, RRPL, Howard Teicher Files, “Israel 1986 (2),” Box 91664; Post-9/11, 
WINEP published an extensive monograph on similar themes. See, Martin Kramer, Ivory Towers on Sand. The Failure of 
Middle Eastern Studies in America, Washington, WINEP, 2001.  
41 Ross, “Acting with Caution,” op.cit., p.iv. 
42 FRUS, Volume III (1981-1988), Document 77. 
43 Ross, “Acting with Caution,” op.cit., p.iii 
		 175	
the Arabs, a final Ross recommendation was to ‘avoid any linking of economic aid to Israeli 
acquiescence [of US arms sales for the Arabs] because it will be counter-productive’.44 
 
With this advice, and the extent to which it would be followed for the remainder of the Reagan 
administration (and beyond), the US’s disavowal of linkage and overturning of the principle of 
balance and impartiality was complete. Indeed, it should come as no surprise that decades after 
these events, in 2016, Martin Indyk, one of the founders of WINEP and a key US diplomat on 
US-Israel relations who had just ended his term as Secretary of State Kerry’s Special Envoy to the 
Peace Process, could claim that the ‘United States is pro-Israel and that’s what gives it its 
influence in the peace process, and that’s the heart of the matter. We are not neutral. We don’t 
claim to be neutral’.45 Even James Baker III, Reagan’s Chief of Staff and later Secretary of State 
in the George H.W. Bush administration, has recently described the US role as a mediator, 
admonishing the US not to act as ‘Israel’s lawyer’ but at least as a ‘semi-honest broker’.46 
 
7.2 The Perils of Exclusivity: Supporting Israel, ‘Right or Wrong’ 
 
As the US moved to enhance various dimensions of the US-Israeli relationship, with many of 
these sweeteners included in the US package agreement to revive the MoU, a number of 
‘services’ were provided by Israel to the US. Mostly tactical, short-term and covert in nature, 
these services were welcomed by the Reagan administration. 
 
Agreements ranged from the key decision taken by Moshe Arens, Israel’s Ambassador to the US 
and later Israeli Defence Minister following the ousting of Ariel Sharon in 1983, to speed up the 
sharing of intelligence and technology employed by Israel against Soviet weaponry in the 
Lebanon war.47 Also important was Israeli covert assistance to secure US and foreign hostages in 
Lebanon, particularly during the TWA hijacking incident in 1985. As noted by one media source 
in 1989, ‘Reagan quietly encouraged Israel to make a deal with the terrorists, to exchange Israeli-
held detainees for American hostages—and that is how the TWA captives were released, as the 
first step in a massive swap of prisoners across Israel’s northern border’.48  
 
Further examples of covert cooperation included an elaborate scheme in which Israel provided 
the DoD and CIA with PLO weaponry captured in Lebanon to be used in the Central American 																																																								
44 Ross, “Acting with Caution,” op.cit.,p.iii 
45 “Transcript: Martin Indyk on Israel and the US,” Head to Head, Al-Jazeera, 11 September 2016, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/headtohead/2016/06/transcript-martin-indyk-israel-160613082408332.html.  
46 Susan B. Glasser, “Jim Baker: The Full Transcript,” The Global Politico, 6 February 2017. 
47 RRPL, Near East And South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, 1983-1989, “Middle East-Briefing Papers 
1983,” Box 90585.  
48 Doyle McManus, “Hostage Crisis in Lebanon: Deal With Terrorists? US Policy Not Totally Clear,” Los Angeles Times, 
2 August 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-02/news/mn-571_1_hostage-crisis; Raviv and Melman, Friends in 
Deed, op.cit.,p.236-9. 
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covert Cold War. Code-named Tipped Kettle, the operation began in 1983 and continued 
through to 1986, in coincidence with the breaking of the Iran-Contra scandal. Documents 
relating to the operation also point to the role of Defence Minister Arens. It was he who ‘made 
the final decision that these weapons were to be provided on a gratis basis to DoD. This was one 
of MOD Arens’ first actions [...] and was clearly a signal of his desire to improve U.S./Israel 
relations’,49 reads one Pentagon document. In a telling turn of events, Israel subsequently sought 
payment for future shipments of weapons. Ultimately, a ‘secret arrangement’ was concluded, 
explains veteran Israeli journalist Amir Oren: ‘in return for Israel waiving the payment, the U.S. 
defence contractor Numax was to retain its security clearance and government contracts after 
being purchased by Israel’.50 
 
It was against this general ‘no-strings attached’ atmosphere of support that US policymakers were 
particularly frustrated by Israel’s stubborn opposition to US-Arab strategic cooperation. While 
Shultz focused on improving the ‘quality of life’ in the occupied territories, leaning on Jordan to 
join the Camp David process and negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, Israel relentlessly 
pursued its settlement expansion project. The US was well aware of these policies, and 
documents from the RRPL, some only declassified in 2015, outline a clear picture of how Israel’s 
government sought to make any future withdrawal from the territory an almost impossible task.51  
Yet, as had occurred with Israel’s covert nuclear arsenal in the late 1960s, the administration 
chose to look the other way, prioritizing Israeli security as the first building block to reassure 
Israel and a key pre-condition for establishing the ‘groundwork for peace’ in the region. After all, 
the counsel coming from US Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis was precisely that pressure on 
Israel would be counterproductive.52 
 
By presuming that a more secure Israel would be more willing to follow US desiderata, the US 
was in fact sowing the seeds for its future failures in the region. For the remainder of the 1980s, 
US repeatedly failed to orchestrate a breakthrough in the peace process, or to convince Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia to yield under pressure.53 																																																								
49 A collection of official documents can be found at, “Tipped Kettle – Man Portable Weapons Captured by Israeli 
Forces in Lebanon,” Cryptome, 9 November 2010, https://cryptome.org/dodi/tipped-kettle/tipped-kettle.htm.  
50 Amir Oren, “The Truth About Israel, Iran and the 1980s US Arms Deals,” Ha’aretz, 26 November 2010, 
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51 RRPL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, “Israel (02/09/1981-02/20/1981),” Box 37. Cables 63572 and 
63581 especially.  
52 RRPL, Geoffrey Kemp Files, “Israel/Lebanon Phase II, 1982 (1),” RAC Box 4. 
53 Reference can be made here to an embarrassing scheme by Reagan and advisors to surprise the Saudi King while on 
visit to the US in 1985 with a speech that would have seemed to indicate a Saudi willingness to directly engage in 
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delegation. The Saudi ambassador realized what was about to happen and a severe diplomatic crisis was avoided at the 
last moment when Reagan was convinced to scrap the speech in order to not offend his guests. See, Patrick Tyler, A 
World of Trouble. America in the Middle East, London, Portobello Books, 2009, pp.310-14. As noted by the author, ‘It was 
hard to look at Reagan’s aborted dinner remarks and not see a biased American outlook or an Israeli-inspired effort to 
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Jordan was particularly incensed by the US’s inability to stand firm in its commitments, support 
the peace process and provide promised arms. Jordan had been instrumental in supporting the 
1982 Reagan Plan in the midst of the Lebanon war, a stance that had come at considerable 
personal risk for the Jordanian King. In that instance, Jordanian authorities had exhorted US 
diplomats about the King’s need ‘for absolute assurance from the President that the US would 
persevere and see this process through despite strong Israeli reaction and problems this could 
cause the administration domestically. He stressed that failure to stay the course could prove fatal 
for him and politically devastating for the US’.54 
 
 As it turned out, the US did just that, abandoning the Reagan Plan under Israeli pressure only to 
then return to Jordan through 1984–86 with massive pressure for it to publicly enter negotiations 
on behalf of the Palestinians. Meanwhile, Jordanian requests for weapons would be repeatedly 
denied or delayed by congressional opposition. US credibility was seriously damaged and yet not 
clear change to this policy materialized. 
 
Given the administration’s reluctance to clash with Israel or approve ‘negative conditionality’, 
and Israel’s ability to rely on its network of pro-Israeli supporters in the US in the event of a 
disagreement, the distribution of leverage and influence remained heavily tipped in Israel’s 
favour. Israel would in fact retain its ability to catapult a public crisis with a sitting US 
administration in the event of a disagreement, while US administrations would be particularly 
reluctant to do the same in the event of Israeli obstructionism. 
 
Moreover, in light of the diffusion of US-Israeli cooperation into the respective bureaucracies of 
the two countries, and the growing constituencies of expert practitioners that would emerge as 
key supporters of this cooperation within different branches of the federal government, it is 
debatable whether these processes of institutionalization actually increased or decreased the 
influence of the executive branch vis-à-vis the bureaucracy or Congress. Indeed, rather than help 
to consolidate decision-making power in the White House, the diffusion of cooperation would 
actually result in a diffusion of potential US leverage over Israel, providing a further set of 
constraints on presidential authority while increasing Israel’s ability to shape US initiatives to 
better suit its interests. 
 
A second implication would be increased consultation and coordination between the respective 
governments and expert constituencies. The major vehicles for this were the JMPG, JSAP, JEDP 
and the 1988 JPC. These would form the core structure for the growing web of relations, 																																																								
54 RRPL, Kemp Files, “Arab/Israel Peace Process: Memos, September 1982 (5),” RAC Box 1. 
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preferential treatment and cooperation between the US and Israel, the institutional architecture 
for an increasingly interdependent and exclusivist US-Israel relationship in the Middle East. The 
last of these working groups, the JPC, were launched in April 1988, by the signing of a new US-
Israeli document, a MoA on Joint Political, Security and Economic Cooperation that would 
further institutionalize the importance of these working groups and joint dialogues (see Appendix 
E). In an interview with the author, former US ambassador Daniel Kurtzer noted how the JPC, 
turned out to be the least effective and consolidated bilateral working group to be established 
during the 1980s.55 This reflected the persistence of deep political disagreements between the 
top-level political leaderships in the two countries, a dynamic that reinforces the point of a 
growing compartmentalization of the relationship and the diffusion of cooperation into the 
respective bureaucracies of the two countries. The mere fact that the JPC was the last of the 
working groups created during the Reagan era, following those in the military-strategic, economic 
and development domains, points to the bizarre nature of the bilateral relationship, which 
continues to grow and expand independently from reoccurrence of severe political tensions and 
disagreements. 
 
Through the JSAP, long-term Israeli security needs could be negotiated in the hope that Israeli 
opposition to arms sales for Jordan or Saudi Arabia would diminish. The JEDG would serve 
similar purposes but tied to the Israeli economy, devising creative schemes to boost Israeli 
growth and exports, particularly in the high-tech and defence sectors. By 1986, the Israel entered 
the top-ten ranking of world arms exporters, a position that it has retained more or less 
consistently since the mid-1980s.56 The US’s role in bankrolling and supporting Israel’s arms 
industry as a vehicle towards economic recovery represents another dimension of these efforts to 
build a ‘safety net’ beneath Israel.57 
 
Yet, the impact of this tendency for prior consultation with Israel was also clear. Given the US’s 
reluctance to clash with Israel in public—as had happened in the context of the arms suspensions 
in 1981 or the unveiling of the Reagan Peace Plan in September 1982 and again over the 
administration’s failed efforts to block a move by Congress to add a further $200 million grant 
on annual US aid to Israel in the midst of the Lebanon war in December 1982—this tendency 
often amounted to granting Israel de facto veto power over US policy in the Middle East.58 																																																								
55 Interview, Daniel C. Kurtzer, op.cit. 
56 Thomas L. Friedman, “How Israel’s Economy Got Hooked on Selling Arms Abroad,” NYT, 7 December 1986, 
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The risks that overreliance on prior consultation with Israel could entail for US policy should 
have become apparent in the context of the negotiations over the 17 May 1983 agreement on 
Lebanon. The US experimented with a policy that has now become almost standard practice in 
the Middle East: consulting with Israel and essentially aligning negotiating positions with it prior 
to bringing a policy document to the Arab counterparts. The outcome of this agreement, which 
as the administration had aptly predicted could become so slanted towards Israel that it would 
become irreconcilable with Arab positions, would be similar to dozens of other ‘peace plans’ and 
position documents US administrations have presented to the Palestinian and Arab leaders in the 
post-Cold War era.59 
 
While US administrations have repeatedly complained about a supposed Arab tendency to stick 
to ‘maximalist positions’ on Israel, rarely has the US asked itself if US policy has over the years 
moved sufficiently close to Israel’s own ‘maximalist positions’ to render its mediation efforts so 
biased and unrealistic that they prevent any concerted movement towards reconciliation. 
 
This policy of supporting Israel ‘right or wrong’ has also arguably been harmful for Israel’s own 
interests. As noted by Thomas Pickering, ‘in light of the present challenge of how Israel will be 
able to remain Jewish and Democratic, one can point at this period [of the 1980s] as having 
shielded Israel from having to engage in this debate and make the hard choices that are 
necessary’.60 
 
Indeed, the policy of ‘hugging Israel closer’ while disavowing negative conditionality, or even the 
potential to criticize Israel in public, arguably freed Israel from any accountability or costs from 
its policies. This would fuel more uncompromising stances by Israeli governments and arguably 
even serve as a political boon for the Israeli right wing, which incidentally has moved to 
consolidate its dominance over Israeli politics. As noted by one senior Israeli figure in the midst 
of the 1982 Lebanon invasion, ‘we can do anything we want now in the [occupied] territories and 
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59 See for instance, Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, “How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East,” The New York 
Review of Books, 15 January 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/01/15/how-not-to-make-peace-in-the-
middle-east/. 
60 Interview, Thomas Pickering, op.cit. 
		 180	
no one will be able to stop us. If they didn’t stop us from going to Beirut, then we will certainly 
be able to install an order favourable to us in Judea, Samaria and Gaza’.61 
 
Harold Saunders was quoted in the media in the mid-1980s as observing how the growing 
normalization of the US-Israeli relationship represented a double-edged sword for both the US 
and Israel. ‘There’s a cancer growing on the relationship’, noted the former Carter official, 
describing ties as a ‘one-way street’ and suggesting that Congress had given Israel a ‘virtual blank 
check’. ‘You can say there is more money being given to Israel, more cooperation. [...] So it looks 
closer. But it can’t be close if it is mindlessly close. It is closer when people on both sides are 
grappling with the tough issues’,62 lamented Saunders, with clear reference to the peace process 
and the outstanding reality of significant differences between the long-term strategic interests of 
Israel and the US in the Middle East. 
 
Instead, the conceptual approach that gained hold in Washington—and continues to be 
propagated to this day by pro-Israel lobby groups and a growing number of affiliated think tanks 
and research centres such as WINEP among others—simply boiled down to the simplistic belief 
that ‘what is good for America is good for Israel, and what strengthens Israel equally strengthens 
America’,63 as Thomas Dine put it in his AIPAC speech in 1986. 
 
Conclusion: Israel, the 51st State 
 
The tangible outcome of the eighteen-month major review of US Middle East policy would 
therefore be a refashioned and considerably expanded US-Israeli relationship. While framed 
under the guise of ‘strategic cooperation’, the implications of these moves to institutionalize and 
normalize the bilateral relationship would extend far beyond the military or strategic domain. 
 
All dimensions of the US-Israeli relationship were affected, including broader elements of US 
policy towards the region that did not directly touch upon US-Israeli relations. Indeed, the 
general process through which the relationship would become institutionalized, with cooperation 
becoming diffused into the respective bureaucracies and US policy increasingly moving closer to 
Israeli viewpoints and concerns, would represent the key outcome of this critical, 
institutionalizing juncture for the US-Israeli relationship. The impact of this period, and the 
degrees of path dependency that would flow from the underlying conceptual approaches 
governing US policy towards Israel, would have far-reaching implications for future US policy, 
retaining considerable explanatory value for contemporary dynamics in US-Israeli relations and 																																																								
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the continued inability (or unwillingness) of the US to confront its ally Israel on policies that 
Washington has long opposed. 
 
The two-year interval between December 1981 and November 1983 would emerge as the 
epicentre of these processes of institutionalization. This was a time when the US administration 
engaged in trial and error vis-à-vis Israel, hesitantly applying short-term pressure and linkage 
before moving to embrace compensation and ‘positive inducements’. By the summer of 1983, 
and in the midst of the Lebanon war and the growing realization that US policy would be unable 
to achieve its stated objectives in the conflict, the Reagan administration decided to revert to the 
traditional baseline of support for Israel, agreeing to augment the US-Israeli relationship on the 
basis of short-term expediency and the related appreciation of Israel’s ability to help (or hinder) 
wide dimensions of US policy. As noted by Dennis Ross, after 1984, ‘Reagan went back to his 
instincts’64 and moved to institutionalize the relationship with Israel. 
 
On the basis of these calculations, and after having repeatedly failed to change Israeli policy or to 
convince it to mute its opposition to US-Arab arms sales, the Reagan administration chose to cut 
its losses, prioritize domestic political calculations in the run-up to the 1984 elections, and move 
to repair its relationship with Israel. This was done by reviving and further expanding on the 
preferential nature of US support, while renouncing, once and for all, its professed neutrality. 
 
While the US had always maintained a degree of preferential treatment for Israel as a result of 
twin pillars of shared Judeo-Christian values and political affinities, all previous administrations—
and even including Henry Kissinger—acknowledged that to achieve US interests in the region 
Washington needed to preserve credibility with both sides. Implicit in these older approaches to 
Israel and the Middle East was a refusal to embrace an exclusivist US-Israeli relationship, 
considering such relations a threat to US interests and freedom of action in the Middle East. 
Indeed, up until the 1980s, the ‘strategic’ nature of the US-Israel relationship had always been 
considered as a function and therefore largely constrained to the broader Arab-Israeli conflict, a 
resolution of which would be needed in order to allow the US to overtly draw closer and 
formalize its alliance with Israel. 
 
Explained in part by the global nature of US interests and the significant political weight Israel 
carries in US domestic politics, this growing tendency to ‘hug Israel closer’ even in the midst of 
fundamental disagreements or in the context of efforts to induce Israel to modify elements of 
policy would hamstring future US policy. Indeed, and contrary to the view outlined by Martin 
Indyk in the above quote on the need for the US to be pro-Israel in the Middle East, the US’s 																																																								
64 Interview, Dennis Ross, op.cit. 
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disavowal of any semblance of balance would fundamentally hamper the US ability to make full 
use of the one true ‘strategic asset’ that Israel provided US interests in the Middle East: its linkage 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 
As a result, the US was again condemned to ‘muddling through’, preventing reconciliation 
between the ‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ components of US policy and limiting the US to a reactive policy 
in the region. Indeed, as aptly noted by Chas W. Freeman, former US ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia, ‘this disconnect’ between the two strategic zones and interests of US Middle East 
policy—Israel in the Near East and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf—‘has precluded’ the 
articulation of a US ‘grand strategy’ for the region.65 Significantly, this state of affairs has also 
kept the US from employing its full toolkit of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power to win hearts and minds 
and consolidate US influence over the strategically vital Middle East.  
 
While the US did emerge from the Cold War as the undisputed external hegemon in the region, 
its inability to deliver on the ‘soft’ dimensions of its power and orchestrate a just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East has significantly weakened US influence and credibility across the Arab-
Muslim world. Instead, US influence is largely limited to the ‘hard’ dimensions of US military and 
economic power. While this might work to co-opt leaders and elites, it has never seeped down 
into society and thereby cannot succeed in establishing a strong and lasting groundwork on 
which to build US strategy or influence in the long term. 
 
While the end of the Cold War could have allowed the US to trace a new approach to the 
conflict and the broader region, institutionalized precedents and the growing weight of domestic 
constraints (including the rising role of the Israel lobby in Congress and vis-à-vis the executive 
branch) had established strong degrees of path dependency, particularly in the realm of prior-
consultation with Israel and the growing tendency to ‘hug it closer’ even in the midst of severe 
top-level disagreement. 
 
The US abandonment of linkage along with the principles of balance and professed neutrality 
would therefore emerge as the most significant conceptual (or qualitative) precedents of the post-
1983 institutionalization of the US-Israel alliance. It would be these new emerging conventional 
wisdoms entrenched in the series of agreements and commitments provided to Israel during the 
remainder of the Reagan administration, rather than the actual tangible benefits derived from the 
revival of the MoU, that would result in the most significant degree of path dependency for 
future US policy. This approach was (and still is) predicated on a misplaced belief that US policy 
was building future leverage over Israel through incremental demonstrations of goodwill and 																																																								
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support that could someday be cashed in by the US in the eventuality that a final resolution of 
the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts appeared within reach. 
 
The strategy also rested on another, deeper, misreading of Israeli policy. In essence, the US 
believed that Israel shared its understanding that Middle East peace represented the best, if not 
only, means to preserve Israeli long-term security and survival. Consequently, the US and Israel 
were believed to be on the same page when it came to key UN documents such as Resolution 
242 and the ultimate need for Israeli withdrawals from Arab and Palestinian lands. Such hopes 
have been proven misplaced, not least in light of the subsequent history of the US-led MEPP and 
Israel’s continued reluctance to entertain territorial withdrawals or compromises for peace, 
particularly in the OPT.  
 
Indeed, US and Israeli interpretations of UN Resolution 242 were (and still are) at odds with one 
another, yet out of expediency and the short-term reactive nature of US policy in the Middle 
East, the US has never confronted Israel head-on to address this fundamental gap. Successive US 
administrations have instead preferred to postpone the inevitable crisis such discussions will 
cause, while seeking to mask this US hesitance under the guise of a gradual approach seeking to 
‘prepare the ground’ for peace in the Middle East predicated on massive Israeli military and 
technological superiority. 
 
In banking on the misplaced belief that Israel would indeed someday agree to major territorial 
withdrawals as called for by UN Resolution 242, and that such withdrawals would occur because 
Israeli leaders would consider them conducive to resolving the country’s security and 
demographic concerns, US policymakers fundamentally misread Israeli objectives. Israeli 
governments have long used security as reason to not withdraw from Arab and Palestinian lands. 
Israel’s whole ‘settlement-industrial complex’ was itself based on a lie that such settlements were 
needed for Israeli defence.66 By institutionalizing a ‘safety net’ beneath Israel, the US would fail 
to address with these fundamental gaps between the long-term US and Israeli viewpoints and 
interests in the Middle East, thereby undermining future US leverage over Israel and further 
strengthen the US’s entrapment in a quasi-exclusivist relationship with Israel in the Middle East. 
These approaches would moreover weaken Israel’s own need for compromise vis-à-vis its Arab 
neighbours, given that Israel’s security was already being addressed by the US, as were the 
military and economic costs of sustaining the occupation. 
 
Indeed, just as US diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli conflict had moved from the initial proactive 
approaches of the mid-1950s to more hesitant and tamed efforts to delay negotiations in order to 																																																								
66 Yotam Berger, “Secret 1970 Document Confirms First West Bank Settlements Built on a Lie,” Ha’aretz, 28 July 
2916, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-document-confirms-first-settlements-built-on-a-lie-1.5416937. 
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first establish a more conducive ‘groundwork for peace’, the Reagan administration in the mid-
1980s was now also moving to delay the use of leverage vis-à-vis Israel, believing that such 
leverage was best preserved for an ill-defined future. Once the groundwork was ready, the US 
could then move to orchestrate a peace agreement, one that would ostensibly produce Israeli 
concessions without the US having to employ negative conditionality. 
 
Such an approach would essentially provide Israel with a semi-veto power over large dimensions 
of US policy, given that it would be Israel, not the US that would decide on the nature and 
severity of security threats in the region, thereby entrapping US policy in a circular, incremental 
process of compensation and inducements, without any clarity as to what would represent a 
sufficiently secure Israel. Thus, ever since the second Reagan administration the White House has 
had a tendency to repeatedly defer to Israeli interests in the articulation of US Middle East policy, 
particularly with regards to the strategic zone of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Near East.67 
 
Yet, by repeatedly postponing the inevitable, and consistently prioritizing short-term tactical 
gains over a long-term and holistic strategy making full use of the US’s extensive toolkit of 
carrots and sticks vis-à-vis both Israel and the Arab states, the US has fundamentally undermined 
its professed role as a mediator in the conflict, harming US interests and influence. It has 
moreover undermined its ability to employ the festering Arab-Israeli conflict and the ‘special’ 
nature of US-Israel ties as strategic levers to advance US interests in the region. Instead, it was 
Israel that increasingly was able to use its ‘special’ relationship with the US to advance its own 
interests and concerns, and often in such a way as to actually damage the US’s own objectives. 
 
Such a policy of ‘hugging Israel closer’ and refraining from employing (and sustaining) negative 
conditionality, has also effectively postponed the need for Israel to engage in its own internal 
debates, shielding Israeli society and politics from the adverse effects of long-term occupation 
and the continued reliance on seemingly bottomless US aid and military support. Such 
approaches were also providing cover for more conservative, militaristic and nationalist-religious 
elements within Israeli politics (and the US), which could argue against the need for concessions 
or territorial withdrawals without any fear of tangible repercussions from the US. 
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includes a detailed list of technology and armaments that Israel was opposed to. See, “Leaked Cables on Israel: Israeli 
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Israeli security was thus elevated to a (pre)condition for the success of much broader dimensions 
of US policy not necessarily limited to Israel or indeed the Middle East. Replacing the previous 
US emphasis on balance and mediation, the centrality of Israeli security and military edge was 
consolidated in US policy out of a belief that this would to create the ‘groundwork for peace’ in 
the Middle East while allowing the US to reap the expected short-term benefits flowing from 
close and amicable US-Israeli relations. 
 
Ultimately, the set of conventional wisdoms that became entrenched in the US body politic as a 
result of the revival of US-Israeli strategic cooperation in 1983, goes a long way in accounting for 
the US’s bias towards Israel and inability (or unwillingness) to put sustained pressure and 
negative conditionality on its small ally. These provide more convincing explanations compared 
to narratives of the quasi-mystical influence and power of the pro-Israel lobby over US Middle 
East policy. 
 
Significantly, and as outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, the willingness of the administration to 
upgrade the strategic dimension of the relationship stemmed not from Israel’s tangible 
contributions to US strategic interests but the need to compensate and restrain Israel to avoid 
tensions spilling over to harm wider US objectives. As a result, and independently from the views 
of supporters and sceptics who tended to consider Israel as an asset or a burden for US policy, 
the final policy prescription that flowed from this centrality of Israeli security would largely 
remain the same. If Israel was an asset, then it deserved further US aid and assistance. If it was a 
burden, then it needed aid and assistance to diminish the weight of this burden, and limit 
potentially adverse effects on broader US interests and concerns. 
 
The now-forgotten September 1982 Reagan Plan, containing many of the fundamental elements 
of the linkage doctrine and proposing balance and mediation between the warring parties, is 
notable as the last time the US would publicly announce a plan for Arab-Israeli peace that also 
contained a number of ‘surprises’ for Israel. Indeed, the Reagan Plan is also the last US 
document dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict that was not previously coordinated with Israel. 
Rather, the text represented the internal workings of the Reagan administration, in coordination 
with a number of Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, as well as the 
Europeans. All future US plans and proposals would by contrast be coordinated with Israel, 
helping to explain why US approaches have generally been defined as unbalanced and 
consequently unacceptable for the Arab and Palestinian side. 
 
Incidentally, a first example of prior consultation with Israel can be found in the negotiations 
over the 17 May 1983 agreement between Lebanon and Israel, an accord that would effectively 
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engage the US in Israel’s ‘war of choice’ in Lebanon, bringing it into the conflict an active 
participant on the side of Israel. From building a ‘safety net’ below Israel, US policy was gradually 
developing a tendency to act ‘as Israel’s lawyer’ in the context of negotiations with the Arabs and 
Palestinians, as described by long-term US negotiator Aaron David Miller in The Much Too 
Promised Land.68 As Miller aptly noted in a subsequent Washington Post op-ed in 2005, ‘ 
 
With the best of motives and intentions, we listened to and followed Israel's lead without 
critically examining what that would mean for our own interests, for those on the Arab 
side and for the overall success of the negotiations. The “no surprises” policy, under 
which we had to run everything by Israel first, stripped our policy of the independence 
and flexibility required for serious peacemaking. If we couldn’t put proposals on the table 
without checking with the Israelis first, and refused to push back when they said no, how 
effective could our mediation be?69 
 
Such would be the ultimate, if unforeseen, implications of the Reagan administration’s efforts to 
normalize US-Israeli relations. In light of the continued expansion of domestic political and 
increasingly bureaucratic and conceptual constraints impacting US policy towards Israel—the 
need for prior-consultation, the security-first approach and the disavowal of linkage or negative 
conditionality vis-à-vis Israel—it has become almost impossible for the US to change its stance. 
As a result, all future administrations have continued ‘hugging Israel closer’ as a means to simply 
‘kick the can down the road’, incrementally augmenting US preferential treatment for Israel in 
exchange for tactical, short-term expediency on other issues. 
 
Yet, the cumulative result of this approach of supporting Israel ‘right or wrong’ and agreeing to 
augment the preferential nature of the relationship with successive increases of aid and support 
even in the midst of severe disagreements over policy and strategy—as most recently happened 
under the Obama administration regarding US policy towards Iran or the settlements issue—has 
essentially ‘entrapped’ US Middle East policy in a pro-Israeli straitjacket that has done much to 
harm US (and arguably Israeli) long-term interests in the Middle East. Until acknowledged and 
addressed at the highest levels of the US establishment, this policy straightjacket will continue to 
prevent the US from adopting a holistic and comprehensive policy strategy for the Middle East. 
It may in fact even accelerate contemporary processes of US global decline and retrenchment. 
 
Indeed, the sequencing and prioritization of the bilateral working groups—starting with the 
strategic and military realm with the JMPG, then extending to the economic and development 
domains with the JSAP and the JEDG—, and only finally touching on the political domain with 
the launching of JPC reflects the unbalanced nature of the relationship, the US embrace of 																																																								
68 Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land. America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, New York, Bantam 
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expediency and its related abdication of responsibilities. Politics—where disagreements are 
profuse—should instead represent the starting point for the institutionalization of the 
relationship and the key locus of high-level bilateral talks on the future of the relationship and the 
broader Middle Eastern region, not an afterthought. It is no coincidence in this regard that the 
JPC are the least functioning of the four bilateral working groups established during the 1980s. 
Indeed, the Joint Political Consultations are generally constrained—or held ‘hostage’—by the 
other institutionalized dimensions of the relationship. Yet, it is here at the level of politics that 
the US and Israel must engage in an honest and forward looking dialogue to reconcile what 
remain fundamentally incompatible long-term visions of the regional order in the Middle East 
and the best means to ensure Israel’s security and survival in the region.  
 
With the Middle East often portrayed as the ‘graveyard of empires’, and the processes of US 
global decline stemming at least in part from its reoccurring policy blunders in the region, this 
scenario may not be so farfetched. The ‘end of America’s moment in the Middle East’70 has no 
doubt begun. While the US is likely to remain a major external actor in the region for years to 
come, future historians may well cite the emergence of a quasi-exclusivist US-Israeli relationship 
in the Middle East—and its broader impact on US ‘soft power’ and credibility—as among the 
fundamental variables explicating the long and gradual process of US decline in the Middle East 
and perhaps even the world. 
 	
																																																								
70 Gerges, Obama and the Middle East. The End of America’s Moment?, op.cit. 
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Conclusion 
 
All of us can take satisfaction, as well, from the new plateau, which the Israeli-American relationship has reached. 
It is correct to speak of a ‘plateau’, rather than a ‘summit’, because we have attained a new, high level upon which 
we continue to build, rather than a peak from which we will descend. 
Ronald Reagan, Written Message to AIPAC’s Annual Policy Conference, 6 April 19831 
 
This thesis has made a number of contentions about the institutionalization of the US-Israel 
relationship during the Reagan administration and the ‘Second Cold War’. It has analysed the 
complex decision-making processes within the administration and the broader US domestic 
setting on the key themes of influence, leverage and interdependence in US-Israel ties. In so doing, it 
has emphasized that ‘strategic rationales’ do not stand the test of motivation for this 
institutionalizing juncture. Rather, this push to formalize the relationship was motivated by a 
mixture of political and tactical expediency, complemented by the traditional need of US 
administrations to protect their ‘domestic flank’. 
 
The research has argued that a central outcome of this juncture would be the further the 
development of a conceptual and bureaucratic straitjacket for US policy, one that has ‘entrapped’ 
the US in an increasingly one-sided and exclusivist relationship with Israel in the Middle East. 
While the beginnings of these processes began to emerge in the late 1950s, and would follow a 
process of incremental development throughout the key decades of the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Reagan administration would inherent and further build upon these institutional frameworks, 
normalizing the relationship while formalizing what had previously been ad hoc and largely 
covert forms of cooperation. The Reagan period would therefore cap and establish new 
grounding in the institutional history of the US-Israel relationship, representing a climax of a long 
process of maturation and a ‘coming out’ period for the de facto geostrategic alliance that exists 
today. 
 
New degrees of interdependence and assimilation would be added to the relationship as Israel 
was further integrated into US military-strategic plans and deterrence posture in the region. While 
Israel’s dependence on the US would become formalized, so would growing elements of US 
policy become reliant on this Israeli pillar. Indeed, US policy would find itself caught in a circular 
game of inducements and compensation for Israel each time the US sought to promote a policy 
action in the region. These periodic upgrades in preferential treatment would serve to tighten this 
policy straitjacket, constraining presidential authority while compartmentalizing the top-level 
political relationship away from its deeper and institutionalized elements of cooperation and 
assistance. 																																																								
1 RRPL, Max Green Files, ‘AIPAC (2)’, Box 30. 
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There is an inherent paradox in this outcome. A central argument of this study has been to 
identify efforts to enhance US leverage and influence over Israel—or to respond to and satisfy 
domestic political constraints on US Middle East policy—as key motivating drivers for those 
processes of institutionalization carried out by the Reagan administration during the 1980s. A key 
objective in this respect was to consolidate US decision-making on Israel and the Middle East in 
the executive branch and away from Congress or public opinion, ostensibly increasing executive 
authority while shielding the administration from the political costs of disagreeing with Israel in 
public. 
 
US officials during the 1980s—like others before them in the 1960s and 1970s—wanted to 
establish new ‘ground rules’ for the relationship, seeking to extract assurances of prior 
consultation and no surprises from Israel and the leadership of the organized Jewish-American 
community in the United States. These were important in order to limit the political costs of 
disagreeing with Israel while enhancing the ability of the administration to reap the full political, 
strategic and moral-ideational benefits that would accrue from polishing its pro-Israel credentials. 
Most importantly, these efforts were understood as indispensable to allow the US to pursue its 
major strategic priority of the time: enhanced US-Arab cooperation in defence of the Persian 
Gulf. 
 
Yet, these processes of institutionalization would result in further constraining presidential 
authority while increasingly making large dimensions of US Middle East policy dependent on Israeli 
approval and backing. Indeed, it appeared it was Israel, rather than the US, that would receive 
assurances of ‘no surprises’ and ‘prior consultation’ from Washington. Rather than enhancing US 
leverage over Israeli policy or helping resolve outstanding areas of disagreement between the US 
and Israel, the outcome was a tighter ‘policy straitjacket’, ‘entrapping’ the US in a quasi-
exclusivist relationship with Israel in the Middle East, and in particular in the Near East, or the 
strategic zone of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
 
It is hard to discern the extent to which this ‘entrapment’ was by design or emerged as an 
unintended consequence of the US’s prioritization of political expediency and the related need to 
compensate Israel with ever-increasing forms of preferential treatment and assistance. What is 
certain, however, is that the institutional architecture that would produce an ever more 
interdependent and exclusivist US-Israel relationship in the post-Cold War era was completed 
and formalized during the 1980s. 
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Support for Israeli security was thus elevated to front and centre of US policy as a key national 
interest in its own right, not a means to carefully lubricate diplomacy or US efforts to coax the 
warring parties into moderating their positions. Drawing on important intellectual and political 
support from a growing number of conservative think tanks and research centres—such as the 
WINEP, the JINSA and the Heritage Foundation—and establishing close links with the 
leaderships of the organized Jewish-American community—chief among which stood Tom 
Dine’s AIPAC—these pro-Israel constituencies would emerge as a powerful domestic force in 
the US bureaucracy and foreign policy establishment, retaining considerable influence over the 
articulation of US Middle East policy well into present times. 
 
A key by-product would be to diffuse and compartmentalize broader elements of cooperation 
and assistance away from the White House and deeper into the respective bureaucracies of the 
two countries. This would constrain US administrations from employing the expanding elements 
of this military-supply relationship as potential levers to influence Israeli policy, thereby largely 
limiting the US’s toolkit of policies to ‘carrots’ (inducements and soft persuasion) instead of 
‘sticks’ (conditionality or coercive diplomacy), approaches that would only further this 
bureaucratic and institutional straitjacket on future US policy. 
 
Ultimately, while a degree of authority was concentrated in the White House, this was mainly 
restricted to a growing tendency for prior consultation and coordination with Israel (and its 
network of supporters in the US) ahead of a major announcement of policy. Yet, by negotiating 
everything with Israel ahead of time, the US was implicitly granting its small Middle Eastern ally 
the means to influence and object to large dimensions of US policy. Moreover, once a decision 
was made and new forms of compensation or inducements provided to Israel, the executive 
branch would lose control over this inducement, which would become institutionalized and 
implemented by the US bureaucracy, rendering it an established precedent that future 
administrations would follow but also a new plane on which Congress and pro-Israel groups in 
the US could argue for further increases in aid and support. 
 
In conceptual terms, three central dimensions can be highlighted as important elements of path 
dependency that can be traced back to the Reagan administration: a changing conceptualization 
of Israel’s role and value for US interests; an overturning of traditional viewpoints and 
approaches in terms of the best means to enhance US leverage over Israel; and the emerging 
tendency to separate the top-level political relationship from its deeper elements of 
institutionalized cooperation and military-supply agreements, preventing US policymakers from 
employing the latter in support of the former. 
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• The first conceptual legacy relates to the ‘strategic asset’ slogan and the degrees to which 
it departed from previous conceptualizations of Israel’s role and value for US interests. 
 
While the US had long appreciated Israel’s ‘strategic’ value in the context of Arab-Israeli 
diplomacy and US efforts to employ the ‘special’ nature of US-Israel ties as a lever to consolidate 
the status quo and slowly attract the Arab states into the US orbit, in the 1980s this linkage with 
the Arab-Israeli conflict was severed. By de-linking the relationship from diplomatic efforts on 
the conflict, the US’s traditional emphasis on a modicum of balance and even-handedness 
between Israel and the Arab states was also overcome. 
 
These shifts reflected the changing geostrategic landscape in the Middle East since the 1979, but 
more fundamentally stemmed from the slow emergence of new constituencies of experts and 
policymakers that joined the administration and were instrumental in promoting new frameworks 
based on closer and increasingly overt demonstrations of US-Israel alliance. Emerging as a 
loosely defined epistemic community in the United States, these constituencies would act as a 
powerful counterbalance to other, more traditional viewpoints within the US domestic setting, 
federal government and foreign policy bureaucracy, helping to overturn previous 
conceptualizations of the US-Israel relationship and the best means to enhance US leverage and 
influence over Israel. 
 
Based on a complementarity of ‘interests’ and ‘values’, these constituencies would argue that the 
US-Israel relationship should indeed be considered ‘special’, more important than other US 
regional partnerships and consequently given precedence over them. The US should no longer be 
ashamed to be openly pro-Israel as such support was essentially equivalent to a pro-American 
policy in the Middle East. Consequently, the US should not hold back from more overt forms of 
cooperation and institutionalization in the US-Israel relationship, as these would actually be 
conducive to broader US interests and concerns, including, paradoxically, that of enhancing 
leverage over Israel, by ‘hugging it closer’ and building US credibility as a security provider. 
 
• In this respect, the second conceptual legacy that can be traced back to the Reagan 
administration and the 1980s relates precisely to the theme of leverage and the best 
means for a US administration to promote its interests vis-à-vis Israel while not risking 
its political survival at home. 
 
While previous US approaches had tended to view emerging elements of US-Israeli cooperation 
or other forms of preferential treatment as a means to ‘reward’ Israeli behaviour, or a quid pro 
quo in exchange for a given Israeli concession or commitment, the Reagan administration, and 
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the pro-Israel constituencies within it, would overturn these approaches. These would argue that 
any overt linkage between US aid and cooperation with Israel and Israeli policies vis-à-vis the 
Arab states or the Palestinians would be counterproductive, as such action would indicate that 
US support was not ‘sincere’, but rather a tactical means of extracting Israeli concessions. 
Pointing to the short-lived 1981 MoU as an example of these abortive US efforts to co-op Israel, 
these constituencies would see to it that the revived 1983 agreement contained no such 
references to an explicit exchange of services between the two countries. 
 
In this respect, overt cooperation and alliance should represent the foundation of the US-Israeli 
relationship in all spheres, an essential (pre)condition for the attainment of key US interests, 
including that of restraining Israel’s unilateral tendencies or succeeding in bringing about a 
diplomatic breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli theatre. By reassuring Israel and ‘hugging it closer’, 
Israel’s underlying mistrust of US motives and objectives in the Middle East could be finally put 
to rest, thereby providing the US with the needed leverage without it having to risk political capital 
by employing hard conditionality or coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Israel. Reassuring Israel and 
building up its military superiority and technological margin would therefore be akin to 
‘preparing the groundwork for peace’ in the region, according to the viewpoints promoted by 
these constituencies. 
 
The US’s traditional focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict as a central irritant to US foreign policy 
objectives in the Middle East and the key avenue to reconcile the ‘Arab’ and ‘Israeli’ dimensions 
of US policy was downgraded below the broader strategic and psychological objectives of the 
Reagan administration. Indeed, any area of disagreement between the US and Israel should be 
downplayed according to these viewpoints, as public disagreements could be construed as a 
potential weakening of the US-Israel relationship, which in turn would not only lead to a 
hardening of Arab demands and the potential for renewed instability in the Middle East but also 
in a loss of US leverage, given that Israeli confidence in the US would be weakened. 
 
Israel’s value for US interests was therefore no longer considered as a function of the broader 
diplomatic process, but elevated to a higher strategic and Cold War plane and institutionalized 
accordingly. Here, Israel’s geostrategic location, advanced military forces and reliability as a 
democratic and Western-oriented ally in the Middle East could serve US interests in fighting the 
‘Second Cold War’ as well as reawakening US society to the superiority of America’s political-
military capabilities on the global stage. 
 
The impact and legacy of these changes would occur gradually, in a fluid and non-linear fashion 
well after the Reagan administration. Pro-Israeli constituencies would never retain a monopoly 
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over the debate, and elements associated with the ‘linkage doctrine’ are indeed detectable well 
beyond the Reagan administration. But the political and institutional precedents created by the 
administration’s efforts to normalize the US-Israel relationship, paired with the consolidation and 
intellectual organization of this constituency of pro-Israel experts in the US, cannot be overstated. 
From the 1980s onwards, pro-Israeli elements in the US could count on a constituency of expert 
practitioners who could speak the language of foreign policy and articulate a set of coherent 
rationalizing principles to back up their support for Israel, ‘right or wrong’. This is what Dennis 
Ross was pointing to when he noted that ‘a new sociology was added to the relationship’ during 
the 1980s.2 
 
As the US moved to prioritize consultation and coordination with Israel ahead of a major 
announcement of policy, US perceptions and approaches came to assume an Israeli colouring 
and slant. This would set in motion a concerted process of ‘Israelization’ of US Middle East 
policy, paralleled by an ‘Americanization’ of the Israeli society, politics and economic system, 
entrapping the US in quasi-exclusivist relationship with the Israel in the Middle East. This brings 
us to the third and final conceptual legacy of this institutionalizing juncture for the bilateral 
relationship. 
 
• This relates to the compartmentalization of the US-Israel relationship, the diffusion of 
US-Israeli cooperation into the respective bureaucracies of the two countries and the 
consequent declining presidential authority to direct policy towards Israel and the 
broader Middle East. 
 
This trend would emerge as a key by-product of those processes of institutionalization that took 
place during the 1980s and the Reagan administration, gradually constraining the executive 
branch from employing the expanding elements of this military-supply relationship as potential 
levers to influence Israeli policy. Indeed, particularly in the post-Cold War era, the extent of US 
leverage often appears limited to ‘asking’ Israel to make concessions and, failing that, simply 
offering Israel increased forms of preferential treatment and inducements as a means to ‘buy’ its 
acquiescence to a given US policy approach. 
 
This tendency was put on clear display in late 2010, for instance, when the Obama administration 
offered Israel a striking inducement of 20 F-35 jet fighters worth an estimated $2.7 billion in 
exchange for a limited 90-day extension of a partial Israeli settlement freeze.3 The offer is but one 
example of the bizarre and often paradoxical nature of US policy towards Israel. After all, the US 																																																								
2 Interview, Dennis Ross, op.cit. 
3 Mark Landler, “US Drops Bid to Sway Israel on Settlements,” NYT, 7 December 2010, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/world/middleeast/08diplo.html. 
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was offering to double a previous Israeli order of 20 F-35s in exchange for a limited agreement to 
comply with international law and longstanding US policy on the issue. 
 
The anecdote is but one example among many that demonstrate the degree to which US leverage 
over Israel is constrained by a combination of domestic political considerations and the murky 
array of political precedents, commitments and ad hoc assurances towards Israel that each 
administration inherits from its predecessor. Many other examples exist, with US policy 
essentially entrapped in an incremental game of inducements and compensation for Israel in 
exchange for limited, short-term and tactical changes to Israeli policies the US has long opposed. 
 
The offer of F-35 fighter jets was all the more striking considering the serious political 
disagreements between the top-level leaderships in the two countries and Benjamin Netanyahu’s 
repeated flouting of stated US policy during the Obama administration. This may demonstrate 
the extent of this policy straitjacket, predicated as it is on a compartmentalization of US-Israel 
relations and a division between the top-level political relationship and the deeper levels of 
institutionalized military-supply arrangements. It further evidences the significant constraints on 
presidential freedom of action towards Israel that stem from this compartmentalization of the 
relationship and the diffusion of cooperation into the respective bureaucracies of the two 
countries. 
 
Such developments reflect the gradual consolidation of a quasi-exclusivist US relationship with 
Israel, one that has resulted in prioritizing Israeli security concerns and interests in US Middle 
East policy. In essence, given US efforts to ‘protect the domestic flank’ and increase coordination 
and prior consultation with Israel on broad dimensions of US Middle East policy and US-Arab 
relations, US policy has— perhaps unintentionally—granted Israel (and its network of supporters 
in the US) what amounts to a semi-veto power over broad aspects of US Middle East policy. 
 
This mismatch between the top-level political relationship—where disagreements are profuse—
and the deeper levels of institutionalized commitments and assistance explains the appearance of 
an inverse relationship between growing Israeli dependence on the US and declining US 
willingness to employ this leverage to change policies it has long opposed. It also explains the 
trend of repeated (political) crises resolved through forms of (policy) continuity and further 
increases in preferential treatment for Israel, a dynamic that is particularly evident in the post-
Cold War era, but was clearly present also during the Ford, Carter and particularly the Reagan 
administration where political crises have consistently been resolved—or more precisely papered 
over—through further increases of aid and preferential treatment for Israel. 
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Indeed, while the Reagan administration sought to consolidate decision-making on Israel in the 
executive branch, even agreeing to negotiate emerging policy directly with Israel and the 
representatives of major pro-Israel lobby groups in the US, the concrete effects of this 
institutionalization process would in actuality increase the influence of Congress and the broader 
bureaucracy over the articulation of policy. 
 
Examples of this growing power of Congress (and declining influence of the executive branch) 
are provided not only by the legalization of Kissinger’s 1975 assurances toward Israel regarding 
the PLO and the diplomatic process in 1985, or the 1987 law that called for the shutting of PLO 
offices in the United States, a legislation that was approved over Reagan’s objections.4 Many 
more recent examples are available, such as the Jerusalem Relocation Act of 1995, the 
formalization of the QME concept in 2008, the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 20145, 
negotiations over the new 10-year military supply agreement with Israel (FY2019–28) and, most 
recently, the 2018 introduction of the United States-Israel Joint Drone Detection Cooperation Act, 
pending approval in the US Congress but likely to be embraced in a bipartisan manner by US 
lawmakers.6 
 
Stemming from the institutionalized legacy of preferential treatment and cooperation, these 
agreements are commonly justified in terms of an ‘unbreakable bond, forged by over sixty years 
of shared interests and shared values’, as noted in the official text of the 2014 ‘strategic 
partnership act’ that has formally elevated Israel’s standing to that of a ‘major strategic partner’ of 
the United States.7 This may serve as an indication of the extent to which these conceptual 
frameworks and strategic justifications have become engrained in the US political system and 
foreign policy bureaucracy, replicated across administrations even when strategic developments 
would seem to indicate the need to revisit these assumptions. 
 
Indeed, US policy has essentially been reduced to avoiding the inevitable, delaying the key 
necessity of ‘getting tough with Israel’ to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict while excusing this 
inaction behind a smokescreen of strategic justifications and rhetorical embellishments that frame 
US aid and support for Israel as an ‘investment in peace’. This smokescreen obfuscates the 
reoccurrence of severe political disagreements that have been a constant feature of the top-level 
political relationship and the persistence of serious doubts in certain—now admittedly 
minoritarian—quarters of the US foreign policy establishment relating to Israel’s tangible 																																																								
4 Robert Pear, “Effect of a PLO Shift on US Policy Unclear,” NYT, 13 November 1988, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/13/world/effect-of-a-plo-shift-on-us-policy-unclear.html. 
5 S.2673 – United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014, United States Congress, 113th Congress (2013-2014), Full 
Text, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2673/text. 
6 “Crist Proposal to Combat Drone Attacks in Israel Included in Defence Act,” Tampa Bay Reporter, 17 May 2018, 
http://www.tbreporter.com/politics/crist-proposal-combat-drone-attacks-israel-included-defense-act/. 
7 S.2673 – United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014, op.cit. 
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contributions to US strategic interests in the Middle East. It serves to mask the US’s fundamental 
inability (or lack of political will) to confront this policy straitjacket and disentangle the US from 
its institutionalized parameters of support for Israel, ‘right or wrong’. 
 
By repeatedly postponing the inevitable, and consistently prioritizing short-term tactical gains 
over a long-term and holistic strategy making full use of the US’s extensive toolkit of carrots and 
sticks vis-à-vis both Israel and the Arab states, the US fundamentally undermined its professed 
role as a mediator in the conflict. It moreover undermined the ability of US administrations to 
employ the festering Arab-Israeli conflict and the ‘special’ nature of US-Israel ties as strategic 
levers to advance US interests in the region. Instead, it was Israel that increasingly was able to use 
its ‘special’ relationship with the US to advance its own interests and concerns, often in such a 
way that was harmful to the US’s own objectives. 
 
It is also as a result of these processes, and building on the institutionalized precedents stemming 
from the increasingly overt integration of Israel into the US’s global military-deterrence posture, 
that pro-Israel lobby groups have become the formidable domestic political force they are today. 
Acting as something akin to an ‘enforcement mechanism’, and increasingly finding strong 
supporters within various branches of the foreign policy establishment, these lobby groups would 
arguably stand to benefit the most from this institutionalization of the relationship and 
increasingly public US portrayals of Israel’s ally status. 
 
Ultimately, a further element of path dependency is the growing tendency to approach the 
Middle East as divided into separate strategic zones and partnerships: Israel in the Near East and 
Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf. As the US began to rely on Israel and Saudi Arabia as the (new) 
‘twin pillars’ of US policy in the 1980s and the broader post-Cold War era, it would establish 
distinct military-strategic contingencies for the two strategic zones of US policy in the Middle 
East. 
 
Largely established in parallel with one another in the fateful year of 1983—through the creation 
of CENTCOM in the Persian Gulf and the concurrent revival of US-Israeli strategic cooperation 
in the central zone of the Near East—US planners appeared to have finally found a means to 
reconcile the two strands of US policy. In this context, the traditional focus on diplomacy and 
Arab-Israeli peace was replaced by expanding military-supply relationships and the US’s growing 
commitment to superior aid for Israel as affirmed in the QME doctrine. 
 
This has not only undermined the US’s professed role as a mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
thereby weakening US international prestige and credibility and in turn the very legitimacy of 
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continued US monopoly over the diplomatic process. It has also created a situation in which US 
(and Israeli) interests in the region have become dependent on and therefore largely tailored 
toward the maintenance of an authoritarian status quo in the Arab world. This latter dimension 
became increasingly apparent in the post-Cold War era and has more recently been reflected in 
the US’s largely abortive support for the 2010–12 Arab uprisings and ultimate return to its 
traditional support for conservative and counter-revolutionary forces, whether these be in Israel 
or Saudi Arabia. Such approaches have fundamentally hampered US influence and credibility, 
transforming the US from a distant and largely undisputed mediator and security provider into an 
active participant in the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and a major impediment not 
only to a resolution of these conflicts but also to the broader stabilization and democratization of 
the Middle East. 
 
Long-term Signi f i cance and Legacy 
 
While US Middle East policy during the Cold War can generally be framed as a struggle to 
reconcile contrasting commitments, interests and values in the context of the parallel 
partnerships with Israel and Saudi Arabia, these trends began to change towards the late 1980s 
and the subsequent end of the Cold War. While the Reagan administration had sought to 
establish a ‘consensus of strategic concerns’ between these disparate alliances focussed on the 
Soviet and Iranian threat, these efforts only truly began bearing fruit in the post-Cold War era. In 
some ways replicating what had occurred in the mid-1950s and early 1960s, when the emerging 
forces of Arab nationalism were posing a threat to both Israel and Saudi Arabia, by the end of the 
1980s the US had established something akin to an informal understanding capable of 
reconciling these parallel military-supply agreements. 
 
This mechanism would be based on parallel—yet always unbalanced—assurances towards both 
partners. Israel received its formal ally recognition, copious amounts of aid and technical support 
and the key US commitment to preserve and augment its Qualitative Military Edge against any 
combination of threats in the region. Saudi Arabia received what amounted to a US security 
guarantee for survival of the monarchy, while ensuring that its oil wealth be spent on US 
armaments that in turn would create an opening for the stationing of growing numbers of US 
military personnel and trainers in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The long-term—albeit perhaps unintended—implications of these understandings would make 
US policy and deterrence posture in the post-Cold War Middle East dependent on these twin 
relationships, a dynamic that has further constrained US presidential freedom of action. While 
during the Cold War the US maintained some degree of leeway by being able to play one 
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relationship off against the other, employing such tensions to maintain a degree of distance and 
impartiality between the sides, as threat perceptions and political or economic interests of both 
Israel and Saudi Arabia began to coincide, these partnerships would increasingly be able to pool 
their respective leverage over their superpower benefactor, increasingly joining forces to impose 
on the US their own viewpoints and priorities in the Middle East. 
 
Today, it is becoming increasingly clear that US Middle East policy is caught in two key 
relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. While welcomed by US planners as 
a means to solidify US standing and influence in the two strategic zones of the Middle East, such 
a dynamic has increasingly made US policy reliant on these twin pillars. As noted by Karen L. 
Puschel in the early 1990s with respect to US-Israel relationship, ‘strategic cooperation is now 
widely viewed as an essential element of the US commitment to Israel’s security. Thus, even if 
the US wishes to go back, this would be at the risk of undermining deterrence in the region and, 
thereby, strategic stability as well’.8 
 
Academic literature has long appreciated the risks of entrapment associated with alliances, and 
examples of small states co-opting and influencing the policies of their external benefactor are 
widespread. Yet, none of these examples come close to the ‘special’ US-Israel relationship and 
the extent to which Israel has been able to preserve its unique partnership with the US while at 
the same time repeatedly flouting US policy and stated objectives in the Middle East. With the 
growing (covert) meeting of minds between Israel and Saudi Arabia, this influence and leverage 
over US policy has been further enhanced, as both US partnerships have joined forces in an 
effort to co-opt and influence Washington’s policies in the region. 
 
While the Obama administration did seek to disentangle the US from both these exclusivist 
relationships in the Middle East, the extent to which its original designs were constrained and 
ultimately undermined by both sets of partners in the region is clear for all to see. Such a 
development has resulted in a further sidelining of dissenting views or alternative approaches in 
the Middle East. With the advent of the Trump administration in 2016, US policy was quickly 
returned to its familiar baseline of support for Israel and Saudi Arabia against their shared rival 
Iran. 
 
Indeed, the Trump administration represents the apex of a gradual normalization process for the 
intrusion of domestic politics over the articulation of US foreign policy priorities in the Middle 
East. In this, the Trump administration—and beneath it, broad elements of the Republican 
Party—have essentially outsourced large portions of US Middle East policy to Israel and (less so) 																																																								
8 Puschel, US-Israeli Strategic, op.cit., p.4. 
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Saudi Arabia. This is again done on the basis of short-term political expediency and economic 
gain, particularly in the realm of US arms sales and the further augmentation of these parallel 
military-supply relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia (and their respective extensions, such as 
Egypt, Jordan and the other Gulf states). 
 
As aptly noted by Bruce Riedel in a recent analysis for the US-based Brookings Institution 
regarding Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 Iran Nuclear deal—a decision 
that has been universally condemned, with the exception of both Israel and Saudi Arabia—‘the 
American people would be wise to lose their cool if the [Trump] administration listens to those 
who are all too eager to send Americans into harm’s way to pursue fantasies. The administration 
made a bad decision to violate the JCPOA [i.e., the Iran nuclear deal]. The road to a repetition of 
the 1982 [Lebanon war] and 2003 [Iraq war] disasters has been opened’.9 
 
The warning sounds ominous and reflects the extent to which US policy in the post-Cold War 
era has become entrapped in and interdependent with two exclusivist partnerships in the Middle 
East that have precluded the US from devising alternative approaches to the region, contributing 
instead to its militarization, the deepening of authoritarianism and in turn the spread of 
instability. While arguably damaging to US interests, such instability and the hardening of battle 
lines and intra-regional rivalries is arguably beneficial to both Israel and Saudi Arabia. Instability 
helps to maintain the US’s focus on the region; aids their efforts to garner more security 
assistance from Washington; and ultimately enhances the US’s reliance on these twin 
partnerships for the protection and advancement of US interests. Such dynamics have tied the 
US to two of the most conservative, anti-democratic and militaristic states in the Middle East, 
harming American soft power and international credibility as a result. US planners, researchers 
and academics would do well to address these dynamics and return US Middle East policy to a 
more balanced, differentiated and values-oriented plane, one that looks beyond contemporary 
security threats and instead seek to address the root causes for these phenomena. 
 
When the United States—the ostensible leader of the ‘free world’—is seen allying in international 
fora with a handful of small countries against the overwhelming majority of the international 
community in order to support Israeli (or indeed Saudi) intransigence that the US itself has long 
opposed, the harm to US credibility and international standing are clear to all. As aptly noted by 
Former Secretary of State John Kerry in a heated 2016 speech at the end of the Obama 
administration, ‘it is vital that we [the US and Israel] have an honest, clear-eyed conversation 
about the uncomfortable truths and difficult choices. […] Regrettably, some seem to believe that 																																																								
9 Bruce Riedel, “Don’t Let Israel and Saudi Arabia Drag the US into Another War,” Order from Chaos, Brookings 
Institution, 15 May 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/15/dont-let-israel-and-saudi-
arabia-drag-the-u-s-into-another-war/. 
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the US friendship means that the US must accept any policy, regardless of our own interests, our 
own positions, our own words, our own principles, even after urging again and again that the 
policy must change. Friends need to tell each other the hard truths, and friendships require 
mutual respect.’10 
 
A fundamental condition that needs to be achieved is that of disentangling the US from its quasi-
exclusivist relationship with Israel in the Middle East, one that is based on an erroneous portrayal 
of complimentary interests but in actuality has transformed the US into the ultimate guarantor 
for an Israeli promoted vision of the regional order in the Middle East characterized by perennial 
conflict and instability. As noted by the US’s former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Chas W. 
Freedman, in a 2010 speech at the Nixon Centre in Washington DC, ‘to flourish over the long 
term, Israel’s relations with the United States need to be grounded in reality, not myth, and in 
peace, not war.’11 	
																																																								
10 US State Department, “Remarks on Middle East Peace. John Kerry,” The Dean Acheson Auditorium, Washington 
DC, 28 December 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/266119.htm. 
11 Chas W. Freeman Jr., “The Role of the Israel-Palestine Conflict,” Remarks at the Nixon Center, Washington DC, in 
Freeman, America’s Continuing Misadventures, op.cit., pp.23-27, p.27 (quote). 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A 
 
US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding, 10 March 19651 
 
I. The Government of the United States has reaffirmed its concern for the maintenance of 
Israel's security and has renewed its assurance that the United States firmly opposes aggression in 
the Near East and remains committed to the independence and integrity of Israel. 
 
II. The Government of Israel has reaffirmed that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear 
weapons into the Arab-Israel area. 
 
III. In view of the importance of an effective Israel deterrent capacity as a major factor in 
preventing aggression in the area, the United States will of course continue, as in the past, to be 
ready to discuss with Israel its needs and problems. 
 
IV. The United States has informed the Government of Israel that it may sell quantities of arms 
and military equipment to Jordan in order to preclude the Soviet supply of arms through the 
UAC to Jordan. King Hussein has assured the United States that if he purchases US tanks, he 
intends to keep his armor on the East Bank of the Jordan. The United States also has made clear 
to King Hussein that if he purchases Soviet arms there will be no sales from the United States. 
The United States will keep Israel informed of the completion of any deal with Jordan for the 
provision of US arms and equipment. 
 
V. It is understood that Israel is not interested in buying some of the particular items sold to 
Jordan. Instead the United States will sell Israel on favorable credit terms, or otherwise help 
Israel procure, certain arms and military equipment as follows: 
 
A. The United States will ensure the sale directly to Israel at her request of at least the same 
number and quality of tanks that it sells to Jordan. 
 
B. In the event of the Federal Government of Germany not supplying to Israel the remainder of 
the 150 M48 tanks outstanding under the German-Israel tank deal of 1964, the United States will 
ensure the completion of this program. 
 
C. The United States is further prepared to ensure an opportunity for Israel to purchase a certain 
number of combat aircraft, if not from Western sources, then from the United States. 
 
VI. The Government of Israel intends to provide the Government of the United States with a list 
of its requirements in the near future and requests that discussions on this list take place in 
Washington at a mutually convenient time. 
 
VII. The Governments of the United States and Israel agree that full secrecy shall be maintained 
on all matters referred to herein and all subsequent actions taken in this connection, until the two 
governments agree on how and when to divulge them. The Government of the United States has 
explained to the Government of Israel that premature publicity on the matters covered under 
this understanding could create serious complications for the United States in its relations with 
other states in the area. The Government of Israel has informed the Government of the United 
States that it understands this concern and will be guided accordingly. 
 
 																																																								
1 Source: FRUS Vol. XVIII (1964-67), Document 185. 
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Appendix B 
 
US-Israel Memorandum of Agreement, 1 September 19752 
 
The United States recognizes that the Egypt-Israel Agreement initialed on September 1, 1975, 
(hereinafter referred to as the Agreement), entailing the withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai, 
constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace. That 
Agreement has full United States support. 
 
United States-Israeli Assurances 
 
1. The United States Government will make every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits 
of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation, on an on-going and long-
term basis to Israel’s military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy 
requirements and to its economic needs. The needs specified in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 below shall 
be deemed eligible for inclusion within the annual total to be requested in FY76 and later fiscal 
years. 
 
2. Israel's long-term military supply needs from the United States shall be the subject of periodic 
consultations between representatives of the United States and Israeli defense establishments, 
with agreement reached on specific items to be included in a separate United States-Israeli 
memorandum. To this end, a joint· study by military experts will be undertaken within 3 weeks. 
In conducting this study, which will include Israel's 1976 needs, the United States will view 
Israel's requests sympathetically, including its request for advanced and sophisticated weapons. 
 
3. Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements 
through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the 
United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel, will act as 
follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this agreement on 
one-year’s notice. 
 
(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is 
unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability or 
the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government 
will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the aforementioned normal 
requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to 
Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary 
means of transport. 
 
(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all or its normal requirements for domestic consumption is 
unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or 
otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the 
United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance 
with the International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula as applied by the 
United States Government, in order to meet Israel's essential requirements. If Israel is unable to 
securer the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will 
make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport. 
 
Israeli and United States experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either 
party, to review Israel’s continuing oil requirement.  
 																																																								
2 Source: Gerald Ford Presidential Library [GFPL], “August 21 - September 1, 1975 - Sinai Disengagement Agreement 
- Vol. III (9)”, Box 5. Available online: https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0331/1553989.pdf  
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4. In order to help Israel meet its energy needs and as part of the overall annual figure in 
paragraph 1 above, the United States agrees: 
 
(a) In determining the overall annual figure which will be requested from Congress, the United 
States Government will give special attention to Israel’s oil import requirements and, for a period 
as determined by Article 3 above, will take into account in calculating that figure Israel's 
additional expenditures for the import of oil to replace that which would have ordinarily come 
from Abu Rodeis and Ras Sudar (4.5 million tons in 1975). 
 
(b) To ask Congress to make available funds, the amount to be determined by mutual agreement, 
to the Government of Israel necessary for a project for the construction and stocking of the oil 
reserves to be stored in Israel, bringing storage reserve capacity and reserve stocks now standing 
at approximately six months up to one-year's need at the time of the completion of the project. 
The project will be implemented within four years. The construction, operation and financing 
and other relevant questions of the project will be the subject of early and detailed talks between 
the two Governments. 
 
5. The United States Government will not expect Israel to begin to implement the Agreement 
before Egypt fulfills its undertaking under the January 1974 Disengagement Agreement to permit 
passage of all Israeli cargoes to and from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal. 
 
6. The United States Government agrees with Israel that the next agreement with Egypt should 
be a final peace agreement. 
 
7. In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the Agreement~ the United States 
Government is prepared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the violation and possible 
remedial action by the United States Government. 
 
8. The United States Government will vote against any Security Council resolution which in its 
judgment affects or alters adversely the Agreement. 
 
9. The United States Government will not join in and will seek to prevent efforts by others to 
bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental to the interests 
of Israel. 
 
10. In view of the long-standing United States commitment to the survival and security or Israel, 
the United States Government will view with particular gravity  
threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective, the 
United States Government will in the event of such threat consult promptly with the 
Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can 
lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices. 
 
11. The United States Government and the Government or Israel will~ at- the earliest possible 
time, and if possible within two months after the signature or this document, conclude the 
contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation.  
 
12. It is the United States Government's position that Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-
Israel Agreement, its implementation, validity and duration are not conditional upon any act or 
developments between the other Arab states and Israel. The United States Government regards 
the Agreement as standing on its own.  
 
13. The United States Government shares the Israeli position that under existing political 
circumstances negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement.  
 
14. In accordance with the principle or freedom of navigation on the high seas and free and 
unimpeded passage through and over straits connecting international waters, the United States 
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Government regards the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international 
waterways. It will support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such straits. 
Similarly, the United States Government recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the 
Red Sea and such straits and will support diplomatically the exercise of that right. 
 
15. In the event that the United Nations Emergency Force or any other United Nations organ is 
withdrawn without prior agreement of both Parties to the Egypt-Israel Agreement and the 
United States before this Agreement is superseded by another agreement, it is the United States 
view that the Agreement shall remain binding in all its parts.  
 
16. The United States and Israel agree that signature of the Protocol of the Egypt-Israel 
Agreement and its full entry into effect shall not take place before approval by the United States 
Congress of the United States role in connection with the surveillance and observation functions 
described in the Agreement and its Annex. The United States has informed the Government of 
Israel that it has obtained the Government or Egypt agreement to the above. 
 
 
US-Israel Memorandum of Agreement, 1 September 19753 
 
The Geneva Peace Conference 
 
1. The Geneva Peace Conference will be reconvened at a time coordinated between the United 
States and Israel. 
 
2. The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation 
Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to 
exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States 
Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva Peace 
Conference on this issue with the Government of Israel. Similarly, the United States will consult 
fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of 
any other additional states. It is understood that the participation at a subsequent phase of the 
Conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of 
all the initial participants. 
 
3. The United States will make every effort to ensure at the Conference that all substantive 
negotiations will be on a bilateral basis.  
 
4. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any initiative in the Security 
Council to alter adversely the terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference or to change 
Resolutions 242 and 338 in ways which are incompatible with their original purpose. 
 
5. The United States will seek to ensure that the role of the co-sponsors will be consistent with 
what was agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Government 
and the Government of Israel of December 20, 1973. 
 
6. The United States and Israel will concert action to assure that the Conference will be 
conducted in a manner consonant with the objectives or this document and with the declared 
purpose or the Conference, namely the advancement of a negotiated peace between Israel and 
each one of its neighbors. 
 
 
 																																																								
3 Ibid. 
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Appendix C 
 
US-Israel Memorandum of Agreement, 26 March 19794 
 
Recognizing the significance of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt 
and considering the importance of full implementation of the Treaty of Peace to Israel's security 
interests and the contribution of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace to the security and 
development of Israel as well as its significance to peace and stability in the region and to the 
maintenance of international peace and security; and 
 
Recognizing that the withdrawal from Sinai imposes additional heavy security, military and 
economic burdens on Israel.  
 
The Governments of the United States of America and of the State of Israel, subject to their 
constitutional processes and applicable law, confirm as follows: 
 
1. In the light of the role of the United States in achieving the Treaty of Peace and the parties’ 
desire that the United States continue its supportive efforts, the United States will take 
appropriate measures to promote full observance of the Treaty of Peace. 
 
2. Should it be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United States that there has been a 
violation or threat of violation of the Treaty of Peace, the United States will consult with the 
parties with regard to measures to halt or prevent the violation, ensure observance of the Treaty 
of Peace, enhance friendly and peaceful relations between the parties and promote peace in the 
region, and will take such remedial measures as it deems appropriate, which may include 
diplomatic, economic and military measures as described below. 
 
3. The United States will provide support it deems appropriate for proper actions taken by Israel 
in response to such demonstrated violations of the Treaty of Peace. In particular, if a violation of 
the Treaty of Peace is deemed to threaten the security of Israel, including, inter alia, a blockade of 
Israel's use of international waterways, a violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace 
concerning limitation of forces or an armed attack against Israel, the United States will be 
prepared to consider, on an urgent basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States 
presence in the area, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel and the exercise of maritime 
rights in order to put an end to the violation. 
 
4. The United States will support the parties' rights to navigation and over flight for access to 
either country through and over the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba pursuant to the Treaty 
of Peace. 
 
5. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any action or resolution in the 
United Nations which in its judgment adversely affects the Treaty of Peace. 
 
6. Subject to Congressional authorization and appropriation, the United States will endeavour to 
take into account and will endeavour to be responsive to military and economic assistance 
requirements of Israel. 
 
7. The United States will continue to impose restrictions on weapons supplied by it to any 
country which prohibit their unauthorized transfer to any third party. The United States will not 
supply or authorize transfer of such weapons for use in an armed attack against Israel and will 
take steps to prevent such unauthorized transfer. 
 																																																								
4 Source: “The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, March 26, 1979,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.8,No.4 (Summer 
1979),pp.189-213. 
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8. Existing agreements and assurances between the United States and Israel are not terminated or 
altered by the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, except for those contained in Articles V, VI, 
VII, VIII, XI, XII, XV' and XVI of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Government 
of the United States and the Government of Israel (United States Israeli Assurances) of 
September 1, 1975. 
 
9. This Memorandum of Agreement sets forth the full understandings of the United States and 
Israel with regard to the subject matters covered between them hereby, and shall be carried out in 
accordance with its terms. 
 
US-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement on Oil, 26 March 19795 
 
The oil supply arrangement of September 1, 1975, between the Governments of the United 
States and Israel, annexed hereto, remains in effect. A memorandum of agreement shall be 
agreed upon and concluded to provide an oil supply arrangement for a total of 15 years, 
including the 5 years provided in the September 1, 1975, arrangement. 
 
The memorandum of agreement, including the commencement of this arrangement and pricing 
provisions, will be mutually agreed upon by the parties within 60 days following the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel. 
 
It is the intention of the parties that prices paid by Israel for oil provided by the United States 
hereunder shall be comparable to world market prices current at the time of transfer, and that in 
any event the United States will be reimbursed by Israel for the costs incurred by the United 
States in providing oil to Israel hereunder. 
 
Experts provided for in the September 1, 1975, arrangement will meet on request to discuss 
matters arising under this relationship. 
 
The United States Administration undertakes to seek promptly additional statutory authorization 
that may be necessary for full implementation of this arrangement. 
 
Annex 
 
Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements 
through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the 
United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel, will act as 
follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this arrangement on 
one year's notice. 
 
(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is 
unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of 
the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government 
will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the aforementioned normal 
requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to 
Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary 
means of transport. 
 
(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is 
unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or 
otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements the 
United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance 
with the International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula, as applied by the 																																																								
5 Ibid. 
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United States Government, in order to meet Israel's essential requirements. If Israel is unable to 
secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will 
make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport. 
 
Israeli and United States experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either 
party, to review Israel's continuing oil requirement. 
 
Letter From Egyptian Prime Minister And Foreign Minister Mustafa 
Khalil To Us Secretary Of State Cyrus Vance, March 26, 1979.6 
 
Dear Secretary Vance: 
Pursuant to my letter of yesterday concerning the proposed Memorandum of Agreement 
between US and Israel I wish to inform you of the following: 
 
While Egypt does not contest the right of the United States Government, or any other 
government for that matter, to take the decisions it deems compatible with its foreign policy, the 
Government of Egypt maintains the right not to accept any decision or action which it considers 
directed against Egypt. I would like to state that the contents of the proposed Memorandum will 
have a direct bearing on the Peace Treaty. 
 
You are certainly aware of the keen desire of Egypt to strengthen the friendly relations between 
our two countries as well as to establish peace and stability in the whole region. This will be 
furthered by achieving a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel as an important step toward a 
comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. Bearing this in mind, I want you to 
know that we were deeply disappointed to find the 
United States accepting to enter into an agreement we consider directed against Egypt. The 
Memorandum does not serve any useful purpose. On the contrary, its contents and purport 
would adversely affect the whole process of peace and stability in the area. 
 
Egypt rejects the Memorandum for the following reasons: 
 
1. It is contrary to the spirit existing between our two countries and does not contribute to the 
strengthening of relations between them. I wish to put on record that Egypt was never consulted 
on the substance of the proposed Memorandum. 
 
2. The contents of the proposed Memorandum are based upon alleged accusations against Egypt 
and providing for certain measures to be taken against her in that hypothetical case of violations, 
the determination of which is largely left to Israel. 
 
3. We have been engaged in the final process of negotiating the Treaty for over a month now, 
however, we have not been notified of the intention of the United States to agree on such a 
Memorandum. Moreover, we learned of it by way of information and not consultation. 
Ambassador Eilts gave it to me at 2 p.m., March 25, only 24 hours before the scheduled 
ceremonies for signature of the Treaty. 
 
4. The United States is supposed to be a partner in a tripartite effort to achieve peace and not to 
support the allegations of one side against the other. 
 
5. The proposed Memorandum assumes that Egypt is the side liable to violate its obligations. 
 
6. The proposed Memorandum could be construed as an eventual alliance between the United 
States and Israel against Egypt. 
 																																																								
6 Ibid. 
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7. It gives the United States certain rights that were never mentioned or negotiated with us. 
 
8. It gives the United States the power to impose measures, or to put it bluntly, punitive 
measures, a matter which raises doubts about the future relations and could affect the situation in 
the whole region. 
 
9. The proposed Memorandum even uses dangerously vague terms as "threats of violations" 
against which certain measures would be taken. We consider this to be a matter of grave 
consequences. 
 
10. It implies that the economic and arms supply are subject to the sole judgment of the United 
States Government in connection with the alleged threats of violations being attributed to one 
side. 
 
11. It makes certain aspects of Egyptian-American relations to be subject to elements extraneous 
to those relations and its commitments made to a third party. 
 
12. It implies the United States' acquiescence to Israel's embarking on measures, including 
military measures, against Egypt on the assumption that there are violations or threats of 
violation of the Treaty. 
 
13. It gives the United States the right to impose a military presence in the region for reasons 
agreed between Israel and the United States, a matter which we cannot accept. 
 
14. The proposed Memorandum will cast grave doubts about the real intention of the United 
States, especially in connection with the peace process. It could be accused of collaboration with 
Israel to create such circumstances that would lead to American military presence in the area, a 
matter which would certainly have serious implications, especially on the stability in the whole 
region. 
 
15. It will have adverse effects in Egypt towards the United States and would certainly drive 
other Arab countries to take a harder position against the peace process, and would give added 
reasons for them not to participate in that process. 
 
16. It would also pave the way for other alliances to be formed in the area to counter the one 
whose seeds could be found in the proposed Memorandum. 
 
For all these reasons, I hereby inform you that the Government of Egypt will not recognize the 
legality of the Memorandum and considers it null and void and as having no effect whatsoever so 
far as Egypt is concerned. 
 
US State Department Response to Khalil Letter7 
 
We have had an expression of unhappiness from Egypt about the Israeli memorandum of 
agreement. We believe this is based upon a misreading of that document. We advised Egypt well 
in advance that assurances would be given to Israel. Egypt in fact frequently indicated that it 
would have no objection to security assurances or guarantees in the context of peace. The Israeli 
memo of agreement does not assume that Egypt is likely to violate the treaty. On the contrary, 
we have full confidence that Egypt and Israel are determined to honour their treaty obligations. 
A similar document was offered to Egypt. This was refused. The offer remains open. The sole 
purpose of the Israeli memorandum of agreement along with that offered to Egypt is to facilitate 
the maintenance of peace in the area. 
 																																																								
7 Ibid. 
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Appendix D 
 
US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation,  
30 November 19818 
 
Preamble 
 
This memorandum of understanding reaffirms the common bonds of friendship between the 
United States and Israel and builds on the mutual security relationship that exists between the 
two nations. The parties recognize the need to enhance strategic cooperation to deter all threats 
from the Soviet Union to the region. Noting the longstanding and fruitful cooperation for 
mutual security that has developed between the two countries, the parties have decided to 
establish a framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance their national 
security by deterring such threats to the whole region. 
 
The parties have reached the following agreements in order to achieve the above aims. 
 
Article I 
 
United States-Israel strategic cooperation, as set forth in this memorandum, is designed against 
the threat to peace and security of the region caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled 
forces from outside the region introduced into the region. It has the following broad purposes: 
 
A. To enable the parties to act cooperatively and in a timely manner to deal with the above-
mentioned threat. 
 
B. To provide each other with military assistance for operations of their forces in the area that 
may be required to cope with this threat. 
 
C. The strategic cooperation between the parties is not directed at any state or group of states 
within the region. It is intended solely for defensive purposes against the above-mentioned 
threat. 
 
Article II 
 
1. The fields in which strategic cooperation will be carried out to prevent the above-mentioned 
threat from endangering the security of the region include: 
 
A. Military cooperation between the parties, as may be agreed by the parties. 
 
B. Joint military exercise, including naval and air exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, as 
agreed upon by the parties. 
 
C. Cooperation for the establishment and maintenance of joint readiness activities, as agreed 
upon by the parties. 
 
D. Other areas within the basic scope and purpose of this agreement, as may be jointly agreed. 
 
2. Details of activities within these fields of cooperation shall be worked out by the parties in 
accordance with the provisions of Article III below. The cooperation will include, as appropriate, 
planning, preparations, and exercises. 
 																																																								
8 Yale Law School ,“The Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy,” Lillian Goldman Law Library, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/pal03.asp  
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Article III 
 
1. The Secretary of Defense and the Minister of Defence shall establish a coordinating council to 
further the purpose of this memorandum. 
 
A. To coordinate and provide guidance to joint working groups. 
 
B. To monitor the implementation of cooperation in the fields agreed upon by the parties within 
the scope of this agreement. 
 
C. To hold periodic meetings, in Israel and the United States, for the purposes of discussing and 
resolving outstanding issues and to further the objectives set forth in this memorandum. Special 
meetings can be held at the request of either party. The Secretary of Defense and Minister of 
Defence will chair these meetings whenever possible. 
 
2. Joint working groups will address the following issues: 
 
A. Military cooperation between the parties, including joint U.S.-Israel exercises in the Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea. 
 
B. Cooperation for the establishment of joint readiness activities including access to maintenance 
facilities and other infrastructure, consistent with the basic purposes of this agreement. 
 
C. Cooperation in research and development, building on past cooperation in this area. 
D. Cooperation in defence trade. 
 
E. Other fields within the basic scope and purpose of this agreement, such as questions of 
prepositioning, as agreed by the coordinating council. 
 
3. The future agenda for the work of the joint working groups, their composition and procedures 
for reporting to the coordinating council shall be agreed upon by the parties. 
 
Article IV 
 
This memorandum shall enter into force upon exchange of notification that required procedures 
have been completed by each party. If either party considers it necessary to terminate this 
memorandum of understanding, it may do so by notifying the other party six months in advance 
of the effective date of termination. 
 
Article V 
 
Nothing in the memorandum shall be considered as derogating from previous agreements and 
understandings between the parties. 
 
Article VI 
 
The parties share the understanding that nothing in this memorandum is intended to or shall in 
any way prejudge the rights and obligations which devolve or may devolve upon either 
government under the charter of the United Nations or under international law. The parties 
reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations and their 
aspiration to live in peace with all countries in the region. 
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Appendix E 
 
US-Israel Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Joint Political, 
Security, and Economic Cooperation, 21 April 19889 
 
Preamble 
 
The parties to this Memorandum of Agreement reaffirm the close relationship between the 
United States of America and Israel, based upon common goals, interests, and values; welcome 
the achievements made in strategic, economic, industrial, and technological cooperation; 
recognize the mutual benefits of the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement; take note of 
United States economic and security assistance to Israel; and note that Israel is currently 
designated, for the purposes of Section 1105 of the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act, as 
a major non-NATO ally of the United States. The parties wish to enhance their relationship 
through the establishment of a comprehensive framework for continued consultation and 
cooperation and have reached the following agreements in order to achieve this aim. 
 
Article I 
 
The United States and Israel recognize the value of their unique dialogue and agree to continue 
frequent consultations and periodic meetings between the President and the Prime Minister, 
between the Secretary of State and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, between the Secretary of 
Defense and the Minister of Defense, and between other Cabinet-level officials. In these 
meetings, international and bilateral issues of immediate and significant concern to both 
countries will be discussed as appropriate. 
 
Article II 
 
A. The Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs will meet regularly for a Joint Political Consultation (JPC) to discuss a wide range 
of international issues of mutual interest with a view toward increasing their mutual 
understanding and appreciation of these issues. 
 
B. The United States Agency for International Development and Israel’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Division of International Cooperation (Mashav) meet periodically to coordinate and 
facilitate, as appropriate, programs of cooperative assistance to developing countries. 
 
Article III 
 
The United States and Israel reaffirm the importance of the following U.S.-Israel Joint Groups: 
 
A. The Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) is the forum in which the two states discuss and 
implement, pursuant to existing arrangements, joint cooperative efforts such as combined 
planning, joint exercises, and logistics. The JPMG also discusses current political-military issues 
of mutual strategic concern. 
 
1. The JPMG is a bi-national, interagency group co-chaired by the Director General of the Israeli 
Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs. 
 
2. The JPMG normally meets biannually, alternating between Israel and the United States. 
 
B. The Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP) is the forum in which the two states 
review Israel’s requests for security assistance in light of current threat assessments and U.S. 																																																								
9 Source:  
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budgetary capabilities and agree upon proposed levels of security assistance. The JSAP also 
discusses issues related to security assistance, such as industrial and technological cooperation, as 
well as issues related to Israel’s inclusion among those countries currently designated as major 
non-NATO allies of the United States for the purpose of cooperative research and development 
under Section 1105 of the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act. 
 
1. The JSAP is a bi-national, interagency group co-chaired by the Director General of the 
Ministry of Defense and the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and 
Technology. 
 
2. The JSAP currently meets annually, in Washington, D.C. 
 
C. The Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG) is the forum which discusses 
developments in Israel’s economy. With a view to stimulating economic growth and self-reliance, 
the JEDG exchanges views on Israeli economic policy planning, stabilization efforts, and 
structural reform. The JEDG also evaluates Israel’s requests for U.S. economic assistance. 
 
1. The JEDG is a bi-national, interagency group co-chaired by the Director General of the 
Ministry of Finance and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The group includes 
private U.S. and Israeli economists invited by their respective countries. 
 
2. The JEDG currently meets biannually, alternating between the United States and Israel. 
 
Article IV 
 
This Memorandum of Agreement does not derogate from any existing agreements or 
undertakings between the two states nor in any way prejudices the rights and obligations of either 
state under the Charter of the United Nations or under international law. In accordance with the 
above, the parties reaffirm their aspirations to live in peace with all countries. This agreement 
shall come into effect upon signature, shall be valid for an initial period of five years, and shall 
thereafter be renewed for additional periods of five years unless either party notifies the other 
prior to the expiration of a five year period that it wishes to terminate the agreement. 
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Appendix F 
 
US-Israel Intelligence Agreement, 15 July 199910 
 
1. (S) PREAMBLE: in 1968 President Cohncon and Prime Minister Eshkol agreed that an 
intelligence exchange would take place between the United States and Israel. This understanding 
resulted in an intelligence exchange arrangement between the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA), Department of Defense (DoD) and. the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF), known as the CYR Agreement. In 1988 the CYR Agreement was 
adjusted, broadened, reinforced, and extended and the new Agreement was named "ICE 
CASTLE". In 1996, the agreement was updated and renamed "STONE RUBY."   
 
Over the years the scope of the intelligence exchange developed both in substance and in depth, 
contributing significantly to the national security of the U.S. and Israel. 
 
This revised Agreement gives expression to the developments in the intelligence exchange 
relationship that have occurred since its inception, and provides the means and procedures for 
the continuation and enhancement of that exchange for the mutual benefit of both countries. 
 
All exchanges of military intelligence whether by meeting, conference, ad hoc gatherings, or via 
any communications medium between any DoD organization and any IDF organization, shall be 
conducted under the auspices of this Agreement and shall be subject to the policies and 
procedures contained herein. Exchanges between DoD and IDF organizations involving only 
signals intelligence have been upgraded to the TOP SECRET level. All other intelligence 
exchanged will be at the SECRET level and below. DIA and the DMI, as the parties to this 
Agreement, represent DoD and the IDF, respectively, in carrying out its provisions. 
 
This Agreement supersedes the STO$E RUBY Memorandum of Agreement dated 19 August 
1996. 
 
2. (S) PURPOSE: In the spirit of defense cooperation between the governments of Israel and the 
United States of America, noting mutually beneficial intelligence exchange arrangements that 
have taken place within that cooperation, and recognizing the benefits from an exchange of 
intelligence in areas of mutual interest, the parties to the Agreement enter into the following 
Memorandum of Agreement on the exchange of intelligence. 
 
3. (S) SCOPE: The scope of this Agreement is defined in Annex 1. 
 
4. (S) OBJECTIVE: It is the objective of this Agreement to establish the means and procedures by which 
intelligence is exchanged between the parties in fulfillment of the scope of the Agreement. This Agreement 
does not address contingencies for combined intelligence cooperation. Combined intelligence cooperation 
under contingency/crisis situations will be as directed on a case-by-case basis by the respective national 
command authorities. 
 
5. (S) RESPONSIBILITIES: The parties to the Agreement shall: 
 
a. Participate in military intelligence exchange conferences and ad hoc meetings. The procedures 
concerning these exchanges are contained in Annex 2 to this Agreement. 
 
b. Participate in the combined exploitation of military materiel and materiel having potential military uses 
as described in Annex 3. 
 
																																																								
10 Snowden Surveillance Archive, “Israel US Intelligence Agreement,” (released August 2014), https://goo.gl/CazNJ6. 
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c. Honor written requests for intelligence information from the respective intelligence agencies through 
each country's defense attaches and/or liaison officers in accordance with the disclosure policies of each 
country and procedures outlined in Annex 4 to this Agreement. 
 
d. Allow attaché-to-analyst discussions on a face-to-face basis within the scope of the Agreement and in 
accordance with procedures at Annex 5 to this Agreement. 
 
6. (TOP SECRET/HVCCO) SECURITY: 
 
a. The existence of this Agreement is TOP SECRET/'HVCCO, and the contents are TOP 
SECRET/HVCCO. The existence and terms of this Agreement will not be disclosed to another nation 
without the permission of both parties to the Agreement. 
 
b. All classified information or material provided or generated pursuant to this Agreement shall be stored, 
handled, transmitted, and safeguarded in accordance with the General Security of Military Information 
Agreement between Israel and the United States of America, dated 10 December 1982, as amended, and 
including the Industrial Security Annex thereto, of 3 March 1983 and shall be in conformance with the 
procedures contained in Annex 6 to this Agreement. 
 
c. In addition, all classified information or material involving signals intelligence provided or generated 
pursuant to this Agreement shall be stored, handled, transmitted, and safeguarded in accordance with the 
"Guidelines for SIGINT Cooperation" between the United States National Security Agency and the Israeli 
SIGINT National Unit, dated 1989, as amended November 1992. 
 
7. (C) INTERPRETATION: Any disagreement regarding the interpretation or application of this 
Agreement will be resolved by consultation between the parties and will not be referred to an international 
tribunal or third party for settlement. 
 
8. (C) DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT: This Agreement will expire 20 years from the date it comes 
into force and it may be extended for additional periods upon mutual Agreement of the parties. The parties 
will review the terms of the Agreement every 5 years. 
 
9. (C) FISCAL OBLIGATIONS: Each party will assume all costs it incurs in carrying out this Agreement, 
including expenses for transportation, lodging, and meals of its participants at the conferences and special 
meetings provided for in annexes to this Agreement. Other expenses related to hosting conferences and 
special meetings, provided for in annexes to this Agreement, will be borne by the hosting party. The 
obligations of each party are subject to the availability of funds. Each party will notify the other 
immediately if funds available to it are not sufficient to carry out all the provisions of the Agreement. 
 
10. (C) AMENDMENTSt The Agreement may be amended at any time upon the mutual Agreement of 
both parties. In accordance with applicable laws, procedures, and regulations governing each party 
additional annexes may be added, with the consent of both parties, to cover areas of cooperation that may 
evolve in the future. Requests for amendments to this Agreement, will be referred to the Directorate for 
Policy Support in DIA and the External Relations Department in the DMI. 
 
11. (C) TERMINATION: The Agreement may be terminated at any time by either party after a written 
notice is forwarded to the other party. 
 
12. (C) DATE AGREEMENT COMES INTO FORCE: This Agreement comes into force 011 the date 
of last signature. It supersedes all previous oral and written Agreements or understandings covering the 
exchange of intelligence between the DIA and the DMI. 
 
ANNEX 1 
SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT 
 
(S) Within the disclosure policies of each party, the scope of this Agreement shall encompass: 
 
a. Military and military-political developments, to include order of battle, in the countries of Syria, 
Iraq, Libya, and Iran and activities of the above countries within Lebanon; the intentions of the 
above countries to use military force against Israel or the United States; and the development of 
weapons of mass destruction by and long-range delivery systems of Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Iran. 
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b. International terrorism and radical Islamic organizations and activities directed against the U.S. 
or Israel worldwide and terrorist and terrorist-related issues in the Middle East. Topics include 
indications and warning of terrorist operations against U.S. and/or Israeli interests, information 
on activities and capabilities of Middle Eastern State Sponsors of Terrorism, and data on 
organizations that threaten U.S. and Israeli interests, e.g. organizations' capabilities, facilities, 
methods of operation, and biographies. Intelligence on narcotics activities by military or political-
military figures and organizations in Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq will be exchanged 
where appropriate. 
 
c. Military and/or military intelligence activities undertaken by the following countries in the 
geographic area of the Middle East and North Africa which have an impact on the mutual 
security interests of Israel and the United States: Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Slovakia, 
former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, North Korea, the Peoples' Republic of China, 
and Vietnam, hereafter referred to as Countries of Interest (COI). Also included are tactics and 
doctrine applicable to Middle Eastern forces trained by the COI. 
 
d. Characteristics of weaponry introduced into; or developed, produced or upgraded within Syria, 
Iraq, Libya, or Iran; or which jointly agreed intelligence indicates will be introduced from the 
COI into Syria, Libya, Iran, and Iraq within the next 4 years. Discussions on this will include 
sharing, on a case-by-case basis, information on military production infrastructures of the COIs. 
In each case the infrastructure to be discussed must relate directly to specific weapon systems 
which are mutually agreed upon to be introduced into Syria, Iraq, Libya, or Iran. This will be in 
accordance with each country's disclosure guidelines and with the provision that intelligence or 
characteristics data provided by a third country will only be shared if that country has expressly 
authorized release of the information. 
 
[Annex 2-6 not reprinted.] 
 
